Judgment rendered August 27, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,398-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
CARNELIUS HOLMES Appellant
Appealed from the Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana Trial Court No. 21-CR-31373
Honorable Nicholas E. Gasper, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Christopher A. Aberle
CHARLES BLAYLOCK ADAMS Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
LEA R. HALL, JR. RHYS E. BURGESS NANCY F. BERGER-SCHNEIDER Assistant District Attorneys
Before THOMPSON, ROBINSON, and ELLENDER, JJ. THOMPSON, J.
Carnelius Holmes stole two firearms from two different vehicles, was
arrested, and eventually pled guilty to two counts of simple burglary. At his
plea hearing, the trial court advised him of the rights that he would be giving
up by pleading guilty, including his right “to testify on your own behalf if
you so choose.” After entering his guilty plea, he never showed up for his
scheduled sentencing hearing and remained at large for almost three years,
until he was arrested for a different crime. When he was brought back
before the court for sentencing on the simple burglary charges, the trial
court, noting the nature of his crime included the theft of firearms and his
unlawful freedom for the prior three years, sentenced him to the maximum
sentence of 12 years of hard labor on each count of simple burglary. The
trial court generously ran each count concurrently and suspended four years
of the sentence, effectively crafting an 8-year sentence for Holmes. The
defendant appealed, now arguing that (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly
and intelligently given because he was not specifically advised of his right to
remain silent, and (2) his sentence is excessive. As Holmes elected to plead
guilty, there was no trial, and he did not testify. For the reasons set forth in
more detail below, we affirm both his convictions and sentences.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Carnelius Holmes (“Holmes”) was charged1 with two counts of
simple burglary, in violation of La. R.S. 14:62, for stealing firearms out of
two vehicles.2 Holmes pled guilty, and the trial court ordered a pre
1 February 2, 2021 2 December 27, 2020 sentence investigation (“PSI”). 3 Prior to his guilty plea, Holmes was
advised by the trial court that he had the right to a jury trial, the right to
confront witnesses against him, and the “right to testify on your own behalf
if you so choose.” The trial court confirmed with Holmes’ defense counsel
that counsel had explained all of Holmes’ rights prior to his guilty plea.
Holmes pled guilty and a sentencing hearing was set.4
Holmes did not appear for his sentencing hearing, and the trial court
issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Holmes remained at large for three
years, until he was arrested on other charges. When Holmes appeared
before the court after his arrest, the trial court, after reviewing the PSI,
sentenced Holmes to 12 years at hard labor on each count of simple
burglary, with four years suspended on each count, with the sentences to run
concurrently. 5 Holmes made a motion to reconsider the sentences based on
his lack of criminal history, and the trial court denied the motion. This
appeal followed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Holmes asserts two assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error: The trial court failed to advise Mr. Holmes of all of his Boykin rights.
Second Assignment of Error: Mr. Homles’ maximum sentences-12 years of imprisonment on his 2 convictions-were excessive.
DISCUSSION
First Assignment of Error: The trial court failed to advise Mr. Holmes of all of his Boykin rights.
3 August 23, 2021 4 November 15, 2021 5 October 14, 2024 2 In the first assignment of error, Holmes contends that his conviction
should be vacated because his guilty plea was not freely, intelligently, and
voluntarily made in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.
Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Specifically, Holmes argues that the trial
court failed to properly inform him of his right to remain silent and that a
jury could not use that silence against him.
Review of the record reveals that the trial court did not specifically
inform the defendant that he had a right to remain silent at the time of his
guilty plea, which, no doubt, is preferrable. However, the record includes
the following exchange:
The Court: Okay. You understand that, when you’re charged with committing a crime, you’re entitled to certain rights? Those include the right to maintain your plea of not guilty and have a trial in front of a judge or jury, where the State would have to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At that trial, you’d have the right to assistance of an attorney, a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to subpoena witnesses to testify on your behalf, and the right to testify on your own behalf if you so choose. If you’re found guilty after a trial, you’d have the right to appeal that conviction. You understand, by pleading guilty, you’re giving up those rights?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
(emphasis added). The record further reflects that the trial court asked
Holmes’ attorney if he had a chance to speak with him and advise him of all
of his rights, and Holmes’ trial attorney affirmed that they had spoken of his
rights and that Holmes knew that he was giving up those rights by pleading
guilty. The following exchange is reflected in the record:
The Court: Okay. And, Mr. Eades, you’ve had a chance to speak with Mr. Holmes and advise him of all of his rights, and you believe he understands what he’s doing today?
Mr. Eades: Yes, Your Honor.
3 We find that the trial court sufficiently advised Holmes of his
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. As this Court has noted
previously in State v Billups, 50,497 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/24/16), 188 So. 3d
1124, quoting State v. Hunt, 573 So. 2d 585 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1991):
In order to effectively waive the constitutional right against self-incrimination, a defendant who pleads guilty must be advised of his right to remain silent at trial. A defendant does not have to be advised that he has a right to ‘stand mute and refuse to enter a plea of any nature at the Boykin examination.’
