STATE OF LOUISIANA IN * NO. 2022-CA-0308 THE INTEREST OF J.K. * COURT OF APPEAL * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
APPEAL FROM JUVENILE COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2022-010-01-DQ-C, SECTION “C” Honorable Candice Bates Anderson, Judge ****** Judge Paula A. Brown ****** (Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase)
Sherry Watters LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT P. O. Box 58769 New Orleans, LA 70158
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Jason Rogers Williams District Attorney G. Benjamin Cohen Chief of Appeals Victoria J. Cvitanovic Assistant District Attorney ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 619 S. White Street New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR STATE/APPELLEE
AFFIRMED JULY 13, 2022 PAB RML TGC
This is a juvenile delinquency appeal. The juvenile, J.K.,1 was adjudicated
delinquent on one count of aggravated second degree battery, two counts of armed
robbery, one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and one count of
attempted second degree murder. The juvenile court imposed a disposition of
juvenile life for aggravated battery, both counts of armed robbery and attempted
second degree murder, and a two-year disposition was imposed for the
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. J.K. appealed. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm J.K.’s delinquency and disposition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 27, 2022, the State filed a delinquency petition (the “Petition”)
in the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Orleans, charging J.K. and three other
juveniles, R.B., D.D. and K.C., for engaging in a crime spree that spanned from
1 In accordance with the Louisiana Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, Rules 5-1 and 5-2, initials
are used throughout this opinion to protect the juvenile’s identity. See e.g., State in Interest of K.D., 2013-1274, p. 1, n. 1 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/9/14), 140 So.3d 182, 183.
1 January 3 to January 7, 2022. In the Petition, the State alleged J.K. committed the
following crimes2 against Victims Ms. Mantle, Mr. Crafton, Mr. Rumsey and Mr.
Estrella:
COUNT 2: LA. R.S. 14:34.7 relative to AGGRAVATED SECOND DEGREE BATTERY, to wit: a battery against [Ms. Mantle] committed with a dangerous weapon when the offender intentionally inflicts great bodily harm, on January 6, 2022 at approximately 8:00 P.M. at the 2400 block of Jena Street, in the Parish of Orleans;
COUNT 3: LA R.S. 14:64 relative to ARMED ROBBERY, to wit: taking gray Lexus keys and cellphone in the possession of [Mr. Crafton], from the victim’s person or in his/her immediate control, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a firearm, a dangerous weapon, on January 6, 2022, at approximately 8:00 P.M. at the 5900 block of Constance Street, in the Parish of Orleans;
COUNT 4: LA R.S. 14:68.4 relative to UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE, to wit: the intentional taking or use of a gray 2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee belonging to [Mr. Rumsey], either without the owner’s consent or by means of fraudulent practice or representations, but without any intent to permanently deprive, between January 6, 2022 at 7:30 P.M. and January 7, 2022 at 9:30 A.M. on or around the 2400 block of Jena Street, the 5900 block of Constance Street and/or the 3400 block of Pauger Street, in the Parish of Orleans; and
COUNT 7: LA R.S. 14:64 relative to ARMED ROBBERY, to wit: taking of black Infinity in the possession of [Mr. Estrella], from the victim’s person or in his/her immediate control, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a firearm, a dangerous weapon, on January 3, 2022, at approximately 8:00 P.M. at the 2200 block of Frenchmen Street, in the Parish of Orleans.
On March 24, 2022, the State filed an amended petition, which charged J.K.
with an additional crime:
2 The State also alleged additional charges in the Petition stemming from the crime spree that
were not applicable to J.K.: COUNT 1 relative to the attempted killing of [Ms. Mantle] while the perpetrator was engaged in the attempted armed robbery of [Ms. Mantle’s] vehicle, a violation of 14:(24)(27)30.1; COUNT 5 relative to the intentional possession of a handgun on January 7, 2022, when the offender has not yet attained the age of 18, a violation of La. R.S. 14:95.8; and, COUNT 6 relative to the intentional concealment of a firearm on one’s person on January 7, 2022, a violation of 14:95(A).
2 COUNT 8: LA R.S. 14: (27) 30.1 relative to ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE MURDER, to wit: attempted killing of [Ms. Mantle] where there was a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and while the perpetrator was engaged in the attempted armed robbery of a white Mercedes Benz car in the possession of [Ms. Mantle], on January 6, 2022, at approximately 8:00 p.m. at the 2400 block of Jena Street, in the Parish of Orleans.
J.K. entered a plea of not guilty on all counts.
