Judgment rendered July 16, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,316-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Plaintiff-Appellee
versus
CORTNEY FITZGERALD Defendant-Appellant TAYLOR
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 380,953
Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for By: Edward K. Bauman Defendant-Appellant
CORTNEY FITZGERALD TAYLOR Pro Se
JAMES EDWARD STEWART, SR. Counsel for District Attorney Plaintiff-Appellee
JASON WAYNE WALTMAN ERIC MATTHEW WHITEHEAD Assistant District Attorneys
Before COX, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ. HUNTER, J.
Defendant, Cortney Fitzgerald Taylor, was charged by bill of
indictment with second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1.
Following a trial, a unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. He
was sentenced to serve life in prison at hard labor without the benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
FACTS
Defendant, Cortney Fitzgerald Taylor, was involved in a romantic
relationship with Bodicia Grant, and the couple lived together in an
apartment in Shreveport, Louisiana for nearly five years. Defendant was the
father of two of Ms. Grant’s children. In 2020, defendant decided to “move
on” from the relationship with Ms. Grant, and he moved out of the
apartment.
Two or three months after defendant ended the relationship, Ms. Grant
became romantically involved with Derrick Taylor (“Derrick”), who lived in
the same apartment complex.1 According to Ms. Grant, Derrick would often
come to her apartment and cook meals, but he only stayed overnight on one
occasion. On September 7, 2020, Derrick cooked dinner at Ms. Grant’s
apartment, and thereafter, the couple fell asleep in Ms. Grant’s bed. While
they were sleeping, defendant entered Ms. Grant’s apartment and stabbed
Derrick twice, once in the arm and once in the chest. Derrick died from the
stab wound in his chest. Although Ms. Grant did not witness the stabbing,
1 Although defendant and Derrick Taylor shared the same last name, there is no indication that they were related to each other. To avoid confusion, Derrick Taylor will be referred to as “Derrick.” she and one of her neighbors were able to identify defendant from the video
surveillance footage obtained from the apartment complex.
Ms. Grant’s neighbor, Marcus Young, was outside working on his
vehicle on the evening of the murder, and he saw a gray Infiniti vehicle enter
the parking lot of the apartment complex.2 Young testified he saw the driver
exit the vehicle and walk toward the apartment complex, but he did not see
which apartment the person entered. However, he recognized the person as
Ms. Grant’s former boyfriend. Young stated the person returned to the
vehicle shortly afterwards and left the apartment complex. Young later
viewed a photographic lineup, and he identified defendant as “the girl who
stayed upstairs’ boyfriend.” He stated defendant was the person he saw
entering and leaving the apartment complex on the day of the murder.
A warrant was issued for defendant’s arrest, but he remained at large
for approximately three months. He was ultimately apprehended in Bossier
Parish in December 2020.
Defendant was charged by bill of indictment with second degree
murder for the killing of Derrick Taylor, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1.
Prior to defendant’s trial, the State filed a notice of intent, pursuant to La.
C.E. art. 404(B), expressing its intent to use evidence of other crimes at trial,
i.e., defendant’s attempt to evade arrest by firing shots at law enforcement
officers when they attempted to execute the arrest warrant. Following a
hearing, the trial court granted the State’s request, deeming the other crimes
evidence admissible.
2 The investigation later revealed defendant’s girlfriend owned a gray Infiniti vehicle. 2 During defendant’s trial, Ms. Grant testified as to the nature of her
relationship with defendant and Derrick. She stated she became acquainted
with Derrick through her uncle, and while she was still in a relationship with
defendant, she, defendant, her uncle, and Derrick would sometimes “hang
out.” Ms. Grant testified that on the evening of the murder, she came home
from work to find Derrick cooking and eating in her apartment. She stated
she went to her bedroom and fell asleep, and she was sleeping when Derrick
was stabbed. Ms. Granted stated Derrick awakened her, and stated, “Baby,
I’m hit,” while holding his chest. She also testified Derrick began walking
down the hall, and she noticed he was bleeding heavily from his chest “like a
fire hydrant.” Derrick fell to the floor, and Ms. Grant ran to the door to see
if she could see anyone and called 9-1-1. Emergency medical personnel
transported Derrick to the hospital; however, he died as a result of the stab
wounds. When she was shown a surveillance video from the apartment
complex, Ms. Grant identified defendant as the person depicted entering the
apartment complex driving a gray vehicle, walking in the direction of her
apartment, returning to the vehicle a brief time later, and leaving the
complex.
