Judgment rendered October 1, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,427-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Plaintiff-Appellee
versus
AHKEEM JAMAL WIGGINS, JR. Defendant-Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 401,201
Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for By: Annette Fuller Roach Defendant-Appellant
JAMES EDWARD STEWART, SR. Counsel for District Attorney Plaintiff-Appellee
JASON WAYNE WALTMAN MARGARET E. RICHIE GASKINS ASHLIN NICOLE THOMAS Assistant District Attorneys
Before STONE, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ. HUNTER, J.
Defendant, Ahkeem Jamal Wiggins, Jr., was charged by bill of
information with battery of a pregnant dating partner, in violation of La. R.S.
14:34.9(K), and battery of a dating partner by strangulation, in violation of
La. R.S. 14:34.9(L). Following a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged.
Defendant was sentenced to serve three years at hard labor without the
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for each count. The
sentences were ordered to be served consecutively with each other and any
other sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
Defendant, Ahkeem Jamal Wiggins, Jr., and the victim, Ebony Baker,
were childhood friends who reconnected in 2023. Ms. Baker was married to
another man, but she and her husband were estranged. By February 2024,
defendant and Ms. Baker were involved in a relationship, which Ms. Baker
described as “dating,” “courting,” “getting to know each other,” and “having
sex.” She had two children from previous relationships, and she was
pregnant with defendant’s child. Defendant was aware of Ms. Baker’s
marital status and that he was the father of her unborn child. He
accompanied her to several obstetric appointments. Over time, Ms. Baker
ceased being sexually intimate with defendant because she “didn’t want to
make a wrong judgment [about] being in a relationship with him.”
On February 24, 2024, Ms. Baker informed defendant that she was
planning to move to Houston, Texas the following year, and according to
Ms. Baker, the conversation did not end well. On the morning of February
25, 2024, defendant and Ms. Baker exchanged text messages and that
evening, she and some of her family members went to dinner at a restaurant. As Ms. Baker was driving home from the restaurant, defendant called her to
continue the conversation about her moving to Texas. Defendant requested
to meet with Ms. Baker to continue the conversation in person; however, she
declined to do so.
Ms. Baker drove home while talking to a friend on her cellphone.
Within minutes of her pulling into her driveway, defendant pulled into the
driveway behind her. Ms. Baker exited her car, admonished defendant about
coming to her home unannounced, and told him to leave. Ms. Baker got
back into her car and attempted to close the door. Defendant reopened the
door, and Ms. Baker told him to leave her alone; defendant refused and
remained in the doorway of her vehicle. Ms. Baker attempted to push
defendant out of her way so she could exit her vehicle. Defendant grabbed
Ms. Baker around her neck and began to strangle her. According to Ms.
Baker, defendant strangled her “so hard that [she] couldn’t breathe.” As he
was strangling her, defendant told her he was a “different breed,” and he
stated, “I’ll kill you. I’ll kill you.”
Eventually, Ms. Baker managed to extricate herself from defendant.
However, as she attempted to move away from him, defendant grabbed her,
and they both fell to the ground. While on the ground defendant put Ms.
Baker in a headlock, by placing his arm around her throat, and attempted to
strangle her again. After a struggle, Ms. Baker escaped the headlock, but
defendant wrapped his legs around her torso and began to squeeze her body
using his legs. Ms. Baker cried out that defendant was hurting her and
begged him to let her go; yet, he refused to release her. According to Ms.
Baker, defendant stated, “Oh, you think you’re going to kill my baby? I’ll
kill you and this baby.” Defendant released Ms. Baker after she verbally 2 placated him by agreeing to talk with him. The two of them had a
conversation, and defendant left Ms. Baker’s home.
The entire incident was captured by Ms. Baker’s Ring Doorbell
camera and a security camera installed underneath her carport. The video
clearly depicted defendant holding Ms. Baker by her neck and lifting her off
the ground. The recording also captured defendant stating to Ms. Baker,
“I’m a different breed. I’m a different breed. I’ll kill you. I’ll kill you.”
