State of Louisiana v. Barry Bowie

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: July 1, 2025
• Docket: 2024-KA-0700
• Status: Published

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-KA-0700

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL

BARRY BOWIE * FOURTH CIRCUIT

* STATE OF LOUISIANA

*

* ******* RLB BELSOME, C. J., CONCURS WITH REASONS

I join in the overall decision reached by the majority but write separately to

concur in the reversal of Mr. Bowie’s obstruction conviction and to highlight my

concerns with the Court’s continued reliance on State v. Scott, 23-0022 (La. App. 4

Cir. 8/30/23), 372 So.3d 42, as a near-dispositive framework for obstruction under

La. R.S. 14:130.1. While Scott aimed to clarify what constitutes obstruction, it has

since been applied in a way that shifts the focus from what the State proves to what

the defendant fails to do.

Under La. R.S. 14:130.1, obstruction of justice is a specific intent crime that

requires: (1) an act of tampering with evidence, including movement; (2) occurring

at or near a location the defendant reasonably believes will be investigated; and (3)

done with the specific intent to distort the results of a criminal investigation. See

State v. Manuel, 21-0273, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/6/22), 337 So.3d 967, 973-74.

The statute does not require that the offender succeed, only that the intent, which

may be inferred from the circumstances, is present. Id. at p. 12, 337 So.3d at 974

(citing State v. Dorsey, 20-0029, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/9/20), 312 So.3d 652,

660).

The State’s evidence showed Mr. Bowie rode a bicycle from his home to the

apartment complex shortly before the shooting and later fled while appearing to

hold a handgun, which he eventually tucked into his waistband. Surveillance

1 footage placed him near the victim’s apartment during the relevant timeframe.

Additional footage showed the victim walking to the alcove where his apartment

was located, followed by a person in dark clothing just before gunshots rang out.

Among the evidence recovered from the scene included six 9mm shell casings, two

bullets, and copper fragments. The firearm was never recovered.

“Nothing beyond ‘movement’ of the evidence is required by the statute if

accompanied by the requisite intent and knowledge.” State v. Powell, 15-0218, p.

11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/28/15), 179 So.3d 721, 728 (citing State v. Jones, 07-1052,

p. 11 (La. 6/3/08), 983 So.2d 95, 102) (emphasis added). The State contends a jury

could infer specific intent from Mr. Bowie’s flight with the weapon. But while

flight may reflect consciousness of guilt, it does not necessarily signal a calculated

effort to obstruct a police investigation.

Indeed, in most cases, taking the weapon and fleeing reflects an instinct for

self-preservation, not interference. That instinct may explain why a defendant runs

or even why he takes the gun, but it does not automatically show a desire to

impede an investigation. The statute appears to anticipate that perpetrators will

flee. What elevates flight to obstruction is additional conduct aimed at concealing

or destroying evidence. See State v. Ramirez-Delgado, 24-119, p. 10 (La. App. 5

Cir. 12/18/24), -- So.3d --, -- , 2024 WL 5153070 *6 (“more [is required] than

merely leaving the scene of a crime with the murder weapon to support an

obstruction of justice conviction.”). In other words, obstruction is conduct that

actively delays or derails investigative efforts. See Powell, supra (hiding weapon in

a closet); State v. Alexander, 23-0540 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/23/24), 401 So.3d 105

(deleting call log history).

The majority is correct in rejecting the State’s assertion that mere flight with

a weapon constitutes obstruction. Id. at p. 17, 401 So.3d at 115 (rejecting the

argument that “any time circumstantial evidence shows that an assailant failed to

2 abandon a weapon used during the commission of an offense at the scene of the

crime, adequate proof would exist to support an obstruction of justice

conviction.”). I agree that this evidence does not rise to the level required to

support Mr. Bowie’s obstruction conviction.

However, I part company with the majority in its continued reliance on dicta

from Scott, echoed recently in State v. White, 24-0385 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/25), --

So.3d --, --, 2025 WL 1415587, as a framework for obstruction analysis.

As in this case, the defendant in Scott fled the scene of a shooting, the gun

was never found, and no other obstructive conduct was shown. The State argued

that intent could be inferred from the defendant’s departure with the gun. Scott

rejected that premise, and in doing so, offered hypothetical actions that might have

supported a finding of obstructive intent including collecting shell casings, deleting

surveillance footage, and harming witnesses. The examples were illustrative and

meant only to explain the evidentiary gap in that case, not to establish a blueprint

for determining obstruction in future cases.

Yet, Scott has since evolved into a de facto test for obstruction, substituting

the statute’s case-specific inquiry with a checklist of omissions. This analysis shifts

the inquiry away from what the State actually proved the defendant did toward

evaluating what the defendant failed to do that would have been obviously

obstructive. But obstruction under La. R.S. 14:130.1 is context-dependent. The

majority’s approach departs from the statutory framework and risks shifting the

evidentiary burden. The question is not whether the defendant’s conduct checked

hypothetical boxes, but whether his actions shows an intent to distort the results of

an investigation. That question cannot be answered by speculating about what

more the defendant might have done.

Still, the majority concludes that Mr. Bowie lacked obstructive intent

because he did not collect shell casings, destroy surveillance footage, or silence

3 witnesses. In doing so, it trades one flawed standard for another: from presuming

obstruction based on flight to denying it based on omission.

Criminal acts often occur in chaotic or emotionally-charged circumstances.

A perpetrator may lack the opportunity, means, or awareness to undertake such

steps as those posed in Scott. Failing to collect casings or erase footage may reflect

situational constraints, not necessarily the absence of intent.

The appropriate inquiry remains rooted in what the defendant did, and

whether the State’s evidence supports a finding that he intended to interfere with

an investigation. To do otherwise risks holding post-crime conduct against an

unrealistic and overly rigid standard of obstruction. The fact is, most defendants

flee to avoid being associated with a crime scene. Presumably, that reflex is

grounded in self-preservation, not an intent to obstruct. Absent evidence that the

defendant took additional steps to hinder the investigation, an obstruction

conviction cannot be sustained. See Ramirez-Delgado, 24-119, p. 10, -- So.3d at --,

2024 WL 5153070, at *6. Because the State offered no evidence of obstructive

conduct beyond Mr. Bowie’s flight with the gun, I agree that the conviction cannot

stand.

For these reasons, I concur in the result but caution against entrenching Scott

as a framework for obstruction under La. R.S. 14:130.1.