IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-2017 Filed October 15, 2014
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM LLOYD BUGELY, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van
Marel, District Associate Judge.
William Bugely appeals from the sentence following his plea of guilty to a
charge of driving while barred. He claims his trial counsel afforded ineffective
assistance by failing to move in arrest of judgment. AFFIRMED.
Angelina M. Thomas of Newbrough Law Firm, L.L.P., Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Alexandra Link, Assistant Attorney
General, Stephen P. Holmes, County Attorney, and Shean Fletchall, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ. 2
POTTERFIELD, P.J.
William Bugely appeals from the sentence following his plea of guilty to a
charge of driving while barred. He claims his trial counsel afforded ineffective
assistance by failing to move in arrest of judgment because the plea may have
been insufficiently voluntary.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Bugely was charged by trial information with driving while barred, an
offense for which he had been twice previously convicted. He initially pleaded
not guilty, but on November 20, 2013, he pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement with the State. The State agreed to recommend a $625 fine, a one-
year jail sentence with all but ten days suspended, and twelve months of
probation. The guilty plea was submitted in writing. The plea was formally
accepted by the court in its November 21, 2013 order.
The plea stated Bugely understood the maximum sentence was
imprisonment not to exceed two years, a $6250 fine, or both. It further stated
Bugely “underst[oo]d this court may sentence [him] up to the maximum provided
by the law.”
The sentencing hearing took place on December 12, 2013. The State
honored its agreed recommendation, but the court rejected that recommendation
and sentenced Bugely to the maximum term of imprisonment.
Bugely had not requested and trial counsel did not filed a motion in arrest
of judgment to preserve a direct challenge to the guilty plea itself. Bugely instead
claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. He asserts he was 3
not made aware of the court’s authority to deviate from the State’s
recommendation.
II. Standard of Review
We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v.
Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Iowa 2008). “We will resolve the claims on direct
appeal only when the record is adequate.” State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 494.
We find the record adequate to decide whether Bugely’s counsel was ineffective
by allowing him to plead guilty and failing to move in arrest of judgment.
III. Discussion
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
must prove that his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that the
defendant suffered prejudice as a result of this failure.” State v. Horness, 600
N.W.2d 294, 298 (Iowa 1999). We begin under a presumption that counsel acted
competently. Hannan v. State, 732 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Iowa 2007).
Though Bugely’s primary assertion on appeal concerns the effectiveness
of his trial counsel, most of his arguments are presented as a direct challenge to
the guilty plea itself. A guilty plea must be voluntary—i.e., knowing, intelligent,
and free from compulsion—to be valid. State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 150
(Iowa 2003); see Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b). However, “[a] defendant’s failure to
challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of
judgment shall preclude the defendant’s right to assert such challenge on
appeal.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a). Bugely attempts to avoid this error
preservation issue by asserting that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to move in arrest of judgment because his guilty plea was not voluntary. 4
He claims the plea was not voluntary because it was made without a sufficient
understanding of the difference between the State’s recommendation and the
court’s ultimate discretion.1
The district court may accept a written plea of guilty to a serious or
aggravated misdemeanor in lieu of an in-court colloquy if the writing is in
substantial compliance with the Iowa Rules’ requirement of sufficiently informing
the defendant of his rights and the effects of a guilty plea. State v. Meron, 675
N.W.2d 537, 543 (Iowa 2004). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b)
provides:
Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must . . . determine that the defendant understands[] the following: (1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered. (2) The mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and the maximum possible punishment provided by the statute defining the offense to which the plea is offered. (3) That a criminal conviction, deferred judgment, or deferred sentence may affect a defendant's status under federal immigration laws. (4) That the defendant has the right to be tried by a jury, and at trial has the right to assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against the defendant, the right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself, and the right to present witnesses in the defendant's own behalf and to have compulsory process in securing their attendance. (5) That if the defendant pleads guilty there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty the defendant waives the right to a trial.
Bugely’s written guilty plea expressly stated that he understands all of the
relevant information and attendant waivers.
1 He further claims a written guilty plea was not sufficient and the district court erred in accepting it. However, we do not review for district court error on this appeal. 5
On appeal Bugely asserts the district court failed to expressly discharge its
duty under Rule 2.8(2)(b), which created a duty in his trial counsel to move in
arrest of judgment. However, we find the court’s November 21 order is an
explicit—not implicit—and proper discharge of its duty. The terms of the plea
show Bugely’s knowledge that the court could deviate from the State’s
recommendation. In his plea, Bugely states, “I understand this court may
sentence me up to the maximum provided by the law.” Bugely now contends this
language “fails to apprise [him] of the effect of the plea bargain upon the court’s
discretion.” To the contrary, the language of his plea demonstrates that he was
apprised that the plea bargain was not binding on the court.
Bugely cites to State v. Runge, 228 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 1975), for support.
In Runge, our supreme court held a lay person’s understanding of the court’s
discretion may not be in line with the reality of the court’s discretion. Id. at 37.
However, the court in Runge was faced with circumstances that are not present
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-2017 Filed October 15, 2014
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM LLOYD BUGELY, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van
Marel, District Associate Judge.
William Bugely appeals from the sentence following his plea of guilty to a
charge of driving while barred. He claims his trial counsel afforded ineffective
assistance by failing to move in arrest of judgment. AFFIRMED.
Angelina M. Thomas of Newbrough Law Firm, L.L.P., Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Alexandra Link, Assistant Attorney
General, Stephen P. Holmes, County Attorney, and Shean Fletchall, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ. 2
POTTERFIELD, P.J.
