IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 88 / 05-0290
Filed September 15, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant,
vs.
LISA RENAE MAJERES,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Robert J.
Dull, District Associate Judge.
Majeres seeks further review of a court of appeals opinion holding
that an uncounseled guilty plea can be used to enhance a subsequent
offense. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant
Attorney General, Darin J. Raymond, County Attorney, and Amy K. Oetken,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Timothy J. Kramer of Waagmeester Law Office, P.L.C., Rock Rapids,
for appellee. 2
WIGGINS, Justice.
The district court held the State could not use an uncounseled guilty
plea to a prior misdemeanor to enhance a subsequent offense to operating
while intoxicated (OWI), third offense where the court imposed incarceration
as part of its sentence on the prior offense without an in-court colloquy.
Our court of appeals reversed the district court’s ruling. Because the
defendant’s written guilty plea in the prior proceeding met the requirements
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 10 of the Iowa constitution, we affirm the decision of the court of
appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A Le Mars police officer stopped a vehicle Lisa Renae Majeres was
driving after observing her commit multiple traffic infractions. After failing
several field sobriety tests, she was arrested and taken to jail. There
Majeres provided a breath sample revealing a breath alcohol concentration
of .236. The State charged Majeres with OWI, third offense, a class “D”
felony.
Majeres had previously been convicted of OWI, first offense, in March
2000 in Woodbury County and OWI, second offense, in November 2001 in
Sioux County. She had an attorney in connection with her guilty plea to
the Woodbury County offense. The Sioux County offense was an aggravated
misdemeanor. Instead of retaining an attorney for the Sioux County
offense, she signed a plea agreement and written plea of guilty at the county
attorney’s office.
The written plea of guilty stated Majeres acknowledged the charge
against her as OWI, second offense; her right to counsel; her right to plead 3
not guilty; the attendant rights of trial; the maximum and minimum
sentences; and that her plea was being made intelligently and voluntarily.
The county attorney presented the plea to the district court without Majeres’
presence. Consequently, she never engaged in an in-court colloquy with a
judge concerning her plea. The court accepted her guilty plea, entered a
judgment of conviction, and as part of her sentence required her to be
incarcerated for seven days.
In this case, Majeres claims the State cannot use the uncounseled
Sioux County offense for which she was incarcerated to enhance the
present charge to OWI, third offense. The district court agreed with
Majeres’ claim. The State filed a notice of appeal. We treated the notice as an
application for discretionary review and granted the application. We
transferred the case to our court of appeals. Our court of appeals reversed
the district court’s ruling. We granted Majeres’ application for further
review.
II. Issue.
It has previously been determined under the federal constitution that
a court may use prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions where no
prison terms are imposed to enhance a subsequent conviction. Nichols v.
United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748-49, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928, 128 L. Ed. 2d
745, 755 (1994). We have found the Iowa constitution to be in line with the
federal constitution in this respect. State v. Allen, 690 N.W.2d 684, 690
(Iowa 2005). We have not decided if a court, in order to enhance a
subsequent conviction, may use prior uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions where the court imposed incarceration as part of its sentence
without an in-court colloquy. The State raises this issue in its appeal. 4
III. Scope of Review.
This appeal implicates constitutional claims under the state and
federal constitutions. Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 687; State v. Moe, 379 N.W.2d
347, 350 (Iowa 1985). We usually review constitutional claims de novo.
Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 687. However, where there is no factual dispute and
the only issue is whether a court may constitutionally use a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance a subsequent crime, our
review is for the correction of errors at law. Id. IV. Analysis.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Article I,
section 10 of the Iowa constitution also provides an accused with the right
to the assistance of counsel. Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. Iowa’s right-to-
counsel guarantee affords no greater protection than the federal
constitution regarding the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions; therefore, we will limit our discussion to Majeres’ federal
constitutional claim. Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 690-92.
At all critical stages of the criminal process, the Sixth Amendment
affords an accused facing incarceration the right to counsel. Iowa v. Tovar,
541 U.S. 77, 80-81, 124 S. Ct. 1379, 1383, 158 L. Ed. 2d 209, 215 (2004).
Entry of a guilty plea, regardless of whether the plea is to a misdemeanor or
a felony charge, “ranks as a ‘critical stage’ at which the right to counsel
adheres.” Id. at 81, 124 S. Ct. at 1383, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 215. Although a
defendant has such a right to counsel, a defendant can choose to waive the
right to counsel. Id. at 87, 124 S. Ct. at 1387, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 219-20. A
waiver of the right to counsel requires that a defendant do so knowingly and 5
intelligently with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances. Id. at
81, 124 S. Ct. at 1383, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 215. A defendant requires less
rigorous warnings as to the waiver of plea counsel than for the waiver of
trial counsel. Id. at 90, 124 S. Ct. at 1388, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 221.
