STATE OF LOUISIANA IN * NO. 2021-CA-0209 THE INTEREST OF C.R. * COURT OF APPEAL * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
APPEAL FROM JUVENILE COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2019-073-09-DQ-C, SECTION “C” Honorable Candice Bates Anderson, Judge ****** Judge Daniel L. Dysart ****** (Court composed of Chief Judge James F. McKay, III, Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Paula A. Brown)
Jason Rogers Williams DISTRICT ATTORNEY PARISH OF ORLEANS G. Benjamin Cohen ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY CHIEF OF APPEALS, PARISH OF ORLEANS David B. LeBlanc ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY 619 S. White Street New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA
Michael Henry Grey, Jr. LOUISIANA CENTER FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 1100-B Milton Street New Orleans, LA 70122
Haylie Jacobson LOUISIANA CENTER FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 1100-B Milton Street New Orleans, LA 70122
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
JUDGMENT AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED JULY 14, 2021 DLD JFM This is a juvenile delinquency appeal. On September 17, 2019, C.R.1 was PAB adjudicated delinquent for the misdemeanor offense of negligent injuring, in
violation of La. R.S. 14:39.2 The juvenile court imposed a disposition of six
months in the custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice (“OJJ”), suspended, placed
the juvenile on active probation for two years, and ordered restitution. The
juvenile court deferred fixing the amount of the restitution. Before the juvenile
court set the amount of the restitution, C.R. appealed his delinquency adjudication
and disposition, and this Court affirmed.3 On February 22, 2021, the juvenile court
ordered restitution in the amount of $10,236.15, payable in $200.00 monthly
installments. C.R. now appeals the judgment setting the amount of the restitution.
Upon careful review, we find that the juvenile court properly ordered and set
the amount of the restitution. However, the two-year probationary period imposed
at the disposition exceeded the statutory limits, and the judgment on appeal
improperly assessed restitution against C.R.’s mother. Accordingly, we amend the
1 C.R. was born on September 18, 2005. Pursuant to the confidentiality requirements set forth in La. Ch.C. art. 412 regarding juvenile proceedings, we refer to the juvenile by his initials. 2 La. R.S. 14:39(A)(1) provides that negligent injuring is “[t]he inflicting of any injury upon the person of another by criminal negligence.” 3 See State in Interest of C.R., 2019-0917 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/29/20), 290 So.3d 220.
1 disposition to impose a probation term of one-year---the statutory maximum,
terminate supervised probation, and remove C.R.’s mother from the judgment
setting the amount of the restitution. In all other respects, the judgment fixing the
restitution amount is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
C.R.’s delinquency adjudication and disposition arose out of the shooting of
his cousin, also a minor.4 The underlying facts of the case are set forth in State in
Interest of C.R., 2019-0917 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/29/20), 290 So.3d 330 (“C.R. I”). In
addition to other special conditions of probation, the juvenile court ordered
restitution at the September 17, 2019 delinquency adjudication and disposition
hearing. The juvenile court deferred fixing the amount of the restitution pending
the State’s submission of the victim’s documentation of expenditures attributable
to the shooting.
The disposition also referenced the juvenile court’s intent to transfer C.R.’s
probationary supervision to Plaquemines Parish and to otherwise retain the matter
in Orleans Parish for the sole purpose of restitution. 5 The juvenile court attempted
to transfer the case to Plaquemines Parish on September 30, 2019; however,
Plaquemines Parish denied the transfer on November 19, 2019.
The juvenile court acknowledged Plaquemines Parish’s denial of the transfer
at a January 28, 2020 pre-trial conference and set the matter for an OJJ sentence
review on April 28, 2020. The April sentence review was continued until July 24,
2020 because of Covid-19 related delays. At the July 24, 2020 sentence review,
4 C.R’s mother and the minor victim’s mother are sisters. 5 The record indicated that C.R.’s domicile was Plaquemines Parish.
2 the State submitted a letter and documentation from the victim’s family outlining
medical expenses and property damages approximating $200,000.00 resulting from
the victim’s shooting. The juvenile court held subsequent OJJ sentence reviews on
October 26, 2020 and January 25, 2021. At the January 25, 2021 sentence review,
the juvenile court received additional paperwork submitted by the State that
included itemization of expenditures paid by the victim’s various insurance
coverages and set a disposition/restitution status review for February 22, 2021.
