IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0345 Filed December 18, 2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM EUGENE HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Kossuth County, John M. Sandy,
Judge.
A defendant appeals his two convictions for third-degree sexual abuse.
AFFIRMED.
Jamie Hunter of Dickey, Campbell & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines,
for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. Sandy, J., takes
no part. 2
LANGHOLZ, Judge.
William Harris was convicted of two counts of third-degree sexual abuse
after inappropriately touching two patients during their echocardiogram
appointments. He appeals those convictions, alleging the State’s evidence was
insufficient to prove he performed a “sex act” when he touched either patient. But
viewing the circumstances of both acts in the light most favorable to the State,
substantial evidence supports his convictions.
During their appointments, Harris had both patients remove their pants and
he inserted his finger into the first patient’s vagina and touched the second
patient’s vaginal area inside her underwear. The patients were only scheduled to
receive an echocardiogram—there was no reason Harris needed to remove their
pants or touch below their chests. The jury could reject his explanation that he
was performing a deep-vein-thrombosis screen as not credible, particularly given
the lack of medical orders for either patient, his failure to document the screens in
either patient’s medical records, and his other unprofessional statements during
the appointments. We thus affirm Harris’s convictions.
I.
In early 2023, sixty-four-year-old Harris was working as a travel
echocardiogram technician. He accepted a twelve-week contract to perform
echocardiograms at a health facility in Iowa.
The First Patient. An eighty-five-year-old woman was having heart
problems and needed an echocardiogram before receiving a pacemaker. After
arriving for her test, she was taken to a small exam room and asked to remove her
shirt and bra. She was then left alone in the room to change into a hospital gown. 3
Harris entered the room and positioned the patient on the exam table so
she was lying down on her side. He lifted the gown and exposed the patient’s left
breast—this was unusual, as the patient had done these tests before and the prior
technicians “pretty much kept [her] covered.” Harris then started telling her he was
lonely in Iowa and he was staying in a nearby motel (and which room he was in).
He asked the patient to visit him for coffee, and when she said she did not drive at
night, he offered to pick her up.
During the exam, Harris commented on the patient’s legs, which appeared
swollen, and asked if he could check her blood flow. He also applied gel to her
chest for the echocardiogram. But as he was applying, he “kept going down
farther” with the gel past her chest and onto her stomach. Harris then unzipped
the patient’s jeans, told her they needed to come off, and pulled off her pants.
Harris continued rubbing the gel “on [her] belly and down in [her] groin.” He asked
the patient if his rubbing hurt, and she said no.
“Then all at once he stuck his finger up in” the patient’s vagina. Harris then
said he needed to do something on the machine and walked away from the table.
The patient started to get off the exam table, and Harris grabbed her jeans and
helped her put them back on. He slipped his business card in her back pocket.
The patient then put her bra and shirt back on—Harris did not leave the room while
she changed. The patient then left the room, exiting so quickly she still had the
echocardiogram patches on her body from the exam.
The patient went back to the waiting room, as she had another appointment
with her treating physician right after the exam. During that appointment, she
reported what happened and the physician observed “an exorbitant amount of gel” 4
on the patient’s “lower abdomen, pelvic area, [and] groin.” The physician called
law enforcement to report the abuse.
The Second Patient. After experiencing a heart attack and suffering
ongoing palpitations, a seventy-five-year-old woman was referred for an
echocardiogram. Harris brought the patient back to the exam room and instructed
her to remove all clothing except her underwear. Though she was disrobed
beyond what was necessary for the test, the appointment otherwise continued as
normal. But toward the end of the exam, Harris began working toward her groin.
The patient mentioned a health issue she was experiencing in her vaginal area.
Harris then put his fingers into her underwear and touched her genitals. The
patient never asked Harris to examine or touch her genitals.
The patient told no one. Months later, law enforcement was investigating
the first patient’s abuse and an officer contacted her as another former patient.
The patient then disclosed to the officer that Harris touched her inside her
underwear during the exam.
The Trial. The State charged Harris with two counts of third-degree sexual
abuse. See Iowa Code §§ 709.1, 709.4(1)(a) (2023). During the four-day jury trial,
both patients testified about the abuse, among other witnesses. Harris also
testified in his defense.
Harris explained that he was qualified to screen patients for certain medical
conditions, including deep vein thrombosis (“DVT”). Part of that screening entails
pushing or compressing areas near the patient’s pelvis, upper thigh, and knee. He
asserted that the facility knew he was performing these DVT screenings, even
though they were outside of his assigned duties. For both patients, Harris denied 5
any contact with their vaginal areas. Instead, he testified that he observed
symptoms of DVT in both women, they gave consent for him to perform a screen,
and any touching or removing of clothing was limited to those screens. And he
explained he did not document the screens in either patient’s medical records
because both screens were negative.