Both of defendant’s hands were wrapped around Ms. Baker’s neck while he
made the threats.1
After defendant left Ms. Baker’s home, she called the Shreveport
Police Department (“SPD”) to report the incident, and Officer James Oates
responded to the call. When Officer Oates arrived, he observed scratches on
Ms. Baker’s face, and he documented her statement.
In April 2024, defendant was interviewed by Detective Kimberly
Monereau of the SPD. After being advised of his Miranda rights and
signing a waiver of rights form, defendant stated that he and Ms. Baker had
been sexual partners and were expecting a child together. He also asserted
that Ms. Baker described their relationship as “friends with benefits,” and
she had expressed concerns about having the baby because she did not want
to have children “from different fathers.” Defendant also stated that tensions
arose because he wanted to raise his unborn child in the same household as
Ms. Baker, but she did not want to live together.
1 The video footage was admitted into evidence and played for the jury at trial. During her testimony, Ms. Baker identified herself and defendant as the people depicted in the video. 3 During the interview, defendant recounted his version of the incident.
He stated that he was “triggered” when Ms. Baker pushed him twice, and he
responded by grabbing her by her neck. Defendant denied choking Ms.
Baker, and, initially, he denied threatening to kill her. However, after the
officers confronted him with the video surveillance footage, he admitted to
that he threatened to kill Ms. Baker “in the heat of the moment.”
Additionally, defendant stated that it was Ms. Baker who pulled him to the
ground. According to defendant, Ms. Baker bit him, and he responded by
biting her back. He denied using his legs to squeeze Ms. Baker around her
abdominal area. Although defendant apologized for his actions, he stated
the only reason he was in jail was “because of a woman who is traumatized”
by her past relationships.
Defendant was charged by bill of information with battery of a dating
partner (while pregnant), in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.9(K), and battery of a
dating partner (strangulation), in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.9(L). A jury
trial was held on October 24, 2024.
During the trial, Ms. Baker testified as to the events that transpired on
February 25, 2024. Officer Oates and Det. Monereau also testified about
their investigation of the incident.
Defendant declined to testify in his defense. However, against the
advice of counsel, defendant addressed the trial court and stated that he
wanted his grandmother, Annie Wiggins, to testify as a character witness.
The trial court allowed Ms. Wiggins to testify, and she testified that she
raised defendant, and he lived with her until he was 16 or 17 years old. She
stated defendant had a good heart, and she had never known him to be
abusive, violent, or disrespectful. During her testimony on cross- 4 examination, Ms. Wiggins admitted that she knew defendant had a prior
conviction for armed robbery, and she heard he had been convicted of
introducing contraband into a correctional facility.
The unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial
court denied defendant’s motions for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and
new trial. Defendant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment at hard
labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for
each count. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively with
each other and any other sentence.2 The trial court denied defendant’s
motion to reconsider sentence.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the
convictions. He argues the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that defendant and Ms. Baker were “dating partners,” which is a necessary
element of the offense. Defendant asserts he and Ms. Baker had engaged in
sexual intercourse “a few times,” and they conceived their child during this
“brief period of intimacy.” According to defendant, Ms. Baker was still
legally married to another man, and she did not want her relationship with
defendant to go any further.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
2 At the time the instant offenses were committed, defendant was on parole after serving 13 years in prison for armed robbery. 5 Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.
Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124
S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now codified in La. C.
Cr. P. art. 821, does not afford the appellate court with a means to substitute
its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v.
Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Johnson, 55,254
(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/9/23), 370 So. 3d 91.
Appellate courts neither assess the credibility of witnesses nor
reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.
Rather, the reviewing court affords great deference to the jury’s decision to
accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.
Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ denied, 02-
3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d 422. Where there is conflicting testimony
concerning factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a
determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the
weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Allen, 36,180 (La. App. 2
Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writ denied, 02-2595 (La. 3/28/03), 849 So.
