NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2026 CJ 0218
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF J.B., M.B., T.B. AND R.B.
Judgment Rendered:
On Appeal from
The Juvenile Court
In and f6r the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana
No. JU13206, Division A
The Honorable Adam J. Haney, Judge Presiding
D.B. Self r-epresented litigant Baton Rouge, Louisiana Defendant/Appellant
Hillar C. Moore, III Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
District Attorney State of Louisiana Otha Nelson Assistant District Attorney Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Laura E. Richardson Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Baton Rouge, Louisiana Department of Children
and Family Services
Joaquin Johnson Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellees Kimberly Avery J. B., M.B., T.B. & R.B.
Mental Health Advocacy Service, Child Advocacy Program Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Tiffany Sanders Attorney for Defendant/ Appellee Alexandria, Louisiana Father/Monrico Jones
BEFORE: McCLENDON, C.J., GREENE, and STROMBERG, JJ.
if rA&
ov-\
STROMBERG, J.
In this appeal, the mother of four children previously adjudicated as children in need of care challenges a juvenile court' s judgment terminating her parental rights and freeing the children for adoption.' Although the minor children did not
appeal or answer the appeal, they filed a brief joining with the mother' s position as
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to the oldest child. For the reasons that follow, we vacate and remand.
D.B. is the mother of four minor children: J. B. ( born on December 13,
2013), R.B. ( born on July 8, 2019), M.B. ( born on December 25, 2020), and T.B.
born on December 28, 202 1). 2 ' The State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services ( DCFS'), filed a petition for the termination of parental rights and certification for adoption regarding the children on August 25, 2025.
According to the petition, the children entered foster care and DCFS custody on or
about July 13, 2024, after I -)
CFS validated allegations of abuse and neglect, and
they were adjudicated as children in need of care on September 10, 2024, DCFS asserted that D.B,' s parental rights should be terminated pursuant to
La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3) and ( 5). According to the petition, as to La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 5), at least one year had elapsed since the children had been placed in DCFS
custody, there had been no substantial parental compliance with DCFS case plans as necessary for reunification with the children, and there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in D.B.' s condition in the near future. The
1 The same judgment terminated the parental rights of the minor children' s fathers; however, the fathers have not appealed. The judgment is final as it relates to the termination of their parental rights. See State in Interest of L.J., 2023- 1357 ( La. App. I Cir. 12/ 26/24), 404 So. 3d 956, 959 n. I. Because only the mother is appealing the termination judgment, we will not discuss the allegations and evidence pertaining to the fathers.
2 In this termination proceeding, the children and parents are referred to by their initials to preserve their privacy in these confidential proceedings. See Uniform Rules — Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rules 5- 1( A)(4) and 5- 2.
petition further alleged that as to La. Ch. C. art. 1015( 3)( 1), D.B. committed
extreme abuse and neglect ol" the children.3 The juvenile court conducted the termination of parental rights trial on
November 20, 2025. At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court ruled that it
was terminating the parental rights of D.B. ( and the fathers) as to the children and certifying the children as free for adoption. On December 9, 2025, the juvenile
court signed a judgment in accordance with its rulings, terminating D.B.' s parental rights to the children pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3)( 1) and ( 5); terminating the fathers' parental rights to the children; continuing the children in DCFS custody and accepting DCFS' s case plan goal of adoption pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 1040;4 freeing the children for adoption; and decreeing that DCFS had made reasonable efforts to reunite the parents and the children, but that reunification was not
possible.
D. B. has appealed the juvenile court' s judgment. D.B. is representing herself on appeal after being represented by counsel in the juvenile court. In her
assignments of error, D.B. contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children; in
concluding that DCFS made reasonable efforts toward reunification; in terminating her parental rights without sufficient clear and convincing evidence; and by violating her constitutional due process rights. In her reply brief, D.B. contends that DCFS addressed the tennination of her parental rights as to the children
3 DCFS also alleged in the petition that D.B.' s parental rights should be terminated under La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3) 0), which concerns abuse or neglect after the child is returned to the parent' s care and custody while under DCFS supervision, when the child had previously been removed for his safety from the parent pursuant to a disposition judgment in a child in need of care proceeding. However, DCFS later dropped its claims under La. Ch. C. art. 1015( 3) 0) and
focused on La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3)( i) and ( 5).