See also State v. Honeycutt, 41,601 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/28/07), 953 So. 2d
914. The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that decisions regarding pleas
should be “decided from the totality of the circumstances whether the plea
has been free and voluntary and made with an intelligent understanding of
the consequence. No express requirement that a specific articulation of
specific constitutional rights are sacramental.” State v. Smith, 375 So. 2d
1328 (La. 1979).
Here, the transcript of the guilty plea hearing shows that the trial court
adequately advised Holmes of his Boykin rights and that Holmes knowingly
and intelligently waived these rights when he pled guilty. The record
reflects that Holmes was represented by counsel when he pled guilty and
throughout these proceedings. The colloquy as a whole reflects a sufficient
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Judgment rendered August 27, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,398-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
CARNELIUS HOLMES Appellant
Appealed from the Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana Trial Court No. 21-CR-31373
Honorable Nicholas E. Gasper, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Christopher A. Aberle
CHARLES BLAYLOCK ADAMS Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
LEA R. HALL, JR. RHYS E. BURGESS NANCY F. BERGER-SCHNEIDER Assistant District Attorneys
Before THOMPSON, ROBINSON, and ELLENDER, JJ. THOMPSON, J.
Carnelius Holmes stole two firearms from two different vehicles, was
arrested, and eventually pled guilty to two counts of simple burglary. At his
plea hearing, the trial court advised him of the rights that he would be giving
up by pleading guilty, including his right “to testify on your own behalf if
you so choose.” After entering his guilty plea, he never showed up for his
scheduled sentencing hearing and remained at large for almost three years,
until he was arrested for a different crime. When he was brought back
before the court for sentencing on the simple burglary charges, the trial
court, noting the nature of his crime included the theft of firearms and his
unlawful freedom for the prior three years, sentenced him to the maximum
sentence of 12 years of hard labor on each count of simple burglary. The
trial court generously ran each count concurrently and suspended four years
of the sentence, effectively crafting an 8-year sentence for Holmes. The
defendant appealed, now arguing that (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly
and intelligently given because he was not specifically advised of his right to
remain silent, and (2) his sentence is excessive. As Holmes elected to plead
guilty, there was no trial, and he did not testify. For the reasons set forth in
more detail below, we affirm both his convictions and sentences.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Carnelius Holmes (“Holmes”) was charged1 with two counts of
simple burglary, in violation of La. R.S. 14:62, for stealing firearms out of
two vehicles.2 Holmes pled guilty, and the trial court ordered a pre
1 February 2, 2021 2 December 27, 2020 sentence investigation (“PSI”). 3 Prior to his guilty plea, Holmes was
advised by the trial court that he had the right to a jury trial, the right to
confront witnesses against him, and the “right to testify on your own behalf
if you so choose.” The trial court confirmed with Holmes’ defense counsel
that counsel had explained all of Holmes’ rights prior to his guilty plea.
Holmes pled guilty and a sentencing hearing was set.4
Holmes did not appear for his sentencing hearing, and the trial court
issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Holmes remained at large for three
years, until he was arrested on other charges. When Holmes appeared
before the court after his arrest, the trial court, after reviewing the PSI,
sentenced Holmes to 12 years at hard labor on each count of simple
burglary, with four years suspended on each count, with the sentences to run
concurrently. 5 Holmes made a motion to reconsider the sentences based on
his lack of criminal history, and the trial court denied the motion. This
appeal followed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Holmes asserts two assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error: The trial court failed to advise Mr. Holmes of all of his Boykin rights.
Second Assignment of Error: Mr. Homles’ maximum sentences-12 years of imprisonment on his 2 convictions-were excessive.
DISCUSSION
First Assignment of Error: The trial court failed to advise Mr. Holmes of all of his Boykin rights.
3 August 23, 2021 4 November 15, 2021 5 October 14, 2024 2 In the first assignment of error, Holmes contends that his conviction
should be vacated because his guilty plea was not freely, intelligently, and
voluntarily made in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.
Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Specifically, Holmes argues that the trial
court failed to properly inform him of his right to remain silent and that a
jury could not use that silence against him.
Review of the record reveals that the trial court did not specifically
inform the defendant that he had a right to remain silent at the time of his
guilty plea, which, no doubt, is preferrable. However, the record includes
the following exchange:
The Court: Okay. You understand that, when you’re charged with committing a crime, you’re entitled to certain rights? Those include the right to maintain your plea of not guilty and have a trial in front of a judge or jury, where the State would have to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At that trial, you’d have the right to assistance of an attorney, a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to subpoena witnesses to testify on your behalf, and the right to testify on your own behalf if you so choose. If you’re found guilty after a trial, you’d have the right to appeal that conviction. You understand, by pleading guilty, you’re giving up those rights?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
(emphasis added). The record further reflects that the trial court asked
Holmes’ attorney if he had a chance to speak with him and advise him of all
of his rights, and Holmes’ trial attorney affirmed that they had spoken of his
rights and that Holmes knew that he was giving up those rights by pleading
guilty. The following exchange is reflected in the record:
The Court: Okay. And, Mr. Eades, you’ve had a chance to speak with Mr. Holmes and advise him of all of his rights, and you believe he understands what he’s doing today?