On March 25, 2022, the adjudication hearing commenced.3 The State called
nine witnesses to testify – four of whom were the victims – and offered, filed and
introduced twenty-four exhibits into evidence. J.K. did not call any witnesses or
introduce any exhibits into evidence in presenting her defense.
Adjudication Hearing Testimony
Victim 1
Mr. Rumsey testified that on December 26, 2021, he and his wife were
loading their 2015 grey Jeep Cherokee (the “Jeep”) with their son’s toys and
stroller. After he returned outside to finish loading his vehicle, he noticed that his
Jeep was gone. He believed the key fob for the Jeep had fallen somewhere inside
the vehicle. While Mr. Rumsey acknowledged that he reported his Jeep stolen, he
testified that he did not know which perpetrator stole his vehicle. Mr. Rumsey was
also unable to make an in-court identification of J.K. but testified that he had not
given anyone, including J.K., consent to occupy his vehicle.4
Victim 2
Mr. Estrella, a Lyft driver on the day of the crime, testified that on January
3, 2022, he picked up five individuals – two females and three males – in his black
3 Juveniles J.K. and R.B. were tried together. 4 The State did not charge J.K. or any of her alleged accomplices with the December 26, 2021
theft of Mr. Rumsey’s Jeep.
3 Infiniti SUV from the Aloft Hotel near the French Quarter (the “Hotel”). As he
was nearing their destination on Frenchmen Street, one of five individuals
instructed him to turn left down an unknown street to drop off one of the
passengers before continuing to their designated stop. Mr. Estrella complied.
After he was halfway down the street, one of the passengers in the backseat put a
gun to Mr. Estrella’s head and told him not to move or they were “going to blast
[him] right there!” According to Mr. Estrella, the perpetrators forced him out of
his vehicle, searched him and made him pull down his pants. Following, they stole
his wallet, cellphone and vehicle, and left him stranded on the dark street. Mr.
Estrella reported the crime to the NOPD. His cellphone was his only possession
recovered by the police. 5
Detective Katherine Barker (“Det. Barker”) testified that she was the lead
investigator for the armed carjacking involving Mr. Estrella on January 3, 2022.
As part of her investigation, Det. Barker collected video surveillance from the
Hotel (the “Hotel footage”). Det. Baker testified that the Hotel footage depicted
five individuals in the Hotel lobby; the same five individuals were seen loitering
outside of the Hotel.6 Det. Barker confirmed that one of the individuals was
average body build wearing a New York Yankees baseball cap and Nike flip flops.
According to Det. Baker, she also collected video surveillance footage from the
corner of Baronne and Gravier Streets (the “Baronne and Gravier Streets footage),
which showed the same five individuals from the Hotel footage, including a female
5 Mr. Estrella’s vehicle was not recovered at the time of the adjudication hearing. 6 The State offered, filed and introduced into evidence the Hotel footage.
4 of average body build wearing a New York Yankees baseball cap and Nike flip
flops.7
Det. Barker noted that all the video surveillance footage she collected was
consistent with Mr. Estrella’s description of the five individuals he picked up at the
Hotel. Because Mr. Estrella’s “Find My iPhone” app was activated, Det. Barker
recovered Mr. Estrella’s cellphone within an hour of the robbery and completed a
latent fingerprint test, which revealed J.K.’s identity. Upon receipt of the latent
fingerprint report, Det. Barker issued a warrant for J.K’s arrest.
Victim 3
Mr. Crafton testified that on the evening of January 6, 2022, at
approximately 7:30 p.m., he was sitting in his black Lexus while parked in the
5900 block of Constance Street when an SUV, later identified as Mr. Rumsey’s
Jeep, drove up and parked next to his vehicle.8 Two females, one wearing a grey
sweatshirt and shorts, exited the Jeep and surrounded Mr. Crafton’s vehicle. Mr.
Crafton said that he immediately exited his vehicle, at which time the female
perpetrators placed a gun to his head and stomach and demanded his possessions.
After begging for his life, Mr. Crafton said he surrendered his cellphone and keys
to the two females. He then hid behind a gate, waiting for the female perpetrators
to leave in his vehicle. Mr. Crafton relayed that after the females failed to start his
vehicle, a male exited the Jeep and attempted to start Mr. Crafton’s vehicle, but
was also unable to do so. The three perpetrators ran back to the Jeep and drove
7 The State offered, filed and introduced into evidence the Baronne and Gravier Streets footage. 8 Although Mr. Crafton testified the vehicle that pulled alongside him was an SUV, the surveillance footage presented by the State revealed that the SUV was actually a Jeep. For clarity, we will refer to the SUV as the Jeep throughout Mr. Crafton’s testimony.
