Judgment rendered July 16, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,351-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
CHARLES WILLIAMS Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 371,573
Honorable John D. Mosely, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Sherry Watters
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
CHEYENNE WILSON TOMMY J. JOHNSON Assistant District Attorneys
Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and THOMPSON, JJ. THOMPSON, J.
Charles Williams was arrested for several crimes stemming from two
separate incidents. Williams was represented intermittently by retained
counsel or a public defender appointed to represent him. While his cases
were pending, and despite being represented by counsel, Williams filed
numerous pro se motions. Williams’ counsel negotiated an agreement on all
pending charges with the state, which included dismissal of many charges.
As a result, Williams pled guilty to one count of domestic abuse battery with
strangulation for an agreed sentence of three years at hard labor, and he pled
guilty to aggravated second degree battery for an agreed sentence of seven
years at hard labor. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.
Williams now appeals his guilty plea to the domestic abuse battery with
strangulation charge, arguing that the trial court failed to timely rule on his
pro se motions prior to his guilty plea, and that his counsel was ineffective.
For the following reasons, we affirm his guilty plea and sentence, and
remand with instructions regarding the imposition of a mandatory fine.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 19, 2019, the Shreveport Police Department responded
to a call regarding an assault and battery of the victim, Labreshia Ross,
(“Ross Incident”) who stated to police that her ex-boyfriend, Charles
Williams, came to her residence unannounced, and upon seeing a male
friend inside, entered her house without permission, placed both of his hands
around her neck and applied pressure. When Williams released her, Ross
called the police from her cell phone but she dropped her cell phone and
Williams attempted to pull her outside of her home. Williams eventually left the residence. During this incident, all three of Ross’s children were present
in the home.
An arrest warrant1 was subsequently issued and Williams was
arrested2 for domestic abuse charges related to the Ross Incident. Williams
was represented at his first court appearance3 by the public defender. When
Williams was arrested and booked into jail on his domestic abuse charge, he
was also booked on a charge of aggravated second degree battery (“Separate
Battery Charge”) arising from a prior incident.4 An arrest warrant5 had been
previously issued in that matter, and the Separate Battery Charge arose from
an entirely separate incident from the Ross Incident. Williams was booked
into jail at the same time pursuant to the two existing arrest warrants.
A bill of information6 was timely filed containing one count of
aggravated second degree battery in the Separate Battery Charge, Case No.
371,574, now also on appeal to this Court in No. 56,352-KA. Williams
remained incarcerated pursuant to that Separate Battery Charge.
A separate bill of information7 was subsequently filed in Case No.
371,573, containing four counts in relation to the Ross Incident. The bill of
information provided that on the date of the Ross Incident,8 Williams
committed three counts of domestic abuse in the presence of three children
under the age of 13, in violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3(I). A fourth count
alleged that Williams committed domestic abuse by strangulation, in
1 October 17, 2019 2 November 2, 2019 3 November 4, 2019 4 June 9, 2019 5 October 1, 2019 6 January 2, 2020 7 January 27, 2020 8 September 19, 2019 2 violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3(L). The bill of information in this matter was
filed beyond the 60-day time limit required for jailed defendants, but within
the 150-day time limit required for a defendant not in custody. Williams was
incarcerated at the time. The record contains an order for electronic
monitoring for Williams’ domestic abuse battery charges from the Ross
Incident contained in this appeal.
On January 27, 2020, the date the bill of information was filed in this
matter, Williams’ arraignment was held on all of his pending charges arising
from the Ross Incident and the Separate Battery Charge. He entered pleas of
not guilty to all charges.
On August 24, 2020, private counsel enrolled and represented
Williams in both of his pending cases for 11 months. Willliams’ private
counsel ultimately withdrew. During the period Williams was represented
by retained counsel, he also filed a pro se motion to suppress evidence.
Subsequently private counsel withdrew,9 and an attorney from the indigent
defender board was appointed to represent Williams.
