State of Louisiana v. Brandy Shackelford

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: January 15, 2020
• Docket: 53,165-KA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered January 15, 2020. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 53,165-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

BRANDY SHACKELFORD Appellant

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 341,382

Honorable Brady O’Callaghan, Judge

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Bruce G. Whittaker

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

WILLIAM J. EDWARDS TOMMY J. JOHNSON Assistant District Attorneys

Before WILLIAMS, MOORE, and THOMPSON, JJ. THOMPSON, J.

This excessive sentence appeal arises from a criminal matter in the

First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish, the Honorable Brady

O’Callaghan presiding. The defendant, Brandy Shackelford

(“Shackelford”), pled guilty to manslaughter committed against her two-

year-old son, in violation of La. R.S. 14:31. She agreed to a potential

sentence range of 0-40 years and received the benefit of reduction of

mandatory sentencing terms and conditions, as well as the dismissal of two

additional charges in reaching her agreement with the state for sentencing

ranges. She was sentenced to 25 years at hard labor with credit for time

served, concurrent with any other sentence. She appeals, now claiming her

sentence within the agreed upon sentence range is excessive. For the

following reasons, Shackelford’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 26, 2016, law enforcement officers responded to a 911 call of

alleged child abuse1 regarding a two-year-old male, R.M. According to the

officers, the child’s skin condition looked pale, and he acted lethargic. The

fire department offered to transport R.M. to the hospital multiple times, but

the family declined. Subsequently, R.M.’s grandmother took R.M. and the

other children back to her house that evening. Shackelford was taken into

custody and charged with two counts of cruelty to a juvenile.2 In the early

morning of May 27, 2016, R.M. was rushed to the hospital due to trouble

1 The record reflects that certain parts of the record were placed under seal. Thus, due to the sensitivity surrounding R.M.’s death, the Court will not discuss the details of R.M.’s injuries. 2 Criminal Docket No. 341,224. breathing. The hospital was unable to revive R.M. The cause of death was

determined to be a homicide.

Shackelford was indicted by a grand jury and subsequently charged in

a separate docket number with manslaughter,3 in violation of La. R.S. 14:31,

committed without intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, while

committing a simple battery. On November 13, 2018, Shackelford appeared

before the trial court to accept the state’s plea offer, which was recited into

the record. The state offered that if Shackelford pled guilty to manslaughter,

the state would not seek the mandatory sentencing range that would apply

because R.M. was under the age of 10 when he died. That would reduce

Shackelford’s potential sentence of 10-40 years at hard labor, without

benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, to 0-40 years, with no

restriction of benefits. Additionally, the state would dismiss the two counts

of cruelty to a juvenile that were still pending.

Judge O’Callaghan began the guilty plea colloquy with questions to

Shackelford, who stated that she was born in 1984, had completed the 12th

grade, and could read, write, and understand the English language.

Shackelford said that she was not under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or

medication, except for the medication she is prescribed for a mental health

disorder. Judge O’Callaghan reviewed the terms of the plea offer with

Shackelford and the sentencing range for the charge of manslaughter.

Shackelford confirmed that she had discussed the charges, sentencing range,

and plea terms with her attorney.

3 Criminal Docket No. 341,382. 2 Judge O’Callaghan then proceeded to review and discuss the rights

that Shackelford would waive if she elected to plead guilty. Shackelford

confirmed that she understood she would waive her right to a jury or judge

trial and to have the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; her right

to confront and cross-examine witnesses against her; her right to compulsory

process; her right to remain silent; and her right to appeal her conviction.

Judge O’Callaghan noted that as there was no agreed-upon sentence,

Shackelford would retain her right to appeal any sentence imposed.

Shackelford stated that, other than the state’s plea offer, she was not

given any promises or inducements to plead guilty and was not threatened or

forced to plead guilty. Judge O’Callaghan stated that the factual basis for

the plea was that Shackelford committed a simple battery on the victim,

without intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, but the victim still died as a

result of her actions. Shackelford agreed with the factual basis for the plea

and stated that she wished to plead guilty. Judge O’Callaghan accepted

Shackelford’s guilty plea as knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.

A presentence investigation report was ordered.

