STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
19-638
STATE OF LOUISIANA, BOARD OF ETHICS
VERSUS
JACKSON JONES, JR., ET AL.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. C-91344 HONORABLE ERIC R. HARRINGTON, DISTRICT JUDGE
PHYLLIS M. KEATY JUDGE
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Phyllis M. Keaty, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.
AFFIRMED; MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED AS MOOT.
Tracy M. Barker Kathleen M. Allen David M. Bordelon Latoya Jordan Post Office Box 4368 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821 (225) 219-5600 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee: State of Louisiana, Board of Ethics
Jackson Jones, Jr. In Proper Person 222 Foshee Ranch Road Natchitoches, Louisiana 71457 (318) 652-1325 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Jackson Jones, Jr. KEATY, Judge.
The plaintiff/appellee, the Louisiana Board of Ethics (BOE), filed suit against
the defendant/appellant, Jackson Jones, Jr., objecting to his qualification as a
candidate for the office of Parish President, Natchitoches Parish. After a hearing,
the trial court rendered judgment ordering Mr. Jones to withdraw from the election
or otherwise be disqualified (disqualifying judgment). That same day, Mr. Jones
filed motions for a continuance, for a new trial/rehearing, and to vacate the
disqualifying judgment, all of which the trial court denied within hours of their filing.
Eight days later, Mr. Jones filed, inter alia, a motion to appeal the disqualifying
judgment, which the trial court denied as untimely. Mr. Jones has now perfected
this appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion to appeal. Finding that
Mr. Jones failed to timely comply with the expedited appellate procedures set forth
in La.R.S. 18:1409(D), we affirm the trial court ruling denying the motion to appeal
as untimely.
I.
ISSUES
The only issue properly before this court is whether the trial court erred in
denying Mr. Jones’s motion to appeal. Although the parties have argued the merits
of the disqualifying judgment in brief, we note at the outset that the disqualifying
judgment is not before this court, and its merits are not at issue in this appeal.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Jones qualified to run for the office of Natchitoches Parish President by
submitting a notice of candidacy during the qualification period that ended on
Thursday, August 8, 2019. The BOE filed a petition on August 15, 2019, objecting
to Mr. Jones’s candidacy on the grounds that he had an outstanding late fee of $2,500.00 and had “falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that he does not owe
any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Code of Governmental Ethics
as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2).” La.R.S. 18:492(A)(6). This matter was set for
hearing on August 20, 2019.
During the hearing, the BOE submitted both documentary and testimonial
evidence through which it sought to prove: (1) Mr. Jones was required by La.R.S.
18:1495.7 to file a 2014 Tier 2 Candidate Personal Financial Disclosure Statement
by December 9, 2015, when he qualified for the March 5, 2016 election for the office
of Mayor, City of Natchitoches; (2) Mr. Jones failed to timely file his disclosure
statement and was assessed with a late fee of $2,500.00 pursuant to La.R.S.
42:1124.4 and La.R.S. 42:1157 of the Code of Governmental Ethics; and (3) Mr.
Jones had not filed his disclosure statement or paid the late fee at the time he
executed his August 8, 2019 notice of candidacy, wherein he swore he did “not owe
any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Code of Governmental
Ethics.”
The trial court found that the BOE made a prima facie showing that Mr. Jones
was not qualified to run for office due to his false certification and that Mr. Jones
failed to rebut the BOE’s showing. On August 20, 2019, at 9:47 a.m. the trial court
issued and signed a judgment ordering Mr. Jones to withdraw from the election
within twenty-four hours or thereafter be disqualified.
Later that day, Mr. Jones, pro se, filed a document styled as a “Motion for
Continuance and Motion for New trial/Rehearing and Motion to vacate Aug 20,
2019 Judgment.” The trial court denied the motions that same afternoon. In its
written reasons, the trial court explained: “The laws encompassed by the Louisiana
Election Code do not allow such motions following a judgment.”