4 Louisiana Children' s Code a, lticle 1040( A) states: " Following a judgment terminating all parental rights pursuant to this Title, when [ DCFS] is the legal custodian of the child, [ DCFS] shall report to the court in detail concerning the child' s permanent placement."
collectively and not as to each child individually, thereby not meeting its burden of proof.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
It is well settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a juvenile court' s
findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong. State in Interest of KB, 2025- 0212 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 19/ 25), 420 So. 3d
rror review, it is important that the appellate court not 12009 1204. In its manifest €:,
substitute its own opinion when it is the juvenile court that is in the unique position
to see and hear the witnesses as they testify. Id. Where there is conflicting testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even when the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable as those of the juvenile court.
Id. If the juvenile court' s findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in
its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse, even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Id. at 1204- 05.
In order to reverse a fact finder' s determination of fact, an appellate court
must review the record in iv, entirety and find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and if such a basis does exist, further determine that the record establishes that the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. State in Interest of K13, 420 So. 3d at 1205. If there are two permissible views of
the evidence, the fact finder' s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous
or clearly wrong. Id. wever, where documents or objective evidence so H(,,)
contradict a witness' s story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness' s
M
9
story, the appellate court may find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. Id.
When a legal error occurs and a juvenile court applies incorrect principles of
law, the appellate court is required, if it can, to render judgment on the record by applying the correct law and determining the essential material facts de novo. In
re C.L.A.C., 2017- 1703 ( La. App. I Cir. 10/ 24/ 18), 266 So. 3d 302, 309; In re
D.M., 2005- 2046 ( La. App.:. Cir. 2/ 10/ 06), 928 So. 2d 624, 632.
Termination of Parental Rights
Termination of the legal relationship between natural parents and children is one of the most drastic actions the State can take against its citizens. State in
Interest of A.L.D., 2018- 1271 ( La. 1/ 30/ 19), 263 So. 3d 860, 863. The interests of
the parents and children must be balanced; however, the paramount consideration
is the best interest of children. See State in Interest of C.F., 2017- 1054 ( La.
12/ 6/ 17), 235 So. 3d 1066, 1075. Thus, rather than simply protecting parental
rights, our judicial system must protect the rights of children to thrive and survive
in a safe, secure environment and to be reared by someone capable of caring for them. See Id. To protect children whose parents are unwilling or unable to provide safety and care adequate to meet their physical, emotional, and mental health needs, the Louisiana Children' s Code provides a judicial process for
terminating the parents' rights and responsibilities and certifying the children as free for adoption. La. Ch.C. art. 1001.
Louisiana Children' s Code article 1015 enumerates the grounds for the
involuntary termination of parental rights. The State must prove the elements of at least one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. See La. Ch. C. art. 1035( A);5 State in Interest of C.F., 235 So. 3d at
5 Louisiana Children' s Code article 1035( A) provides that "[ t] he petitioner bears the burden of
establishing each element of a ground for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence."
1072. If the juvenile court finds that the State has met its burden of proving one of the grounds for termination 1.) y clear and convincing evidence, the court must then determine whether termination is in the best interest of the child. See La. Ch.C.
art. 1039; State in Interest of A.L.D., 263 So. 3d at 863.
To summarize, involuntary termination of parental rights is a two- pronged inquiry. First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one of the eight statutory grounds for termination under La. Ch.C. art. 1015. Second, after a ground for termination is found, the juvenile court must
determine whether the termination is in the child' s best interest. La. Ch.C. arts.
1037( B)6 and 1039.
In this matter, DCFS alleged grounds for termination of D.B.' s parental
rights pursuant to La. Ch. C. art. 10 15 (3)( i) and ( 5), which provide:
The grounds for termination of parental rights are:
3) Misconduct of' the parent toward this child or any other child of the parent or any other child which constitutes extreme abuse, cruel and inhuman treatment, or grossly negligent behavior below a reasonable standard of human decency, including but not limited to the conviction, commission, aiding or abetting, attempting, conspiring, or soliciting to commit any of the following:
i) Abuse or neglect which is chronic, life-threatening, or results in gravely disabling physical or psychological injury or disfigurement.
5)
Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed since a child was removed from the parent' s custody pursuant to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the
6 Louisiana Children' s Code article 1037( B)( 1) provides, in pertinent part:
When the court finds that the alleged grounds set out in any Paragraph of Article 1015 ... are proven by the evidentiary standards required by Article 1035 and that it is in the best interest of the child, it shall order the termination of the parental rights of the parent against whom the allegations are proven. The court shall enter written findings on both issues. The consideration of the best interest of the child shall include consideration. of the child' s attachment to his current caretakers.