William Bugely appeals from the sentence following his plea of guilty to a
charge of driving while barred. He claims his trial counsel afforded ineffective
assistance by failing to move in arrest of judgment because the plea may have
been insufficiently voluntary.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Bugely was charged by trial information with driving while barred, an
offense for which he had been twice previously convicted. He initially pleaded
not guilty, but on November 20, 2013, he pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement with the State. The State agreed to recommend a $625 fine, a one-
year jail sentence with all but ten days suspended, and twelve months of
probation. The guilty plea was submitted in writing. The plea was formally
accepted by the court in its November 21, 2013 order.
The plea stated Bugely understood the maximum sentence was
imprisonment not to exceed two years, a $6250 fine, or both. It further stated
Bugely “underst[oo]d this court may sentence [him] up to the maximum provided
by the law.”
The sentencing hearing took place on December 12, 2013. The State
honored its agreed recommendation, but the court rejected that recommendation
and sentenced Bugely to the maximum term of imprisonment.
Bugely had not requested and trial counsel did not filed a motion in arrest
of judgment to preserve a direct challenge to the guilty plea itself. Bugely instead
claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. He asserts he was 3
not made aware of the court’s authority to deviate from the State’s
recommendation.
II. Standard of Review
We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v.
Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Iowa 2008). “We will resolve the claims on direct
appeal only when the record is adequate.” State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 494.
We find the record adequate to decide whether Bugely’s counsel was ineffective
by allowing him to plead guilty and failing to move in arrest of judgment.
III. Discussion
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
must prove that his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that the
defendant suffered prejudice as a result of this failure.” State v. Horness, 600
N.W.2d 294, 298 (Iowa 1999). We begin under a presumption that counsel acted
competently. Hannan v. State, 732 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Iowa 2007).
Though Bugely’s primary assertion on appeal concerns the effectiveness
of his trial counsel, most of his arguments are presented as a direct challenge to
the guilty plea itself. A guilty plea must be voluntary—i.e., knowing, intelligent,
and free from compulsion—to be valid. State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 150
(Iowa 2003); see Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b). However, “[a] defendant’s failure to
challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of
judgment shall preclude the defendant’s right to assert such challenge on
appeal.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a). Bugely attempts to avoid this error
preservation issue by asserting that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to move in arrest of judgment because his guilty plea was not voluntary. 4
He claims the plea was not voluntary because it was made without a sufficient
understanding of the difference between the State’s recommendation and the
court’s ultimate discretion.1
The district court may accept a written plea of guilty to a serious or
aggravated misdemeanor in lieu of an in-court colloquy if the writing is in
substantial compliance with the Iowa Rules’ requirement of sufficiently informing
the defendant of his rights and the effects of a guilty plea. State v. Meron, 675
N.W.2d 537, 543 (Iowa 2004). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b)
provides:
Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must . . . determine that the defendant understands[] the following: (1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered. (2) The mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and the maximum possible punishment provided by the statute defining the offense to which the plea is offered. (3) That a criminal conviction, deferred judgment, or deferred sentence may affect a defendant's status under federal immigration laws. (4) That the defendant has the right to be tried by a jury, and at trial has the right to assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against the defendant, the right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself, and the right to present witnesses in the defendant's own behalf and to have compulsory process in securing their attendance. (5) That if the defendant pleads guilty there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty the defendant waives the right to a trial.
Bugely’s written guilty plea expressly stated that he understands all of the
relevant information and attendant waivers.
1 He further claims a written guilty plea was not sufficient and the district court erred in accepting it. However, we do not review for district court error on this appeal. 5
On appeal Bugely asserts the district court failed to expressly discharge its
duty under Rule 2.8(2)(b), which created a duty in his trial counsel to move in
arrest of judgment. However, we find the court’s November 21 order is an
explicit—not implicit—and proper discharge of its duty. The terms of the plea
show Bugely’s knowledge that the court could deviate from the State’s
recommendation. In his plea, Bugely states, “I understand this court may
sentence me up to the maximum provided by the law.” Bugely now contends this
language “fails to apprise [him] of the effect of the plea bargain upon the court’s
discretion.” To the contrary, the language of his plea demonstrates that he was
apprised that the plea bargain was not binding on the court.
Bugely cites to State v. Runge, 228 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 1975), for support.
In Runge, our supreme court held a lay person’s understanding of the court’s
discretion may not be in line with the reality of the court’s discretion. Id. at 37.
However, the court in Runge was faced with circumstances that are not present
in the instant case. In Runge, the sentencing court told the prosecution and
defense in advance that it would not honor the State’s recommendation based on
the court’s own personal “policy” relative to the specific crime charged. Id.
Neither party communicated that fact to the defendant. Id. Further, the State
failed to even present the agreed-upon recommendation to the court. Id. The
Runge court therefore found the plea was induced and the agreement
dishonored. Id.
The facts of this case are distinguishable. There is no indication that the
State or Bugely’s counsel knew the court would depart from the State’s
recommendation. The State followed through with its agreement to recommend 6
a less-severe sentence. The plea itself described the maximum sentence and
acknowledged that the court could impose that sentence. It also described the
State’s actions in bold-faced type as a recommendation. The court, the State,
and Bugely’s counsel properly relied on that language to establish the
voluntariness of the guilty plea.
Based on the record, Bugely’s counsel did not render ineffective
assistance by failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment unless she knew the
plea was actually not voluntary or was in some other way defective and would
merit the motion. See State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 620 (Iowa 2009)
(“[C]ounsel has no duty to raise issues that have no merit.”). Nothing in the
record suggests that counsel had such knowledge, that Bugely was induced to
plead guilty, or that Bugely was not informed of the consequences of the plea.
Bugely has not overcome the presumption that his trial counsel performed
competently. On the record before us, Bugely’s trial counsel took adequate
steps to inform him of the consequences of pleading guilty and was not under an
obligation to move in arrest of judgment following the guilty plea.
AFFIRMED.