2d 566, writ denied, 02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1255, cert denied,
540 U.S. 1185, 124 S. Ct. 1404, 158 L. Ed 2d 90 (2004).
As stated above, defendant was convicted of battery of a pregnant
dating partner and battery of a dating partner by strangulation. La. R.S.
14:34.9(B)(3) provides, in pertinent part:
“Dating partner” means any person who is involved or has been involved in a sexual or intimate relationship with the offender characterized by the expectation of affectionate involvement independent of financial considerations, regardless of whether the person presently lives or formerly lived in the same residence with the offender. “Dating partner” shall not include a
6 casual relationship or ordinary association between persons in a business or social context.
In State v. Smith, 23-399 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 380 So. 3d 109,
the defendant appealed his conviction for battery of a dating partner, arguing
the victim did not meet the definition of “dating partner.” During the trial,
the victim was asked whether she and the defendant were involved in a
“romantic relationship,” and she responded, “We were just having sex.” The
defendant argued that a casual and purely sexual relationship did not meet
the definition of “dating partner.” The Court stated:
[T]he two factors that encompass a “dating partner” are: 1) a past or current sexual or intimate relationship, and 2) an expectation of affectionate involvement. *** For purposes of statutory interpretation, courts have commonly used dictionaries as a valuable source for determining the “common and approved usage of words.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “expectation” as “1. The act of looking forward; anticipation. 2. A basis on which something is expected to happen; esp., the prospect of receiving wealth, honors, or the like.” The term “affection” is defined as “a feeling of liking and caring for someone or something: tender attachment: fondness.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “affection” as “[f]ond attachment, devotion, or love.” Finally, the term “involved” is defined as “having a part in something: included in something: actively participating in something: having a romantic or sexual relationship.” Therefore, considering the common usage of the words included in the phrase “expectation of affectionate involvement,” we interpret that phrase to mean the prospect of liking someone or something that also includes having a romantic or sexual relationship.
Id. at 115-6 (internal citation and footnotes omitted).
The Court concluded the State met its burden of proving the defendant
and the victim were dating partners as defined in the statute. The Court
considered the following facts: the defendant and the victim were
romantically involved for approximately two years; they texted and called 7 each other; the defendant had a key to the victim’s home; the victim
chauffeured the defendant upon request; the defendant and the victim “hung
out” together; and the victim would bring the defendant to the home where
her children were present.
In the instant case, Ms. Baker admitted that she did not want to be
involved in a committed relationship with defendant. Nevertheless, she used
the terms “dating” and “courting” to describe her relationship with
defendant. Additionally, the jury was able to view the video of defendant’s
interview with law enforcement officers. During the interview, defendant
described his relationship with Ms. Baker as “complicated.” He stated he
and Ms. Baker spent a lot of time together, they texted and called each other,
and he sometimes spent the night at her home where her children were
present. Defendant expressed his desire to live in the same household as Ms.
Baker so they could raise their unborn child together. Defendant further
stated that he spent the night at Ms. Baker’s residence, and he would assist
her children, particularly her four-year-old son, in getting ready for school to
allow Ms. Baker to rest in the mornings. He also asserted that Ms. Baker’s
12-year-old son had expressed confusion because although his mother told
him that defendant was her “friend,” the child had witnessed intimate and
affectionate gestures between his mother and defendant.
We have reviewed this record in its entirety. According to Ms.
Baker’s testimony and the defendant’s description of the relationship, it is
clear that defendant and Ms. Baker “ha[d] been involved in a sexual
relationship with an expectation of affectionate involvement independent of
financial considerations.” Consequently, based on our review of this record
and the applicable law, we find the evidence was sufficient to support the 8 jury’s determination that defendant and Ms. Baker were “dating partners,”
within the meaning of La. R.S. 14:34.9.