7 Louisiana Children' s Code article 1039( B)( 1) provides for dispositions other than termination i] f the court finds that the alleged grounds are not proven in accordance with the evidentiary standards set forth in Article 1035 or if the court finds that termination of parental rights is not in the best interest of the child...."
department and appro=ved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent' s condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child' s age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home. $ Footnote added.)
Louisiana Children' s Code article 1036( C)( 6) and ( 7) provide, respectively,
that lack of parental compliance with a case plan may be evidenced by the parent' s lack of substantial improvement in redressing the problems preventing
reunification or by the persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar potentially harmful conditions.
According to the jurisprudence, " reformation" of a parent, for purposes of determining whether parental rights should be terminated, means more than mere cooperation with agency authorities. State in Interest of R.M., 2025- 0622 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 7/ 25), 424 ScOd 841, 846. A showing of a significant, substantial
s Louisiana Children' s Code article 603( 2) defines " abuse," in pertinent part, as:
2) " Abuse" means any one of the following acts that seriously endanger the physical, mental, or emotional health, welfare, and safety of the child:
a) The infliction, attempted infliction, or, as a result of inadequate supervision, the allowance of the infliction or attempted infliction of physical or mental injury upon the child by a parent or any other person.
Louisiana Children' s Code article 1003( 1)( 2)( a) defines " abuse" similarly. Louisiana Children' s Code article 603( 18) defines " neglect" as follows:
Neglect" means the refi,.sal or unreasonable failure of a parent or caretaker to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, care, treatment, or counseling for any injury, illness, or condition of the child, as a result of which the child' s physical, mental, or emotional health, welfare, and safety is substantially threatened or impaired. Neglect includes prenatal neglect.
Consistent with Article 606( 13), the inability of a parent or caretaker to provide for a child due to inadequate financial resources shall not, for that reason alone, be considered neglect. Whenever, in lieu of medical care, a child is being provided treatment in accordance with the tenets of a well-recognized religious method of healing that has a reasonable, proven record of success, the child shall not, for that reason alone, be considered to be neglected or maltreated. However, nothing in this Subparagraph shall prohibit the court from ordering medical services for the child when there is substantial risk of harm to the child's health, welfare, or safety.
Louisiana Children' s Code article 1003( 10) defines " neglect" similarly, but adds the language, Disagreement by the parent regarding the need for medical care shall not, by itself, be grounds for termination of parental rights."
indication of reformation is required, such as altering or modifying in a significant way the behavior which served as a basis for the State' s removal of the child from the home. Id. at 846- 47. Moreover, the lack of any reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent' s conduct in the near future may be evidenced by "[ a] ny other condition or conduct that reasonably indicates that the parent is unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for the child, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior." La.
Ch.C. art. 1036( D)( 3).
Termination of Parental Rights Hearing At the termination hearing, DCFS called D.B., three DCFS employees, a foster parent, a Court Appointed Special Advocate ( CASA) employee, and a case
facilitator to testify. DCFS also introduced documentary evidence, including the children' s birth certificates; a list of pretrial inserts; a plea agreement form; and a
DCFS TIPS client program inquiry.' For her case, D.B. testified on her own behalf and introduced documentary evidence, including photographs; a psychological evaluation; a copy of an email thread; a mental health assessment; a substance abuse assessment; emergency department notes; and certificates of completion for a parenting course and anger management.
At the beginning of the hearing, DCFS requested that the juvenile court take judicial notice of the child in need of care records involving the children, identified as docket numbers 116049, - 116902, and 120395 in the Juvenile Court. The other
parties did not object, and the juvenile court took judicial notice of the child in
need of care records. The parties then stipulated that in docket number 116049, the
three oldest children, J.B., M.B., and R.B., were taken into DCFS custody in August 2021, adjudicated as children in need of care in November 2021, and
9 The remainder of the evidence DCFS introduced concerned the fathers.
ri -
returned to D.B.' s custody on March 12, 2024. As to the youngest child, T.B., the parties stipulated that in docket number 116902, T.B. was taken into DCFS
custody in April 2022, later adjudicated as a child in need of care, and returned to D.B.' s custody on March 12, 2024. The parties also stipulated that in docket
number 120395, the children were removed from D.B.' s custody on July 12, 2024; were adjudicated children in need of care on September 10, 2024; and had
continued as such since that disposition.