The jury convicted Harris on both counts of third-degree sexual abuse. He
was sentenced to two consecutive ten-year terms of incarceration. Harris now
appeals both convictions.
II.
Harris disputes that sufficient evidence supported convicting him of third-
degree sexual abuse for either patient. We review his challenge for correction of
errors at law. See State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 138 (Iowa 2011). “In doing
so, we examine whether, taken in the light most favorable to the State, the finding
of guilt is supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. “Substantial
evidence is evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa
2021). “Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different
conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding actually
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0345 Filed December 18, 2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM EUGENE HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Kossuth County, John M. Sandy,
Judge.
A defendant appeals his two convictions for third-degree sexual abuse.
AFFIRMED.
Jamie Hunter of Dickey, Campbell & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines,
for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. Sandy, J., takes
no part. 2
LANGHOLZ, Judge.
William Harris was convicted of two counts of third-degree sexual abuse
after inappropriately touching two patients during their echocardiogram
appointments. He appeals those convictions, alleging the State’s evidence was
insufficient to prove he performed a “sex act” when he touched either patient. But
viewing the circumstances of both acts in the light most favorable to the State,
substantial evidence supports his convictions.
During their appointments, Harris had both patients remove their pants and
he inserted his finger into the first patient’s vagina and touched the second
patient’s vaginal area inside her underwear. The patients were only scheduled to
receive an echocardiogram—there was no reason Harris needed to remove their
pants or touch below their chests. The jury could reject his explanation that he
was performing a deep-vein-thrombosis screen as not credible, particularly given
the lack of medical orders for either patient, his failure to document the screens in
either patient’s medical records, and his other unprofessional statements during
the appointments. We thus affirm Harris’s convictions.
I.
In early 2023, sixty-four-year-old Harris was working as a travel
echocardiogram technician. He accepted a twelve-week contract to perform
echocardiograms at a health facility in Iowa.
The First Patient. An eighty-five-year-old woman was having heart
problems and needed an echocardiogram before receiving a pacemaker. After
arriving for her test, she was taken to a small exam room and asked to remove her
shirt and bra. She was then left alone in the room to change into a hospital gown. 3
Harris entered the room and positioned the patient on the exam table so
she was lying down on her side. He lifted the gown and exposed the patient’s left
breast—this was unusual, as the patient had done these tests before and the prior
technicians “pretty much kept [her] covered.” Harris then started telling her he was
lonely in Iowa and he was staying in a nearby motel (and which room he was in).
He asked the patient to visit him for coffee, and when she said she did not drive at
night, he offered to pick her up.
During the exam, Harris commented on the patient’s legs, which appeared
swollen, and asked if he could check her blood flow. He also applied gel to her
chest for the echocardiogram. But as he was applying, he “kept going down
farther” with the gel past her chest and onto her stomach. Harris then unzipped
the patient’s jeans, told her they needed to come off, and pulled off her pants.
Harris continued rubbing the gel “on [her] belly and down in [her] groin.” He asked
the patient if his rubbing hurt, and she said no.
“Then all at once he stuck his finger up in” the patient’s vagina. Harris then
said he needed to do something on the machine and walked away from the table.
The patient started to get off the exam table, and Harris grabbed her jeans and
helped her put them back on. He slipped his business card in her back pocket.
The patient then put her bra and shirt back on—Harris did not leave the room while
she changed. The patient then left the room, exiting so quickly she still had the
echocardiogram patches on her body from the exam.
The patient went back to the waiting room, as she had another appointment
with her treating physician right after the exam. During that appointment, she
reported what happened and the physician observed “an exorbitant amount of gel” 4
on the patient’s “lower abdomen, pelvic area, [and] groin.” The physician called
law enforcement to report the abuse.
The Second Patient. After experiencing a heart attack and suffering
ongoing palpitations, a seventy-five-year-old woman was referred for an
echocardiogram. Harris brought the patient back to the exam room and instructed
her to remove all clothing except her underwear. Though she was disrobed
beyond what was necessary for the test, the appointment otherwise continued as
normal. But toward the end of the exam, Harris began working toward her groin.
The patient mentioned a health issue she was experiencing in her vaginal area.
Harris then put his fingers into her underwear and touched her genitals. The
patient never asked Harris to examine or touch her genitals.
The patient told no one. Months later, law enforcement was investigating
the first patient’s abuse and an officer contacted her as another former patient.
The patient then disclosed to the officer that Harris touched her inside her
underwear during the exam.