Defendant also contends the evidence was insufficient “to overcome
Ms. Baker’s implied consent to the battery.” He argues his verbal
disagreement with Ms. Baker did not become physical until she pushed him
twice and “got in his face.” According to defendant he merely reacted by
grabbing her around her neck.
Battery of a dating partner is the intentional use of force or violence
committed by one dating partner upon the person of another dating partner.
La. R.S. 14:34.9(A). In a non-homicide situation, a claim of self-defense
requires a dual inquiry: first, an objective inquiry into whether the force used
was reasonable under the circumstances; and second, a subjective inquiry
into whether the force used was apparently necessary. State v. Walker,
53,975 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 1154, writ denied, 21-01334
(La. 11/23/21), 328 So. 3d 83; State v. Broadway, 53,105 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1/15/20), 288 So. 3d 903, writ denied, 20-00372 (La. 7/24/20), 299 So. 3d
78; State v. Jackson, 51,575 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 764. In
any criminal proceeding in which the justification of self-defense is raised,
the state shall have the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in self-defense. La. C. Cr. P. art. 390.
We find that the evidence adduced at trial does not support
defendant’s claim that he acted in self-defense. Ms. Baker testified that
defendant arrived at her house unannounced, after she expressly told him not
to do so, and she told him to leave several times before the physical
altercation began. She stated she was seated in her vehicle, and defendant
blocked her escape by standing in the doorway of the vehicle. Ms. Baker, 9 who is 5’2” tall, repeatedly told the 6’4” defendant to leave, and she
attempted to push him out of her way so she could exit the vehicle. The
video showed that defendant responded by grabbing Ms. Baker by her neck,
briefly lifting her off the ground by her neck, and threatening to kill her. As
she attempted to extricate herself from defendant’s grip, they fell to the
ground, where defendant continued to strangle her by placing her in a
headlock, while simultaneously using his legs to pin her down. While the
defenseless Ms. Baker struggled against his grasp, she repeatedly told him,
“Stop Ahkeem.”
Under the facts of this case, we find the evidence adduced at trial was
sufficient to satisfy the elements of battery of a pregnant dating partner by
strangulation. The jury was able to weigh the evidence presented and arrive
at the conclusion that defendant’s use of force was unreasonable and
unnecessary under the circumstances. This assignment lacks merit.
Defendant further contends the trial court abused its discretion when it
allowed him, rather than his trial counsel, to decide to call his grandmother,
Ms. Wiggins, to testify as a character witness. He argues the testimony of
Ms. Wiggins led to the impermissible introduction of other crimes evidence,
i.e., his criminal history. Defendant also argues that trial management was
in the province of his counsel, who was responsible for deciding which
witnesses to call, what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary objections to
raise, and what evidence to introduce.
In the instant case, after the State concluded its case, the following
colloquy occurred:
COUNSEL: Your Honor, I don’t anticipate calling any witnesses –
10 COURT: And do you wish to testify?
DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor, I don’t wish to testify, but I would like the character witness that’s here on my behalf to make a statement as far as my character.
COURT: Is there a character witness?
COUNSEL: There is, Your Honor, and we had initially considered calling her, although it is my determination that it would be best for Ms. Wiggins’ case that I not call her.
COURT: I think he’s got a – I mean, if that’s what he wishes to do. I think you’re going to have to do it.
COUNSEL: Okay –
COURT: [T]he defendant has the right to present his case the way he wishes. I mean, if that’s what he wishes to do. I think you have to do it but note for the record that it’s against it’s over the – or against the advice of counsel.
COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor. ***
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant’s
right to the effective assistance of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963); State v. Brooks, 94-2438 (La.
10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 1333; State v. Bayles, 53,696 (La. App. 2 Cir.
