IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 07–0452
Filed February 20, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
VINCENT FITZGERALD WALLS,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J.
Ovrom, Judge.
Defendant appeals his criminal convictions contending the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress testimony obtained in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the admission of this
testimony at trial was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jeff Noble and
Susan Cox, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee. 2
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer,
Assistant Appellate Defender, and Vincent Walls, pro se, Anamosa, for
appellant. 3
BAKER, Justice.
A jury convicted the defendant, Vincent Walls, of sexual abuse in
the first degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.2,
sexual abuse in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code sections
709.1 and 709.3, willful injury causing serious injury in violation of Iowa
Code section 708.4(1), and kidnapping in the second degree in violation
of Iowa Code sections 902.9 and 902.3 (2004). Walls appealed these
convictions, contending the interrogating officer failed to honor his
request for counsel in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and his right to counsel, and therefore, the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during
this interrogation. We transferred this case to the court of appeals,
which determined that the district court should have suppressed the
defendant’s statements but that any error in admitting them was
harmless. We granted Walls’ application for further review. We conclude
that the district court should have suppressed Walls’ statements, and
the erroneous admission of those statements was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Susan Lombard is a substitute teacher from Ankeny, Iowa. In
2004, Lombard was struggling with alcohol and drug addictions. On the
weekend of May 5, 2004, she came to Des Moines to buy drugs. In the
three days that followed, Lombard met drug dealers, loaned her car out
in exchange for crack cocaine, and attended a drug party in a Des
Moines hotel room. On Sunday, May 7, Lombard stumbled into the
home of Nancy Pilcher bloody and disoriented. Lombard told Pilcher that
she and another woman had been forcibly held against their will by a 4
man, and that she had been pistol-whipped for refusing his sexual
advances. Responding police were unable to locate the man.
Vincent Walls was arrested by the Des Moines police and brought
in for questioning regarding Lombard’s assault and kidnapping. After
explaining the allegations that Lombard and Cathy Riley, the other
victim, had made against Walls concerning the incident, Officer Bender
read Walls his Miranda rights and asked him to sign a waiver. Walls
responded by asking if Bender could get in contact with Roger Owens,
his attorney. At this point, Bender attempted to clarify Walls’ request for
an attorney by asking, “Is [getting in contact with him] what you’re
wanting me to do?” To this Walls replied, “Yeah, because I’d love to talk
to you but I couldn’t talk to you on that recorder.”
Instead of terminating the interview, Bender continued talking,
informing Walls that their conversation was being taped in order to
create a record and protect the rights of both parties. After this
explanation, Bender asked Walls to once again clarify his request for an
attorney before Bender proceeded with the interrogation. Walls never
clearly answered Bender’s second request for clarification; instead, he
stated, “[s]ee, and then I’ve got to sign this paper.” Bender again
proceeded with the interrogation, questioning Walls about his
involvement in Lombard’s kidnapping and assault.
During the interrogation that followed, Walls confessed to some of
the allegations. The State subsequently charged Walls with first- and
second-degree sexual abuse, second-degree kidnapping, first-degree
robbery, and willful injury causing serious injury. Prior to trial, Walls’
attorney moved to suppress his confession on the ground that Officer
Bender continued to question Walls after he asked for an attorney. The
district court denied the motion. At trial, the confession was admitted, 5
and the jury found Walls guilty of both counts of sex abuse, kidnapping,
willful injury, and assault, a lesser included offense of robbery.
Walls appealed the jury’s verdict, challenging the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress his confession. The court of appeals
affirmed his conviction, concluding that the State violated Walls’ Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination but that the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress was harmless error. Walls filed an
application for further review with this court, requesting that his
conviction be reversed and he be given a new trial. We granted further
review.
II. Scope of Review.
We review constitutional issues de novo. State v. Peterson, 663
N.W.2d 417, 423 (Iowa 2003). In assessing the validity of a defendant’s
Miranda waiver, the State bears the heavy burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily without intimidation, coercion, or deception.
State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Iowa 2006) (citing State v. Morgan,
559 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Iowa 1997)). Our review of the record is de novo,
and we will make our own evaluation of the circumstances. Id.
III. Fifth Amendment Violation.
The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution provides that no
person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution makes this right
binding on the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84, S. Ct. 1489,
1492, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653, 658 (1964). According to the United States
Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.
Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706–07 (1966), pursuant to the Fifth 6
Amendment, a person “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way” must first be warned by police
that “he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” If at that point,
the person indicates that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present. Id. at 473–74, 86 S. Ct. at 1627–28,
16 L. Ed. 2d at 723. The Miranda Court dictated that:
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. . . . If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. . . . [The police] must respect his decision to remain silent.
Id.
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 101 S. Ct. 1880,
1884–85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386 (1981), the Court further clarified that
when an individual expresses a desire for counsel, the authorities must
cease any further interrogation until counsel is present or the accused
individual has initiated further communication with the police. The
State carries the burden of proving that the individual “knowingly and
intelligently waived” these privileges afforded under the Fifth
Amendment. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1628, 16 L. Ed. 2d
at 724.
After being read his Miranda rights by Bender, Walls stated, “Roger
Owens. Can you get in contact with him? That’s my attorney.” To this
Bender asked, “Is that what you’re wanting me to do?” To which Walls
responded, “Yeah.” This is clearly a request for an attorney. Bender was 7
then required to cease all interrogation until an attorney was present.
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85, 101 S. Ct. at 1884–85, 68 L. Ed. 2d at
386; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74, 86 S. Ct. at 1627–28, 16 L. Ed. 2d at
723. Bender’s decision to proceed with the interrogation was in violation
of Walls’ Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and to
counsel. The district court erred in not granting Walls’ motion to
suppress his interrogation testimony.
IV. Harmless Error.
Most federal constitutional errors, including the erroneous
admission of evidence in a criminal trial in violation of a defendant’s
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, do not require reversal if
the error is harmless. State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1, 10 (2007) (citing
Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 430). Harmless-error analysis looks to the basis
on which the jury’s verdict actually rested. Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 431.
“To establish harmless error, the State must ‘prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.’ ” Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.
Ct. 824, 828, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710 (1967)).
To determine whether the State has met its burden under the
harmless-error standard, the court employs a two-step analysis. Id.
(citing Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1893, 114 L.
Ed. 2d 432, 449 (1991)). First, the court asks what evidence the jury
actually considered in reaching its verdict. Id. Second, the court weighs
the probative force of that evidence against the probative force of the
erroneously admitted evidence standing alone. Id. This step requires the
court to ask “whether the force of the evidence is so overwhelming as to
leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that 8
evidence would have been the same without the erroneously admitted
evidence.” Id.
A. Evidence Jury Actually Considered. In this case, the State
was required to prove the elements of five separate counts: (1) sexual
abuse in the first degree, (2) sexual abuse in the second degree, (3) willful
injury causing serious injury, (4) kidnapping, and (5) assault. Besides
Walls’ erroneously admitted testimony, the State presented four
witnesses.
Susan Lombard testified in detail regarding the incident. She told
the jury that she was an alcoholic and crack addict, and had come to
Des Moines to get drugs. She testified that on the morning of May 7,
Walls jumped into the backseat of her car, was “very angry,” and kept
yelling about his stolen money and drugs. Lombard testified that he told
her to drive down an alleyway, that he pulled a gun on her, and that he
dragged Riley into the backseat, forced her to strip, and put her in the
trunk. Then Lombard testified that Walls asked her to perform a sex act,
and when she refused, he attempted to force her to do the act, pistol-
whipped her several times, stomped on her hand, and attempted to place
her in the trunk with Riley. She also testified about her escape to Nancy
Pilcher’s house, the extent of the injuries she suffered due to the
incident, and that she denied being sexually abused at the hospital
because she felt the staff was treating her horribly.
Cathy Riley testified that she too was a drug addict. She testified
that she had met Lombard the day before the alleged incident through a
drug dealer, John Cameron, and that she and Lombard had been
drinking beer and smoking crack. Riley also testified that Walls got into
Lombard’s car, that he was very angry, and that after parking in the
alley, he grabbed Riley’s hair, pulled her into the backseat, made her 9
strip, hit her, and put her in the trunk naked. Riley testified that
although she could hear Walls hit Lombard and say, “we’re not going to
stop until you get it right,” and Lombard begging for him to stop, she did
not see Walls attempting to rape Lombard. Riley stated that she kicked
through the trunk into the backseat, but when she stuck her head
through the opening Walls pointed the gun at her and she retreated. She
testified that when Walls opened the trunk to put Lombard inside, she
escaped.