On January 7, 2019, Shackelford appeared for sentencing. R.M.’s

grandmother testified about him, and the developmental obstacles that he

had to overcome after being born prematurely and requiring breathing

treatments and corrective shoes. Judge O’Callaghan acknowledged that he

had received and reviewed victim impact letters from family as well as the

presentence investigation report. The state also introduced a copy of the

grand jury testimony offered by the forensic pathologist who conducted

R.M.’s autopsy. The trial judge reviewed all documents.

3 Judge O’Callaghan stated that after considering the circumstances of

the crime and other evidence presented in the pretrial hearing, including the

testimony of a neonatologist and R.M.’s siblings, he was considering a

sentencing range of 5-30 years, based on the pattern of neglect and abuse,

and Shackelford’s willingness to plead guilty and spare the family the ordeal

of trial.

Judge O’Callaghan found that a suspended or probated sentence

would be inappropriate in the matter, given the circumstances and the

gravity of Shackelford’s correctional needs. He then reviewed the

sentencing guidelines under La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and found applicable the

following aggravating factors.

First, Judge O’Callaghan noted that Shackelford showed deliberate

cruelty to the victim, where the forensic pathologist testified that R.M.

suffered a duodenal transection, a forceful and painful injury resulting from

blunt abdominal trauma, and she failed to properly respond and get him

treatment. Second, Shackelford knew, as the child’s mother and primary

caregiver, that R.M. was particularly vulnerable, given his troubled birth and

the obstacles he had endured. Third, Shackelford used actual violence in the

commission of the crime, which resulted in a significant injury that caused

R.M.’s death. Fourth, Shackelford had a history of neglectful abuse and of

prioritizing her drug use above the child’s welfare. Last, as a final

aggravating factor, the trial court found that, while Shackelford had accepted

legal responsibility, she had not done so psychologically as she believed that

she was somehow wronged, and that the criminal responsibility fell on her

and not on other members of the household.

4 Judge O’Callaghan noted as mitigating factors that Shackelford did

not intend to kill the child, that she had no history of prior criminal

convictions, and that she suffered some impairment due to mental health

issues.4

Judge O’Callaghan sentenced Shackelford to serve 25 years at hard

labor, with credit for time served. He ordered the sentence to run

concurrently to any other sentence and designated the conviction as a crime

of violence. He advised Shackelford that she had 30 days to appeal her

sentence and two years from the finality of the conviction and sentence to

file for post-conviction relief. The state dismissed the two counts of cruelty

to a juvenile that remained pending, and the mandatory sentencing

provisions of the sentence being without the benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence were also removed, meaning Shackelford would now

be eligible for consideration for the possibility of those provisions.

On January 11, 2019, Shackelford filed a motion to reconsider

sentence. She asked the trial court to reconsider her sentence in light of her

age, 34, her lack of substantial criminal history, and her mental health issues.

Judge O’Callaghan denied the motion on April 15, 2019, noting that he had

given careful consideration to her circumstances and the circumstances of

the case, and had given the previously detailed reasons explaining why the

sentence imposed was appropriate. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION

In her assignment of error, Shackelford argues the trial court erred in

imposing a constitutionally harsh and excessive sentence, given the

4 While in jail, Shackelford was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. 5 circumstances of this case. On review, Shackelford argues that she has a

deprived and unstable background based on self-medication with illicit

drugs, and now has been diagnosed with two mental health disorders. She

argues that courts have recognized that defendants with mental health issues

have a diminished capacity to understand and process information and that

this circumstance diminished her personal culpability. In support of this

argument, Shackelford cites Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct.

2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002), in which the United States Supreme Court

held that executions of criminals “suffering from a mental disability”

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth

Amendment. Shackelford argues that, given her mental illnesses, 25 years at

hard labor was constitutionally excessive.

The state argues that the sentence was not excessive in light of R.M.’s

death due to the painful blunt force trauma caused by Shackelford,

Shackelford’s pattern of drug abuse and child neglect, and the substantial

benefit that Shackelford received by pleading guilty and receiving a reduced

sentencing exposure and the dismissal of two other charges. The state

argues that the sentence was well within the sentencing range, was within

the trial court’s discretion, and was not a shock to the sense of justice.

Applicable law:

La. R.S. 14:31 provides that manslaughter is:

(A)(1) A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender’s blood had actually cooled, or that an average person’s blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed; or 6 (2) A homicide committed, without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm.