11/17/21), 329 So. 3d 1149. To gain assistance of counsel, a defendant need
not surrender control entirely to counsel. In granting to the accused
personally the right to make his defense, the Sixth Amendment “speaks of
the ‘assistance’ of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an
assistant.” McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 421, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508,
200 L. Ed. 2d 821 (2018), quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-
11 820, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). The Sixth Amendment
“contemplates a norm in which the accused, and not a lawyer, is a master of
his own defense.” McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. at 422, quoting Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382, n. 10, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 61 L. Ed. 2d
608 (1979).
In the instant case, in lieu of testifying in his own defense, the
defendant, whose competency was never questioned throughout these
proceedings, opted to have his grandmother testify “on [his] behalf to make
a statement as far as [his] character.” The defendant has the undeniable right
to make decisions regarding his own defense, and based on this record, we
see no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in granting defendant’s request to
allow Ms. Wiggins to testify.
Moreover, the erroneous introduction of other crimes evidence is a
trial error, i.e., an error which occurs during the case’s presentation to the
trier of fact, which may be quantitatively assessed in the context of the other
evidence. As such, it may be reviewed for harmless error. State v. Johnson,
94-1379 (La. 11/27/95), 664 So. 2d 94; State v. Allen, 54,153 (La. App. 2
Cir. 12/15/21), 331 So. 3d 1101; State v. Floyd, 51,869 (La. App. 2 Cir.
6/27/18), 250 So. 3d 1165, writ denied, 18-1292 (La. 2/25/19), 266 So. 3d
288. In this context, the proper analysis for harmless error review is to
determine whether the guilty verdict actually rendered at trial was surely
unattributable to the erroneous admission of other crimes evidence. See,
State v. Allen, supra; State v. Kurz, 51,781 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 245 So.
3d 1219, writ denied, 18-0512 (La. 1/18/19), 262 So. 3d 285, and writ
denied, 18-0529 (La. 3/25/19), 267 So. 3d 598, cert. denied, 587 U.S. 973,
139 S. Ct. 1624, 203 L. Ed. 2d 905 (2019). 12 The jury heard the testimony of Ms. Baker, reviewed the surveillance
footage of the attack, and reviewed defendant’s videotaped interview with
law enforcement. During his interview, defendant mentioned that he had
reconnected with Ms. Baker after serving 13 years in prison. There is no
indication that the jury’s verdicts were attributable to Ms. Wiggins’
testimony regarding defendant’s criminal history. Consequently, defendant
has not shown he was prejudiced by Ms. Wiggins’ testimony regarding his
criminal history. This assignment lacks merit.
Defendant further contends the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing consecutive maximum sentences of three years without the benefit
of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Therefore, the sentences
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the
Louisiana Constitution. Defendant argues that he acted “under strong
emotions,” but he is not the worst offender, and this is not the worst offense
to justify consecutive maximum sentences.
The law concerning excessive sentences is well-settled. Claims are
reviewed by examining whether the trial court adequately considered the
guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. State v. Vanhorn, 52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d
1065. A review of the sentencing guidelines does not require a listing of
every aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Id. The goal of La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1 is to articulate an adequate factual basis for the sentence, not to
achieve rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v.
Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982); State v. West, 53,526 (La. App. 2 Cir. 13 6/24/20), 297 So. 3d 1081. There is no requirement that any specific factor
be given any particular weight at sentencing. State v. Taves, 03-0518 (La.
12/3/03), 861 So. 2d 144.
A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20 if it is grossly out of
proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a
purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Efferson,
52,306 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1153, writ denied, 18-2052
(La. 4/15/19), 267 So. 3d 1131. To constitute an excessive sentence, a
reviewing court must find that the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime as to shock the sense of justice or that the sentence
makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is
nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Griffin, 14-1214 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So. 3d 1262; State v. Efferson, supra.
The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within the statutory limits, and such sentences should not be set aside as
excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.
Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116; State v. Efferson,
supra. Generally, maximum or near-maximum sentences are reserved for
the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 07-2031 (La.