Williams proceeded to file numerous pro se pleadings between
November 2, 2021, and October 25, 2022, including a writ of habeas corpus,
two motions to quash the bill of information, two motions for speedy trial,
and a bill of particulars. Williams’ motions to quash, filed on November 12
and 19, 2021, respectively, asserted that the bill of information had not been
filed in a timely manner. Williams’ motion for a bill of particulars was then
filed on January 6, 2022. The State filed responses to discovery. The
discovery responses included a “Violence Report” prepared by the
9 September 9, 2021 3 Shreveport Police Department, including numerous arrests and several prior
guilty pleas including multiple misdemeanor domestic abuse battery charges,
two simple battery charges, aggravated assault, disturbing the peace, and
discharge of a firearm.
Williams’ pro se writ of habeas corpus filed on January 17, 2023, was
denied by the trial court on April 8, 2023. Williams’ pro se application for a
writ to this Court was not considered due to noncompliance with the
Uniform Rules.
On July 20, 2023, Williams withdrew his plea of not guilty and pled
guilty to the fourth count, relative to domestic abuse by strangulation. As
part of the apparent plea agreement, the other three domestic abuse charges
arising from the Ross Incident were dismissed. A simultaneous plea was
also entered in Williams’ pending Separate Battery Charge case. The trial
court imposed the agreed sentence for the Ross Incident of three years at
hard labor, to be served concurrently with a sentence of seven years at hard
labor in the Separate Battery Charge. Because this was an agreed sentence,
there was no objection and no motion to reconsider the sentence was raised.
Williams was advised that the plea waived his right to appeal, and that he
had the right to pursue post-conviction relief in both matters.
The trial court granted two of Williams’ requests for documents10 and
Williams also filed an application for post-conviction relief11 alleging that
the bill of information did not charge a punishable offense because Ross was
not a household member and asserted ineffective assistance of counsel in the
10 December 7, 2023, and July 9, 2024 11 June 11, 2024 4 Ross Incident. The State filed a written response and the trial court12 denied
Williams’ post-conviction relief application. The trial court’s opinion
provided Williams’ allegation regarding the deficient bill of information was
a challenge of the factual basis of the State’s case, and it concluded that
Williams admitted the factual basis contained in the bill of information was
true when he made his guilty plea. Additionally, the trial court found that
Williams’ general statements and conclusory allegations did not suffice to
show ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1982). The
trial court found that Williams failed to show deficient performance by
counsel and failed to show that but for counsel’s alleged deficiencies, he
would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
Williams did not seek supervisory review of the denial of his
application for post-conviction relief. Williams then filed a pro se motion
for out-of-time appeal13 which was granted.14 The pro se motion for appeal
states the grounds as “his two (2) motions for habeas corpus and one (1) for
mandamus, dating to 2021 and 2022, have not been addressed by the 1 st
Judicial District Court.”
Williams was appointed appellate counsel from the Louisiana
Appellate Project, who filed an appellate brief, identifying it as a “hybrid”
Anders brief. Appellate counsel explained that after a thorough review of
the entire record, no nonfrivolous issues remained for appeal. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967); State v.
12 July 17, 2024 13 September 27, 2024 14 October 1, 2024 5 Jyles, 96-2669 (La. 12/12/97), 704 So. 2d 241; State v. Mouton, 95-0981
(La. 4/28/95), 653 So. 2d 1176; State v. Benjamin, 573 So. 2d 528 (La. App.
4 Cir. 1990). Appellate counsel’s brief outlines the procedural history of the
case, provides a statement of the facts, and contains a detailed and
reviewable assessment for both Williams and this Court regarding whether
the appeal is worth pursuing. Counsel explained that she did not argue, but
merely outlined the issues, and states that Williams should be allowed to
obtain a copy of the record and file his own brief with the Court. No pro se
brief was filed.
DISCUSSION
Williams’ appellate counsel provides two assignments of error
[verbatim]:
Assignment of Error No. 1: The district court erred in denying the application for post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Williams argues that he was incarcerated past the maximum sentence
on his domestic abuse battery with strangulation case, the Ross Incident.