We summarize here that part of the trial testimony regarding the timeline for the children' s custody with DCFS. Kimberly Allen, the DCFS supervisor of the family' s case manager from August 2021 until April 2023, testified about the children being placed in care and about the 2021 case plan approved by the court.
Kelly Deedon, the family services case manager supervisor assigned to D.B.' s case when it was moved to Livingston Parish on April 17, 2024, testified that the
children were with D.B. under a court- ordered safety plan, and they were returned to DCFS custody on July 13, 2024. Shaunna Stevens, who was assigned to work
with J.B. in August 2025 in her job as a facilitator with Choices Coordinating Care Solutions, Region 3, was questioned about the number of placements for J. B. Kathlin Julien, the foster care case manager assigned to the case in September 2024, testified that the children came into DCFS custody due to lack of adequate supervision. 10 Ms. Julien testified she helped develop case plans for January 6, 2025 and July 2, 2025, whie;:h were substantially the same as previous case plans. Ms. Julien testified that the basis for the termination of D.B.' s parental rights was
the failure to comply with the case plans and her chronic abuse and neglect of the
children. She further testi i red - that DCFS believed that termination was in the
10 Ms. Julien identified a four-page document from DCFS labeled " TIPS CLIENT PROGRAM INQUIRY," which showed a timeline of D.B.' s DCFS history. Ms. Julien testified the DCFS document included five valid family services investigations; a family services case from April 17, 2024 to July 12, 2024; and two previous foster care cases from April 1, 2024 to April 11, 2024, and from August 23, 2021 to March 12, 2024.
E
children' s best interest. DCFS called D.B. to testify as a witness and she also
testified on her own behalf for her own case. 11 In its reasons for judgment, the juvenile court stated that D.B. loved her
children. The juvenile court then said that in the beginning of this case, D.B. and the DCFS representatives had an adversarial relationship and that DCFS' s conduct fell short." The juvenile court stated that it initially returned custody of the children to D.B. because she had completed much of the case plan requirements
and because the children' s placements were " not the best," such that the children' s
best interest were satisfied b;y returning them to D.B. The juvenile court then set forth what happened next, which was the pattern in this case: the children were
removed from D.B.' s custody and returned to DCFS custody, D.B. received additional services, the children returned to D.B., and a couple of months later,
D.B.' s same conduct caused the children' s return to DCFS custody. The juvenile
court commented that by its count J.B. was in foster care four times and the other children three times. The juvenile court noted that D.B. completed the
requirements of her case plan each time, yet the subsequent history indicated that D.B. did not change her behavior. The juvenile court stated that the children' s
removal was based on issues not " easily fixed" by DCFS because they involved D.B.' s continued poor decision-making concerning the children' s welfare. The
juvenile court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that the requirements of a lack of compliance was satisfied under La. Ch.C. art. 1036( C)( 6)
and ( 7). The juvenile court determined that termination was in the best interest of
the children, stating that although J. B., T.B., and M.B. were not in the secure adoptive placements it would like to see, keeping them in limbo was not healthy
11 Other witnesses at the hearing=; included Tony Pryer and Robert Beamon. Mr. Pryer, the advocate supervisor with CASA working on the case from September 2021 to May 2024, testified about the relationship between D.B. and DCFS. Mr. Beaman, R.B.' s foster parent since April 15, 2022, testified that R.B. was two and a half years old when she entered his and his wife' s care, and that half of her life: had been with them.
SO]
11
for them either. The juvenile court found that termination would allow the parties
the best opportunity to move forward and be successful.
Analysis
On appeal, D.B. contends that DCFS failed to prove its case with clear and
convincing evidence, asserting that that its evidence was inconsistent, incomplete, and disputed, and it failed to present clear and convincing evidence of ongoing neglect, drug abuse, or child endangerment. D.B. further contends that more
weight should be given to the testimony and evidence showing that she completed the case plan requirements. D.B. also challenges the juvenile court' s consideration
of the best interest of the children collectively, rather than individually.
In the children' s appellate brief, they joined with D.B. as to J.B., contending that the termination of D.B.' s parental rights was not in the best interest of J.B.; as to all other matters, the children joined with DCFS. Regarding J. B., the children argue that the juvenile court erred in failing to discuss the likelihood of adoption in considering J.B.' s best interest. The children contend that the juvenile court should have considered alternative placements for J.B., referring to La. Ch.C. arts. 718, et
seq. concerning guardianship, and La. Ch.C. art. 1051, which is a motion to restore parental rights for children over fifteen years old who are in foster care.