At the February 22, 2021 status review,6 the juvenile court determined that
the victim’s out-of-pocket expenditures that were not subject to any insurance
coverages amounted to $10,236.15. The court ordered restitution in that amount
and orally advised that restitution had been assessed against the mother.
C.R. filed a motion and notice of appeal of the judgment ordering restitution,
which the juvenile court denied. C.R. sought writ review of the denial, and this
Court granted C.R.’s writ application. Finding that C.R. had a right to appeal the
restitution award judgment, this Court instructed the juvenile court to grant C.R.’s
motion and notice of appeal.7
This timely appeal followed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
C.R. alleges the following assignments of error:
1. The juvenile court imposed an illegal disposition when it ordered probation beyond the statutory term;
2. The juvenile court erred by imposing restitution eighteen (18) months after the adjudication hearing;
6 C.R.’s request to modify the disposition was continued. 7 See In Re C.R., 2021-0158 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/25/21) (unpub.).
3 3. The juvenile court erred by imposing restitution on C.R.’s mother rather than on C.R., the child adjudicated delinquent; and
4. The juvenile court erred by imposing restitution without consideration and in excess of C.R.’s ability to pay.
ERRORS PATENT
This Court has determined that an error patent review is warranted in
juvenile delinquency cases. See State in the Interest of A.H., 2011-1152, p. 9 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 12/21/11), 80 So.3d 1203, 1209 (citation omitted). An illegal
disposition constitutes an error patent. See State in Interest of J.T., 2011-1646, p.
24 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/16/12), 94 So.3d 847, 862. Here, in assigned errors one and
three, C.R. contends that the juvenile court imposed an illegal disposition in
assessing an active probation term beyond the statutory maximum and in ordering
his mother to pay restitution. Accordingly, this Court shall first conduct an error
patent review of these errors before addressing C.R.’s remaining assignments of
error contesting the juvenile court’s assessment of restitution.
Assigned Error No. 1: Illegal Probation Disposition
C.R. contends that the two-year probation disposition imposed is illegal as it
exceeds the permissible maximum sentence for a misdemeanor-grade adjudication
disposition pursuant to La. R.S.14:39(C) and La. Ch.C. art. 900(A). The State does
not contest the substance of C.R.’s argument on this issue. Instead, the State
maintains that this Court should not review the excessiveness of the two-year
probation term imposed because C.R. failed to timely file a motion to reconsider
sentence, did not object to the disposition at the time of his adjudication, and did
not raise the issue of excessiveness in his notice and motion for appeal. The State
relies on La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(E) which provides:
4 Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.
C.R. counters that he contests the legality, rather than the constitutional
excessiveness of the punishment imposed. In contrast to an excessive sentence
claim, La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A) provides that “[a]n illegal sentence may be corrected
at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by the appellate court on
review.” Accordingly, the issue of the illegality of the sentence imposed is
properly before this Court.
La. R.S. 14:39(C) provides that “[w]hoever commits the crime of negligent
injuring shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not
more than six months, or both.” La. Ch.C. art. 900(A) provides, in pertinent part,
the following:
No judgment of disposition shall remain in force for a period exceeding the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense which forms the basis for the adjudication, except that if the child is placed on probation, the term of probation may extend for a maximum of one year, or for such longer period of time if the child is a full-time participant in a juvenile drug court program operated by a court of this state, if such participation has been ordered by the court as a condition of the child’s probation.
Here, the record reflects that the juvenile court did not order C.R.’s
participation in a full-time juvenile drug court program as a condition of his
probation, an exception to the one-year statutory maximum for a misdemeanor
adjudication probation term. Nor did the disposition meet other exceptions to alter
the maximum probation term.8 Therefore, upon reviewing La. R.S. 14:39(C) in
8 La. Ch.C. art. 900(C) also provides that the maximums do not apply if:
5 pari materia with La. Ch.C. art. 900(A), the maximum probation term allowable at
the time of C.R.’s disposition was one year. Accordingly, we agree with C.R. that
the two-year active probation period imposed was illegal.
