State of Louisiana in the Interest of C.W., C.T., and T.L

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: September 19, 2025
• Docket: 2025 CJ 0082
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA

FIRST CIRCUIT

2025 CJ 0082

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF C. W., C. T., and T.L.

Judgment Rendered:_ SEP 19 2025

On Appeal from the 23rd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Assumption State of Louisiana Trial Court No. 4799

Honorable Steven Tureau, Judge Presiding

Jane C. Hogan Attorney for Appellants Hammond, Louisiana S. T., Mother of T.L. Tr.L., Father of T.L.

Mary R. Mustaller McMillan Attorney for Appellant New Orleans, Louisiana T.L.

Linda A. Mitchell Attorney for Appellee Houma, Louisiana State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services

BEFORE: THERIOT, PENZATO, AND BALFOUR, JJ. PENZATO, I

This is an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights and certifying a.

minor child, T.L., for adoption. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL. HISTORY

T.L. ( born June 11, 2013) entered the State' s custody on July 14, 2022,

pursuant to an instanter order for removal.' According to the affidavit in support of

the instanter order, the Department of Children and Family Services ( DCFS)

received a report on July 7, 2022, of Neglect/Lack of Adequate Supervision and

Neglect/Dependency. T.L.' s mother, S. T., had called 911 and indicated to the

operator that she wanted to kill herself. S. T. was transported to the hospital for a

mental evaluation, and law enforcement made arrangements with S. T.' s mother, L.T.,

to care for T.L. while S. T. was hospitalized. At that time, T.L.' s father, Tr.L., was

incarcerated. Thereafter, on July 14, 2022, L.T. contacted law enforcement stating

that she no longer wanted to care for T.L. because he was not listening nor following

directions. T.L. was then taken into the State' s custody.

On August 2, 2022, the District Attorney for the 23rd Judicial District filed a

child in need of care petition, asserting therein that S. T. demonstrated diminished

caretaker capacities due to her violent, dangerous, and/ or impulsive behavior

towards her children, untreated mental health, and alleged substance abuse. The

petition further alleged that Tr.L. demonstrated diminished caretaker capacities due

to his recent incarceration, lack of involvement with T.L., and inability to care for

and/ or meet T.L.' s day-to-day needs. According to the petition, the diminished

caretaker capacities presented safety threats and concerns to the safety and well-

being of T.L. and left him at risk of neglect and/or abuse.

1 T.L.' s siblings, C. W. (born October 18, 2006) and C. T. (born October 17, 2007), were also taken into State custody on July 14, 2022. C. W. was placed in the custody of a paternal relative with whom he had been living for the six years prior to these proceedings, and his case was closed at the October 6, 2022 disposition hearing. C. T. remained in foster care at the time of the October 8, 2024 termination hearing. C. W. and C. T. were not subject to the judgment on appeal.

M At the adjudication hearing on September 7, 2022, S. T. and Tr.L. stipulated to

continued custody without admitting to the allegations of the petition, and T.L. was

adjudicated to be in need of care. At a disposition hearing on October 6, 2022, the

trial court ordered that T.L. remain in the custody of the State and that the parties

comply with the DCFS case plan.

The matter came for a case review hearing on January 4, 2023. T.L.' s custody

was maintained with the State, and a permanency hearing was set for July 6, 2023.

At that time, DCFS requested and was granted an additional three months to discuss

permanency. At the October 3, 2023 permanency hearing, the case plan for T.L. was

changed to adoption.

On April 25, 2024, DCFS filed a petition for termination of parental rights,

requesting that S. T.' s and Tr.Us rights be terminated pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 1015,

including but not limited to Sections (4) and/or (5). In support thereof, DCFS alleged

that neither parent had provided any financial contributions for T.L.' s care since he

came into the State' s custody on July 14, 2022, despite being court-ordered to pay

25. 00 per month as a part of their case plans. Additionally, DCFS alleged that

neither parent had substantially complied with the court -approved case plan for

services for the safe return of T.L. Specifically, DCFS alleged that S. T. had failed to

provide documentation of successful completion of a substance abuse treatment

program and demonstrate sustained sobriety. DCFS further alleged that despite the

interventions attempted, there was no reasonable expectation of significant

improvement in either parent' s condition or conduct in the near future as they had

failed to demonstrate an ability and/or willingness to provide for T.L.' s ongoing

health and safety needs in a safe, healthy, drug- free environment.