DCFS responds by asserting that it does not need to prove ongoing abuse and neglect under La. Ch.(.-. art. 1015( 3)( 1) and ( 5). It also contends that it
established a pattern of the children' s removal from D.B., progress by D.B., the
children' s return to D.B., and then repeated removal from D.B. and return to
DCFS. DCFS contended that termination was in the best interest of children based
on D.B.' s established pattern of behavior, the history of the case, and the children' s need for permanency. DCFS alleged that due process and proper procedure were
followed in the case, citing La. Ch.C. arts. 1019. 2, 1025. 1, and 1025. 4.
12
Stipulations and Child in Need of Care Suit Records
In considering this matter on appeal, we must initially consider an evidentiary issue. The child in need of care records are not part of the appellate
t in its brief, DCFS states that it " offered, filed, and record in this case, althougt,.
introduced into evidence the entire suit record of the multiple cases [ D.B.] had in
Court, into evidence without objection." However, the child in need of care
records were not specifically offered, introduced, and admitted into evidence." The record in this case contains a trial index at the beginning of the transcript, which includes the language, " JUDICIAL NOTICE OF CHILD IN NEED OF
CARE CASES STIPULATION CASE 116049, STIPULATION CASE 116902
AND STIPULATION CAST; 120395" before the list of witnesses and exhibits in
the case. The case management order was filed into evidence and it shows as
potential evidence "[ a] ny filings under prior CINC proceedings ( EBR Juvenile Court docket # 120395, # 116902, and # 116049)."
The Children' s Code contains an article providing for judicial notice of a prior child in need care adjudication. Louisiana Children' s Code article 1036. 1
entitled " Proof of prior c-hild. in need of care judgment, stipulation; record"
provides for judicial notice as follows:
A. Evidence of a prior adjudication or a parent' s prior stipulation that a child is in need of care and an instanter order or disposition judgment removing the child from the parent' s custody shall be admissible in proceedings brought under this Title. If the prior adjudication judgment was entered by the same court, it may take judicial notice of its own records. If the prior order or judgment was entered by another court, a certified copy of the order or judgment or
12 We note that the parties may leave used the child in need of care records when questioning witnesses. For example, when D. B.' s then -counsel questioned the CASA worker, she asked him about a February 10, 2022 CASA report that she stated was already submitted into the court record, but out of an abundance of caution, she would introduce it. DCFS objected on the basis of hearsay and the juvenile court sustained the objection. D.B.' s counsel did not introduce the report into evidence, but she stated she thought it was part of the court record. The CASA report is not in the appellate record, but could have been part of the child in need of care suit records. The CASA employee was also asked about a February 9, 2024 letter he wrote to the judge, but as with the report, his letter is also not in the record.
13
certified copy of the rninute entry shall be admissible in accordance with the Louisiana Code of Evidence.
B. The court record of a prior child in need of care proceeding involving the child who is the subject of the termination proceeding may be introduced into evidence at the hearing on the termination of parental rights.
Emphasis added.)
La. Ch.C. art. 1036. 1 allows the juvenile court to take judicial notice of its own
records in subsection A, and in subsection B provides that the court record of a
prior child in need of care proceeding may be introduced into evidence at the termination hearing. In this case, the juvenile court took judicial notice of the prior child in need of care proceec[ings, but the court records of those proceedings were
not introduced into evidence.
Under La. C. E. art. 2f 2, while a court may take judicial notice of its own proceedings, the article does not allow, nor has it ever been interpreted to allow,
courts to take judicial notice of suit records in other courts. See Hospital Service
District No. I of Parish of Terrebonne, State v. Hospital Service District No. 3
of Parish of Lafourche, State, 2024- 0999 ( La. App. I Cir. 8/ 4/ 25), 421 So. 3d
977, 983, writ denied sub nom. Hospital Service District No. 1 of Parish of
Terrebonne v. Hospital Service District No. 3 of Parish of Lafourche, 2025-
01617 ( La. 3/ 25/ 26), 428 So. 3d 266, on reconsideration, 2025- 01617 ( La. 5/ 27/ 26),
and writ denied sub nom. Hospital Service District No. 1 of Parish of
Terrebonne v. Hospital Service District No. 3 of Parish of Lafourche, 2025- 01609 ( La. 3/ 25/ 26), 428 So. 3d 678, on reconsideration, 2025- 01609 ( La. 5/ 27/ 26);
KJMonte Investments, LLC v. Acadian Properties Austin, LLC, 2020- 0204
La. App. I Cir. 12/ 30/ 20), 319 So. 3d 354, 362. Documentation of other courts' proceedings must be offered into evidence in the usual manner. See Uniform
14
Rules — Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2- 1. 7; 13 KJMonte Investments, LLC,
319 So. 3d at 362.
The law is clear that e-,,,idence not properly and officially offered, introduced, and admitted into evidence cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in the record. See Denoux v. Vessel Management Services, Inc., 2007- 2143 ( La.