Ms. Grant’s neighbor, Marcus Young, testified as to what he
witnessed on the night of Derrick’s murder. Young positively identified
defendant as the person he saw entering and leaving the apartment complex
on the day of the murder.3
3 Corporal John Adam Scheen of the Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”) testified he was working as a patrol officer on the evening of the murder, and he responded to a call in reference to a stabbing. He stated when he arrived, the fire department was working on the victim. Cpl. Scheen also testified he saw “lots of blood” in the hallway, and he spoke to Ms. Grant and Mr. Young and provided their names to the detectives.
3 Dr. James Traylor was accepted by the court as an expert in the field
of forensic pathology. He testified Derrick’s cause of death was two
penetrating stab wounds. One stab wound was to the back of Derrick’s
upper right arm. The fatal wound was to the upper chest, measured
approximately 3.75 inches deep, perforated the right ventricle of Derrick’s
heart, and caused significant blood loss. Dr. Traylor classified Derrick’s
death as a homicide.
A unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged of second degree
murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The trial court
denied defendant’s motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of
acquittal and his motion to reconsider sentence.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to find him guilty of second degree murder. Defendant concedes
that “stabbing someone with a knife to the chest may indicate specific intent
to kill or inflict great bodily harm.” However, he argues the fact that
Derrick was stabbed twice does not prove a specific intent to kill.
According to defendant, Derrick also suffered a stab wound to the back of
his right arm, and it was never determined whether the nonfatal wound was
Detective Peggy Elzie testified she was a crime scene investigator with the homicide unit of the SPD at the time of the murder. She testified she took photographs at the crime scene and collected fingerprints and blood samples from the apartment. Det. Elzie also obtained samples of what appeared to be blood from the gray Infiniti vehicle.
Katie Traweek, a forensic DNA analyst with the North Louisiana Crime Lab, testified as an expert in forensic DNA analysis. She testified she tested the samples obtained from the gray Infiniti and discovered the matter on the swabs was not blood.
4 “defensive or offensive.” Defendant also argues it was reasonable “to
assume” he became enraged and killed Derrick in sudden passion or heat of
blood because he “was startled” by finding Derrick in bed with Ms. Grant.
Therefore, he argues the evidence was only sufficient to prove manslaughter.
Defendant maintains this Court should reverse his conviction, vacate his
sentence, render a judgment of conviction for manslaughter, and remand for
resentencing.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.
Wayne, 55,052 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/28/23), 367 So. 3d 924, writ not cons., 23-
01166 (La. 2/27/24), 379 So. 3d 666; State v. Alexander, 51,918 (La. App. 2
Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 981, writ denied, 18-0805 (La. 2/11/19), 263 So.
3d 436. The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or
reweigh evidence. Id.; State v. Bass, 51,411 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/17), 223
So. 3d 1242, writ not cons., 18-0296 (La. 4/16/18), 239 So. 3d 830. A
reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or
reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Wayne, supra;
State v. Haley, 51,256 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/24/17), 222 So. 3d 153, writ
denied, 17-1230 (La. 4/27/18), 241 So. 3d 305.
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the
offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.
14:30.1(A)(1). Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the
circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed 5 criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1).
Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances and the actions of the
defendant. State v. Wayne, supra; State v. Walker, 51,217 (La. App. 2 Cir.
5/17/17), 221 So. 3d 951, writ denied, 17-1101 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d
1064. Specific intent can be formed in an instant. State v. Wayne, supra;
State v. Alexander, supra; State v. Washington, 50,424 (La. App. 2 Cir.
3/16/16), 188 So. 3d 350, writ denied, 16-0718 (La. 4/13/17), 218 So. 3d
119. Specific intent to kill may also be inferred from the extent and severity
of the victim’s injuries and the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon to
produce those injuries. State v. Wayne, supra; State v. Alexander, supra.
The determination of whether the requisite intent to kill is present is a
question for the trier of fact. State v. Wayne, supra; State v. Walker, supra.
Manslaughter is a homicide which would be murder, but the offense is
committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by
provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and
cool reflection. La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1). “Sudden passion” and “heat of
blood” are not separate elements of the offense but are mitigating factors
that may show less culpability than when a homicide is committed without
them. State v. Lombard, 486 So. 2d 106 (La. 1986); State v. Lemons, 38,269
(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/7/04), 870 So. 2d 503, writ denied, 04-1288 (La.
10/29/04), 885 So. 2d 584. Provocation is a question of fact to be
determined by the trier of fact. To be entitled to the lesser verdict of
manslaughter, a defendant is required to prove mitigatory factors by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id.; State v. Mackens, 35,350 (La. App. 2
Cir. 12/28/01), 803 So.2d 454.
