State of Iowa v. Zachary Karl Hunt

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 24-1915
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1915 Filed October 29, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ZACHARY KARL HUNT, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Thomas P. Murphy,

Judge.

A defendant appeals from his conviction for possession of a dangerous

weapon while under the influence. AFFIRMED.

Raya Dimitrova of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and

Sandy, JJ. 2

SANDY, Judge.

Zachary Hunt appeals from his conviction for possession of a dangerous

weapon while under the influence, a serious misdemeanor, pursuant to Iowa Code

section 724.4C (2024). Specifically, he contends (1) the evidence was insufficient

to support his conviction and (2) the district court abused its discretion by refusing

his requested jury instruction.

Because we find the jury’s verdict to be supported by substantial evidence

and an existing jury instruction adequately embodied Hunt’s requested instruction,

we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

At around 1:00 a.m. on June 22, 2024, Officer Nyan Baker responded to a

trespassing complaint in Indianola. After arriving on scene, he encountered three

people: Kaleb Reha, Stacie Reha, and Zachary Hunt, the defendant. Kaleb

informed Officer Baker that he wanted to trespass Stacie, his mother, off his

property.

Hunt, who is Kaleb’s cousin and Stacie’s nephew, quickly interjected himself

in the conversation, explaining this was a familial matter and he did not want to

escalate things. To better understand the situation, Officer Baker instructed Hunt

and Stacie to stand aside so he could speak to Kaleb privately. Kaleb then

recounted to Officer Baker how he had received a knock on his door, where he

found Hunt and Stacie in the hallway of his apartment. But Kaleb was on bad

terms with his mother and yelling ensued during their encounter, causing him to

call 911. 3

After listening to Kaleb’s side of the story, Officer Baker questioned Hunt

and Stacie. Hunt explained he was attempting to make amends between Kaleb

and Stacie, reiterating that this was a familial matter and he did not want to escalate

the situation. Officer Baker then directed Stacie towards his vehicle to issue her a

trespass warning and dismissed her from the scene. But before the affair could

be resolved, Hunt abruptly confronted the officer and stated “[he had] a registered

firearm.” Officer Baker was concerned by this statement and questioned Hunt as

to the purpose of the conversation. Hunt said he wanted his property to be

returned because Stacie was being trespassed, indicating that Stacie was now in

possession of his gun.

Officer Baker became concerned because both Hunt and Stacie exhibited

signs of intoxication. The officer specifically observed an odor of alcohol, as well

as Hunt’s slurred speech, watery bloodshot eyes, lethargic behavior, repetitive

speech patterns, and conversational hijacking. Officer Baker asked Hunt why he

had given his gun to a “highly intoxicated individual,” to which Hunt responded,

“[I]s she?” Kaleb then intervened and asked how Hunt could not have known

Stacie was intoxicated, citing her uncoordinated speech and movement. Now

aware that Stacie had a gun, Officer Baker left to track her down.

The officer swiftly located Stacie down the street from the initial scene,

where he found a loaded handgun in the bag she was carrying. He took the gun,

rendered it safe, and stored it in his police vehicle. He subsequently returned to

tell Hunt it was illegal for Stacie to carry the gun due to her level of inebriation.

Again, Hunt denied having knowledge of her condition. Officer Baker then asked

whether Hunt had anything to drink that night. Hunt further denied consuming any 4

alcohol himself. During the remainder of the officer’s questioning, Hunt stated he

had met up with Stacie near Kaleb’s property and had no knowledge of where she

had been prior to them meeting. Notably, he remarked that he “took [his] shirt off

because it was hot . . . [and] gave her [the gun] to hold onto until [they]were done.”

At this point, Officer Baker was convinced Hunt handed his gun to Stacie

while under the influence of alcohol and inquired whether Hunt would be willing to

take a preliminary breath test. Hunt refused to do so and was taken to the Warren

County Jail. There, he once more refused to participate in a breath test.