5/ 21/ 08), 983 So. 2d 84, 88. A court of appeal is a court of record, which must
limit its review to evidence in the record before it and render its judgment upon the
record on appeal. Touchet v. McGehee, 2024- 1283 ( La. App. I Cir. 7/ 15/ 25), 418 So. 3d 438, 445 n.4. Appellate courts may not review evidence that is not in the appellate record or receive new evidence. See La. C. C. P. art. 2164; Denoux, 983 I. .
Without the records of the child in need of care cases, we conclude that
DCFS did not meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that there has been no substantial compliance with the case plan and that there is no
reasonable expectation of significant improvement in D.B.' s condition or conduct
in the future under La. Ch.C. arts. 1015( 5), 1035( A), and 1036( C)( 6) and ( 7).
Although the judgment refers to both La. Ch.C. arts. 10 1 5( 3)( i) and ( 5) as grounds for termination, the juvenile court in its reasons for judgment only discussed termination under La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 5), for which DCFS must show a lack of
substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services that was previously filed by DCFS and approved by the juvenile court. Ms. Allen, Ms. Julien, and
D.B. testified about the case plans, but without the actual case plans in evidence,
we are left to rely on their testimony about the case plan requirements for multiple case plans for four different children and about whether D.B. met the case plan
13 No record of another case ( or prior record in the same titled and numbered case) shall be included in the record, unless such other record has been introduced into evidence at the trial court in the case on appeal, or on writs, and such other record shall accompany the record as an exhibit. Uniform Rules —Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2- 1. 7.
15
requirements. 14 While the issue of the absence of the case plans in the records has not been raised in this court, a review of termination cases based on La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 5) before this court shows that in most cases, the case plans have been
reviewed by the lower count and that this court has them in the record for its appellate review of the termination.' 5
In State in the Interest of B.H., 24- 46 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 5/ 1/ 24), 433 So. 3d
48, 57, the Third Circuit reversed the trial court' s termination of parental rights for
failure to comply with a case plan under La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 5) because the record did not contain a case plan created or filed by DCFS and " the procedure outlined by the Louisiana Children' s Code with respect to filing and obtaining court approval of a case plan [ undr;r La. Ch.C. art. 677 16] was not followed." In a more
14 Moreover, at the trial, DCFS did not submit evidence or testimony to support the following allegations in its petition: that on March 8, 2020, D.B. was arrested and charged with child desertion; that on August 23, 20211, 1B., R.B., and M.B. were placed in DCFS custody after it received and validated a report ofF neglect as to the three children ( T.B. had not yet been born) and also physical abuse as to J. B.; and that D.B. was charged with " Cruelty to Juvenile," and the criminal court issued protective orders on behalf of the children. Additionally, DCFS did not clearly establish the basis under which it regained custody of the children in March 2024 or in July 2024.
15 See State in Interest of L.S., 2026- 0068 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 28/ 26), _ So. 3d , _; State in Interest of N.J., Jr., N.J., and A.J., 2025- 0278 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 19/ 25), 2025 WL 2741870, 6 ( unpublished); State in Interest of C.W., 2025- 0257 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 19/ 25), 421 So. 3d 570, 578; State in Interest of C.S., 2025- 0017 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 17/ 25), 2025 WL 2670612, * 4 unpublished), writ denied, 2025- 01222 ( La. 11/ 5/ 25), 420 So. 3d 38; State in Interest of K.C.N., 2023- 1144 ( La. App. 1 C;.r. 5/ 29/ 24), 2024 WL 2746505, * 4 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2024- 00837 ( La. 9/ 4/ 24), 391 So -3d 1. 059, cert. denied sub nom. A.N. v. Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services:, 1. 45 S. Ct. 2708, 221 L.Ed.2d 970 ( 2025); State in Interest of I.K., 2022- 0927 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 22), 358 So. 3d 56, 63, writ denied, 2023- 00089 ( La. 3/ 7/ 23), 357 So. 3d 349; State in Interest of T.L., 2021- 0728 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 21), 340 So. 3d 4, 11, writ denied, 2022- 00170 ( La. 3/ 2/ 22), 333 So. 3d 827; State in Interest of E. O., 2018- 1093 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 6/ 19), 272 So. 3d 552, 558; State in Interest of M.F., 2017- 0545 La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 21/ 17), 241 So. 3d. 316, 321.
