State of Louisiana v. Angella Rochell Marshall

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: January 10, 2024
• Docket: 55,470-KA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered January 10, 2024. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,470-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

ANGELLA ROCHELL Appellant MARSHALL

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 379,125

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Peggy J. Sullivan

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

SAMUEL S. CRICHTON TOMMY J. JOHNSON Assistant District Attorneys

Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and MARCOTTE, JJ. PITMAN, C. J.

Defendant Angella Rochell Marshall was found guilty of vehicular

homicide and was sentenced to 15 years at hard labor, 5 years of which

were to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence; a fine of $10,000; and a requirement that she take a substance

abuse course and a driver improvement course. She appeals her conviction

and sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On October 10, 2020, near midnight, Defendant was driving on West

College Street in Shreveport. She ran a stop sign at the corner of West

College and Jewella Avenue and struck a 2020 Chevrolet pickup truck

driven by Kerrick Walker, a licensed CDL (Commercial Driver’s License)

driver who was driving north on Jewella. The force of the initial impact

spun Walker’s truck into the southbound lane of Jewella where he was

struck again by a car driven by Lenard Pierce. The second collision caused

Walker’s truck to roll over the top of Pierce’s car. Walker was

unconscious for a few moments. Pierce was killed in the accident.

Defendant showed signs of intoxication and a breathalyzer was

performed approximately two hours after the accident. The result was a

blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) of .184, more than twice the legal

limit. Walker was also tested, and his BAC was 0.0. The damage to all

vehicles was extensive, and Pierce’s body had to be removed from his

vehicle with the jaws of life.

Defendant was charged with vehicular homicide, a violation of La.

R.S. 14:32.1, in that she caused the death of Pierce while she was engaged

in the operation of, or in actual physical control of, any motor vehicle whether or not she had the intent to cause death or great bodily harm and

had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more.

A jury trial was held October 25, 2022. Walker testified that he was

driving on Jewella, saw the headlights of Defendant’s car coming toward

him and knew an accident was going to occur. He described being hit,

being knocked into the southbound lane, being struck by Pierce’s car and

his truck rolling over. He stated that he passed out briefly, but when he

came back to consciousness, he saw people running away from Pierce’s car.

He testified that he did not know a person was still in the vehicle because it

appeared empty. He stated that he spoke to Defendant who said she had

been on the phone fighting with her boyfriend when she ran the stop sign.

He stated that she was alone in her car except for her dog. Family members

met him and took him to the police station. He went to the hospital to be

checked the next day.

Officer A. Visciotti of the Shreveport Police Department patrol

division responded to the scene of the accident. He observed all three

heavily damaged vehicles in the southbound lanes of Jewella. He stated

that at that intersection, there were no traffic control devices on Jewella, but

there were stop signs on both sides of West College prior to entering

Jewella. He testified that Walker’s truck was initially struck on the left, or

driver’s side, which caused it to veer into the southbound lane of Jewella.

Pierce’s car’s windshield was completely flat and crushed in on top of the

driver. He checked Pierce’s body for a pulse but found none. The

Shreveport Fire Department responded and pronounced Pierce dead at the

scene. Pierce’s death certificate and coroner’s report were introduced into

evidence and showed blunt force injury caused by a motor vehicle crash to 2 be the cause of death. Pierce’s autopsy report also stated that postmortem

toxicology revealed the presence of different forms of THC, which is

associated with marijuana consumption. The manner of death is stated as

an accident.

Ofc. Visciotti took the written statements of Defendant and Walker at

the scene. They were admitted into evidence at the trial. Defendant’s

statement is almost illegible, but the last line states, “[ j]ust thank God

everyone was okay.” He testified that he took Defendant to a controlled

area to conduct sobriety tests because the accident scene was already very

large and it was dark and raining. She made another statement and

admitted to driving her car and hitting another vehicle. He stated that

Defendant’s speech was slurred and that she had trouble answering

questions. She also seemed very detached from the situation, saying she

was glad everyone was okay, when in fact, a deceased person was right in

front of her. According to Ofc. Visciotti, she was more concerned about

her dog than she was about the scene of the accident.

Corporal Corey Sullivan, Shreveport Police Department, testified that

on the night of the accident he was working on the DWI (Driving While

Intoxicated) taskforce and that he was trained to administer field sobriety

tests and was certified in the Intoxilyzer 9000. Cpl. Sullivan administered

the Intoxilyzer 9000 test to both Walker and Defendant in a room at the

station equipped with a video camera. The Chemical Rights Form was

given to both of them, and Defendant also received a voluntary submission

form after her rights were read to her. Defendant was unable to sign her

form because it was an electronic form but stated she was willing to sign

3 had she been able to do so. Cpl. Sullivan testified that Walker had no

alcohol in his system, but Defendant’s BAC was .184.