Mr. Eades: Yes, Your Honor.
3 We find that the trial court sufficiently advised Holmes of his
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. As this Court has noted
previously in State v Billups, 50,497 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/24/16), 188 So. 3d
1124, quoting State v. Hunt, 573 So. 2d 585 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1991):
In order to effectively waive the constitutional right against self-incrimination, a defendant who pleads guilty must be advised of his right to remain silent at trial. A defendant does not have to be advised that he has a right to ‘stand mute and refuse to enter a plea of any nature at the Boykin examination.’
See also State v. Honeycutt, 41,601 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/28/07), 953 So. 2d
914. The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that decisions regarding pleas
should be “decided from the totality of the circumstances whether the plea
has been free and voluntary and made with an intelligent understanding of
the consequence. No express requirement that a specific articulation of
specific constitutional rights are sacramental.” State v. Smith, 375 So. 2d
1328 (La. 1979).
Here, the transcript of the guilty plea hearing shows that the trial court
adequately advised Holmes of his Boykin rights and that Holmes knowingly
and intelligently waived these rights when he pled guilty. The record
reflects that Holmes was represented by counsel when he pled guilty and
throughout these proceedings. The colloquy as a whole reflects a sufficient
inquiry by the trial court and response from Holmes regarding his
fundamental rights. Holmes’ counsel also confirmed reviewing with
Holmes each of his rights and confirmed for the court that Holmes was
aware of his rights and was entering a guilty plea with full knowledge of
what he was doing. This assignment of error is without merit.
Second Assignment of Error: Mr. Homles’ maximum sentences-12 years of imprisonment on his 2 convictions-were excessive.
4 In his second assignment of error, Holmes contends that his maximum
sentences on his two convictions were excessive. He argues that he is a 30-
year-old, first felony offender and that the 12 years of imprisonment are
excessive and serve no purpose.
An excessive sentence claim is reviewed by examining whether the
trial court adequately considered the guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. State v.
Dowles, 54,483 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/25/22), 339 So. 3d 749; State v. Vanhorn,
52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La.
11/19/19), 282 So. 3d 1065. First, the record must show that the trial court
took cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The
articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art.
894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. The trial
court is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance, so
long as the record reflects that it adequately considered the guidelines of the
article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Croskey, 53,505
(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1151. The important elements which
should be considered are the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties,
marital status, health, and employment record), prior criminal record,
seriousness of offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones,
398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981); Dowles, supra. There is no requirement that
specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. Dowles,
supra.
Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. Dowles, supra. Constitutional review turns upon
whether the sentence is illegal, grossly disproportionate to the severity of the 5 offense, or shocking to the sense of justice. A sentence violates La. Const.
art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense
or nothing more than the purposeless infliction of pain and suffering. A
sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are
viewed in light of the harm to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v.
Baker, 51,933 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 990, writ denied, 18-
0858 (La. 12/3/18), 257 So. 3d 195, and writ denied, 18-0833 (La. 12/3/18),
257 So. 3d 196.
The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within the statutory limits, and such sentences should not be set aside as
excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. Dowles, supra. A
trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion
in sentencing. Id. Absent specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate
court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the
appropriateness of a particular sentence. Id. As a general rule, maximum
sentences are appropriate in cases involving the most serious violation of the
offense and the worst type of offender. State v. Taylor, 41,898 (La. App. 2
Cir. 4/4/07), 954 So. 2d 804.
Holmes pled guilty to two counts of simple burglary, which is defined
as the unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle, watercraft, or other
structure, moveable or immovable, or any cemetery, with the intent to
commit a felony or any theft therein. La. R.S. 14:62(A)(1). The maximum
sentence for simple burglary is 12 years with or without hard labor. La. R.S.
14:62. The trial court imposed the maximum 12-year sentence on each
count, to be run concurrently, with four years suspended. While the 6 sentencing provisions exposed Holmes to 12 years on each count, for a
potential 24-year sentence (if ordered to be served consecutively), Holmes
actually received the equivalent of a total of an 8-year sentence when
considering the concurrent nature of the sentences and suspension of 4 years
on each.
We find the trial court adequately considered La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1
for sentencing. The trial court considered several factors provided in Article
894.1 on the record, including both aggravating and mitigating factors. The
trial court specifically noted the fact that Holmes had absconded for almost
three years after pleading guilty but prior to his sentencing. Prior to the
imposition of the maximum sentence, the court also noted that these simple
burglary charges included the theft of firearms by Holmes, which the court
stated made the crimes more serious as stolen firearms are generally used in
the commission of further crimes.
The trial court imposed sentences well within the statutory limits, and
kindly allowed those sentences to be served concurrently. Considering the
seriousness of burglaries where firearms were stolen and the fact that
Holmes evaded sentencing for almost three years, the imposition of the
maximum is not a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering.
The trial court acted within its discretion in imposing the concurrent
maximum sentences, with four years suspended and credit for any time
served. These sentences are not excessive, and this assignment of error also
lacks merit. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Carnelious Holmes’ convictions
and sentences.
AFFIRMED. 7