5 away. Mr. Crafton inspected his vehicle and found a pair of Nike flip flops on the
floorboard, which did not belong to him, and reported the crime to the NOPD.
Officer Jack Wilson (“Ofc. Wilson”) with the NOPD testified that he was
involved in the investigation of the armed robbery of Mr. Crafton. As a part of
carrying out his investigation, Ofc. Wilson canvassed the area where the crime
occurred and secured video footage of Constance Street (the “Constance Street
footage”), and a pair of Nike flip flops left on the floorboard inside Mr. Crafton’s
vehicle along with Mr. Crafton’s vehicle keys.
Detective Timothy Jones (“Det. T. Jones”) testified that he also investigated
Mr. Crafton’s armed robbery, and reviewed the Constance Street footage that
captured the crime. Det. T. Jones confirmed the Constance Street footage showed
the perpetrators arriving and leaving in Mr. Rumsey’s grey Jeep.9 The Constance
Street footage also depicted two females inside Mr. Crafton’s vehicle – one
wearing a grey hooded sweatshirt and shorts. Shortly afterwards, a male exited the
Jeep, entered Mr. Crafton’s vehicle and attempted to start it.
Victim 4
Ms. Mantle testified that on the evening of January 6, 2022, she was sitting
in her vehicle with the doors locked waiting for her takeout dinner at a restaurant
on Freret and Jena Streets, when two females approached her car. She said that as
one of the individuals knocked on her driver window with a gun brandished in her
right hand, the other individual was simultaneously trying to open the passenger
door. Ms. Mantle panicked and shifted her car into drive, then “floored” the gas
pedal and sped away. The two females fired gunshots into her vehicle as she fled
9 The State offered, filed and introduced into evidence the Constance Street footage.
6 away. One of the bullets grazed her arm and another bullet penetrated the driver’s
seat headrest.10
Ms. Mantle drove her vehicle to St. Charles Avenue – where a parade was
rolling – jumped out of the vehicle and ran to the neutral ground seeking help from
the first family she saw. The family rendering aid to Ms. Mantle called 911. The
paramedics concluded that Ms. Mantle sustained a gunshot wound to her right
triceps and a large contusion injury to the right side of her abdomen. Ballistics
evidence revealed two separate firearms were used in the shooting.
Det. T. Jones testified that he was investigating the incident that occurred on
January 6, 2022 with Ms. Mantle. In carrying out his investigation, Det. T. Jones
reviewed surveillance video footage of Jena Street (the “Jena Street footage”) near
the shooting of Ms. Mantle’s vehicle. According to Det. T. Jones, the perpetrator,
having lost her Nike flip flops in the prior armed robbery of Mr. Crafton, was seen
approaching Ms. Mantle’s vehicle in black socks with a firearm.11 After
investigating further and noticing that the Jeep was in both the Constance and Jena
Streets footage, Det. T. Jones believed that the same perpetrators were involved in
committing both crimes. Because the Jeep has previously been reported stolen,
Det. T. Jones attempted to track its location by Sirius XM radio technology.
However, an officer notified Det. T. Jones that the Jeep was seen near an
apartment, surrounded by four individuals. Thereafter, the Jeep was recovered on
Pauger Street nearby Richard’s Food Store (“Richard’s”).
Detective David Jones (“Det. D. Jones”) testified that on the morning of
January 7, 2022, he was dispatched to assist a few NOPD detectives with a
10 The State offered, filed and introduce into evidence photos that depicted bullet holes in the
glovebox and driver’s seat headrest, along with three shattered windows of Ms. Mantle’s vehicle. 11 The State offered, filed and introduced into evidence the Jena Street footage.
7 surveillance operation at Richard’s located on the corner of Allen and Rocheblave
Streets. As J.K. was a person of interest in the crime spree, she was arrested.
According to Det. D. Jones, R.B., who was also arrested with J.K, was illegally
carrying a concealed firearm at the time of his arrest and had Mr. Rumsey’s Jeep
keys hooked onto his pants.12 Det. D. Jones confirmed that J.K. was arrested
wearing the same New York Yankees baseball cap, grey hooded sweatshirt and
shorts as seen in the Hotel, Jena and Constance Streets footages.