Upon finding an error in the disposition, courts are instructed to correct the
disposition where the error has imposed restrictions beyond what is authorized in
the statutes. See State in Interest of M.S., 2020-0346 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/5/20), 306
So.3d 487, 493. Moreover, “[w]here the defect in [disposition] does not involve
the exercise of discretion, the [disposition] may be corrected on appeal by
amendment rather than remand.” State in Interest of M.S., 2020-0346 (La. App. 4
Cir. 10/05/20), 306 So.3d 487, 493 (quoting State in Interest of H.L.F., 1997-2651,
p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/20/98), 713 So.2d. 810, 813 (citation omitted).
The record establishes that C.R.’s active probation term has already
exceeded the statutory maximum of one-year.9 Accordingly, we amend the
disposition to remove the two-year active probation term, substitute a one-year
(1) A portion of an order of commitment was suspended, in which case the term of parole shall end when the time period so suspended has elapsed.
(2) The child commits a felony after having been committed to the custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections or while on probation and is tried as an adult and convicted or pleads guilty, in which case the judgment of disposition in the juvenile court shall terminate as of the date of conviction. The child shall earn no diminution of his felony sentence based upon time served under the order of disposition.
(3) The judgment expires by its own term, is modified, or is vacated.
(4) The child reaches age twenty-one. 9 Based on the September 17, 2019 disposition, a one-year probation term would have expired on September 17, 2020. However, the juvenile court extended C.R.’s probation for an additional two years at the January 28, 2020 pre-trial conference. The court noted that no probation services had been put into place since the September 2019 disposition inasmuch as Plaquemines Parish had rejected the transfer of C.R.’s case. Nonetheless, even if the January 28, 2020 date is applied to trigger the start of C.R.’s probation, a one-year probation term would have concluded on January 28, 2021.
6 active probation term, and order the immediate termination of C.R.’s supervisory
probation.
Assignment of Error No. 3: Legality of Restitution Order Against Mother
C.R. maintains that the juvenile court lacked authority under La. Ch.C. art.
899B(2)(c) to order his mother, T.S.A.,10 to pay restitution inasmuch as the article
only permits assessment of restitution against the child adjudicated delinquent. We
agree.
La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2)(c) allows the court to impose as a condition of
probation “[a] requirement that the child make reasonable restitution to any victim
for any personal or property damage caused by the child in the commission of a
delinquent act.” Well-settled Louisiana jurisprudence provides that where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute should be applied as
written. See State of Louisiana v. Watts, 2009-0912, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/6/10),
41 So.3d 625, 635 (citation omitted). La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2)(c) clearly and
unambiguously imposes the duty to make reasonable restitution on the delinquent
child. Had the legislature intended to allow courts to directly order parents to pay
restitution, it could have done so as it did when it placed other special probationary
10 This Court notes a discrepancy and/or an ambiguity involving the written disposition and the transcript of the judgment fixing the restitution amount. The written disposition stated that “[t]he Court assesses restitution in the amount of $10,236.15” and provides that “[t]he family can mail the payment of $200.00 to the address of the victim.” On the other hand, the transcript reveals that the juvenile court specifically instructed T.S.A. as follows: “[m]a’am, you’re going to need to start making payments to your sister in the amount of $200.00 per month until those payments are made.” After C.R.’s counsel objected, the juvenile court added, “I’ve assessed restitution against the mother. You represent the mother now, Mr. Grey?”
Generally, when there is a discrepancy or lack of clarity between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript prevails. See State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983). In applying this principle to the present matter, any reconciliation of the dispositions in the minutes and the transcript necessarily requires this Court to include T.S.A, C.R.’s mother, as a party to the juvenile court’s order that fixed the amount of restitution to be paid.
7 conditions under La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2) on both the child and parent.11
Accordingly, when we apply the restitution statute as written, the juvenile court
erred in directly assessing restitution against C.R.’s mother.
This Court reached a similar result in State in the Interest of D.M.G., 579
So.2d 525, 528 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1991). In D.M.G., the trial court ordered the
mother, along with the child, to make restitution to the victim for 50% of the
victim’s damages. In deleting that portion of the judgment which ordered the
mother to pay restitution, the D.M.G. Court reasoned that the mother could not be
ordered to pay restitution as she was not a formal party to the proceedings, and she
could not be held financially responsible.12 As such, in accordance with our
jurisprudence, we order that restitution be assessed only against C.R. and order the
removal of C.R.’s mother’s name from the restitution order.