Williams continues that his attorney’s failure to file any action to secure his
release violated the duty of care. The bill of information was filed on
January 27, 2020. La. C. Cr. P. art. 578 required the trial be held within two
years of the institution of his prosecution to prevent prejudicial delay.
Williams asserts that because of this failure to act by his attorney, he
remained in jail an additional 8 months before being persuaded to plead
guilty.15 Williams argues his plea and conviction should be vacated, as the
15 Williams was simultaneously incarcerated on the Separate Battery Charge at the same time as the Ross Incident. 6 case should have been dismissed for untimely prosecution had his trial
counsel provided competent assistance.
The Supreme Court set out the two-prong test for a defendant
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington,
supra: that counsel’s performance was deficient; and the deficiency
prejudiced his defense. State v. Hilliard, 52,652 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/14/19),
278 So. 3d 1065, writ denied, 19-01701 (La. 7/24/20), 299 So. 3d 68. Both
the Louisiana and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant’s
right to the effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; La.
Const. art. 1, § 13; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.
Ed. 2d 799 (1963); State v. Brooks, 94-2438 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d
1333; State v. Bayles, 53,696 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/17/21), 329 So. 3d 1149.
Under the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in Strickland
v. Washington, supra, adopted by Louisiana’s Supreme Court in State v.
Washington, 491 So. 2d 1337 (La. 1986), a reviewing court must reverse a
conviction if the defendant establishes that counsel’s performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,
and counsel’s inadequate performance prejudiced the defendant to the extent
that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect. State v. Ball, 19-
01674 (La. 11/24/20), 305 So. 3d 90; State v. Bayles, supra.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are more properly raised in
an application for post-conviction relief in the trial court because this
provides the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing under La. C. Cr. P.
art. 930. State v. McGee, 18-1052 (La. 2/25/19), 264 So. 3d 445; State v.
Ward, 53,969, (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 324 So. 3d 231. When the record
is sufficient, however, allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 7 may be resolved on direct appeal in the interest of judicial economy. Id. We
find that this record is sufficient to resolve Williams’ claims.
Timely Institution of Prosecution
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 578(A)(2) provides that,
in non-capital felony cases, the state must commence trial within two years
from the date of institution of prosecution. According to La. C. Cr. P. art.
934(7), “institution of prosecution” means the finding of an indictment, or
the filing of an information, or affidavit, which is designed to serve as the
basis of a trial. The purpose of La. C. Cr. P. art. 578 is to enforce a
defendant’s right to a speedy trial and to prevent the oppression caused by
suspending criminal prosecutions over citizens for indefinite periods of time.
State v. Barnett, 50,213 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/12/15), 174 So. 3d 748. The issue
that a prosecution was not timely instituted may be raised at any time, but
only once, and shall be tried by the court alone. La. C. Cr. P. art. 577.
A motion to quash is the proper procedural vehicle for challenging an
untimely commencement of trial. La. C. Cr. P. art. 532(7). A trial court’s
decision on a motion to quash should not be reversed in the absence of a
clear abuse of the trial court’s discretion. State v. Burrell, 50,461 (La. App.
2 Cir. 03/02/16), 189 So. 3d 481; State v. Barnett, supra. When a defendant
has brought an apparently meritorious motion to quash based upon
prescription, the state bears the burden to demonstrate that the time
limitation period has been interrupted or that it has been suspended so that
the time limitation has not yet expired. La. C. Cr. P. art. 577; State v.
Burrell, supra; State v. Barnett, supra.
Time limits are suspended when a defendant files a motion to quash or
other preliminary plea. La. C. Cr. P. art. 580(A). For purposes of article 8 580(A), a preliminary plea is any pleading or motion filed by the defense
that has the effect of delaying trial, which includes motions to quash,
motions to suppress, applications for discovery, bills of particulars, and
motions for continuances. (Emphasis added). State v. Barnett, supra. When
the prescriptive period is suspended, the relevant period is not counted, and
the running of the time limit resumes when the court rules on the motions.