Nancy Pilcher testified that Lombard came running into her house
“all bloody and physically hurt.” She then stated that Lombard ran
around her house looking for a place to hide and stated, “call 911; he’s
going to kill me,” before collapsing in her entryway. Pilcher also testified
that Lombard said that she was an alcoholic, that she had come to Des
Moines to get drugs, and that she had been pistol-whipped by a man
after she refused his sexual advances.
Alycia Peterson, a Des Moines police officer, testified that when she
arrived at Pilcher’s home Lombard was in “pretty bad shape.” Peterson
testified that Lombard said she had been pistol-whipped by a man after
refusing to perform a sex act. The police recovered physical evidence of
the attack, including prints, bloodstains, discarded clothing, and took
pictures of the broken backseat. The police also obtained a partially
corroborating statement from Riley before she was able to discuss the
incident with Lombard.
During the course of his interrogation with Officer Bender, Walls
made statements concerning three of the five charges against him. He
admitted that he got into the backseat of Lombard’s car and forced
Lombard to drive him to an alley near Tenth Street and Franklin. Walls
also admitted he wanted to interrogate the women and threatened them 10
with a gun. He further stated that he made Riley swallow some crack,
forced her to take off all her clothes, and put her in the trunk.
Regarding Lombard’s assault, Walls told Bender that he hit her
multiple times with his gun, “[b]ecause she wouldn’t tell me what the f___
I wanted to know. Honestly, she wouldn’t tell me what I wanted to
know.” In response to Bender’s questioning, Walls admitted that he also
intended to put Lombard in the trunk, and that afterwards he tried to
clean the gun with bleach, but was unable to get rid of all the evidence.
He explained how Riley had kicked through the trunk to the backseat
and described in detail Lombard’s attempts to get him to stop beating
her. His recital of the statements made by Lombard during the assault
mirrored her earlier statements to police.
B. Probative Force of Evidence. In weighing the probative force
of the untainted evidence the jury actually considered against the
probative force of Walls’ erroneously admitted testimony, the key
question for this court is “whether we can conclude the erroneously
admitted statements are so unimportant in relation to everything else the
jury considered that there is no reasonable possibility they contributed to
[the defendant’s] conviction.” Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 434 (emphasis in
original). It is not enough that the State show that the same result is
probable in the context of a constitutional error. Sullivan v. Louisiana,
508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182, 189 (1993)
(“The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred
without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but
whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error.” (Emphasis in original)). The State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is “no reasonable possibility”
the falsely admitted statements contributed to Walls’ conviction. 11
Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 434. In explaining this test, we stated: “It is
only when the effect of the incorrectly admitted evidence is comparatively
minimal to this degree that it can be said . . . there is no reasonable
possibility that such evidence might have contributed to the conviction.”
State v. Hensley, 534 N.W.2d 379, 383 (Iowa 1995) (emphasis added).
Walls’ admissions were detailed confessions to kidnapping, willful
injury, and assault. In weighing the probative force of the untainted
evidence, however, we note one of the victims admittedly spent three
days drinking and doing drugs, and the second victim was engaged in
similar activities. In addition, the other witnesses saw the victims only
after the assault.
The State’s assertion on appeal that the effect of the interrogation
is comparatively minimal is belied by its use of the testimony at trial.
The prosecutor emphasized the admissions in the opening statement.
The entire one and a half hour interrogation was played to the jury at the
end of the State’s case, capping its case in chief. Finally, Walls’
statements became the cornerstone of the State’s closing argument. The
prosecutor used the statements as proof of almost every disputed
element of each crime charged. He played excerpts of the interrogation
at least eight times and commented on each. Quotes were put on slides
and shown to the jury, again with comments. The State certainly did not
believe that the admissions were “unimportant in relation to everything
else.” Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 434.
Walls did not admit to the sexual assault, but was nevertheless
convicted of sexual abuse, even in light of Lombard’s denial at the
hospital of being sexually abused and Riley’s testimony that she never
saw the sexual assault. Given the harmful nature of Walls’ statements
corroborating the other charges and their use at trial, we cannot say the 12
effect of these statements is so comparatively weak that there is no
reasonable possibility that such statements might have contributed to
the conviction for sexual abuse. Further, Walls’ confession virtually
guaranteed his conviction on the remaining charges. Although the same
result may have been probable, it would defy credulity to find that there
was no reasonable possibility the confession contributed to Walls’
conviction. The error was not harmless.
V. Disposition.
We find that the district court should have suppressed Walls’
interrogation testimony and erred in admitting those statements into
evidence during trial. Such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. We therefore vacate the court of appeals decision, reverse the
district court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, and remand the
case for a new trial.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Cady, J., who dissents. 13
07–0452, State v. Walls
CADY, Justice (dissenting).
I agree the custodial statements made by Walls were improperly
admitted into evidence at trial, but I would conclude the error was
harmless.
We recognize the harmless-error doctrine and follow a two-step
analysis in the application of the doctrine to a particular case. State v.
Hensley, 534 N.W.2d 379, 383 (Iowa 1995). Under this doctrine, the
probative force of the evidence considered by the jury in reaching its
verdict is weighed against the probative force of the evidence that was
improperly admitted. Id. The error is harmless if the force of the
properly admitted evidence is so overwhelming that the verdict would
have been the same without the improperly admitted evidence. Id. There
must be no reasonable possibility the improperly admitted evidence
contributed to the verdict. Id.
The two victims of the crimes in this case, Lombard and Riley,
detailed the actions of Walls in their trial testimony with remarkable
consistency. Essentially, they testified Walls pulled a gun on them while
in Lombard’s car, placed Riley in the trunk of the car after forcing her to
strip naked, and repeatedly beat Lombard while in the car after she
resisted his efforts to obtain oral sex. The testimony of Lombard and
Riley clearly supported the convictions for sexual abuse, willful injury,
and kidnapping. A witness who observed the bloody and battered
Lombard immediately after she escaped from the car gave testimony at
trial that was consistent with both victims’ testimony, including an
excited utterance by Lombard that she had been pistol-whipped for
refusing sexual advances. A police officer who arrived at the scene also
provided testimony consistent with the testimony of Lombard and Riley. 14
Physical evidence gathered by police was also consistent with the
testimony of Lombard and Riley, including discarded clothing and
evidence Riley tried to escape from the trunk.
The improperly admitted evidence essentially consisted of
statements by Walls that he entered Lombard’s car, threatened the two
women with a gun, and placed Riley in the trunk of the car after forcing
her to disrobe. He also said he hit Lombard with the gun and later tried
to clean the gun with bleach to destroy any evidence. He also made a
statement that he attempted to place Lombard in the trunk and
corroborated Riley’s testimony that she tried to escape from the trunk.
The majority essentially concludes the harmless-error test cannot
be met because the improperly admitted statements were emphasized by
the prosecutor in opening and closing arguments and were corroborated
by the testimony of the other witnesses. The majority believes the
presence of these two factors means the improperly admitted statements
necessarily contributed to the guilty verdict. This approach is a
misapplication of the harmless-error doctrine and effectively renders it
meaningless when applied to improperly admitted incriminating
statements by an accused. Nearly all confessions admitted at trial
influence the verdict, and it should come as no surprise that prosecutors
tend to emphasize confessions and that confessions tend to be consistent
with the other evidence offered by the prosecution. If the doctrine is
inapplicable to improperly admitted confessions, we would not have
applied it in Hensley to find the trial court error harmless. See id. at 384
(holding improperly admitted statement by defendant that he believed
the vehicle was stolen was harmless error in a conviction for vehicle
theft, even though an element of the crime required proof that defendant
knew or had a reasonable belief the vehicle was stolen). The test is not 15
whether the improperly admitted evidence was consistent with the
verdict or was emphasized by the prosecutor, but whether the properly
admitted evidence was so strong that the verdict would have been the
same without the improperly admitted evidence. The majority has failed
to properly apply this test by considering the strength of the properly
admitted evidence and has improperly focused on two factors that do not
drive the outcome of the test.
Applying the harmless-error test in this case, the probative force of
the evidence produced by the State on all four crimes, without
considering the improperly admitted statements by Walls, was
overwhelming. Each victim presented very similar testimony, which was
consistent with the other evidence offered by the State supporting the
convictions. The majority points out the victims were consuming drugs
and alcohol in the days prior to the incident, but there is no indication
this activity adversely impacted their ability to observe and recall the
incident. On the other hand, the probative force of each statement by
Walls, weighed against the other evidence of guilt, was minimal. The
force of this evidence was minimal because the testimony of Lombard
was corroborated by the testimony of Riley, and vice versa. Additionally,
the testimony of both women was consistent with the other evidence
offered by the State. Consequently, other than the statement by Walls
that he cleaned the gun with bleach, the improperly admitted statements
were only cumulative, and the outcome of the trial would have been the
same without the statements. The statement by Walls that he cleaned
the gun with bleach was minimal and could not have contributed to the
verdict.