2 Thereafter, on August 28, 2019, Mr. Jones filed a “Motion of Jackson Jones,
Jr. for an Appeal of the Judgment Granting the Objection to Candidacy Filed on
Behalf of the Louisiana Board of Ethics,” in which he argued that, by his August 20,
2019 motions, he had timely appealed the disqualifying judgment. The trial court
denied the motion on August 29, 2019. While acknowledging that Mr. Jones, in his
August 20, 2019 motions, stated that he “seeks an appeal,” the trial court reasoned:
All the motions Mr. Jackson made may have been procedurally appropriate in an ordinary proceeding, but this is a candidacy challenge proceeding, which carries its own limited rules and time delays. The court accordingly denied them by written ruling on the same day they were filed, August 20, 2019. Mr. Jackson did not seek relief from the court of appeal, but from the trial court. Because he did not timely seek an order of appeal pursuant to R.S. 18:1409D within 24 hours of the signing of the judgment against him on August 20, 2019, his time to appeal expired, and his motion for an appeal filed August 28, 2019 is therefore denied as untimely.
On August 30, 2019, Mr. Jones, pro se, filed a motion to appeal the trial
court’s August 29, 2019 ruling, seeking pauper status. The trial court issued an order
of appeal on September 3, 2019, allowing Mr. Jones to proceed in forma pauperis.
Thereafter, the BOE moved to have this court dismiss the appeal as untimely.
III.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1409(D) governs appeals of actions objecting
to candidacy and provides:
Within twenty-four hours after rendition of judgment, a party aggrieved by the judgment may appeal by obtaining an order of appeal and giving bond for a sum fixed by the court to secure the payment of costs. The clerk of the trial court shall give notice of the order of appeal to the clerk of the court of appeal and to all the parties or their counsel of record. The trial judge shall fix the return day at a time not to exceed three days after rendition of judgment.
Interpreting this provision, our supreme court in Francois v. Thibodeaux, 02-
1588, p. 1 (La. 6/12/02), 821 So.2d 479, 480, explained:
3 (“A general rule of statutory construction is that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, a special statute enacted for a particular purpose will not be presumed to have been within the scope of a subsequent general enactment on the same subject matter. . . . [I]n the event of ambiguity or conflict, special laws prevail over general laws.”) . . . The relevant statute, La.R.S. 18:1409(D) is clear and unambiguous in its requirement. It provides that “[w]ithin twenty-four hours after rendition of judgment, a party aggrieved by the judgment may appeal by obtaining an order of appeal and giving bond for a sum fixed by the court to secure the payment of costs.” (Emphasis supplied.) Where the requirements of law are so straightforward, it is improper to resort to equity. See and compare, La. Civil Code arts. 4 and 9.
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STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
19-638
STATE OF LOUISIANA, BOARD OF ETHICS
VERSUS
JACKSON JONES, JR., ET AL.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. C-91344 HONORABLE ERIC R. HARRINGTON, DISTRICT JUDGE
PHYLLIS M. KEATY JUDGE
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Phyllis M. Keaty, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.
AFFIRMED; MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED AS MOOT.
Tracy M. Barker Kathleen M. Allen David M. Bordelon Latoya Jordan Post Office Box 4368 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821 (225) 219-5600 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee: State of Louisiana, Board of Ethics
Jackson Jones, Jr. In Proper Person 222 Foshee Ranch Road Natchitoches, Louisiana 71457 (318) 652-1325 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Jackson Jones, Jr. KEATY, Judge.
The plaintiff/appellee, the Louisiana Board of Ethics (BOE), filed suit against
the defendant/appellant, Jackson Jones, Jr., objecting to his qualification as a
candidate for the office of Parish President, Natchitoches Parish. After a hearing,
the trial court rendered judgment ordering Mr. Jones to withdraw from the election
or otherwise be disqualified (disqualifying judgment). That same day, Mr. Jones
filed motions for a continuance, for a new trial/rehearing, and to vacate the
disqualifying judgment, all of which the trial court denied within hours of their filing.
Eight days later, Mr. Jones filed, inter alia, a motion to appeal the disqualifying
judgment, which the trial court denied as untimely. Mr. Jones has now perfected
this appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion to appeal. Finding that
Mr. Jones failed to timely comply with the expedited appellate procedures set forth
in La.R.S. 18:1409(D), we affirm the trial court ruling denying the motion to appeal
as untimely.
I.
ISSUES
The only issue properly before this court is whether the trial court erred in
denying Mr. Jones’s motion to appeal. Although the parties have argued the merits
of the disqualifying judgment in brief, we note at the outset that the disqualifying
judgment is not before this court, and its merits are not at issue in this appeal.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Jones qualified to run for the office of Natchitoches Parish President by
submitting a notice of candidacy during the qualification period that ended on
Thursday, August 8, 2019. The BOE filed a petition on August 15, 2019, objecting
to Mr. Jones’s candidacy on the grounds that he had an outstanding late fee of $2,500.00 and had “falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that he does not owe
any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Code of Governmental Ethics
as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2).” La.R.S. 18:492(A)(6). This matter was set for
hearing on August 20, 2019.
During the hearing, the BOE submitted both documentary and testimonial
evidence through which it sought to prove: (1) Mr. Jones was required by La.R.S.
18:1495.7 to file a 2014 Tier 2 Candidate Personal Financial Disclosure Statement
by December 9, 2015, when he qualified for the March 5, 2016 election for the office
of Mayor, City of Natchitoches; (2) Mr. Jones failed to timely file his disclosure
statement and was assessed with a late fee of $2,500.00 pursuant to La.R.S.
42:1124.4 and La.R.S. 42:1157 of the Code of Governmental Ethics; and (3) Mr.
Jones had not filed his disclosure statement or paid the late fee at the time he
executed his August 8, 2019 notice of candidacy, wherein he swore he did “not owe
any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Code of Governmental
Ethics.”
The trial court found that the BOE made a prima facie showing that Mr. Jones
was not qualified to run for office due to his false certification and that Mr. Jones
failed to rebut the BOE’s showing. On August 20, 2019, at 9:47 a.m. the trial court
issued and signed a judgment ordering Mr. Jones to withdraw from the election
within twenty-four hours or thereafter be disqualified.
Later that day, Mr. Jones, pro se, filed a document styled as a “Motion for
Continuance and Motion for New trial/Rehearing and Motion to vacate Aug 20,
2019 Judgment.” The trial court denied the motions that same afternoon. In its
written reasons, the trial court explained: “The laws encompassed by the Louisiana
Election Code do not allow such motions following a judgment.”
2 Thereafter, on August 28, 2019, Mr. Jones filed a “Motion of Jackson Jones,
Jr. for an Appeal of the Judgment Granting the Objection to Candidacy Filed on
Behalf of the Louisiana Board of Ethics,” in which he argued that, by his August 20,
2019 motions, he had timely appealed the disqualifying judgment. The trial court
denied the motion on August 29, 2019. While acknowledging that Mr. Jones, in his
August 20, 2019 motions, stated that he “seeks an appeal,” the trial court reasoned:
All the motions Mr. Jackson made may have been procedurally appropriate in an ordinary proceeding, but this is a candidacy challenge proceeding, which carries its own limited rules and time delays. The court accordingly denied them by written ruling on the same day they were filed, August 20, 2019. Mr. Jackson did not seek relief from the court of appeal, but from the trial court. Because he did not timely seek an order of appeal pursuant to R.S. 18:1409D within 24 hours of the signing of the judgment against him on August 20, 2019, his time to appeal expired, and his motion for an appeal filed August 28, 2019 is therefore denied as untimely.
