FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #009
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 6th day of March, 2026 are as follows:
BY Hughes, J.:
2025-KK-00471 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. CHRISTOPHER CLOUDIE (Parish of Orleans Criminal)
REVERSED. SEE OPINION.
Weimer, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons. Hughes, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. McCallum, J., dissents. Cole, J., additionally concurs for the reasons assigned by Weimer, C.J. Penzato, J., dissents and assigns reasons. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2025-KK-471
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
CHRISTOPHER CLOUDIE
On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans Criminal
HUGHES, J.*
In this case, the defendant seeks review of the trial court’s ruling permitting
an expert witness to give her diagnosis at trial of child sexual abuse. For the
following reasons, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The defendant, Christopher Cloudie, was charged with one count of first-
degree rape in violation of La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4) and one count of aggravated crime
against nature in violation of La. R.S. 14:89.1(A)(2). The State of Louisiana accuses
Mr. Cloudie of performing oral sex on his minor son while giving the child a bath
on December 16, 2023. The child was eight years old at the time.
The child was taken to the emergency department of a hospital on the evening
of the alleged abuse, and the medical exam revealed no physical findings.
Approximately one month later on January 19, 2024, the complaining witness was
seen at the Audrey Hepburn CARE Center in the New Orleans Children’s Hospital
by a psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner, Ongelle Bergeron, who diagnosed
the child with “child sexual abuse.”
The State filed a notice of intent to offer Ms. Bergeron as an expert at trial. At
the Daubert hearing, Ms. Bergeron testified as to her education and professional
experience as well as the procedure she follows for medical evaluations carried out
* Judge Allison H. Penzato of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, appointed as Justice pro tempore, sitting for the vacancy in the First District. at the CARE Center. Ms. Bergeron testified that her appointment with the child in
this case was not a forensic exam but rather a “medical assessment.” As to the
procedure, Ms. Bergeron testified that a medical evaluation begins with speaking to
the child and his or her caregiver to get a “past medical history,” which includes any
medical diagnosis, past surgeries, and medication. Then the interviewer speaks one-
on-one with the child to obtain a “medical incident history.” This includes building
rapport with the child, a discussion about private parts, private part rules, and
whether those rules were broken. After this, a physical examination is conducted,
where a child’s body is thoroughly examined to look for signs of injury. Based on
these steps and possibly others (such as reviewing lab results, reports previously
written by other healthcare providers, and consultation with other medical
specialists), a diagnosis is formed.
Ms. Bergeron testified that in 80 to 85 percent of cases, there are no physical
findings. She further testified that cases will be peer reviewed by her colleagues at
the CARE Center if there are any abnormalities found, but in this case there were no
abnormalities. Ms. Bergeron also testified that she takes what a child tells her as true.
She continued: “I make sure that there aren’t any ambiguities. I look for clear and
concise details, also, if there is any abnormalities in lab work. So it’s not just what
the patient is saying. It’s all of those factors.” Ms. Bergeron said that she follows the
diagnostic criteria in the book Child Abuse and Neglect by Crosson-Tower, 9th
edition. She also testified that there are no standardized checklists for diagnostic
criteria and that a diagnosis “all depends on your experience.” Ms. Bergeron could
not provide an error rate for the diagnosis of child sexual abuse for the method used
in this case. She testified that occasionally a child’s statement of sexual abuse would
later be confirmed with a positive pregnancy or STI test.
Ms. Bergeron stated that when it came to a diagnosis she would typically
consider “[w]hat was said by the patient” and “if there are any abnormal findings.”
2 In a case with no physical findings, she stated she’s “looking for a clear and concise
disclosure from the medical incident history from the patient.” According to Ms.
Bergeron, a clear and concise disclosure is important because what “[w]e found in
child abuse medicine is that the more clear and concise a child is, the more detail
they’re able to provide, that’s the least likely they are coached.” In this case, Ms.
Bergeron said that the child gave her a “clear and concise” disclosure.1 She found
no physical abnormalities on the child, and she did not see signs of coaching.