Notwithstanding our agreement with the findings of the D.M.G. case, we
clarify that C.R’s mother may still be found financially responsible for any
restitution assessed against C.R. This Court explained in State v. Portie, 2008-
1580, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/09), 22 So.3d 213, 222 that a restitution order is a
civil money judgment that may be enforced in the same manner as a money
judgment in a civil case in accordance with La. C.Cr. P. art. 895.1(A)(2)(a).13
11 See, e.g., La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2)(b) which permits a court to impose a “requirement that the child or his parent or his legal guardian perform court-approved community service activities[;]” or La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2)(g) which provides, in part, that “[t]he court may order a parent, tutor, guardian, or other person who is financially responsible for the care of the child to be responsible for payment of all or part of any supervision fee imposed.” 12 See also State in Interest R.L.K., 1995-1277, p. 9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/95/95), 666 So.2d 427, 432, which vacated an order for the mother to pay restitution, finding that if restitution was ordered, only the juvenile should be ordered to pay the restitution. 13 La.C.Cr. P. art. 895(A)(2)(a) states, in relevant part, that “[t]he order to pay restitution . . . is deemed a civil money judgment in favor of the person to whom restitution, costs, or fines are owed. . .” In addition to proceedings by the court which orders the restitution . . ., the judgment may be enforced in the same manner as a money judgment.
8 Here, we note that C.R. was a minor at the time of his offense. La. C.C. art.
2318 provides that the father and the mother are responsible for the damage caused
by their minor children.14 Hence, although we remove the mother’s name from the
restitution order, the victim still retains all other civil remedies permitted under
statutory and jurisprudential authority to execute on the restitution order as a civil
money judgment against C.R.’s mother or father in the event C.R. defaults on his
restitution obligation.
We now return to address C.R.’s remaining assignments of error.
Timeliness of Restitution Disposition
C.R.’s arguments regarding the timeliness of the restitution disposition falls
primarily in two categories: (1) the juvenile court’s imposition of restitution
eighteen months after the adjudication hearing, which C.R. contends violated La.
Ch.C. art. 892, and (2) the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to impose restitution
in February 2021 because the statutory maximum one-year probation term it could
impose had already expired. In this error, C.R. conflates the disposition ordering
restitution and the disposition fixing the amount of the restitution. Hence, our
review shall separately address the timeliness of each disposition.
As to the order of restitution, the written record and the transcript in C.R. I
show that the juvenile court imposed restitution as a part of C.R.’s disposition on
September 17, 2019, the same date as the delinquency adjudication. The juvenile
court discussed restitution as follows:
14 La. C.C. art. 2318 states, in relevant part, that “[t]he father and mother are responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor child, who resides with them or who has been placed by them under the care of other persons . . . .”
9 And then obviously we never talked about restitution - - hey, but you know, one issue we have not - - excuse me. So one issue that we have not resolved is restitution. Obviously, he has been adjudicated delinquent. Obviously this child was injured. Obviously he has had to have five injuries [sic]. Obviously that has cost money, there has been money associated with, I’m sure, deductibles for insurance, care, damage to your home, I would suggest that, so you need to obviously put that together for the District Attorney if you all are going to request restitution. Obviously that restitution will be due and owing by Mr. R[]s’ family so I’m not certain whether or not you had to make any type of claims in order to get your house fixed, or to get your house repaired, or if there was any money that was out of pocket, but most certainly you need to give that information to the District Attorney as restitution would be assessed in this case, okay.
Okay, so do you have - - so what we can do is we can come back in about 30 days when you can get documentation together. Obviously all the families do not need to be present the attorneys could be here, but so that you-all are aware that there would be restitution due and owing.
The written record also indicates that “[t]his matter will remain in Orleans Parish
for the sole purpose of restitution. State is to provide any and all receipts in
regards to restitution.” Additionally, the juvenile court encouraged the parties to
talk amongst themselves to arrive at a restitution number.
Based on the above, clearly, the adjudication and disposition hearing which
took place on September 17, 2019 timely ordered restitution within the thirty day
time delays afforded by La. Ch.C. art. 892.15 Moreover, in C.R. I, this Court
affirmed the disposition imposing the special condition of restitution. That
notwithstanding, the juvenile court delayed completion of the disposition terms
when it deferred setting the amount of restitution pending receipt of the
documentation establishing the sum owed. Accordingly, in addressing the
15 La. Ch.C. art. 892 provides that “[p]rior to entering a judgment of disposition, the court shall conduct a disposition hearing. The disposition may be conducted immediately after the adjudication and shall be conducted within thirty days after the adjudication. Such period may be extended for good cause.”