16 Louisiana Children' s Code artic. e 677 states, in pertinent part:
A. At the disposition hearing, the court shall consider the content or
implementation of the case plan and any response filed concerning it. At any other hearing held subsequent: to the filing of the case plan, on its own motion or upon motion of any party for good cause shown, the court may consider the content or implementation of the case plan or of any response filed concerning it.
B. If no party files a written response objecting to the case plan and the court finds that the plan protects the health, welfare, and safety of the child and is in the best interest of the child, the court shall render an order approving the plan.
16
recent Third Circuit case, where the record did not contain a case plan that was
properly approved by the trial court and the record did not show that the trial court considered and approved a case plan as required by La. Ch.C. art. 677, the Third Circuit reversed the termination of both parents' rights. State in Interest of P. G.,
2025- 494 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 1/ 21/ 26), 433 So. 3d 68, 72. 17 In the absence of the crucial documentation of the case plans, the portion of
the judgment terminating D.B.' s parental rights based on La. Ch.C. art. 10 15( 5) is vacated. Without the case plans, DCFS did not meet its burden of proof and the
juvenile court manifestly erred in finding that D.B.' s parental rights should be terminated under La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 5). See State in Interest of A.L.D., 2018-
1271 ( La. 1/ 30/ 19), 263 So. 3d 860, 867. However, because DCFS need only prove one ground for termination and the judgment also based the termination of D.B.' s
parental rights on La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3)( 1), we must consider whether DCFS met
its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that D.B. engaged in the following:
3) [ m] isconduct . m.
toward this child or any other child of the parent or any other child which constitutes extreme abuse, cruel and inhuman treatment, or grossly negligent behavior below a reasonable standard of human de(:;ency, including ... the ... commission [ of] any of the following:
i) [ a] buse or t eglect which is chronic, life-threatening, or
results in gravely disabling physical or psychological injury or disfigurement.
17 We note an earlier Third Circuit case where the Third Circuit denied motions to strike as to child in need of care proceeding...;that were not introduced at the termination trial, nor did the trial court comment that it was taking judicial notice of them; the Third Circuit found that the trial court' s statement in its reasons for judgment that the children came into care on October 24, 2011, showed that the court took judicial notice of its own records. State in Interest of B. C., 15)),
2014- 1043 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 4/ 1/ 2015 WL 1513994, ** 3, 5 ( unpublished). In a recent Fourth
Circuit case, the trial court in its ,judgment terminating the mother' s parental rights stated that it was taking judicial notice of the underlying Child in Need of Care ( CINC) case. On appeal, the mother filed a motion to strike two court reports that were submitted directly to the court, but which were not referred to or admitted into evidence at the termination proceedings, arguing they were inadmissible hearsay. The :Fourth Circuit referred to La. Ch.C. art. 1036. 1( A) in denying the motion to strike, stating that when the trial court took judicial notice of the underlying CINC case in the termination of parental rights proceedings, this notice included the court reports. State in Interest of Z.B., 2025- 0771 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 2/ 13/ 26), 430 So. 3d 1261, 1267.
17
We have carefully reviewed the testimony and evidence submitted at the termination hearing concerning abuse or neglect as to the children. The testimony and evidence submitted at trial concerning abuse and neglect established that in 2021, the children came into DCFS care after DCFS received reports of alleged
physical abuse, including reports that D.B. drug J.B. down the street with a bloody nose and had hit J.B. with a 2 by 4. Ms. Allen testified that, at that time, the family home had no water, appliances, or furniture, and that the children had inadequate
clothing. Ms. Allen further testified that in 2022, D.B. refused surgery for J.B. for a ruptured appendix, which D.B. denied. Ms. Allen further testified about an
incident on April 14, 2022, where D.B. took the children from the home of their
maternal grandmother, with whom they had been placed, and law enforcement ultimately located them in Lake Charles. D.B. was arrested and charged criminally with kidnapping, and DCFS obtained a protective order prohibiting D.B. from visiting the children.