The trial court held a hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights

on October 8, 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter

under advisement. On October 13, 2024, the trial court signed a judgment

3 terminating the parental rights of both S. T. and Tr.L. to T.L. and certifying T.L. for adoption.

S. T. and Tr.L., individually and on behalf of T.L., appeal the judgment,

contending the trial court erred in terminating both S. T.' s and Tr.L.' s parental rights

and in finding that termination was in T.L.' s best interest. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Title X of the Louisiana Children' s Code governs the involuntary termination

of parental rights. The purpose of an involuntary termination proceeding is " to

protect children whose parents are unwilling or unable to provide safety and care

adequate to meet their physical, emotional, and mental health needs, by providing a

judicial process for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities and for

the certification of the child for adoption." La. Ch.C. art. 1001. The focus is not

whether the parent should be deprived of custody, but whether it would be in the best

interest of the child for all legal relations with the parents to be terminated. State in

Interest ofH.R., 2021- 1328 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 25/ 22), 341 So. 3d 592, 597.

Louisiana Children' s Code article 1015 provides the statutory grounds by

which a court may involuntarily terminate the rights of parents. Relevant hereto,

Sections ( 3), ( 4), and ( 5) provide the following grounds for termination:

3) Misconduct of the parent toward this child or any other child of the parent or any other child which constitutes extreme abuse, cruel and inhuman treatment, or grossly negligent behavior below a reasonable standard of human decency, including but not limited to the ... commission ... of ...:

i)Abuse or neglect which is chronic, life-threatening, or results in gravely disabling physical or psychological injury or disfigurement.

4) Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical custody of a nonparent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him under circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid

parental responsibility by any of the following:

M a) For a period of at least four months as of the time of the hearing, despite a diligent search, the whereabouts of the child' s parent continue to be unknown.

b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to provide significant contributions to the child' s care and support for any period of six consecutive months.

c) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to maintain significant contact with the child by visiting him or communicating with him for any period of six consecutive months.

5) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed since a child was removed from the parent' s custody pursuant to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent' s condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child' s age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.

In order to terminate a person' s parental rights, the court must find the State

has established at least one of the statutory grounds contained in Article 1015 by

clear and convincing evidence. See La. Ch.C. art. 1035( A); State in Interest of C.F.,

2017- 1054 ( La. 12/ 6/ 17), 235 So. 3d 1066, 1072. Even upon finding the State has

met its evidentiary burden, a court may not terminate parental rights unless it

determines that to do so is in the child' s best interest. See La. Ch.C. art. 1037( B).

Whether termination of parental rights is warranted is a question of fact, and a trial

court' s factual determinations will not be set aside in the absence of manifest error.

State in Interest ofE.0., 2018- 1093 ( La. App. I Cir. 2/ 6/ 19), 272 So. 3d 552, 556.

Under the manifest error standard, this Court does not decide whether the factfinder

was right or wrong; rather, we are required to consider the entire record to determine

whether a reasonable factual basis exists for the finding, and whether the finding is

manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. State in Interest ofKR., 341 So. 3d at 598.

In reasons contained in the October 13, 2024 judgment, the trial court found

that S. T. had not provided financial support for T.L. since T.L. was taken into

DCFS' s custody on July 14, 2022. The trial court further found that while S. T. had

5 completed a parenting class and 36 hours of domestic abuse counseling, she had failed to address the substance abuse issue central to her case plan. The trial court

noted that S. T. had left treatment on two separate occasions, admitted to using

methamphetamine as recently as August 2024, and had not made any meaningful

progress toward achieving stability or sobriety. The trial court found that under the

circumstances, S. T.' s behavior constituted gross negligence under La. Ch.C. art..

10 15 (3) and presented a significant risk to T.L.' s well-being.

With regard to R.L., the trial court found that he had also failed to comply

with his case plan. The trial court noted that Tr.L. resided with his mother, and

although the home was unsuitable for T.L.' s care, Tr.L. admitted he had not made a

concerted effort to secure stable housing. The trial court also noted that Tr.L. had

used marijuana as recently as July 15, 2024, and had not provided financial support

or demonstrated substantial compliance with the case plan in the two years since

T.L. had been in DCFS' s care. The trial court found that Tr.L.' s failure to secure

suitable housing and demonstrate progress met the grounds for termination under

La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 5).