In the instant case, the video surveillance footage depicted defendant 6 parking a gray Infiniti vehicle, walking to Ms. Grant’s apartment, then
exiting the apartment, returning to the vehicle, and driving away. The video
showed defendant entering and exiting the apartment within a span of 23
seconds.
Derrick was in bed, defenseless, and unarmed when defendant entered
Ms. Grant’s apartment and stabbed him. There is no evidence to support
defendant’s claim that he killed Derrick in sudden passion or heat of blood
because he was startled and “became enraged” when he saw Derrick in bed
with Ms. Grant. The evidence demonstrated defendant was the one who
ended the relationship with Ms. Grant, and the stabbing occurred two or
three months after Ms. Grant became involved with Derrick. Considering
the totality of the record, a rational trier of fact could have concluded
defendant failed to establish the mitigating factors for manslaughter,
provocation and heat of blood, by a preponderance of the evidence.
Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to establish that a reasonable
trier of fact could have concluded defendant had the requisite specific intent
to kill or inflict great bodily harm. As stated above, Dr. Taylor testified
Derrick suffered one fatal wound to the upper chest, which measured
approximately 3.75 inches. He was also stabbed in the arm, which may have
indicated a futile attempt to defend himself. Moreover, the video evidence
established that defendant entered the apartment, proceeding directly to Ms.
Grant’s bedroom, stabbed Derrick twice, and exited the apartment – all
within a span of 23 seconds. Provided with this evidence, we find a
reasonable jury could have concluded defendant arrived at the apartment
armed with a knife with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm
upon Derrick. 7 Defendant also contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to
introduce evidence of other crimes, i.e., firing shots when police officers
attempted to execute the warrant for his arrest for Derrick’s murder. He
argues the events leading to his capture and arrest had nothing to do with the
actual murder and should not have been relayed to the jury. According to
defendant, the evidence of those alleged incident occurred three months after
Derrick was killed and was “highly prejudicial and irrelevant.” Defendant
maintains the evidence of him firing shots at police officers prejudicial
because it portrayed him “as a hardened criminal who went from allegedly
stabbing someone to shooting at police officers.” He also asserts the
probative value of the evidence does not outweigh its prejudicial effect, and
it cannot be seen as harmless error.
Contrarily, the State argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in allowing evidence of defendant’s other crimes to be introduced at trial.
The State maintains that evidence of defendant’s escape and attempts to
evade arrest constituted admissible res gestae evidence. See, State v. Taylor,
01-1638 (La. 1/14/03), 838 So. 2d 729.
Generally, evidence of other acts of misconduct is inadmissible
because it creates the risk that the defendant will be convicted of the present
offense simply because the unrelated evidence establishes him or her as a
“bad person.” La. C.E. Art. 404(B)(1); State v. Jackson, 625 So. 2d 146 (La.
1993); State v. Young, 51,101 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/15/17), 216 So. 3d 236.
This rule of exclusion stems from the “substantial risk of grave prejudice to
the defendant” from the introduction of evidence regarding his unrelated
criminal acts. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 128 (La. 1973).
8 However, evidence of other crimes may be admissible if the state
establishes an independent and relevant reason, i.e., to show motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral
part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding. La.
C.E. Art. 404(B)(1); State v. Young, supra; State v. Roberson, 40,809 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 4/19/06), 929 So. 2d 789.
Evidence of other crimes forms part of the res gestae when said
crimes are related and intertwined with the charged offense to such an extent
that the state could not have accurately presented its case without reference
to it. It is evidence which completes the story of the crime by showing the
context of the happenings. State v. Odenbaugh, 10-0268 (La. 12/6/11), 82
So. 3d 215; State v. Brewington, 601 So. 2d 656 (La. 1992). Evidence of
crimes committed in connection with the crime charged does not affect the
accused’s character because the offenses are committed as parts of a whole.
Id. The inquiry to be made is whether the other crime is “part and parcel” of
the crime charged and is not offered for the purpose of showing that the
accused is a person of bad character. State v. Prieur, supra.
The res gestae doctrine in Louisiana is broad and includes not only
spontaneous utterances and declarations made before or after the
commission of the crime, but also testimony of witnesses and police officers
pertaining to what they heard or observed during or after the commission of
the crime if a continuous chain of events is evident under the circumstances.