At the conclusion of the hearing, on March 28, 2022, the juvenile court
rendered its judgment, adjudicating J.K. delinquent on all the charges. J.K. waived
all sentencing delays. Following, the juvenile court imposed a disposition of
juvenile life for one count of aggravated battery, juvenile life for each count of
armed robbery, two years for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and juvenile
life for attempted second degree murder. J.K.’s dispositions are to run
concurrently.
This timely juvenile delinquency appeal followed.
ERRORS PATENT
This Court routinely reviews the face of the record in juvenile delinquency
appeals for potential errors patent. State in Interest of J.P., 2019-0542, p. 2 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 9/25/19), 280 So.3d 245, 247-48 (citing State ex rel. A.H., 2010-1673,
p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/11), 65 So.3d 679, 685) (wherein this Court set forth that
pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 104 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, “conducting an error patent
review in juvenile delinquency proceedings is warranted”). A review of the face of
the record reveals one error patent, J.K.’s double jeopardy challenge, which will be
12 While Det. Jones was at NOPD’s central evidence and property cages, where vehicles are
stored, he verified that the Jeep keys seized from R.B. accessed Mr. Rumsey’s Jeep.
8 more fully discussed, infra, as J.K. assigns this error patent as her first assignment
of error.13
DISCUSSION
J.K. asserts three assignments of error. First, J.K argues that her charges and
convictions of aggravated second degree battery and attempted second degree
murder involving the same incident and same victim violates the double jeopardy
clause of her Fifth Amendment right. Second, J.K. contends the State’s evidence
was insufficient to prove J.K.’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, J.K argues
that the juvenile court’s imposition of the most severe and excessive disposition
was an excessive, cruel and unusual punishment. We will first address the
sufficiency of the State’s evidence as it relates to each count.
Assignment of Error 2: Sufficiency of the Evidence
J.K. contends that the State failed to negate the possibility of her
misidentification as a perpetrator of the charges. J.K. argues that, as to all the
charges, the State’s wholly circumstantial evidence does not satisfy the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, nor does it negate a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
J.K. further argues that as to count three, the charge of armed robbery, the State
failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
something was taken – a necessary element to prove armed robbery.
It is well-settled that “[w]hen reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence in juvenile cases, the standard of review is whether, viewing all of the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the juvenile court committed
manifest error in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed a
13 See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 2003-0647, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/4/04), 867 So.2d 793, 798
(wherein this Court found that a double jeopardy challenge raised for the first time on appeal as an assignment of error, is an error patent).
9 delinquent act.” State in Interest of C.R., 2019-0917, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/29/20),
290 So.3d 220, 223 (citation omitted). Review requires the appellate court to
“determine that the evidence was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact ‘that
all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.
at p. 6, 290 So.3d at 223 (citing State v. Neal, 2000-0674, p. 9 (La. 6/29/01), 796
So.2d 649, 657) (citation omitted). In order to adjudicate a juvenile delinquent, the
State must prove the identity of the perpetrator and each element of the offense.
State in Int. of A.P., 2020-0623, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/21/21), 317 So.3d 887, 892.
“The rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming every fact to be proved
that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” La. R.S. 15:438. A reasonable hypothesis of
innocence must sufficiently lead a rational fact finder to entertain a reasonable
doubt about guilt. See State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471, 475 (La. 1983). Recently,
this Court in State v. Gilliam, 2021-0506, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/10/22), 336 So.
3d 513, 523, writ denied, 2022-00537 (La. 6/8/22), and writ denied, 2022-00601
(La. 6/8/22) (citing State v. Lee, 01-1080, p. 12 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 833,
841) set forth:
[R]elying on circumstantial evidence to prove one or more elements of the crime, when the fact-finder reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence advanced by the defendant at trial, that hypothesis fails, and the verdict stands unless the evidence suggests an alternative hypothesis sufficiently reasonable that rational jurors could not find proof of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, “[i]t is not the function of the appellate court to assess the
credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.” State v. Dukes, 2019-0172, p. 8
(La. App. 4 Cir. 10/2/19), 281 So.3d 745, 752 (citing State v. McGhee, 2015-2140,
p. 2 (La. 6/29/17), 223 So.3d 1136, 1137) (citation omitted). “Credibility
10 determinations, as well as the weight to be attributed to the evidence, are soundly
within the province of the trier of fact.” Id. (citing State v. Brumfield, 93-2404 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 6/15/94), 639 So.2d 312, 316).
COUNT 2: Aggravated Second Degree Battery of Ms. Mantle
“Aggravated second degree battery is a battery committed with a dangerous
weapon when the offender intentionally inflicts seriously bodily injury.” La. R.S.