(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in Article 30 or 30.1, or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person; or

(b) When the offender is resisting lawful arrest by means, or in a manner, not inherently dangerous, and the circumstances are such that the killing would not be murder under Article 30 or 30.1.

B. Whoever commits manslaughter shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty years. However, if the victim killed was under the age of ten years, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, for not less than ten years nor more than forty years.

An excessive sentence claim is reviewed by examining whether the

trial court adequately considered the guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. State v.

Wing, 51,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/28/18), 246 So. 3d 711; State v. Gardner,

46,688 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/02/11), 77 So. 3d 1052.

A review of the sentencing guidelines does not require a listing of

every aggravating or mitigating circumstance. State v. Boehm, 51,229 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 04/05/17), 217 So. 3d 596; State v. Cunningham, 46,664 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/02/11), 77 So. 3d 477, writ not cons., 2016-0729 (La.

06/03/16), 192 So. 3d 758. When the defendant’s motion to reconsider

sentence raises only a claim that the sentence imposed was constitutionally

excessive, review of the sentence on appeal is restricted to that claim. La. C.

Cr. P. art. 881.1; State v. Williams, 51,667 (La. App. 2 Cir. 09/27/17), 245

So. 3d 131, writ not cons., 2018-0017 (La. 03/09/18), 237 So. 3d 1190; State

7 v. Turner, 50,221 (La. App. 2 Cir. 01/20/16), 186 So. 3d 720, writ denied,

16-0283 (La. 02/10/17), 215 So. 3d 700.

A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of

proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey,

623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Boehm, supra. A sentence is

considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are

viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice.

State v. Weaver, 2001-0467 (La. 01/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166; State v. Wing,

supra. Here, an innocent child relying on the care provided by his mother

was made to suffer and die at her hands.

The trial court must state for the record the consideration taken into

account and the factual basis for the sentence imposed. La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1(C). The trial court must consider the defendant’s personal history, the

defendant’s criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, and the

likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Boehm, supra. There is no requirement

that specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. Id. All

convictions and all prior criminal activity may be considered as well as other

evidence normally excluded from the trial. State v. Platt, 43,708 (La. App. 2

Cir. 12/03/08), 998 So. 2d 864, writ denied, 09-0265 (La. 11/06/09), 21 So.

3d 305.

The trial court has wide discretion in imposing a sentence within the

statutory limits, so absent a showing of abuse of that discretion, such a

sentence will not be set aside as excessive. State v. Mandigo, 48,801 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 02/26/14), 136 So. 3d 292, writ denied, 14-0630 (La. 10/24/14),

151 So. 3d 600. The reviewing court does not determine whether another 8 sentence would have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court

abused its discretion. State v. Jackson, 48,534 (La. App. 2 Cir. 01/15/14),

130 So. 3d 993; State v. Esque, 46,515 (La. App. 2 Cir. 09/21/11), 73 So. 3d

1021, writ denied, 11-2347 (La. 03/09/12), 84 So. 3d 551.

Application of law to facts:

Review of the record discloses no abuse of discretion regarding the

sentence imposed. The 25 year sentence was within the statutory limits of

the 0-40 years offered by the state’s plea agreement and was not a

maximum, nor a near-maximum sentence. The trial court took cognizance

of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and carefully detailed the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case.

The trial court noted the defendant’s lack of criminal history and her

history of drug abuse and her mental health issues. The trial court also

considered the circumstances of R.M.’s birth and developmental difficulties,

Shackelford’s history of neglect toward her children, the injuries that R.M.

suffered, and R.M.’s resulting death. The trial court reviewed letters and

testimony by R.M.’s family members.

The state’s plea offer afforded Shackelford a great deal of leniency in

sentencing by reducing her sentencing exposure and dismissing two other

criminal charges. Additionally, the trial court offered some leniency in

sentencing because Shackelford took legal responsibility by pleading guilty

and not causing the family to endure a trial. Regardless of whether

Shackelford’s situation was one that warranted any leniency, where she

suffered from mental health issues only recently diagnosed, the state and the

trial court clearly allowed for such considerations in providing her with a

reduced sentencing exposure and a sentence significantly less than the term 9 that could have been imposed. It is clear that the sentence imposed was

tailored to the offender and the offense. Thus, the sentence imposed here is

not out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense and does not shock the

sense of justice. Shackelford’s assignment of error is without merit. We

affirm.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Shackelford’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed.