State of La., Department of Social Services v. Travis Scott Young

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: October 3, 2012
• Docket: CA-0012-0242
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 12-242

STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

VERSUS

TRAVIS SCOTT YOUNG

**********

APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 10,749 HONORABLE PATRICIA EVANS KOCH, DISTRICT JUDGE

BILLY HOWARD EZELL JUDGE

Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Jimmie C. Peters, and Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Robert George Levy LaCroix, Levy & Barnett P. O. Box 1105 Alexandria, LA 71309-1105 (318) 443-7615 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE: State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services Travis Scott Young In Proper Person 1367 Hwy 457 Lecompte, LA 71346 (318) 787-7824 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Travis Scott Young EZELL, Judge.

Travis Young appeals the decision of the trial court below reducing his child

support obligation. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This case originated as an application for enforcement of child support made by

Diana McGowan in November 2006 against Mr. Young. At issue was a support order

requiring Mr. Young to pay $448.35 per month in child support. After being laid off

in June 2009, Mr. Young filed a rule for modification on July 1, 2009. While that

filing was pending, Mr. Young went back to work in November 2009. In April 2010,

a consent judgment was entered stipulating that child support would stay at the then

current rate of $448.35. Mr. Young continued to work until August 2010, when he

was laid off again. That September, Mr. Young again filed a motion to modify his

child support obligation which was eliminated by exceptions filed by Mrs. McGowan

concerning jurisdictional issues. In February of 2011, Mr. Young filed the current

motion to reduce his obligation, claiming to still be out of work. In November of

2011, the hearing officer reduced his obligation to $235.63 per month plus a five

percent administrative fee for a total obligation of $247.41 per month. This amount

included Mr. Young’s portion of daycare expenses for child care during summer

months and holidays. Mr. Young appealed the hearing officer’s ruling to the trial

court, who affirmed that decision. From that ruling, Mr. Young appeals.

Mr. Young asserts four assignments of error on appeal. He claims that the trial

court erred in failing to grant him a continuance due to his incarceration at the time of

trial, that the trial court erred in including day care expenses without written proof of

expenses, that the trial court erred in imputing minimum wage due to him while

incarcerated, and that the trial court erred in failing to make the reduction retroactive

to his July 2009 motion. Mr. Young first claims that the trial court erred in not granting him a

continuance. We disagree. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1601 provides

that “[a] continuance may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor.”

The standard of review of the denial of a motion for continuance is an abuse of

discretion standard. Jackson v. Royal Ins. Co., 97-723 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/17/97), 704

So.2d 424. Mr. Young did not raise any issue before the trial court that was not raised

previously before the hearing officer and presented his arguments, though previously

made, well. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Mr. Young’s

motion for continuance.

Mr. Young next claims that the trial court erred in awarding day care expenses

in the absence of evidence of amounts needed. Again, we disagree. “The trial court

has great discretion in determining a child support award, and its findings of fact

regarding financial matters underlying an award of child support will not be disturbed

in the absence of manifest error or a clear abuse of discretion.” Bazile v. Washington,

05-1583, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/14/06), 934 So.2d 214, 215 (citing McCorvey v.

McCorvey, 05-889 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/06), 922 So.2d 694, writ denied, 06-435

(La.4/28/06), 927 So.2d 295; Murphy v. Murphy, 04-1332 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05),

894 So.2d 542, writ denied, 05-983 (La.11/28/05), 916 So.2d 144). Mrs. McGowan

testified that she incurred expenses in the amount of $85.00 per week caring for her

child during the summer months. Both the hearing officer and the trial court found

this to be credible testimony and a reasonable amount. Nothing in the record before

this court indicates these findings to be in error.

Mr. Young next claims the trial court erred in imputing him with minimum

wage while he was incarcerated. It is well settled that incarceration does not relieve

one of an existing child support obligation.

2 A parent’s obligation to support his children is a primary, continuous obligation, which is not excusable except for fortuitous events. When a person commits a voluntary act, that act cannot be used to justify the extinction of a protected right like child support. As a general rule, the obligation continues when the defendant has brought about his own financial condition, regardless of a temporary situation making it impossible for the defendant to pay for a given length of time. Additionally, the fact that a person is jailed does not necessarily mean that he is unable to meet his support obligations; each case depends on the financial circumstances. Even when a defendant is actually unable to pay for the period of his incarceration, his support obligation can be satisfied after his release from prison.

State v. Nelson, 587 So.2d 176, 178 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1991). Moreover, Mr. Young is

no longer incarcerated. This assignment of error is completely devoid of merit.

Finally, Mr. Young asserts that the trial court erred in failing to make the

reduction retroactive to his July 2009 filing. We disagree. The consent judgment Mr.

Young entered into in April 2010, continuing the child support obligation at the prior

amount, eliminated that claim for reduction. If anything, the reduction should be

retroactive only to the February 2011 filing. However, both the trial court and the

hearing officer gave Mr. Young credit for the four months he was unemployed

between August and November of 2009, making the reduction retroactive to October

2010, four months prior to the current motion for reduction. Mr. Young fails to see

that the trial court did him a favor in that regard. Despite this, we find no error in the

trial court’s ruling.

For the above reasons, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs

of this appeal are assessed against Mr. Young.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal. Rule 2-16.3.