14:34.7. For a delinquency of aggravated second degree battery, the State must
prove: “1) the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another, 2)
using a dangerous weapon, 3) without the consent of the victim, and 4) when the
offender has the specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury.” State v. Clanton,
2019-0316, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/6/19), 285 So.3d 31, 36 (citing La. R.S.
14:34.7). Specific criminal intent is defined as “that state of mind which exists
when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the
prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La. R.S.
14:10(1).
The State’s evidence presented on this charge shows that on January 6,
2022, Ms. Mantle suffered serious bodily injury when two female perpetrators
intentionally fired gunshots at her, striking her in her right triceps, with the intent
to commit great bodily harm, as she attempted to flee the crime scene. Ms. Mantle
had been sitting in her vehicle on Jena Street with her doors locked when one of
the perpetrators brandished a firearm, while the other attempted to open the
passenger side of her vehicle. Review of the Jena Street footage depicted J.K.,
with a firearm, wearing black socks, a grey hooded sweatshirt and shorts – the
same clothing she was arrested in the following day. Thus, we conclude the
State’s uncontroverted evidence was reasonably sufficient to identify J.K. as the
11 offender and adjudicate J.K. delinquent beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated
second degree battery.
COUNT 3: Armed Robbery of Mr. Crafton
“The elements of armed robbery are: (1) the taking, (2) of anything of value
belonging to another, (3) from the person of another or in the immediate control of
another, (4) by the use of force or intimidation, (5) while armed with a dangerous
weapon.” State ex rel. C.J., 2010-1350, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/9/11), 60 So.3d 46,
51 (citation omitted). “The State bears the burden of proving the elements of the
charged offense, as well as the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator.” State
in Int. of T. B., 2020-0929, p. 8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/19/21), 320 So.3d 1143, 1150.
On this charge, the State’s evidence reflects that on January 6, 2022, two
armed female perpetrators approached Mr. Crafton and placed a firearm to his head
and stomach in an attempt to steal his vehicle. The evidence further reveals that
Mr. Crafton surrendered his cellphone and keys to the female perpetrators. J.K.
suggests that because Mr. Crafton’s keys were left in the vehicle and the police
later found his cellphone near the crime scene, there was not an armed robbery.
Rather, J.K. argues that the crime, at best, was an attempted armed robbery as
nothing was actually “taken” from Mr. Crafton. We disagree.
Our review of the Constance Street footage clearly depicts J.K. forcefully
pointing a firearm at Mr. Crafton and taking the cellphone and keys Mr. Crafton
tossed to her. Mr. Crafton, then, hid and waited for the perpetrators to leave in his
vehicle. Ofc. Wilson as a part of his investigation canvassed the area and secured
the Constance Street footage, the keys to the vehicle and the Nike flip flops left on
the floorboard of Mr. Crafton’s vehicle. There is no evidence to suggest that Mr.
Crafton’s cellphone was recovered from the crime scene. Notwithstanding, the
12 fact that J.K. was not able to start Mr. Crafton’s vehicle or that she did not take Mr.
Crafton’s keys with her as she left the crime scene, does not negate the
uncontroverted evidence that J.K. took something of value from Mr. Crafton by
use of force with a deadly weapon. J.K. was identified as one of the female
perpetrators by what she was wearing, a New York Yankees baseball cap, a grey
hooded sweatshirt and shorts – the same clothing she was wearing in her arrest the
following day. Moreover, the Nike flip flops J.K. was seen wearing in the Hotel
footage were left behind in Mr. Crafton’s vehicle. Accordingly, we conclude the
State’s uncontroverted evidence was reasonably sufficient to identify J.K. as the
offender and adjudicate J.K. delinquent beyond a reasonable doubt of armed
robbery of Mr. Crafton.
COUNT 4: Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle
J.K. was charged with the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle for using Mr.
Rumsey’s Jeep in the commission of an armed robbery against Mr. Crafton and
Ms. Mantle, a violation of La. R.S. 14:68.4. The “[u]nauthorized use of a motor
vehicle is the intentional taking or use of a motor vehicle, which belongs to
another, either without the other’s consent, or by means of fraudulent conduct,
practices, or representations, but without any intention to deprive the other of
the motor vehicle permanently.” La. R.S. 14:68.4; see also State ex rel. C.B., 2009-
1114, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/09), 28 So.3d 525, 527 (citing La. R.S.
14:68.4(A)). “The Louisiana Supreme Court has expressly construed unauthorized
use of a movable as ‘requiring a showing of mens rea or criminal intent . . . .’”
State ex rel. T.C., 2009-1669, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/16/11), 60 So. 3d 1260, 1262
(citing State v. Bias, 400 So.2d 650, 652-53 (La. 1981)). As such, it is sufficient
that the State prove a vehicle was knowingly used without the consent of the owner
13 to establish the element of criminal intent. See State in Int. of C.T., 2016-0939, p.
3, n. 3 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1210, 1212.
The evidence presented here reflects that on December 26, 2021, Mr.
Rumsey’s Jeep was taken without his permission, and he reported it stolen. The
State’s evidence further reflects that J.K. and her cohorts used Mr. Rumsey’s
vehicle in the commission of the crimes, which indicates J.K. possessed the
criminal intent to knowingly occupy Mr. Rumsey’s vehicle without his consent.
Mr. Crafton testified that on January 6, 2022, just before he was robbed at
gunpoint, two female perpetrators exited the Jeep and then left in the Jeep when
they could not start his vehicle. The Constance Street footage corroborated Mr.
Crafton’s testimony. In addition, review of the Jena Street footage depicts J.K.
exiting and entering Mr. Rumsey’s Jeep just before and immediately after firing
gunshots at Ms. Mantle. Moreover, when J.K. was arrested with R.B., R.B. had
the Jeep key fob hooked onto his pants at the time of their arrest. Based on the
evidence, we conclude the State’s uncontroverted evidence was reasonably
sufficient to identify J.K. as the offender and adjudicate J.K. delinquent beyond a
reasonable doubt of unauthorized use of Mr. Rumsey’s Jeep.
COUNT 7: Armed Robbery of Mr. Estrella
The State’s evidence on this charge reveals that on January 3, 2022, Mr.
Estrella picked up five individuals, including J.K., from the Hotel for a Lyft ride.
The individuals threatened Mr. Estrella by gunpoint and stole his car keys, car,
cellphone and wallet. The State’s uncontroverted evidence further shows that after
Mr. Estrella’s cellphone was found near the crime scene within an hour of the
incident, a latent fingerprint test of the cellphone was a conclusive match to J.K.
Thus, we conclude the State’s uncontroverted evidence was reasonably sufficient
14 to identify J.K. as the offender and adjudicate J.K. delinquent beyond a reasonable
doubt of the armed robbery against Mr. Estrella.
COUNT 8: Attempted Second Degree Murder
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has
a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1).
Thus, for a delinquency finding of the attempted second degree murder, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the perpetrator:
(1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1. Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,” La. R.S. 14:30.1, attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La. 1982). Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant.
State ex rel. G.B., 2007-1577, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/08), 985 So.2d 828, 830
(quoting State v. Bishop, 2001-2548, p. 4 (La.1/14/03), 835 So.2d 434, 437)
(citations omitted). “The overt act need not be the ultimate step toward or the last
possible act in the consummation of the crime attempted, and it is the intent to
commit the crime, not the possibility of success that determines whether the act or
omission constitutes the crime of attempt.” Dukes, 2019-0172, p. 12, 281 So.3d at
755 (citation omitted).
The State’s evidence shows that J.K. attempted to kill Ms. Mantle on
January 6, 2022. J.K. possessed the specific intent to kill when J.K. aimed her
firearm at Ms. Mantle while she was fleeing away in her vehicle, and J.K.
completed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of Ms. Mantle’s death
when J.K. pulled the firearm’s trigger. Det. T. Jones testified that J.K., wearing
black socks (having left her Nike flip flops in Mr. Crafton’s vehicle from the prior
15 offense), a grey hooded sweatshirt and shorts, was seen in the Jena Street footage
committing the offense against Ms. Mantle. In their attempt to kill Ms. Mantle,
J.K. and her accomplice fired multiple gunshots at Ms. Mantle, striking her driver
seat headrest, glovebox and windows. Ms. Mantle sustained serious bodily injuries
to her right arm and right abdomen. Additionally, the State’s ballistics evidence
reflects that two separate firearms were used in the attempt to kill Ms. Mantle.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the State’s uncontroverted evidence was
reasonably sufficient to identify J.K. as the offender and adjudicate J.K. delinquent
beyond a reasonable doubt of attempted second degree murder of Ms. Mantle.