At the conclusion of Ms. Bergeron’s testimony, the trial court found her to be
an expert in the field of pediatric child abuse medicine and stated that Ms. Bergeron
would be allowed to testify to the diagnosis she made as a result of her visit with the
child. The defendant sought review with the court of appeal. The court of appeal
denied his writ, citing State v. D.D., 18-891, p. 65 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/19), 288
So.3d 808, 854, which it said stood for the proposition that a nurse practitioner’s
diagnosis of chronic sexual abuse was admissible because it ‘“did not take the place
of the jury in determining the ultimate fact of Defendant’s guilt or innocence.”’2
Justice Lobrano dissented from the writ denial on the basis that Ms. Bergeron should
not be allowed to present a medical diagnosis of child sexual abuse without evidence
of peer review by a board-certified child abuse pediatrician.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The defendant challenges Ms. Bergeron’s diagnosis of child sexual abuse. He
argues that Ms. Bergeron’s diagnosis was improperly admitted because it was based
on insufficiently reliable methodology and because it goes to the ultimate issue of
his guilt, which is a judgment to be made by the jury. The State argues that Ms.
Bergeron’s diagnosis is admissible under the standards set forth in
1 Ms. Bergeron provided no details of what she considered “clear and concise.” 2 In D.D. the issue was whether the expert testimony went to the ultimate question of defendant’s guilt or innocence (in contravention of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 704) not whether the expert testimony bolsters the credibility of the complaining witness. 3 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3 or Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael4 and that the diagnosis does not speak on the ultimate issue of the
defendant’s guilt.
In reviewing rulings on the relevancy and admissibility of evidence, the trial
court is accorded great discretion and, absent a clear abuse of that discretion, such
rulings will not be disturbed. State v. Wesley, 22-1312 (La. 8/27/22), 344 So.3d 647
(per curiam).
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702(A) provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that: (1) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (2) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (3) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (4) The expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Based on the testimony at the Daubert hearing, we determine that the State
has not met its burden of proof in demonstrating that Ms. Bergeron’s diagnosis “will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue” nor
that it is “based on sufficient facts or data.”
Ms. Bergeron testified that her diagnoses of child sex abuse are based on any
abnormalities that might be present plus the statement given by the child. She
testified that she takes what the child says to her in the “medical incident history” to
be true. While Ms. Bergeron testified she evaluates the child’s statement based on
whether the language used was “clear and concise,” Ms. Bergeron did not provide a
basis or methodology for how that evaluation is made, nor did she provide any
3 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 4 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 4 specifics of what was “clear and concise” in the child’s statement. Her diagnosis will
not help the trier of fact to understand the only evidence presented at trial (the child’s
statement), nor is it based on sufficient facts or data because the diagnosis is solely
based on the child’s account of the incident, which the jury will hear at trial from the
child himself.
The methodologies described by Ms. Bergeron also run afoul of the reliability
requirements in Article 702. When evaluating the reliability of expert evidence,
pertinent factors for a court to consider include: (1) the “testability” of the scientific
theory or technique, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication, (3) the known or potential rate of error, and (4) whether the
methodology is generally accepted in the scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 594; see also State v. Quatrevingt, 93-1644 (La. 2/28/96), 670 So.2d 197, 204.
Ms. Bergeron testified that she utilized criteria for her diagnosis as published in the
textbook Child Abuse and Neglect by Crosson-Tower. However, she also testified
that there is no known error rate for the methodology she followed and that there are
only a limited number of instances when a diagnosis of child sexual abuse can be
confirmed by physical evidence (such as an STI or pregnancy test).
Expert witness testimony has an important but limited place in criminal jury
trials and specifically child sexual abuse trials. As this court in State v. Chauvin
explained:
Expert testimony can assist a trier of fact in understanding the significance of a child-witness’s demeanor, inconsistent reports, delayed disclosure, reluctance to testify, and recantation. An expert witness can explain to jurors that a child-witness’s seemingly abnormal behavior—delayed reporting, inconsistent statements, and recantation—is in fact normal for children who have been sexually abused and can also dispel inaccurate perceptions held by jurors, allowing them to better assess a child-witness’s testimony. Expert testimony becomes problematic when it infringes upon other interests: for example, when it is unduly prejudicial, when it invades the province of the jury, when it bolsters a child-witness’s testimony, or when it leads to a ‘battle of the experts.’
5 02-1188 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 697, 702-03 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In Chauvin, this court held that an expert witness’ testimony regarding the
PTSD diagnosis of the child complainant in a sexual abuse case was inadmissible
because it exceeded the purposes for which expert testimony could be introduced.