The trial court further noted that the DCFS case worker confirmed that both

parents had failed to make sufficient progress toward reunification and

recommended that T.L. be freed for adoption as neither parent had provided a safe,

stable environment for him. The trial count found the evidence presented had clearly

shown that both parents had failed to comply with their case plans and provide T.L.

with the stability necessary for his well-being, concluding the State had met its

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination of S. T.' s and

Tr.L.' s parental rights was justified under La. Ch.C. art. 1015. The trial court further

found that based on the evidence, it was in T.L.' s best interest that the parental rights

of both parents be terminated so that T.L. could be placed in a stable and permanent

home through adoption.

Cel Appellants argue the trial court erred in terminating S. T.' s parental rights

pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3), which was neither pled nor proven by the State,

and in finding that S. T. had not made sufficient progress toward reunification.

Appellants further argue the trial court erred in terminating Tr.L.' s parental rights,

contending DCFS failed to make reasonable efforts to achieve reunification. Finally,

appellants argue the trial court erred in finding that termination of parental rights and

subsequent adoption was in T.L.' s best interest.

At the termination hearing, the DCFS case manager testified that S. T.' s case

plan for reunification required: a mental health assessment, a drug abuse assessment,

parental contributions, stable living, parenting classes, and visitation. The case

manager confirmed that S. T. had completed parenting classes and maintained

suitable housing. The case manager agreed that substance abuse, specifically

methamphetamine, was identified as an issue for S. T. and that S. T. had been to two

inpatient facilities. The case manager testified that on both occasions, S. T. checked

out of the facilities before completing the programs. In connection with the case

manager' s testimony, the State introduced into evidence the results of a drug test

reflecting that a urine specimen collected from S. T. on August 21, 2024, tested

positive for methamphetamines. The case manager also testified that S. T. had not

provided the required $ 25. 00 per month financial contributions.

With regard to Tr.L., the case manager testified that his case plan required:

batterers intervention, a mental health assessment, a drug abuse assessment, parental

contributions, safe and stable housing, and parenting classes. Tr.L. had not provided

anything to the case worker to indicate he was in compliance with his case plan. The

case manager testified regarding one instance in September of 2024 that Tr.L. had

reached out for transportation to one of the court-ordered classes, but DCFS did not

have anyone available to transport him. The case manager testified that Tr.L.' s

housing was not suitable for T.L. but Tr.L. had never asked for assistance in finding

7 suitable housing.

Finally, the case manager testified that T.L. had recently been placed in a. certified foster home in Zachary. She confirmed that DCFS believed adoption would

be in T.L.' s best interest.

S. T. testified at the termination hearing that she had completed the parenting

classes and domestic violence counseling that were part of her case plan. According

to S. T., the only thing she had left to complete was addressing her substance abuse

problem. She testified that the last time she had used methamphetamine was in

August of 2024. S. T. testified she could not participate in substance abuse

counseling because she did not have transportation and DCFS would not provide it.

She further testified that since T.L. had been taken into the State' s custody, she went

for inpatient treatment twice. According to S. T., she left both facilities without

completing the program " because of the nonsense that was happening inside the

facility." S. T. testified she was currently receiving substance abuse treatment and

mental health counseling through Start Corporation in Thibodaux, because Start

provided transportation. She did not know whether she told DCFS that she was

going to Start. S. T. testified that since July 14, 2022, she had made only one $ 25. 00

monthly payment as required by her case plan because she could not afford it, but

she gave T.L. money directly when she saw him.

Tr.L. testified at the termination hearing that he was incarcerated at the time

T.L. was taken into the State' s custody on July 14, 2022, and was released on

November 9, 2022. Tr.L. testified he completed eight out of twenty-one classes of a

batterers intervention program, but the program was shut down. According to Tr.L.,

he was currently participating in substance abuse treatment and had last used

marijuana on July 15, 2024. His case plan also required him to pay $ 25. 00 per

month, but he acknowledged he had not made any payments. Tr.L. testified he was

living with his mother, and her home could not accommodate T.L.

N. In determining whether the record supports the trial court' s finding that termination of both S. T.' s and Tr.L.' s parental rights was justified under La. Ch.C.

art. 1015, we first address appellants' argument that the trial court committed an

error of law in relying on La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3), which was not pled by the State.

We note that in its petition for termination, DCFS requested that S. T. and Tr.L' s

rights be terminated pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 1015, including but not limited to

Sections ( 4) and/ or (5). Moreover, the trial court made a number of factual findings

in its October 13, 2024 judgment. It concluded S. T. had not provided financial

support since T.L. was taken into custody on July 14, 2022, a ground for termination

under La. Ch.C. art. 10 15( 4). The trial court further found S. T. had failed to address

the substance abuse issue central to her case plan, left treatment centers prior to

completion of treatment on two separate occasions, admitted to using

methamphetamine as recently as August 2024, and had not made meaningful

progress toward achieving stability or sobriety. While the trial court concluded this

behavior constituted gross negligence under La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 3), it also

demonstrates that S. T. failed to substantially comply with her case plan. Appellants

argue that there was a reasonable expectation S. T. could demonstrate significant

improvement in the near future because she had been drug- free for two months at

the time of the termination hearing and had started substance abuse treatment at

Start. Reformation sufficient to prevent termination of parental rights requires that

the parent demonstrate a substantial change, such as significantly altering or

modifying that behavior which served as the basis for and resulted in the State' s

removal of the children from the home. State in Interest of TL., 2021- 0728 ( La.

App. I Cir. 12/ 22/ 21), 340 So. 3d 4, 12, writ denied, 2022- 00170 ( La. 3/ 2/ 22). In

this case, S. T. started and abandoned two inpatient treatment plans during the time

T.L. was in the State' s custody and continued to use methamphetamine even after

the petition for termination had been filed. Under these circumstances, the record

0J supports the finding that there was no reasonable expectation of significant

improvement in her condition or conduct in the near future, establishing a ground

for termination under La. Ch.C. art. 1015( 5). As noted above, only one ground for

termination need be established under Article 1015. State in Interest ofI.K., 2022-

0927 ( La. App. I Cir. 12/ 22/ 22), 358 So. 3d 56, 62, writ denied, 2023- 00089 ( La.

3/ 7/ 23), 357 So. 3d 349. Under the evidence presented herein, we find the record

supports the factual finding that multiple grounds for termination of S. T.' s parental

rights were proven and further find no merit to any of S. T.' s arguments in connection

therewith on appeal.

We next address appellants' argument that DCFS failed to make reasonable

efforts to achieve reunification. See La. Ch.C. art 682 ( requiring DCFS to

demonstrate reasonable efforts were made to reunify the parent and child after

removal). Appellants argue DCFS failed to offer assistance to S. T. with regard to

her difficulties with transportation to appointments and to Tr.L. in finding suitable

housing. " Reasonable efforts" are defined by La. Ch.C. art. 603( 26) as " the exercise

of ordinary diligence and care by the department throughout the pendency of a case

pursuant to the obligations imposed on the state by federal and state law to provide

services and supports designed and intended ... to reunite families after separation,

and to achieve safe permanency for children." This requires DCFS to at least direct

parents toward appropriate agencies that may be able to assist them in meeting their

responsibilities and removing the impediments to reunification with their children.

State in Interest of H.R., 341 So. 3d at 601- 02. S. T. participated in two inpatient

substance abuse programs and testified Start provided transportation to her current

substance abuse counseling. Thus, S. T. did not demonstrate a need for transportation

to substance abuse treatment. Tr.L. testified he knew T.L. could not be

accommodated in his mother' s house where he was living at the time of the October

8, 2024 hearing. However, there was no evidence Tr.L. requested assistance in finding a home for himself. Considering the record, we find no merit to this

argument.

Finally, we address appellants' argument that the trial court erred in finding that termination of parental rights was in T.L.' s best interest. In its judgment, the

trial court found the evidence presented at the hearing clearly showed that both

parents failed to comply with their case plans and provide T.L. with the stability

necessary for his well-being, and, based on the evidence, it was in T.L.' s best interest, that the parental rights of both parents be terminated so that T.L. could be placed in.

a stable and permanent home through adoption.

After considering the entire record, we find a reasonable factual basis exists

for the trial court' s finding that termination of S. T.' s and Tr.L.' s parental rights was

in the best interest of T.L. Thus, we find no error in the trial court' s judgment

terminating S. T.' s and Tr.L.' s parental rights.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the trial court' s October 13, 2024 judgment

terminating the parental rights of both S. T. and Tr.L. to T.L. and certifying him for

adoption is affirmed. Costs are assessed one- half to S. T. and one- half to Tr.L.

AFFIRMED.