In sum, we conclude the State negated the possibility of misidentification of
J.K. as the perpetrator of the charges. In negating a reasonable hypothesis of
innocence, J.K. was seen in the Hotel, Constance and Jena Streets surveillance
footage wearing the same clothing as she was wearing at the time of her arrest – a
New York Yankees baseball cap, grey hooded sweatshirt and shorts. The footage
also depicts J.K. entering and exiting the Jeep that was used throughout the
commission of the crime spree. As such, the juvenile court, as a rational trier of
fact, had sufficient evidence to identify J.K. as the offender and adjudicate J.K.
delinquent of all the charges. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
Assignment of Error 1: Double Jeopardy
J.K. argues that because count two, aggravated second degree battery, is a
responsive verdict to count eight, attempted second degree murder, and involves
the same evidence, victims, actions and incident, the double jeopardy clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes charging and
adjudicating her delinquent of both counts. We disagree.
16 The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects persons “against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal, Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300
(1896), against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, Ex
parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 9 S.Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 118 (1889), and against multiple
punishments for the same offense, Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 18 Wall. 163, 21
L.Ed. 872 (1873).” State v. Frank, 2016-1160, p. 5 (La. 10/18/17), 234 So.3d 27,
30; see also La. Const. art. I, § 15.
This Court in State v. Smith, 2017-0661, pp. 23-24 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/10/18),
237 So.3d 29, 44, noted that the application of the “same evidence” test is no
longer a requirement, as set forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Smith
Court explained that “the protections against double jeopardy mandated by the
federal constitution, as restated in this state’s constitution, fall within the analytical
framework set forth in Blockberger [v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180,
76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)] and Louisiana courts need only apply that framework in
analyzing questions of double jeopardy.” Id. In Blockberger, the Supreme Court
espoused that “[t]he applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180,
182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932).
In the case sub judice, J.K.’s delinquency of second degree aggravated
battery and attempted second degree murder was not a violation of the double
jeopardy clause of her Fifth Amendment right. For a delinquency finding of
aggravated second degree battery, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable
17 doubt that J.K. had the specific intent to inflict a serious bodily injury with the use
of a dangerous weapon against Ms. Mantle. In contrast, attempted second degree
murder required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that J.K. had the
specific intent to kill Ms. Mantle. The intent elements of each offense are
distinguishable, and J.K. can be tried and adjudicated delinquent on both offenses.
See, e.g., Smith, at p. 24, 237 So.3d at 44 (citing State v. Cain, 324 So.2d 830, 832
(La. 1975) (wherein the Supreme Court reiterated that “if one offense requires
proof of additional facts which the other does not, the accused may be tried and
convicted on both offenses”). Moreover, the record reflects that the juvenile court
adjudicated J.K. delinquent of aggravated second degree battery. J.K. is not
afforded the protections of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment
because guilty of aggravated second degree battery is not a responsive verdict to
attempted second degree murder. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 814(4).14 Accordingly, this
assignment of error lacks merit.
Assignment of Error 3: Excessive Disposition
J.K. argues that her concurrent dispositions of juvenile life as to both counts
of armed robbery, juvenile life as to aggravated second degree battery and juvenile
life as to attempted second degree murder are excessive and severe. J.K. contends
that the juvenile court judge abused her sentencing discretion by not ordering or
relying on a pre-disposition investigation or any mitigating circumstances
This Court in State in Interest of M.R., 2020-0347, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir.
10/5/20), 306 So.3d 479, 485 (quoting State in the Interest of D.M., 2002-2528, p.
14 La. C.Cr.P. art. 814(4) provides that the only responsive verdicts for the attempted second
degree murder are guilty, guilty of attempted manslaughter, guilty of aggravated battery, guilty of aggravated assault with a firearm, and not guilty.
18 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/2/03), 851 So.2d 1216, 1222) set forth the guidelines for
reviewing a juvenile’s claim of an excessive disposition:
In any review for excessiveness, the appellate court must first ascertain whether the lower tribunal took cognizance of the general guidelines provided for juvenile cases in Louisiana Children’s Code Article 901, and whether the record reflects an adequate factual basis for the commitment imposed. State in Interest of T.L., 674 So.2d 1122. “Following that determination, the reviewing court need only explore for constitutional excessiveness in light of the circumstances of the case and the background of the juvenile.” Id. at 1124. “[A]bsent a showing of manifest abuse of the wide discretion afforded in such cases, a disposition will not be set aside as constitutionally excessive.” Id.
As such, this Court’s review of J.K.’s claim of an excessive disposition requires
examination for both statutory and constitutional excessiveness. See Id.