Accordingly, a prior uncounseled guilty plea to a misdemeanor charge
where the court imposed incarceration as part of its sentence can be used
to enhance a subsequent offense if the defendant knowingly and
intelligently with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances waived
the right to counsel in the prior proceeding. Thus, the determinative factor
in this appeal is whether Majeres knowingly and intelligently with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances waived the right to counsel in the
Sioux County proceeding. It is the defendant’s burden to prove he or she
did not competently and intelligently waive the right to counsel when
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 88 / 05-0290
Filed September 15, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant,
vs.
LISA RENAE MAJERES,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Robert J.
Dull, District Associate Judge.
Majeres seeks further review of a court of appeals opinion holding
that an uncounseled guilty plea can be used to enhance a subsequent
offense. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant
Attorney General, Darin J. Raymond, County Attorney, and Amy K. Oetken,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Timothy J. Kramer of Waagmeester Law Office, P.L.C., Rock Rapids,
for appellee. 2
WIGGINS, Justice.
The district court held the State could not use an uncounseled guilty
plea to a prior misdemeanor to enhance a subsequent offense to operating
while intoxicated (OWI), third offense where the court imposed incarceration
as part of its sentence on the prior offense without an in-court colloquy.
Our court of appeals reversed the district court’s ruling. Because the
defendant’s written guilty plea in the prior proceeding met the requirements
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 10 of the Iowa constitution, we affirm the decision of the court of
appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A Le Mars police officer stopped a vehicle Lisa Renae Majeres was
driving after observing her commit multiple traffic infractions. After failing
several field sobriety tests, she was arrested and taken to jail. There
Majeres provided a breath sample revealing a breath alcohol concentration
of .236. The State charged Majeres with OWI, third offense, a class “D”
felony.
Majeres had previously been convicted of OWI, first offense, in March
2000 in Woodbury County and OWI, second offense, in November 2001 in
Sioux County. She had an attorney in connection with her guilty plea to
the Woodbury County offense. The Sioux County offense was an aggravated
misdemeanor. Instead of retaining an attorney for the Sioux County
offense, she signed a plea agreement and written plea of guilty at the county
attorney’s office.
The written plea of guilty stated Majeres acknowledged the charge
against her as OWI, second offense; her right to counsel; her right to plead 3
not guilty; the attendant rights of trial; the maximum and minimum
sentences; and that her plea was being made intelligently and voluntarily.
The county attorney presented the plea to the district court without Majeres’
presence. Consequently, she never engaged in an in-court colloquy with a
judge concerning her plea. The court accepted her guilty plea, entered a
judgment of conviction, and as part of her sentence required her to be
incarcerated for seven days.
In this case, Majeres claims the State cannot use the uncounseled
Sioux County offense for which she was incarcerated to enhance the
present charge to OWI, third offense. The district court agreed with
Majeres’ claim. The State filed a notice of appeal. We treated the notice as an
application for discretionary review and granted the application. We
transferred the case to our court of appeals. Our court of appeals reversed
the district court’s ruling. We granted Majeres’ application for further
review.
II. Issue.
It has previously been determined under the federal constitution that
a court may use prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions where no
prison terms are imposed to enhance a subsequent conviction. Nichols v.
United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748-49, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928, 128 L. Ed. 2d
745, 755 (1994). We have found the Iowa constitution to be in line with the
federal constitution in this respect. State v. Allen, 690 N.W.2d 684, 690
(Iowa 2005). We have not decided if a court, in order to enhance a
subsequent conviction, may use prior uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions where the court imposed incarceration as part of its sentence
without an in-court colloquy. The State raises this issue in its appeal. 4
III. Scope of Review.
This appeal implicates constitutional claims under the state and
federal constitutions. Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 687; State v. Moe, 379 N.W.2d
347, 350 (Iowa 1985). We usually review constitutional claims de novo.
Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 687. However, where there is no factual dispute and
the only issue is whether a court may constitutionally use a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance a subsequent crime, our
review is for the correction of errors at law. Id. IV. Analysis.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Article I,
section 10 of the Iowa constitution also provides an accused with the right
to the assistance of counsel. Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. Iowa’s right-to-
counsel guarantee affords no greater protection than the federal
constitution regarding the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions; therefore, we will limit our discussion to Majeres’ federal
constitutional claim. Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 690-92.