Id. A suspension lasts from the date a qualifying motion is filed until the
date the trial court rules on the motion. After the trial court rules on the
motion, the state has either the remainder of the time limitation or a
minimum period of one year from the date of ruling in which to commence
trial, whichever time is longer. La. C. Cr. P. art. 580(A); State v. Barnett,
supra.
In this case, Williams was charged with domestic abuse battery with
strangulation, a violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3(L), a non-capital felony.
Under La. C. Cr. P. art. 578(A)(2), Williams’ trial was required to begin
within two years from the date the prosecution was initiated. A bill of
information charging Williams with domestic abuse battery was filed on
January 27, 2020. Therefore, the State technically had until January 27,
2022, to commence Williams’ trial.
However, Williams filed pro se motions to quash his bill of
information in November 2021, based on his allegation that it was not timely
filed. Notwithstanding the suspension of certain legal deadlines due to the
Covid-19 pandemic, the record shows that Williams filed numerous
qualifying motions that suspended the two-year period to bring his case to
trial.
9 While it is regrettable that the bill of information in this case appears
to have been untimely filed, the record shows Williams was properly in
custody due to his other simultaneously pending charges, the Separate
Battery Charge. Also, the record indicates that electronic monitoring was
ordered in this matter, indicating that he could have been released from
custody in the Ross Incident had the charges not been simultaneously
pending in the Separate Battery Charge. As Williams’ appeal seeks review
of pro se pleadings that were filed prior to his guilty plea, he is not entitled
to appellate review of those pleadings. Accordingly, we find that Williams’
arguments regarding his untimely prosecution are without merit.
We further find that Williams’ claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel lack merit. The trial court denied his application for post-conviction
relief asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, and Williams did not seek
supervisory review of that decision. On appeal, Williams failed to show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Williams
knowingly and voluntarily entered into an agreed upon plea agreement that
resolved two separate commissions of crimes.
Assignment of Error No. 2: Although counsel cannot ethically argue the issues Williams wants to raise on appeal, counsel will provide an outline of the issues and the applicable law and requests the Court to review the record for errors patent on the face of the record under Louisiana Constitution of 1974, Article 1, Section 19; State v. Martin, 329 So. 2d 688 (La. 1975). In accordance with such a review, the defendant asks the Court to reverse his conviction and sentence.
Williams’ appointed counsel from the Louisiana Appellate Project
notes that Williams filed numerous pro se pleadings in this case, and she, in
keeping with her professional responsibility, explained to him that she could
not ethically argue the issues he hoped to raise in this Court on appeal. As 10 noted above, Williams is not entitled to appellate review on the pro se
motions prior to his guilty plea. Williams responded to his appointed
counsel that he would still like the issues addressed in brief, a request to
which appellate counsel complied. The issues Williams urges this court to
consider are that the State failed to timely institute his prosecution, the State
failed to initiate trial timely, and the trial court did not rule on several of
Williams’ pro se motions.
In Anders v. California, supra, the United States Supreme Court noted
that, “if counsel finds [the] case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious
examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to
withdraw.”16 The Louisiana Supreme Court explained that an Anders brief
must demonstrate by full discussion and analysis that appellate counsel “has
cast an advocate’s eye over the trial record and considered whether any
ruling made by the trial court, subject to the contemporaneous objection rule,
had a significant, adverse impact on shaping the evidence presented to the
jury for its consideration.” State v. Jyles, supra.
When conducting a review for compliance with Anders, an appellate
court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine
whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. State v. Bradford, 95-929 (La. App.
5 Cir. 6/25/96), 676 So. 2d 1108. If, after an independent review, the
reviewing court determines there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal, it
may grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the defendant’s
conviction and sentence. Id. Upon review, we find that the record discloses
16 Appointed counsel did not file a motion to withdraw in conjunction with her “hybrid” Anders brief. 11 no non-frivolous issues and no rulings that would arguably support an
appeal.