State v. Odenbaugh, supra; State v. Huizar, 414 So. 2d 741 (La. 1982). In
addition, integral act (res gestae) evidence in Louisiana incorporates a rule
of narrative completeness without which the state’s case would lose its 9 “narrative momentum and cohesiveness, ‘with power not only to support
conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences,
whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict.’” State v.
Colomb, 98-2813 (La. 10/1/99), 747 So.2d 1074, 1076 (quoting Old Chief v.
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186, 117 S. Ct. 644, 653, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574
(1997).
In State v. Taylor, supra, the defendant objected to the State’s
introduction of the res gestae evidence, i.e., the other crimes committed
while he and Timothy Taylor were “on the run” after they killed a car
salesman in DeSoto Parish.4 The Supreme Court found the evidence was
admissible, stating:
Although defendant contends the evidence of other crimes was erroneously admitted as res gestae because the crimes involved different victims in different states, over a seven-day span, as discussed above, the doctrine of res gestae is designed to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place. *** At first blush, defendant seems correct that the events happening in far-away Iowa, Kansas, and in Texas at the Mexican border, occurring within a seven-day span of time, could not possibly qualify under a doctrine meant to place the charged crime in its immediate context of happening near in time and in place. Clearly, as the state traced the movements of defendant and Timothy Taylor, the events detailed by its evidence, especially after the bank robbery in Iowa, became increasingly remote in time and in place, so much so that it would be difficult if not impossible to say the charged crime
4 Michael and Timothy Taylor went to a car dealership in DeSoto Parish and asked to test drive Pontiac Firebird. During the test drive, they shot and killed the car salesperson, left his body on a bridge, and fled in the Pontiac. The following day, Michael and Timothy used the Pontiac in a bank robbery, high speed chase, and the non- fatal shooting of a police officer in Iowa. Officials found the Pontiac abandoned in Missouri. Michael and Timothy stole another vehicle in Kansas and continued their flight. Two days later, they were apprehended in Laredo, Texas, after they attempted to cross the border into Mexico.
10 gave defendant notice of the truck theft in Kansas or the currency reporting violation at the Mexican border.
However, under the rule of narrative completeness incorporated in the res gestae doctrine “the prosecution may fairly seek to place its evidence before the jurors, as much to tell a story of guiltiness as to support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable as much as to point to the discrete elements of a defendant’s legal fault.”
Id., at 742-43 (internal citations omitted).
In this case, in December 2020, law enforcement officials received a
tip from Crime Stoppers and were able to trace defendant’s location to a
residence on Henderson Street in Shreveport. Seargent Joel Davidson of the
Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”), who was also serving as a member
of the United States Marshals Task Force, conducted surveillance on the
residence. At the hearing, Sgt. Davidson testified he observed defendant and
a woman arrive at the residence, exit a vehicle, and enter the house, so he
called for the rest of the task force and a K-9 unit.5 The officers knocked on
the door of the residence, and the woman answered and verbally denied
defendant was there; however, according to Sgt. Davidson, the woman
silently indicated defendant was inside the residence. The officers obtained
the woman’s consent to enter and search the residence, and two officers and
a K-9 entered the home. The officers began searching the home room by
room, calling defendant’s name along the way. The K-9 gave a positive
alert on a bedroom door, and two gunshots were fired from the bedroom.6
5 The license plate on the gray vehicle in the driveway matched the license plate on the vehicle seen in the surveillance footage the night Derrick was killed. 6 Officer Matthew Dixon of the SPD investigated the scene. He found two spent 9 mm casings on the floor and two projectiles in the wall of the back bedroom. Officer Dixon surmised the bullet went through the door, ricocheted on the ground, and lodged into the wall. Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted first degree murder of a police officer, in violation of La. R.S. 14:27(A) and 14:30(A)(2), due to allegedly 11 Sgt. Davidson entered the bedroom and saw defendant jump out of a
window and flee. He testified that the presence of another dog in the
backyard prevented them from using the K-9 to apprehend defendant.
Defendant was captured in Bossier City three days later.
We find the evidence regarding the events surrounding law
enforcement’s efforts to execute the warrant for defendant’s arrest was
admissible at trial. Defendant fled the scene immediately after he killed
Derrick, and he remained at large for approximately three months.
Thereafter, law enforcement officials received an anonymous tip as to
defendant’s location, and the officers attempted to execute the arrest
warrant. During the officers’ attempt to execute the warrant for defendant’s
arrest for killing Derrick, defendant fired shots at the officers and
successfully evaded arrest. Based on these facts, we find the police officer’s
testimony was admissible under the res gestae exception. This assignment
lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
firing two shots at law enforcement officers. The attempted murder charges remain pending.