Id. at 709. In Chauvin, the State sought to use the expert testimony of a licensed
clinical social worker to establish that the child’s clinical symptoms were “consistent
with a sexual abuse victim; in other words, to use her testimony as substantive
evidence of sexual abuse.” Id. at 699. Citing State v. Foret, infra, the court in
Chauvin reasoned that expert testimony of general characteristics that would explain
delays in reporting, recantations, and omissions of details would be admissible;
however, those situations were not present in that case. Id. at 708. This court
concluded:
We find [the] expert testimony went beyond the limited purpose of explaining the superficially bizarre behavior of a victim of child sexual abuse. We further find [that the] testimony deprived defendant of a fair trial by imbuing the [victims’] testimony with an undeserved scientific aura of truth. This testimony impermissibly bolstered the testimony of both [victims]. There was absolutely no indication that this testimony was necessary to explain to the jury the significance of a child-witness’s demeanor, inconsistent reports, reluctance to testify or recantation.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
The Chauvin and Foret cases were both concerned about an expert witness
bolstering the testimony of the complaining witness. In Foret, which adopted the
United States Supreme Court’s standards for determining reliability of expert
scientific testimony set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993), a child psychologist qualified as an expert testified that the victim
was telling the truth due to the detailed accounts she gave of the incident and
conversations with the defendant, her feelings of disgust and sadness, her report that
the defendant was possessive of her and told her to keep the incident a secret, and
6 that the victim felt she had done something wrong. State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116,
1119 (La. 1993). The psychologist, Dr. Janzen, further explained:
And then on the basis of what I get from the child, the type of detail that I get from the child to make some conclusions about whether or not what she is telling me suggests that she has been sexually abused, or another way of putting it, on the basis of what I get from the child I make some conclusions about whether or not what she is telling me is consistent with what we know about the dynamics of sexual abuse.
Id.
This court wrote that based “largely on the testimony of the victim, as
bolstered by Dr. Janzen, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of attempted
molestation.” Id. at 1120.
In reversing the conviction, the Foret court reasoned that this type of expert
testimony should focus on explaining seemingly unusual or inconsistent reactions
(such as delayed reporting) of the complaining witness to the jury. Id. at 1130. Such
testimony on psychological dynamics and behavior patterns is of assistance to the
jury because the child’s behavior is not within the common experience of the average
juror. Id. The Foret court emphasized that such opinion testimony should be general
in nature without giving testimony directly on the complaining witness’ credibility.
Id. With the expert’s scientific perspective, the jurors can evaluate the child’s
testimony for themselves. Id. In reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, the Foret
court concluded:
The rationales for excluding the evidence all seem to focus on the factfinding role of juries and that [ ] this role involves a determination as to the credibility of each witness. Testimony by an expert is not particularly helpful to a jury that must rely upon its own common sense as a barometer for the evaluation of truthfulness. The cases all seem to focus on, in the face of such expert testimony, fears of ‘the jury surrender[ing] its own common sense in weighing [victim] testimony and deferr[ing] to [a] diagnosis [of sexual abuse] without knowing that the diagnosis was nothing more than a subjective opinion favoring [the victim].’
7 Id. at 1127 (quoting United States v. Whitted, 994 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1993)
(rehearing granted on other grounds).5
Furthermore, the introduction of the diagnosis in the instant case would also
be admitted in contravention of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 403. As Foret
ruled, “[t]his bolstering of credibility has the effect of unfairly prejudicing a criminal
defendant,” and, thus the use of such medical expert testimony “for the purpose of
bolstering a witness’ credibility creates a risk of prejudice that outweighs its
questionable probative value.” Id. at 1129.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the trial court erred in ruling that Ms. Bergeron was allowed
to testify to the diagnosis of child sexual abuse because, under the facts of this case,
such an opinion is prohibited by Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702(A) and
would improperly bolster the complaining witness’ testimony.
DECREE
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we reverse the ruling of the trial court.
REVERSED.
5 On rehearing the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Whitted wrote:
Dr. Likness could not base his diagnosis solely on L.’s allegations of abuse. See Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987) (doctor’s opinion based solely on patient’s oral history is nothing more than patient’s testimony ‘dressed up and sanctified’); Loudermill v. Dow Chem. Co., 863 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1988) (expert opinion lacking objective factual support cannot help jury and thus is inadmissible under Rule 702).
United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 1993) (on rehearing). 8 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2025-KK-00471
VERSUS
On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans–Criminal
WEIMER, C.J., concurring.
Child abuse cases are always a tragedy. Often these matters involve
diametrically conflicting testimony of the accuser and the accused. Abuse mostly
occurs in private with the accused and the alleged victim having some relationship.
Physical evidence is rare. Many children delay reporting abuse and often do not
include details; they may recant or alter their testimony because of threats, fear, or
confusion. Against this backdrop, judges and juries must assess the admissibility of
expert testimony that assists–but does not supplant–the jury in its fact-finding role
regarding credibility.