Guilty Plea
Under La. C. Cr. P. art. 556.1, a valid guilty plea must be a voluntary
choice by the defendant and not the result of force or threats. La. C. Cr. P.
art. 556.1 also provides that prior to accepting a guilty plea, the court must
personally inform the defendant of the nature of the charge to which the plea
is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, and the maximum possible
penalty. When the record establishes that an accused was informed of and
waived his right to a trial by jury, to confront his accusers, and against self-
incrimination, the burden shifts to the accused to prove that despite the
record, his guilty plea was involuntary. State v. Branch, 54,591 (La. App. 2
Cir. 4/5/23), 361 So. 3d 80). An express and knowing waiver of an
accused’s rights must appear on the record, and an unequivocal showing of a
free and voluntary waiver cannot be presumed. Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); State v. Cheveallier,
56,068 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25); State v. Branch, supra.
Here, the record shows that Williams was aware he was pleading
guilty to domestic abuse with strangulation arising from the Ross Incident.
The record indicates that Williams was advised of his right to a judge or jury
trial, his right to confrontation, and his privilege against self-incrimination,
as required by Boykin v. Alabama, supra. Williams indicated during the plea
colloquy that he understood that he was waiving these rights.
Williams further stated that he had not been forced, coerced, or
threatened to enter his guilty pleas. The judge indicated that he was satisfied
that there was a factual basis for the acceptance of the pleas and accepted 12 them as knowingly, intelligently, freely, and voluntarily made. In exchange
for his plea of guilty, three felony domestic abuse charges were dismissed,
and Williams was offered a sentence of three years at hard labor, to run
concurrently to the sentence imposed in his Separate Battery Charge
conviction. Williams agreed that he understood the possible legal
consequences of pleading guilty and still wished to plead guilty.
Williams’ sentence does not present issues for appeal. The sentence
was imposed in conformity with the plea agreement, and La. C. Cr. P. art.
881.2(A)(2) precludes him from seeking review of his sentence imposed in
conformity with a plea agreement, which was set forth in the record at the
time of the plea. Because Williams’ plea agreement was clearly set forth in
the record at the time of his plea, he is statutorily precluded from review.
Nonetheless, our independent review of the record reveals that Williams’
sentence is within the limits prescribed by the statute in effect on the date the
offense was committed and are therefore proper under the circumstances.
ERROR PATENT
The sentence imposed here is illegally lenient. The trial court did not
properly restrict benefits or impose a mandatory fine. La. R.S. 14:35.3(L),
the subsection regarding domestic abuse involving strangulation, provides
for penalties in addition to any other penalties imposed under La. R.S.
14:35.3. Subsection (L) provides for three years at hard labor if the
domestic abuse involved strangulation, which is the provision pursuant to
which Williams pled guilty. La. R.S. 14:35.3(C) provides that the penalty
for a first offender is a fine of $300 to $1000 and imprisonment of 30 days to
6 months, with at least 48 hours to be served without benefits of probation,
parole, or suspensions of sentence. Therefore, Williams’ sentence should 13 have included a mandatory fine, as well as the proper restriction of benefits
for the first 48 hours of the sentence that he served. We remand to the trial
court for the limited purpose of conducting a hearing pursuant to La. C. Cr.
P. art. 875.1 to determine the imposition of the mandatory fine and
Williams’ financial ability to pay any such fine, and to amend the minutes to
reflect the proper restriction of benefits for the first 48 hours of the sentence
he served.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the guilty plea of Williams and
affirm his sentence of three years at hard labor; and remand solely for a
hearing pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 875.1, to determine Williams’ ability to
pay the mandatory fine, to determine the amount of the fine pursuant to La.
R.S. 14:35.3, and to amend the minutes to reflect the proper restriction of
benefits.
AFFIRMED. REMANDED, WITH INSTRUCTIONS.