At trial, the only testimony presented came from law enforcement. As a

result, Hunt moved to include the following jury instruction:

You have heard testimony from law enforcement officers. The fact that a witness is employed as a law enforcement officer does not mean that his testimony necessarily deserves more or less consideration or greater or lesser weight than that of any other witness. You must decide, after reviewing all the evidence, whether you believe the testimony of the law enforcement witness and how much weight, if any, it deserves.

The district court denied the motion, stating that existing instructions adequately

covered the issue. Hunt was subsequently convicted of possession of a

dangerous weapon while under the influence. Hunt appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law. State v. Kelso-

Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 2018). “In evaluating the sufficiency of the

evidence, we consider whether the finding of guilt is supported by substantial

evidence in the record.” State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned

up). “Substantial evidence exists when the evidence would convince a rational

fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kelso-Christy, 911 5

N.W.2d at 666 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, ‘including legitimate inferences

and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record

evidence.’” State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted).

While we review challenges to a required jury instruction for errors at law,

we review the refusal to give a discretionary jury instruction for abuse of discretion.

State v. Bynum, 937 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Iowa 2020).

When assessing a district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, we only reverse if the district court’s decision rested on grounds or reasoning that were clearly untenable or clearly unreasonable. Grounds or reasons are untenable if they are “based on an erroneous application of the law or not supported by substantial evidence.”

State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Iowa 2017) (citations omitted).

III. Analysis

Hunt contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and

the district court erred in refusing his requested jury instruction.

A. Sufficiency of Evidence

Hunt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in two ways, first arguing

the State presented insufficient evidence that he was intoxicated, and second, the

State presented insufficient evidence to show he possessed or carried his gun at

the time the State alleges he was intoxicated. We disagree with Hunt on both

points and conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that he

carried a dangerous weapon while under the influence.

Beginning with Hunt’s intoxication argument, Iowa Code section 724.4C

makes it a crime to carry a dangerous weapon while intoxicated. “The definition 6

of ‘intoxicated’ (found in section 321J.2) means a person is under the influence of

alcohol or drugs (or some combination of them).” State v. Johnson, 950 N.W.2d

232, 236 (Iowa 2020). Hunt specifically asserts that Officer Baker’s testimony was

insufficient to support a finding that he was intoxicated. Hunt argues the officer’s

testimony was contradictory because he stated Hunt had slurred his speech

without his words bleeding together. Additionally, he argues the officer’s testimony

describing his watery bloodshot eyes was unreliable because the defendant was

wearing a hat and it was dark outside when the officer made those observations.

“Inherent in our standard of review of jury verdicts in criminal cases is the

recognition that the jury is free to reject certain evidence, and credit other

evidence.” State v. Thompson, No. 23-1770, 2025 WL 707777, at *3 (Iowa Ct.

App. Mar. 5, 2025) (quoting State v. Thomas, 847 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Iowa 2014)).

In this case, the jury was able to hear testimony from two law enforcement officers

and reach a conclusion about the testimony’s reliability and weight. Officer Baker

testified that Hunt refused to take breath tests and exhibited numerous signs of

intoxication in addition to his slurred speech and watery bloodshot eyes. See State

v. Shannon, No. 17-0717, 2018 WL 1182561, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2018)

(finding an officer’s observations of signs of impairment provides substantial

evidence that a defendant was under the influence); State v. Doolin, No. 17-1715,

2019 WL 1055784, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2019) (determining an officer’s

testimony describing the defendant’s alcoholic odor, slurred speech, and watery

bloodshot eyes was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that he was intoxicated),

aff’d in part and vacated in part, 942 N.W.2d 500 (Iowa 2020). Moreover, the jury

viewed body camera footage from Officer Baker, allowing it to independently 7

assess Hunt’s condition. Despite Hunt’s claim that the officer’s testimony was

insufficient to show he was intoxicated, “that conclusion was for the jury to make.”

Thompson, 2025 WL 707777, at *3 (quoting State v. Perry, No. 23-1062, 2024 WL

2839215, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 5, 2024)). For the foregoing reasons, we

conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s determination that Hunt was

intoxicated.