Statutory Excessiveness
The juvenile court’s judgment of disposition orders J.K.’s placement in the
custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice (“OJJ”) until J.K. turns twenty-one years
old. La. Ch.C. art. 901(B) provides in pertinent part that “the court should impose
the least restrictive disposition authorized by Articles 897 through 900 of [the
Louisiana Children’s Code] which the court finds is consistent with the
circumstances of the case, the needs of the child, and the best interest of
society.” See State in Interest of C.H., 2021-0516, p. 21 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/26/22),
335 So.3d 451, 464 (citing State in Interest of D.T., 2019-1284, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 1
Cir. 2/21/20), 2020 WL 862311, *4 (unpub.)). La. Ch.C. art. 901(A) provides that
“in considering dispositional options, the court shall not remove a child from the
custody of his parents unless his welfare or the safety and protection of the public
cannot, in the opinion of the court, be adequately safeguarded without such
removal.” “Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no
judgment of disposition shall remain in force for a period exceeding the maximum
19 term of imprisonment for the felony forming the basis for the adjudication. The
court shall give a child credit for time spent in secure detention prior to the
imposition of disposition.” La. Ch.C. art. 898; see also La. Ch.C. art. 900(A).
In the case sub judice, had J.K. been charged as an adult, the underlying
offense of aggravated second degree battery, La. R.S. 14:34.7(C), carries a
maximum statutory punishment of fifteen years; the underlying offense of armed
robbery, La. R.S. 14:64(B), carries a statutory punishment of not less than ten
years and not more than ninety-nine years; and attempted second degree murder,
La R.S. 14: (27) 30.1, carries a maximum statutory punishment of life
imprisonment. As J.K. was seventeen years old at the time of her disposition of
placement in the custody of OJJ, her overall secure custody is only four years total
or until she turns twenty-one, well within the statutory sentencing range for the
offenses she committed.
Accordingly, given the guidelines of La. Ch.C. arts. 897 through 900, we
conclude J.K.’s concurrent dispositions of juvenile life are not statutorily
excessive.
Constitutional Excessiveness
J.K. argues that the juvenile court’s judgment of disposition is nothing more
than needless infliction of pain and suffering. J.K. maintains that the juvenile court
failed to cite the mitigating factors used in its judgment of disposition, pursuant to
La. Ch.C. art. 901. J.K. further maintains that the juvenile court imposed the most
severe sentences without ordering or relying on a pre-disposition investigation.
“A juvenile has the same constitutional right against excessive punishment
as an adult.” State in Int. of C.H., 2021-0516, pp. 20-21 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/26/22),
335 So. 3d 451, 463 (citing State in Interest of N.S., 2020-01171, pp. 1-2 (La.
20 12/8/20), 305 So.3d 855, 855-56). “Although a disposition is within the statutory
limits, it can be constitutionally excessive if it is ‘grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime or is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering.’” State in Interest of M.S., 2020-0346, p. 14 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 10/5/20), 306 So.3d 487, 497 (citing State in Interest of R.C., 2016-
0966, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/28/16), 208 So.3d 962, 964-65) (internal citation
omitted). “A sentencing court has ‘wide discretion in the imposition of [a]
sentence within statutory limits’ and a sentence imposed ‘should not be set aside as
excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of [its] discretion.’” State in Interest
of M.R., at p. 11, 306 So.3d at 487 (quoting State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767
(La. 1979)).
La. Ch.C. art. 901(C) pertinently provides:
[C]ommitment of the child to the custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections may be appropriate if any of the following exists:
(1) There is an undue risk that during the period of a suspended commitment or probation the child will commit another crime.
(2) The child is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment.
(3) A lesser disposition will deprecate the seriousness of the child's delinquent act.
(4) The delinquent act involved the illegal carrying, use, or possession of a firearm.
In the case sub judice, the record reflects that the juvenile court considered
the foregoing factors in its judgment of disposition. At the disposition hearing, the
juvenile court judge explained that J.K. committed two armed robberies within
twenty-four hours. The juvenile court judge reiterated the seriousness of the
21 offenses – specifically the delinquent act of the attempted second degree murder of
Ms. Mantle with a firearm as she was fleeing away from gunshots. The juvenile
court acknowledged that J.K. had multiple opportunities to correct her behavior
and cease committing the offenses, but J.K. failed to do so. After reviewing the
record and given the severity of the crimes J.K. committed, we agree with the
juvenile court that J.K. is in need of correctional treatment. Accordingly, this
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court’s judgment of J.K.’s delinquency
and disposition are affirmed.
AFFIRMED