State of Louisiana v. Billy Dean Cotten

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 14, 2018
DocketKA-0017-0684
StatusUnknown

This text of State of Louisiana v. Billy Dean Cotten (State of Louisiana v. Billy Dean Cotten) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Louisiana v. Billy Dean Cotten, (La. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

17-684 STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

BILLY DEAN COTTEN

************

APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 323,137 HONORABLE MARY LAUVE DOGGETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

************ SYLVIA R. COOKS JUDGE ************

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Billy Howard Ezell, and D. Kent Savoie, Judges.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

J. Phillip Terrell, Jr., District Attorney Catherine L. Davidson, Assistant District Attorney Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides P.O. Drawer 1472 Alexandria, LA 71309 (318) 473-6650 COUNSEL FOR STATE/APPELLEE: State of Louisiana

Mary Constance Hanes Louisiana Appellate Project P.O. Box 4015 New Orleans, LA 70178-4015 (504) 866-6652 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Billy Dean Cotten COOKS, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 6, 2014, nine-month-old Aiden Dyson was left by his mother in

the care of his step-father, Defendant, Billy Dean Cotten, while she went to work.

Several hours later, the victim was taken to the hospital suffering from life

threatening injuries requiring him to be placed on life support. The following day,

after it was determined that Aiden had no brain activity, he was removed from life

support.

After an investigation by the authorities, Defendant was jointly charged with

his wife, Darlene Michelle Cotten, by bill of indictment with the March 6, 2014,

second degree murder of Defendant’s step-son, Aiden Dyson. A jury unanimously

convicted Defendant of the charged offense, and the court subsequently imposed a

mandatory life sentence at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or

suspension of sentence. From this conviction and sentence, Defendant appeals.

ANALYSIS

Assignment of Error One

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends the State presented

insufficient evidence to support his conviction of second degree murder in that it

failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the death was caused accidentally

and unintentionally.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1 states in pertinent part:

A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:

....

(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of . . . cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, . . . even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

Cruelty to juveniles is defined in pertinent part as:

2 (1) The intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect by anyone seventeen years of age or older of any child under the age of seventeen whereby unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused to said child. Lack of knowledge of the child’s age shall not be a defense[.]

La.R.S. 14:93.

Second degree cruelty to juveniles is defined in pertinent part as follows:

A. (1) Second degree cruelty to juveniles is the intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect by anyone over the age of seventeen to any child under the age of seventeen which causes serious bodily injury or neurological impairment to that child.

(2) For purposes of this Section, “serious bodily injury” means bodily injury involving protracted and obvious disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or substantial risk of death.

La.R.S. 14:93.2.3.

In State v. Jackson, 15-393 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/15), 179 So.3d 753, 767-69,

writ denied, 15-2191 (La. 5/2/16), 206 So.3d 877, this court reviewed the

sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented in a second degree murder

case which was based on cruelty to a juvenile. In doing so, this court stated:

In State v. Taylor, 14-432, pp. 7-8 (La.3/17/15), 166 So.3d 988, 993-94 (emphasis added), the court explained in pertinent part:

The rational trier of fact standard established by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), preserves “‘the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence,’” by requiring an appellate court to review “‘all of the evidence . . . in the light most favorable to the prosecution.’” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 134, 130 S.Ct. 665, 674, 175 L.Ed.2d 582 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781). Preserving the role of the factfinder means that in cases involving circumstantial evidence, when “the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant [ ], that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt.” State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La.1984). The alternative hypothesis is not one that merely “could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion,” but one that, after viewing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, admissible as well as inadmissible, “is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not ‘have found proof of guilt beyond 3 a reasonable doubt.’” Captville, 448 So.2d at 680 (quoting Jackson ); see State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La.1992) (“[W]hen the entirety of the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, is sufficient to support the conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing court must then consider the assignments of trial error to determine whether the accused is entitled to a new trial.”). . . .

. . . This court has stated the following regarding circumstantial evidence:

[W]hen the conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence, La.R.S. 15:438 provides that such evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Camp, 446 So.2d 1207 (La.1984); State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984). However, La.R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review on appeal than the rational juror’s reasonable doubt standard. . . . On appeal, the issue is whether a rational trier of fact, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could find that all reasonable hypotheses of innocence were excluded.

State v. Dotson, 04-1414, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05), 896 So.2d 310, 312. Additionally, when a jury “‘reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant[ ], that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Strother, 09-2357, p. 11 (La.10/22/10), 49 So.3d 372, 378 (quoting State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La.1984)).

Id. at 767-69.

At trial, Doug Alford, a detective with the Alexandria Police Department,

testified that on March 6, 2014, he investigated a call concerning the incident at

issue in this case. He proceeded to the emergency room where he observed the

victim intubated and non-responsive. From there, he went to the police station to

interview Defendant. After advising Defendant of his rights and securing a waiver

thereof, Detective Alford took a statement from Defendant wherein he detailed the

events that transpired on the day of the incident: 4 A. He said that his wife had left somewhere around ten, ten thirty in that time frame that morning. He had laid the baby down, Aiden, down for a nap. He said the baby slept till about twelve forty-five, somewhere in that time frame. He wasn’t real sure on the time. He woke the baby up, fed the baby, gave him his medicine, put him back to sleep. About forty-five minutes later, he heard the baby crying. He goes in there, picks the baby up and the baby started seizing.

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Related

McDaniel v. Brown
558 U.S. 120 (Supreme Court, 2010)
Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
State v. Captville
448 So. 2d 676 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1984)
State v. Dotson
896 So. 2d 310 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2005)
State v. Wright
445 So. 2d 1198 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1984)
State v. Hearold
603 So. 2d 731 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1992)
State v. Camp
446 So. 2d 1207 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1984)
State v. Strother
49 So. 3d 372 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2010)
State of Louisiana v. Wayne G. Taylor A/K/A Wayne Taylor
166 So. 3d 988 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2015)
State v. Augustine
131 So. 3d 109 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2013)
State v. Bowman
139 So. 3d 529 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2014)
State v. Weathersby
140 So. 3d 260 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2014)
State v. Jackson
179 So. 3d 753 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2015)
State v. Peters
60 So. 3d 672 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2011)
State v. Foster
828 So. 2d 72 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2002)

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