Moving onto Hunt’s possession argument, to convict a defendant of

possession of a dangerous weapon while under the influence the State must prove

the weapon was carried “on or about the [defendant].” State v. Shorter, 945

N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Iowa Code § 724.4C(1)(a)). Here, Hunt argues

the State’s evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he carried his gun at

the time the State alleges he was intoxicated because the gun was not found on

his person. Specifically, Hunt points to the absence of a timeline accounting for

when the gun handoff between him and Stacie occurred. He additionally

references Officer Baker’s testimony that Hunt could have “potentially” given the

gun to Stacie sometime before he was alleged to be intoxicated. But this argument

overlooks the significant circumstantial evidence presented by the State.1

During his conversation with Officer Baker, Hunt stated he and Stacie had

met outside near Kaleb’s property and did not know where she had been prior to

that. Hunt additionally stated he removed his shirt because of the summer heat,

causing him to give Stacie his gun. This information could reasonably be used to

infer that the gun handoff occurred during their meeting outside of Kaleb’s property.

1 Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated as equally probative. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d at 57. 8

Furthermore, it could be inferred that Stacie was intoxicated at the time of the

handoff because Hunt was unaware of her intoxication and, thus, her alcohol

consumption likely occurred before they met. Consequently, the jury could reason

that Hunt exhibited poor judgement at the time of the handoff because he did not

notice Stacie’s inebriated condition, leading to the conclusion that he was in an

impaired state when handing off his gun.

Moreover, Hunt expressed to officers he wanted Stacie to hold onto the gun

until “[they] were done.” This could be fairly understood to mean he wanted her to

keep his gun until they concluded their confrontation with Kaleb, indicating the

handoff likely took place in close temporal proximity to the confrontation. This

significantly narrows the window in which the handoff could have occurred and

makes it doubtful that Hunt became intoxicated during the short period after the

handoff and before Officer Baker’s arrival, especially when Kaleb had previously

identified Stacie’s behavior as evidence of her intoxicated state rather than

indicating her or Hunt had consumed alcohol during the confrontation. See State

v. Walker, 499 N.W.2d 323, 325 (Iowa App. 1993).

“Juries must necessarily make inferences when finding facts based on

circumstantial evidence. . . . The relevant inquiry is not whether a fact finding is

based on an inference drawn from another inference.” Ernst, 954 N.W.2d at 59

(internal citation omitted). We instead ask if “the relevant inquiry is whether a fact

finding is a legitimate inference ‘that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from

the record evidence.’” Id. (citation omitted). Considering the evidence in the light

most favorable to the jury’s verdict, including the reasonable inferences drawn 9

therein, we conclude there is substantial evidence supporting that Hunt carried a

dangerous weapon while under the influence.

B. Abuse of Discretion

Alternatively, Hunt argues the district court should have admitted his

proposed jury instruction and abused its discretion by not doing so. Specifically,

he contends that “Iowa law generally requires courts to give a requested instruction

if [(1)] it correctly states a rule of law, [(2)] applies to the facts of the case, and

[(3)] is covered in other instructions.” The first two elements are correctly stated,

but the third is not. The third element requires the requested instruction “is not

otherwise embodied in the other instructions.” Stover v. Lakeland Square Owners

Ass’n, 434 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1989) (emphasis added)).

Hunt’s requested instruction aimed to address the potential for jurors to give

excessive weight to police officer testimony, stating “[t]he fact that a witness is

employed as a law enforcement officer does not mean that his testimony

necessarily deserves more or less consideration or greater or lesser weight than

that of any other witness.” But Instruction 7 made it clear that jurors “may believe

all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony” in “determining the facts.” Thus,

Hunt’s instruction amounted to a narrower restatement of the broad principle

illustrated by Instruction 7.

Because the requested instruction was adequately addressed elsewhere,

the district court had the discretion to either admit or deny it. See State v. Williams,

929 N.W.2d 621, 632–33 (Iowa 2019) (finding it was in the district court’s discretion

to admit or deny a requested implicit-bias instruction where the issue was already 10

covered by a broader instruction). Consequently, we find the district court did not

abuse its discretion in declining to give Hunt’s requested instruction.

IV. Conclusion

Hunt’s conviction for possession of a dangerous weapon while under the

influence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.