2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665. On review, an appellate court does not determine
whether another sentence may have been more appropriate but whether the
trial court abused its discretion. Id.; State v. McKeever, 55,260 (La. App. 2
Cir. 9/27/23), 371 So. 3d 1156, writ denied, 23-01429 (La. 4/16/24), 383 So.
3d 149.
When two or more convictions arise from the same act or transaction,
or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of imprisonment 14 shall be served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some or
all be served consecutively. La. C. Cr. P. art. 883. It is within the court’s
discretion to make sentences consecutive rather than concurrent. State v.
Dunams, 55,443 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/24), 379 So. 3d 251, writ denied, 24-
00205 (La. 9/17/24), 392 So. 3d 632; State v. Robinson, 49,677 (La. App. 2
Cir. 4/15/15), 163 So. 3d 829, writ denied, 15-0924 (La. 4/15/16), 191 So.
3d 1034; State v. Dale, 53,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d 1031.
Concurrent sentences arising out of a single course of conduct are not
mandatory, and consecutive sentences under those circumstances are not
necessarily excessive. State v. Dunams, supra; State v. Hebert, 50,163 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 181 So. 3d 795.
When consecutive sentences are imposed, the court shall state the
factors considered and its reasons for the consecutive terms. State v.
Dunams, supra; State v. Wing, 51,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So. 3d
711. However, the failure to articulate specific reasons for consecutive
sentences does not require remand if the record provides an adequate factual
basis to support consecutive sentences. State v. Kennon, 50,511 (La. App. 2
Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 661, writ denied, 16-0947 (La. 5/19/17), 220 So.
3d 747.
At the time defendant committed these offenses, La. R.S. 14:34.9(K)
provided:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is pregnant and the offender knows that the victim is pregnant at the time of the commission of the offense, the offender, in addition to any other penalties imposed pursuant to this Section, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than three years.
La. R.S. 14:34.9(L) provided:
15 Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, if the offense involves strangulation, the offender, in addition to any other penalties imposed pursuant to this Section, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than three years.
Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court considered the factors set
forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. Namely, the court considered defendant’s
personal, family, educational, and criminal background. The record reveals
that defendant received his GED and welding certification while he was
incarcerated for the prior armed robbery, and he was enrolled in barber
school when he committed the instant offenses. At the time of the offenses,
defendant was unemployed and living with his mother, stepfather, and sister.
At the time of sentencing, defendant was 34 years old, and he was the father
of Ms. Baker’s two-month-old daughter.
The trial court also considered the following aggravating factors: (1)
defendant’s conduct during the commission of the offenses manifested
deliberate cruelty to the victim; (2) defendant used threats of or actual
violence in the commission of the offenses; and (3) defendant was convicted
of armed robbery in 2009, had been on “good time parole supervision” since
January 6, 2023, and was on parole when he committed the instant offenses.
The trial court found that none of the mitigating factors applied. The court
stated:
[I]n your own words you stated that you were a different breed and you’re capable of killing in anger. Society is not safe with you on the streets. These sentences will run consecutive[ly], and they will run consecutive[ly] to your parole, whatever you’re backing up on parole.
After reviewing this record, we find the sentences were amply
supported by the record. The trial court properly considered aggravating
factors and found that no mitigating factors applied. The record reveals that
16 defendant grabbed a pregnant Ms. Baker by her neck with both hands, lifted
her off the ground by her neck, and threatened to kill her. Although
defendant expressed remorse for his actions during sentencing, he attempted
to minimize his behavior by stating he acted “out of emotions and not
intentionally” because he “was enraged.”
Further, although the record reflects the convictions arose from the
same act/transaction, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering the sentences to run consecutively. The trial court thoroughly
discussed the applicable sentencing factors, including defendant’s violent
actions and threats to kill Ms. Baker. Considering the entirety of the record
before us and the wide discretion afforded to the sentencing court, we cannot
say the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the consecutive three-
year sentences in this case. Thus, this assignment lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s convictions and sentences
are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.