When D.B. testified, she was asked about specific incidents involving her three oldest children after she moved to Louisiana, and she either denied or did not
recall them. '$ D.B. acknowledged that she was arrested for neglect and a
protective order was put in place for the children. D.B. admitted that her children
were taken into DCFS custody in August 2021. She also admitted she was charged
with the kidnapping of her children in April 2022, but she testified that the charge was ultimately dismissed. D.B. was asked about the children' s removal from her custody in July 2024, to which she testified that she was gone for several hours or
18 When asked about a report about leaving J. B. and R.B. home alone in August 2020, D.B. denied it. When asked about a cal accident with J. B., R.B., and M.B., where she left them inside the hospital while she went into the parking lot to argue with their father, she testified that she did not remember. Later questioning by DCFS indicates that D.B. was charged with cruelty to a juvenile, possibly based on this incident. D.B. denied being verbally or physically abusive toward J. B., but testified that she did punish her children with time out or by taking a toy away and she did spank her children, by which she meant " a tap on the hand." D.B. denied the allegations surrounding her removal of J. B. from the hospital when J. B.' s appendix ruptured, testifying that J. B. was in pain and the hospital was taking too long, so she took her to another hospital.
more and her children " ended up at Checkers."" When asked why she did not take the children with her, she testified that her plan was to run to the grocery store and come back, and when she returned, the children were gone. D.B. testified that she
was only in the grocery store for " maybe like [ an] hour and something." D.B.
testified that she had left her children before, stating that she had " hard times, and my kids just came home. I didn' t have a stable job, I just got a place...."
In its brief, DCFS contends that it proved by clear and convincing evidence that the abuse the children sustained was chronic because they were adjudicated as children in need of care multiple times. DCFS also points out that D.B. was
charged twice while the children were in foster care with kidnapping her children, and she was convicted in criminal court of at least one count of simple kidnapping. DCFS also relies on D.B.', s testimony acknowledging child protection service
cases in Texas and Louisiana, and the stipulations regarding the children' s removal from D.B.' s care to establish chronic abuse or neglect. Yet again, DCFS is relying on evidence in the prior case! records to establish its case. Without that evidence,
DCFS has not met its burden of proving chronic abuse and neglect by clear and convincing evidence, and the juvenile court manifestly erred in terminating D.B.' s parental rights on that basis. See State in Interest of A.L.D., 263 So. 3d at 867.
Therefore, similar to our ruling on that portion of the judgment concerning La. Ch.C. art. 10 15( 5), the portion of the judgment terminating D.B.' s parental rights based on La. Ch.C. art. 10 1 5( 3)( i) is vacated. 20
This matter is remanded with instructions to the juvenile court to complete the record and, if neces,.,,ary, to allow DCFS to present the necessary
19 Apparently, there were two instances where D.B.' s children were left unattended in 2024.
D.B. was asked about a DCFS allegation that she left her children home alone for twelve hours in July 2024, but she denied it, stating that she left them with someone and that person left them alone. DCFS counsel stated that the incident D.B. described happened in April 2024.
20 We pretermit review of D.B.' s contention that she was denied due process based on our ruling in this matter.
IN
documentation and evidence establishing D.B.' s mental condition and capacity. See State ex rel. B.J., 2000- 1434 ( La. App. I Cir. 7/ 27/ 00), 767 So. 2d 869, 877 Whipple, J., concurring). Moreover, because we base our decision herein in part
on the record deficiencies, our action this date should not be construed to mean that
DCFS is pre- empted from initiating termination proceedings as may be warranted and legally supportable. See Id.
CONCLUSION
Considering the foreg,,.)ing, the December 9, 2025 judgment of the juvenile court, terminating the parental rights of D.B. as to J.B., R.B., M.B., and T.B., is vacated, and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.21 The four minor children are to remain in foster care with DCFS services and
controlled, supervised visitation with their mother, D.B. Costs of this appeal in the
amount of $ 1, 562 are to be paid by the State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services.
21 Although we reverse the termination of D. B.' s parental rights and the certification of the children for adoption, the record reflects that reunification is not in the children' s best interest at this time.
IM
KqUft' J,
FIRST CIRCUIT
KOT-Taffly-
W.
STATE OF LOUISIANA
IN THE INTEREST OF J. B. f MB., T.B. AND R. B.
McClendon, C.J., concurring.
I concur with the majority's decision to remand. However, I would remand for the sole purpose of allowing the juvenile court to supplement the appellate record with any records that the juvenile court took judicial notice of in accordance with LSA- Ch. C. art. 1036. 1.