Cpl. Sullivan further testified that the legal limit for alcohol

consumption is .08 and that Defendant’s was more than double the legal

limit. The presumption was that Defendant was intoxicated and unable to

operate a motor vehicle. He stated that over time, the BAC will decrease if

the person has not consumed any more alcohol and that the test was

administered to Defendant two hours after the accident. He testified that he

did not perform the tests usually performed in the field, i.e., the one-leg

stand test, the horizontal gaze nystagmus test and others, because Defendant

had been in a very serious car accident and might have been injured, which

would have affected her ability to take the test. He stated that the

breathalyzer test was adequate to prove that she was intoxicated at the time

of the accident. The state rested, and the defense did not present any

evidence.

A unanimous jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged of vehicular

homicide. Sentencing was held on November 28, 2022. Defendant filed a

motion for a new trial and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict. The trial court denied both motions at the sentencing hearing, and

Defendant waived the delay provided by law for sentencing to occur.

The trial court noted the penalty for vehicular homicide under La.

R.S. 14:32.1. It considered La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and mitigating factors.

It offered Defendant the opportunity to have a hearing on whether she could

pay the fine to be imposed, but she waived this right and stated that she

could pay the fine over time. She signed a waiver of financial declaration

hearing. The trial court sentenced her to 15 years at hard labor, 5 of which 4 were to be served without benefits. It fined her $10,000 and court costs,

which would be paid through inmate banking. She was ordered to

participate in a court-approved substance abuse program and a driver

improvement program when she was finished serving her sentence. She

filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied.

Defendant appeals her conviction and sentence.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant argues the state failed to carry its burden of proof beyond

a reasonable doubt that she was guilty of vehicular homicide in that it failed

to establish a causal link between her “condition” and the crash as required

by statute. She admits she was driving the car and that she hit Walker’s

truck, causing him to hit Pierce. She admits her BAC was .184, but she

denies that she was the cause of Pierce’s death. She asserts that a link must

be shown between intoxication and the death; and because no causation was

shown, the evidence presented was insufficient to find her guilty as

charged. She argues that the state failed to exclude every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence, including the “reasonable hypothesis” that the

victim’s own impairment contributed to the accident.

Defendant also argues that the state relied on circumstantial evidence

to prove her guilt, i.e., that her BAC was .184. She contends that when the

state relies on circumstantial evidence to establish the existence of an

essential element of a crime, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of

innocence. She contends that it is a reasonable hypothesis that Pierce’s own

inebriation from marijuana, which was found in the toxicology report of his

autopsy, was a cause of his death. She claims that this was not a subject 5 that was brought up at trial other than in the autopsy report submitted in

conjunction with the state’s case. For these reasons, she argues that the

state failed to meet its burden of proof.

The state argues that the blood alcohol results and Defendant’s

behavioral manifestations provided sufficient evidence to sustain the

conviction. The state asserts that, clearly, Defendant’s BAC of .184, more

than twice the legal limit, was a contributing cause of the accident and,

thus, caused Pierce’s death. It argues that Defendant’s BAC is presumptive

evidence of impairment that contributed to Pierce’s death and points out

that other aspects of her demeanor at the scene, and later at the station,

indicated that her impairment was the cause of the accident. She had

slurred speech, could not write legibly, was unaware that she had killed

someone and was detached from the situation. It contends that proof of her

BAC and associated behavior should be considered sufficient to meet the

elements of the statute.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). This standard, now

legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, is applicable in cases

involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Miller, 53,356

(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/22/20), 295 So. 3d 443, writ denied, 20-00888 (La.

11/24/20), 305 So. 3d 104. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. 6 When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct

evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence

must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of

the crime. Id. Where a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the

evidence “must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id.,

quoting La. R.S. 15:438.

La. R.S. 14:32.1 states in pertinent part as follows:

A. Vehicular homicide is the killing of a human being caused proximately or caused directly by an offender engaged in the operation of, or in actual physical control of, any motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or other means of conveyance, whether or not the offender had the intent to cause death or great bodily harm, whenever any of the following conditions exist and such condition was a contributing factor to the killing:

*** (2) The operator’s blood alcohol concentration is 0.08 percent or more by weight based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.

In State v. Leger, 17-2084 (La. 6/26/19), 284 So. 3d 609, the court

stated:

The plain text of the statute now requires the state to prove four things: 1) the killing of a human being; 2) caused proximately or caused directly by an offender engaged in the operation of, or in actual physical control of, any motor vehicle; 3) a prohibited degree of intoxication; and 4) a link between the intoxication and the killing. Most importantly, the link between the intoxication and the killing does not have to be a “proximate cause,” but simply a “contributing factor.”

A “proximate cause” is one that directly produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred. By contrast, a “contributing cause” is a factor that - though not the primary cause - plays a part in producing a result. A “factor” is an agent or cause that contributes to a particular result.

(Internal citations omitted.)