10 timeliness of the disposition based on the eighteen-month delay between the
timely-ordered restitution disposition and the hearing fixing the amount of the
restitution, the issue this Court must resolve is whether the delay constituted an
unreasonable delay in sentencing. We determine that it was not.
This Court discussed the parameters to determine unreasonable sentencing
delays in juvenile matters in State in Interest of T.W., 2013-1564, p. 10 (La. App. 4
Cir. 5/14/14), 141 So.3d 822, 828-29 as follows:
Louisiana Children’s Code article 892 does not provide a remedy for a violation of the time limitation. When procedural matters are not addressed by the Children’s Code, the juvenile court proceeds under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. La. Ch.C. art. 104. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 874 provides that “[s]entences shall be imposed without unreasonable delay. If the defendant claims the sentence has been unreasonably delayed, he may invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the appellate court.” The sanction for an unreasonable delay is to divest the court of the power to impose the sentence. State v. McQueen, 308 So.2d 752, 755 (La. 1975).
To determine whether the sentence delay is unreasonable, the court will apply the four factors developed by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed. 104 (1972): the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice the defendant has suffered.
In applying the Barker factors, this Court acknowledges that the length of
the delay between the order to pay restitution and setting the amount (eighteen
months) was significant. However, in reviewing the other factors and
circumstances of this case ---- the reasons for the delay, C.R.’s failure to assert his
right to a speedy trial and/or disposition, and the lack of prejudice----we conclude
that the eighteen-month delay in setting the restitution amount was not
unreasonable.
11 In considering the reasons for the delay, the record shows that the juvenile court
deferred fixing the amount of the restitution pending receipt of documentation
from the victim and his family. Court-ordered restitution shall not exceed the
actual pecuniary loss to the victim. See State of Louisiana v. Walker, 2015-1026,
p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/6/16), 192 So.3d 813, 818. Therefore, the juvenile court
appropriately deferred fixing the restitution amount to give the victim and his
family time to document their pecuniary losses and for the court to evaluate that
evidence. See State in the Interest of J.C.O., (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/2/04), 877 So.2d
1020, 1025 n.3, where the Second Circuit observed that a disposition hearing not
conducted within the statutory delays was extended for good cause where the delay
was caused, in part, by preparation of reports to aid in disposition.
Here, the victim’s family did not submit restitution expenditures to the State
until July 2020. Upon submission, an additional delay occurred when the juvenile
court further asked the victim’s family to itemize expenditures not covered by
insurance policies. The family explained in its victim impact statement that any
delay in gathering the restitution documentation resulted from the fact that the
family was still accumulating expenditures as the victim had undergone multiple
surgeries, faced future surgeries and extensive physical therapy, was required to
purchase medical equipment, and had other ongoing medical care. Indeed, on the
day of the hearing fixing restitution, the victim’s mother indicated the victim had
another procedure scheduled in the upcoming weeks.
The record also reflects that Covid-19 concerns caused delays in scheduling
status conferences and disposition hearings. We also note potential delays
resulting from the juvenile court’s aborted attempt to transfer C.R.’s case to
12 Plaquemines Parish and C.R.’s appeal of the September 17, 2019 delinquency
adjudication and order of restitution.16
The third Barker factor, a defendant’s request for a speedy trial, does not
apply to the present matter. Although C.R. did object to the disposition fixing the
restitution amount, C.R. never filed a motion for a speedy trial or a related motion
urging the juvenile court to timely fix the restitution amount.
C.R. also does not meet the fourth Barker factor. C.R. has not shown any
prejudice from the delay in setting the restitution amount. As noted by the State,
C.R. was not incarcerated; he was not forced to make any payments; and his active
probation was not extended. The juvenile court also made C.R. aware at the initial
adjudication and disposition that he would have to make restitution. Therefore, the
record contradicts C.R.’s claim that “there was no indication restitution would be
imposed beyond the thirty day time period.” In State ex rel. A.M., 2007-1228, pp.
13-14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/9/08), 983 So.2d 176, 185, this Court reasoned that where
the juvenile could not prove he was prejudiced by the delay in sentencing, any
error in the delay was harmless. Likewise, in the present matter, any error
associated with the deferred disposition amounts to harmless error as C.R. has not
demonstrated he was prejudiced by the delay.