The testimony of the proposed expert, Ms. Bergeron, demonstrates that she has
sufficient expertise and experience to testify in certain cases, but that does not show
that she has the requisite knowledge to testify in this specific case, on this record.
Most problematic is Ms. Bergeron’s testimony that, in her evaluation, she accepts
what the child tells her as true. An expert’s testimony that she believes the child is
particularly troubling in cases involving abuse to juveniles where one party testifies
against another, and the expert’s testimony would merely “prop up” the testimony of
the alleged victim. This court addressed a similar predicament in State v. Foret, 628
So.2d 1116, 1130-31 (La. 1993), holding that an expert’s testimony, giving his opinion that a victim was telling the truth, was an impermissible comment on the
victim’s credibility, making that testimony inadmissible. The court reasoned that an
expert giving a “stamp” of truthfulness on a victim’s/witness’s testimony has the
effect of bolstering credibility and artificially increasing its probative strength with
the jury, thereby prejudicing the defendant. Id. at 1129. Instead, the evidence should
be admissible for the limited purpose of explaining, in general terms, certain reactions
of a child to abuse (late reporting, recanting statements) that would be used to attack
the victim’s credibility. Id. at 1131. Such expert evidence must be restricted to
providing a scientific context to the jury on matters outside its experience that the jury
can use to assess credibility on its own. Id. at 1130.
Thus, while Ms. Bergeron has ample educational qualifications and skill in
evaluating child abuse medically, I find testimony offered at the pretrial hearing that
she believes the child is in conflict with Foret. The jury’s role is to evaluate the
credibility of the alleged victim and the accused if the accused chooses to testify.
The majority cites State v. Chauvin, 02-1188 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 697,
which relied on Foret, citing broad principles that expert testimony must not
improperly bolster the complaining witness’s testimony by imbuing it with an
expert’s endorsement of truthfulness or invade the province of the jury to determine
the credibility of witnesses. I dissented in Chauvin related to the discrete issue of
admissibility of evidence related to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).
Although I dissented in Chauvin, that case involved a PTSD diagnosis, which this
case does not involve. The victims-witnesses were also older–teenagers–not young
children. Further, unlike this matter, Chauvin did not invoke an expert’s assessment
of a victim-witness’s credibility. My dissent in Chauvin is distinguishable from this
case.
2 For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
3 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans Criminal
Hughes, J., additionally concurring.
Respectfully, the dissent’s reference to a “sweeping ruling” and the adoption
of a “bright-line rule” is misguided. This court does not have the power to change
the provisions of Louisiana Code of Evidence articles 403 and 702(A) and the
Opinion is clearly limited “under the facts of this case.” SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans Criminal
PENZATO, Justice Pro Tempore, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that a properly qualified
medical expert cannot testify to a diagnosis based on patient history.
Healthcare providers routinely rely on patient history to diagnose conditions
that do not necessarily manifest in physical findings. In those instances, the patient
history is a vital source of information needed to make the diagnosis. This is not a
novel or otherwise unreliable method of reaching a medical opinion. This Court has
long recognized that reliance on patient history is widely accepted in the medical
community and often the only basis for making a diagnosis:
Physicians rely upon a patient’s history, his candor in relating that history, observations of reactions to false tests as well as accurate tests, observations of normal activity and demeanor during examination and treatment, and many non-clinical factors. Laymen are certainly able to relate their own observations of the activity and demeanor of one claiming injury and pain.
In many cases, including the one we consider, much of the medical evaluation must be based upon subjective symptoms. All diagnoses cannot be objectively supported. Physicians recognize that medical diagnoses, although not clinically established, may be correct. In most countries of the world, and in the medical treatment of the greatest portion of the world’s population, physicians seldom resort to laboratory analyses for diagnoses and treatment of illness.
Tantillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 315 So. 2d 743, 747 (La. 1975). The threshold reliability requirement of Louisiana Code of Evidence article
702 is satisfied when, as here, an expert’s opinion is based on their extensive
experience in a scientific field and is the product of a methodology generally
accepted in that field. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592;
113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796; 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (“Widespread acceptance can be an
important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible.”).
The majority’s reliance on State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La.1993) and State
v. Chauvin, 02-1188 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So. 2d 697 is misplaced. In both cases, an
expert diagnosed other psychological conditions that, according to the expert, were
caused by the abuse and thus substantiated the victim’s testimony. The Foret and
Chauvin courts excluded the opinions because the causal link between the abuse and
the other conditions was not supported by sufficient scientific evidence.
In Foret, the expert used a “psychological phenomenon” known as child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome to opine that the victim’s sexual abuse
accusation was truthful. The syndrome itself was diagnosed based on the victim’s
behavior and emotional state. But the use of the syndrome as a tool to diagnose
sexual abuse “is seen as having highly dubious value by many members of the
psychological treatment community” and “fails to satisfy the . . . general acceptance”
element of Daubert. See Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1125. This Court further found “the
results of psychoanalysis are rife with the potential for inaccuracy,” and “studies . .
. suggest that evidence based on psychodynamic formulations are unreliable . . .
[which] contributes to the inefficient, misleading, and prejudicial nature of this
testimony.” Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1125-26 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
syndrome-related evidence was “of highly questionable scientific validity, and fails
to unequivocally pass the Daubert threshold test of scientific reliability.” Foret, 628
So. 2d at 1127.
2 Even assuming the evidence met the Daubert standard, the Foret court
alternatively found the expert could not rely on the syndrome findings to opine the
victim was telling the truth. The court explained:
[T]he use of [the syndrome]-based testimony for the purpose of bolstering a witness’ credibility creates a risk of prejudice that outweighs its questionable probative value. Given the near unanimity of other jurisdictions’ disapproval of [the syndrome]-based testimony as a determinant of abuse, coupled with our observations of the risk of prejudice inherent in [the syndrome], this court now concludes that such opinion testimony as a determinant of a victim/witness’ credibility is not admissible.
Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1129.
In Chauvin, a social worker testified that the victim’s post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) was consistent with sexual abuse. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d at 700.
Finding the trial court erred in allowing the testimony, this Court emphasized the
lack of scientific evidence establishing a link between sex abuse and PTSD:
Although PTSD is widely accepted among professionals as an anxiety disorder attributable to some type of trauma, it has not been proven to be a reliable indicator that sexual abuse is the trauma underlying the disorder or that sexual abuse has even occurred.
Chauvin, 846 So. 2d at 707.
As indicated, the experts in Foret and Chauvin diagnosed the victim with a
psychological condition and, in an effort to bolster the victim’s credibility, testified
the psychological condition was consistent with sex abuse. The experts used the
secondary condition as purported proof the victim was telling the truth. The problem
with that approach, as this Court made clear, was the lack of scientific evidence
establishing a causal link between the psychological conditions and sex abuse.
Absent that link, the experts were simply “imbuing the girls’ testimony with an
undeserved scientific aura of truth . . . [that] impermissibly bolstered the testimony
of both girls.” Chauvin, 846 So. 2d at 708 (emphasis added).
Ms. Bergeron did nothing of the sort. She is a highly qualified healthcare
provider who diagnosed a patient with child sexual abuse. She confirmed her
3 methodology for conducting the examination, obtaining the patient history, and
making the diagnosis consistent with her training, education, and experience. She
did not diagnose a second condition and attempt to “impermissibly bolster” the
victim’s credibility by maintaining, without support, that the second condition is
caused by sexual abuse. Ms. Bergeron likewise did not vouch for the victim’s
credibility. Like any competent healthcare provider, she accepted the patient history
as true absent anything indicating otherwise. Again, this is a widely accepted
practice in the medical field. Any inconsistencies in the patient history, which might
undermine Ms. Bergeron’s opinion, can be fully developed on cross-examination.
The majority adopts a bright-line rule that excludes a diagnosis of sexual
abuse not supported by physical findings. The unfortunate reality is that “physical
evidence of the abuse is rare.” Chauvin, 846 So. 2d at 702. Today’s holding
effectively eliminates critical testimony by treating healthcare providers in 80 to 85
percent of all abuse cases. Article 702 does not require this blanket exclusion,
particularly in a pre-trial ruling without the benefit of the actual testimony presented
to the jury.
The majority’s sweeping ruling is counter to the deference granted to trial
courts to act as gatekeepers for expert testimony. “[T]he trial judge must have
considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining
whether particular expert testimony is reliable.” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 152; 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176; 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). The trial court
is thus afforded broad discretion in determining whether expert testimony is
admissible, and its decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.
Melerine v. Tom's Marine & Salvage, LLC, 20-00571 (La. 3/24/21), 315 So. 3d 806,
818.
4 I find no abuse of discretion in this case and would affirm the trial court’s
ruling permitting the state’s expert to testify to her diagnosis. For these reasons, I
respectfully dissent.