7 The evidence presented in this case was sufficient to meet every

element of the crime of vehicular homicide. Defendant’s BAC was more

than twice the legal limit and was established at .184 approximately two

hours after the accident took place, presumably during which time it should

have typically decreased. Defendant’s demeanor at the scene of the

accident as reported by the responding officer proved that she was oblivious

to the damage she caused when she ran the stop sign, hit Walker and caused

his truck to crush the victim’s vehicle. It is clear her intoxication was a

contributing cause of Pierce’s death. Further, it is not a reasonable

hypothesis to argue that the presence of THC in Pierce’s body at the time of

his death was a contributing factor of his demise. For these reasons, this

assignment of error is without merit.

Excessive Sentence

Defendant argues that the sentence imposed of 15 years’

imprisonment at hard labor with the first 5 years being served without

benefits, a fine of $10,000, the requirement that she attend a rehabilitation

program and a driving improvement program is excessive under the

circumstances of the case. She asserts that the trial court failed to state the

provisions of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 that it considered and noted it cited the

loss of life as a factor for her harsh sentence. She argued that the loss of life

had already been considered as an element of the crime and should not have

been reconsidered as a factor during sentencing. She also points out that

mitigating factors were not discussed in great detail when sentencing

occurred.

Defendant also argues that had she known she was going to be fined

$10,000 when the statute calls for a fine of not less than $2,000 and not 8 more than $15,000, she would not have waived her right to a hearing to

determine her ability to pay over time. She complains that the trial court

had not specifically advised her the fine would be so substantial when it

questioned her about her ability to pay and whether she wanted the hearing.

She contends that the imposition of a substantial fine in conjunction with a

lengthy hard labor sentence was not appropriate. She states that the purpose

of financial obligations is to hold an offender accountable for his actions,

but any financial obligation in excess of what an offender can reasonably

pay undermines the primary purpose of the justice system. For these

reasons, Defendant argues the sentence imposed was excessive and shocks

the conscience.

The state argues that the sentence imposed is not excessive as it falls

within the statutory range imposed in La. R.S. 14:32.1(B) and that the

record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence. The trial

court is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so

long as the record reflects adequate consideration of the guidelines. It is not

required to assign any particular weight to any specific matters at

sentencing and is given broad discretion in sentencing matters.

La. R.S. 14:32.1(B) contains the penalty for vehicular homicide and

states in pertinent part:

Whoever commits the crime of vehicular homicide shall be fined not less than two thousand dollars nor more than fifteen thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years. At least three years of the sentence of imprisonment shall be imposed without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. If the operator’s blood alcohol concentration is 0.15 percent or more by weight based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood, then at least five years of the sentence

9 of imprisonment shall be imposed without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Appellate review of sentences for excessiveness is a two-pronged

inquiry. State v. Benavides, 54,265 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 336 So. 3d

114. First, the record must show that the court complied with La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1. The court need not list every aggravating or mitigating factor so

long as the record reflects that it adequately considered the guidelines.

State v. Benavides, supra. When the record shows an adequate factual basis

for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even in the absence of full

compliance with the article. Id. No sentencing factor is accorded greater

weight by statute than any other factor. Id.

The second prong is constitutional excessiveness. A sentence violates

La. Const. art. 1, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of

the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless imposition of

pain and suffering. State v. Benavides, supra. A sentence is deemed

grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in

light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice or makes no

reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals. Id. The sentencing court

has wide discretion in imposing a sentence within statutory limits, and such

a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest

abuse of that discretion. Id. The issue is not whether some other sentence

might have been more appropriate, but whether the district court abused its

discretion. Id.

The purpose of imposing financial obligations on an offender who is

convicted of a criminal offense is to hold the offender accountable for his

actions, to compensate victims for any actual pecuniary loss or costs

10 incurred in connection with a criminal prosecution, to defray the cost of

court operations, and to provide services to offenders and victims. La. C.

Cr. P. art. 875.1(A). These financial obligations should not create a barrier

to the offender’s successful rehabilitation and reentry into society. Id.

Financial obligations in excess of what an offender can reasonably pay

undermine the primary purpose of the justice system, which is to deter

criminal behavior and encourage compliance with the law. Id.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 875.1(C)(1) provides that the court shall conduct a

hearing to determine whether payment in full of the aggregate amount of all

the financial obligations to be imposed upon the defendant would cause

substantial financial hardship to the defendant or his dependents. However,

the defendant or the court may waive the judicial determination of a

substantial financial hardship required by the provisions of the article. La.

C. Cr. P. art. 875.1(C)(2).

In this case, the trial court reviewed the sentencing range provided in

the statute, addressed the factors to be considered under La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1 and found Defendant in need of correctional treatment. It also

found that a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of her crime.

The trial court considered mitigating factors but found that the crime

warranted imposition of imprisonment in the midrange of 15 years.

The imposition of the fine of $10,000 was also provided by statute.

Defendant was given the opportunity to ask for a hearing on the hardship of

paying the fine, but she waived that right, which was also provided by

statute. There is nothing to indicate the trial court abused its discretion in

the imposition of the sentence, and it is not constitutionally excessive.

For the foregoing reasons, this assignment of error is without merit. 11 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of Defendant

Angella Rochell Marshall are hereby affirmed.

AFFIRMED.