The Trial. The State charged Harris with two counts of third-degree sexual
abuse. See Iowa Code §§ 709.1, 709.4(1)(a) (2023). During the four-day jury trial,
both patients testified about the abuse, among other witnesses. Harris also
testified in his defense.
Harris explained that he was qualified to screen patients for certain medical
conditions, including deep vein thrombosis (“DVT”). Part of that screening entails
pushing or compressing areas near the patient’s pelvis, upper thigh, and knee. He
asserted that the facility knew he was performing these DVT screenings, even
though they were outside of his assigned duties. For both patients, Harris denied 5
any contact with their vaginal areas. Instead, he testified that he observed
symptoms of DVT in both women, they gave consent for him to perform a screen,
and any touching or removing of clothing was limited to those screens. And he
explained he did not document the screens in either patient’s medical records
because both screens were negative.
The jury convicted Harris on both counts of third-degree sexual abuse. He
was sentenced to two consecutive ten-year terms of incarceration. Harris now
appeals both convictions.
II.
Harris disputes that sufficient evidence supported convicting him of third-
degree sexual abuse for either patient. We review his challenge for correction of
errors at law. See State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 138 (Iowa 2011). “In doing
so, we examine whether, taken in the light most favorable to the State, the finding
of guilt is supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. “Substantial
evidence is evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa
2021). “Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different
conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding actually
made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding.” Id. (cleaned
up).
To convict Harris of third-degree sexual abuse, the jury must have found—
as it was instructed—that he “performed a sex act” with each patient “by force or
against the will” of each patient. And a “sex act” was defined to include “any sexual
contact . . . [b]etween the finger or hand of one person and the genitals or anus of 6
another person.” See Iowa Code §§ 709.1, 709.4(1)(a); see also State v. Mathis,
971 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2022) (explaining unopposed jury instructions become
the law of the case when reviewing whether sufficient evidence supports a
conviction).
Harris disputes whether the State proved he performed a “sex act” on either
patient, arguing the State’s evidence only showed incidental and nonsexual
contact. “The sexual nature of the contact can be determined from the type of
contact and the circumstances surrounding it.” State v. Pearson, 514 N.W.2d 452,
455 (Iowa 1994) (en banc). A jury may consider, for example, “whether the contact
was made to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of” Harris, though “the lack of
such motivation would not preclude a finding of sexual abuse where the context in
which the contact occurred showed the sexual nature of the contact.” Id. Other
considerations could include Harris’s relationship with the patients; “whether
anyone else was present; the length of the contact; the purposefulness of the
contact; whether there was a legitimate, nonsexual purpose for the contact; where
and when the contact took place; and the conduct of [Harris] and [the patients]
before and after the contact.” Id.
Viewing the circumstances of both patient encounters in the light most
favorable to the State, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Harris
performed sex acts on the patients. Both patients testified about their abuse—that
Harris inserted his finger into the first patient’s vagina and touched the second
patient’s vaginal area inside her underwear. See State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d
1, 10–11 (Iowa 2021) (“A sexual abuse victim’s testimony alone may be sufficient
evidence for conviction.”). Harris conceded during trial there would be no medical 7
purpose for that kind of contact during a DVT screen. Cf. In re J.D.S., 436 N.W.2d
342, 349 (Iowa 1989) (reasoning that the defendant’s conduct—including inserting
a finger in the minor victim’s anus—“belies his implication that he was just checking
to see if [the victim] had spoiled his pants” and that “the circumstances reveal the
sexual purpose for which [the defendant’s] finger was used”), overruled on other
grounds by State v. White, 9 N.W.3d 1, 12–13 (Iowa 2024). So the jury, crediting
the patients’ testimonies, could find Harris performed sex acts on both patients.
What’s more, Harris far exceeded the scope of his duties by touching the
patients’ legs, groin, and vaginal areas. An echocardiogram is an ultrasound of
the heart—Harris had no legitimate reason to touch any other area of the patients’
bodies. Harris also undressed both of them beyond what was necessary to
perform an echocardiogram. The jury was free to reject Harris’s DVT-screen
explanation as not credible, particularly given his concessions that those screens
were outside his job duties and he never documented the screens in the patients’
medical records. See Pearson, 514 N.W.2d at 455 (“The fact that no nonsexual
purpose for the contact was discernible also demonstrated the sexual nature of the
contact.”). And Harris’s conversations with the patients further supports finding
that his conduct was unrelated to any medical purpose.1
Substantial evidence thus supports the jury’s finding that Harris performed
a sex act against the will of each patient. And so, we affirm his convictions.
1 During trial, the State called another of Harris’s patients as a witness, who testified Harris also gave her his card and told her she “can call [him] but don’t tell anyone.” This evidence corroborates the patients’ accounts and shows that Harris often flouted professional boundaries.