At all critical stages of the criminal process, the Sixth Amendment
affords an accused facing incarceration the right to counsel. Iowa v. Tovar,
541 U.S. 77, 80-81, 124 S. Ct. 1379, 1383, 158 L. Ed. 2d 209, 215 (2004).
Entry of a guilty plea, regardless of whether the plea is to a misdemeanor or
a felony charge, “ranks as a ‘critical stage’ at which the right to counsel
adheres.” Id. at 81, 124 S. Ct. at 1383, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 215. Although a
defendant has such a right to counsel, a defendant can choose to waive the
right to counsel. Id. at 87, 124 S. Ct. at 1387, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 219-20. A
waiver of the right to counsel requires that a defendant do so knowingly and 5
intelligently with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances. Id. at
81, 124 S. Ct. at 1383, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 215. A defendant requires less
rigorous warnings as to the waiver of plea counsel than for the waiver of
trial counsel. Id. at 90, 124 S. Ct. at 1388, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 221.
Accordingly, a prior uncounseled guilty plea to a misdemeanor charge
where the court imposed incarceration as part of its sentence can be used
to enhance a subsequent offense if the defendant knowingly and
intelligently with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances waived
the right to counsel in the prior proceeding. Thus, the determinative factor
in this appeal is whether Majeres knowingly and intelligently with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances waived the right to counsel in the
Sioux County proceeding. It is the defendant’s burden to prove he or she
did not competently and intelligently waive the right to counsel when
collaterally attacking a prior uncounseled conviction. Id. at 92, 124 S. Ct.
at 1390, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 223; see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31, 113
S. Ct. 517, 524, 121 L. Ed. 2d 391, 405 (1992) (stating the proof burden is
on the defendant in view of “the presumption of regularity that attaches to
final judgments”).
When a defendant waives the right to counsel and enters a plea of
guilty, the Sixth Amendment is satisfied by the trial court informing the
defendant “of the nature of the charges against [the defendant], of [the
defendant’s] right to be counseled regarding his [or her] plea, and of the
range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.”
Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81, 124 S. Ct. at 1383, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 216. The
information a defendant needs to waive counsel intelligently depends on the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case. Id. at 88, 124
S. Ct. at 1387, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 220. 6
At the time Majeres entered her guilty plea, our rule allowed a
defendant, when pleading guilty to a serious or aggravated misdemeanor, to
waive the defendant’s appearance in open court to engage in an in-court
colloquy. Iowa R. Crim. P. 8(2)(b) (2001) (amended Nov. 9, 2001, eff.
Feb. 15, 2002; amended Dec. 22, 2003, eff. Nov. 1, 2004). 1 In the Sioux
County case, Majeres signed a written plea of guilty without counsel. In
that written plea, she acknowledged the charge against her as OWI, second
offense; her right to counsel; and the maximum and minimum sentences.
Thus, her written plea met the informational requirements under Tovar to
waive the right to counsel and plead guilty. An in-court colloquy is not
necessary to ensure the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See
Tovar, 541 U.S. at 87-88, 124 S. Ct. at 1387, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 220 (stating
the Court has not “prescribed any formula or script to be read to a
defendant” in regards to the intelligence of waiving the right to counsel). A
written guilty plea containing such a waiver is prima facie evidence the
defendant gave the waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See
State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 811 (Iowa 2003) (holding a written waiver
of the right to a jury trial is prima facie evidence the waiver was voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent). Majeres failed to meet her burden of proving she did not voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waive her right to counsel in the Sioux County
proceeding. In the present case, Majeres testified she did not have the
money for an attorney and decided not to apply for court-appointed counsel
in the Sioux County proceeding. When questioned why she did not apply
for court-appointed counsel, she responded, “I didn’t feel I wanted one or
needed one.” Prior to entering her plea of guilty in that case, Majeres
1 This rule is now renumbered as Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b). 7
obtained a copy of the police report and reviewed it. She acknowledged
there was nothing in the police report that led her to believe she wanted to
speak to an attorney prior to entering her guilty plea. She further testified
she was comfortable in proceeding on her own without an attorney.
Consequently, the district court may use Majeres’ uncounseled guilty
plea to the OWI, second offense, in Sioux County to enhance the offense in
this case, even though the court imposed incarceration as part of its
sentence without an in-court colloquy. V. Conclusion and Disposition.
The defendant’s written guilty plea in the prior proceeding met the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 10 of the Iowa constitution. Accordingly, the prior
uncounseled plea to a misdemeanor that resulted in incarceration may be
used to enhance the offense in the present criminal proceeding. Therefore,
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the
district court, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.