On August 30, 2019, Mr. Jones, pro se, filed a motion to appeal the trial
court’s August 29, 2019 ruling, seeking pauper status. The trial court issued an order
of appeal on September 3, 2019, allowing Mr. Jones to proceed in forma pauperis.
Thereafter, the BOE moved to have this court dismiss the appeal as untimely.
III.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1409(D) governs appeals of actions objecting
to candidacy and provides:
Within twenty-four hours after rendition of judgment, a party aggrieved by the judgment may appeal by obtaining an order of appeal and giving bond for a sum fixed by the court to secure the payment of costs. The clerk of the trial court shall give notice of the order of appeal to the clerk of the court of appeal and to all the parties or their counsel of record. The trial judge shall fix the return day at a time not to exceed three days after rendition of judgment.
Interpreting this provision, our supreme court in Francois v. Thibodeaux, 02-
1588, p. 1 (La. 6/12/02), 821 So.2d 479, 480, explained:
3 (“A general rule of statutory construction is that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, a special statute enacted for a particular purpose will not be presumed to have been within the scope of a subsequent general enactment on the same subject matter. . . . [I]n the event of ambiguity or conflict, special laws prevail over general laws.”) . . . The relevant statute, La.R.S. 18:1409(D) is clear and unambiguous in its requirement. It provides that “[w]ithin twenty-four hours after rendition of judgment, a party aggrieved by the judgment may appeal by obtaining an order of appeal and giving bond for a sum fixed by the court to secure the payment of costs.” (Emphasis supplied.) Where the requirements of law are so straightforward, it is improper to resort to equity. See and compare, La. Civil Code arts. 4 and 9.
The supreme court has also noted that “the 24-hour delay period is based on
the obvious need for expedited treatment.” Dumas v. Jetson, 445 So.2d 424, 425
(La.1984). “The short time delays are in the interest of the electorate, not the private
parties litigant. As such they may not be waived or modified even with the agreement
of the litigants and the courts.” Plaquemines Par. Council v. Petrovich, 95-2263, p.
2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/18/95), 662 So.2d 542, 543, writs denied, 95-2540, 95-2541
(La. 10/27/95), 663 So.2d 703.
Hence, the provisions of La.R.S. 18:1409(D), as interpreted by our
jurisprudence, set forth strict procedural and temporal requirements for perfecting
an appeal of an action objecting to candidacy. These straightforward requirements
include the obtaining of an order of appeal as well as the posting of an appeal bond
within twenty-four hours after the rendition of the judgment, which is “deemed to
have been rendered when signed by the judge.” La.R.S. 18:1409(J).
Pursuant to these clear and unambiguous provisions, Mr. Jones had to obtain
an order of appeal and post an appeal bond within twenty-four hours of the signing
of the disqualifying judgment, i.e., by August 21, 2019 at 9:47 a.m. However, the
record establishes that Mr. Jones did not obtain an order of appeal or post an appeal
bond within that twenty-four-hour time delay. Therefore, Mr. Jones did not timely
perfect an appeal of the disqualifying judgment, and the time fixed by law for
4 perfecting such an appeal elapsed. See Franklin v. Sec. of State, 06-1332 (La.App.
3 Cir. 10/19/06), 942 So.2d 62. As a consequence thereof, the disqualifying
judgment, by operation of law, acquired the authority of a thing adjudged over which
no “court has the jurisdictional power and authority to reverse, revise or modify[.]”
Baton Rouge Bank & Trust Co. v. Coleman, 582 So.2d 191, 192 (La.1991).
Accordingly, we find that the motion for appeal, filed on August 28, 2019,
some eight days after the rendition of the disqualifying judgment it sought to appeal,
was clearly untimely under La.R.S. 18:1409(D). Finding no error in the denial of
the motion as untimely, we affirm the trial court judgment and further deny the
BOE’s motion to dismiss appeal, which is now moot.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The
motion for dismissal filed by the Louisiana Board of Ethics is hereby denied as moot.