When we apply the Barker factors, the eighteen-month sentencing delay was
not so unreasonable as to divest the juvenile court of the power to order the
restitution amount.17 Therefore, we find this assigned error is without merit.
16 This Court affirmed the adjudication and disposition on January 29, 2020. See n.3. 17 Relatedly, La. Ch.C. art. 892 permits a disposition hearing to be continued for good cause shown. Although there was no hearing to show good cause, based on the totality of the circumstances, good cause existed for the delay in fixing the restitution amount.
13 The second part of C.R.’s claim challenging the timeliness of the restitution
award argues the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to set a restitution amount after
C.R.’s one-year maximum probation term had expired. La. Ch.C. art. 313(A)
specifies a juvenile court’s duration of jurisdiction over proceedings ends when
any of the following conditions are met:
(1) Declination of jurisdiction.
(2) Transfer of the proceeding.
(3) Expiration or satisfaction of an informal adjustment agreement.
(4) Expiration or satisfaction of an informal adjustment plan.
(5) Expiration, satisfaction, or vacation of a juvenile disposition or adult sentence.
(6) Dismissal of the proceeding.
Thus, pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 313(A)(5), the juvenile court retains
jurisdiction until the expiration, satisfaction, or vacation of C.R.’s disposition.
Inasmuch as C.R. was ordered to pay restitution as a condition of his probation at
the initial disposition and that condition had not been satisfied at the time
restitution was fixed, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction necessarily continued beyond
the conclusion of any supervised probation, regardless of the term. As we decline
to vacate the disposition fixing the restitution for the reasons discussed herein, the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction over C.R. remains uninterrupted. Thus, C.R.’s
timeliness arguments lack merit.
Excessive Restitution Amount
C.R.’s final assignment of error contends that the juvenile court’s restitution
order of $10,236.15, in monthly installments of $200.00, is in excess of his ability
to pay. C.R. argues he is indigent and thus, the restitution amount contravenes the
14 requirement under La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2)(c) for “reasonable” restitution and La.
C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(A)(1) which requires the court to base restitution on the earning
capacity and assets of the defendant.18
As discussed herein, only the child can be included in the order to pay
restitution in a juvenile proceeding. Nevertheless, there is no statutory prohibition
against consideration of the parents’ assets in evaluating the juvenile’s capacity to
pay, especially in light of La. C.C. art. 2318 that subjects the parents to liability for
the damages caused by their minor child. At the restitution hearing, the juvenile
court established that C.R.’s mother was employed as a bus driver and his
stepfather was also gainfully employed. The evidence also documented that the
victim and his family had incurred expenses in excess of $200,000.00 and actual
out-of-pocket expenses of $10,236.15, and the losses were still accruing.
C.R. maintains that because he is indigent, restitution serves no rehabilitative
purpose. As noted, however, the record shows C.R. may have access to resources
to satisfy the restitution order. Moreover, Louisiana jurisprudence establishes that
a juvenile court’s order of restitution requiring the juvenile to bear accountability
for his actions is a reasonable form of rehabilitation. See State in the Interest of
D.B., 2013-1364, p. 10 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/23/14), 137 So.3d 1282, 1288. “Ordering
a child to make partial restitution to the victim not only serves the public interest
but is also in the interest of the child by teaching him that he will be held not only
morally but also financially responsible for his acts.” D.M.G., 1990-1080, 579
So.2d at 528.
18 See also La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(A)(1) which provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he restitution payment shall be made, in discretion, of the court, either in a lump sum or in monthly installments based on the earning capacity and assets of the defendant.”
15 District courts have broad discretion in sentencing decisions, including the
ordering of restitution. See Walker, 2015-1026, p. 8, 192 So.3d at 818 (citations
omitted). Accordingly, appellate courts will not set aside a district court’s
judgment on restitution absent an abuse of discretion. Id. In this case, the victim
sustained severe injuries. We cannot say that the restitution amount ordered was
unreasonable so as to constitute an abuse of the district court’s discretion. This
error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, we amend the disposition to impose a one-
year active probation term, terminate the probation, and remove C.R.’s mother
from the order to pay restitution. In all other respects, the judgment fixing the
AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED