IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1924 Filed May 21, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WILL EARNEST YOUNG JR., Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
David P. Odekirk, Judge.
A defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for willful injury causing
serious injury and intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent. AFFIRMED.
Alan R. Ostergren (argued) of Alan R. Ostergren, PC, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher, Badding, Buller,
and Sandy, JJ. 2
BADDING, Judge.
Late at night in downtown Waterloo, a sidewalk brawl broke out between
Joseph Ayala, Will Young Jr., and Young’s brother, Willis Brown. It ended when
Young shot Ayala three times below the waist. The State charged Young with
willful injury causing serious injury and intimidation with a dangerous weapon with
intent. At trial, Young raised a justification defense, arguing he shot Ayala to
protect his brother. The jury found Young guilty as charged, and the district court
sentenced him to consecutive prison terms, each carrying a five-year minimum.
Young appeals, claiming he was denied effective assistance of counsel
when his attorney failed to object to a legal error in the district court’s instructions.
Although Iowa Code section 814.7 (2023) prohibits that ineffective assistance
claim from being decided on direct appeal, Young urges the statute is
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
Young also contends that the State failed to prove the “reasonable apprehension”
element of his intimidation charge, and that the court was unaware it had discretion
to reduce the minimum sentences.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On November 8, 2020, Young and Brown went to a bar in downtown
Waterloo to drink beer and shoot pool. Near closing time, another patron, Ayala,
made a comment that angered Brown. Sensing the start of an argument, the
bartender told everyone to leave. So Brown went outside to smoke a cigarette,
with Young close behind him. Ayala and his friend, Ricky Ledesma, paid their tab
and followed. 3
Outside the bar, a fight broke out between Ayala and the brothers. Security
cameras from nearby businesses captured some of the action. Ayala—a former
amateur mixed martial arts fighter—threw the first punch at Young. Brown then
tackled Ayala to the ground and punched him repeatedly. But according to Young,
Ayala had the upper hand. As Brown and Ayala regained their feet, Young raised
a pistol and shot Ayala three times. Young and Brown left the scene as nearby
officers quickly responded to the shooting. Young later testified that he thought
shooting Ayala was the only way to protect his brother.
The State charged Young with willful injury causing serious injury, in
violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(1) (2020), and intimidation with a dangerous
weapon with intent, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.6(1). Young claimed
justification. In an unchallenged instruction, the district court told the jury that
Young was not entitled to that defense if he shot Ayala while “participating in Willful
Injury Causing Serious Injury,” or if Young “was not lawfully present or was
engaged in the illegal activity of Assault . . . in the place where he used force, he
made no effort to retreat, and retreat was a reasonable alternative to using force.”
The jury found Young guilty as charged and, by special interrogatory, found he
was armed with a dangerous weapon. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of
imprisonment of up to ten years, with a five-year minimum on both counts.
On appeal, Young asserts three claims of error. First, he argues that he
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when his
attorney failed to object to the district court’s justification instruction. Young
recognizes that Iowa Code section 814.7 prohibits that claim from being decided
on direct appeal. But he argues the Supremacy Clause requires Iowa courts to 4
resolve questions of federal law when the record is sufficient to do so—a
constitutional challenge that has not yet been considered by our supreme court.
Second, Young challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
“reasonable apprehension” element of his intimidation charge. Third, Young
contends he must be resentenced because the district court failed to recognize
that it had discretion under section 910.10(1) to reduce the otherwise applicable
minimum prison term in section 902.7.
II. Standard of Review
“We review challenges to the constitutionality of a statute de novo.” State
v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 107 (Iowa 2021). Sufficiency of the evidence claims
are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State v. Mong, 988 N.W.2d 305, 312
(Iowa 2023). Sentencing challenges are also reviewed for correction of errors at
law, although a sentence within statutory limits will not be reversed “absent an
abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. Letscher,
888 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Iowa Code section 814.7
The Iowa constitution authorizes the general assembly “to provide for a
general system of practice in all the courts of this state.” Iowa Const. art. V, § 14.
Criminal appeals alleging ineffective assistance of counsel are one area in which
the legislature has exercised its authority to regulate appellate practice:
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case shall be determined by filing an application for postconviction relief pursuant to chapter 822. The claim need not be raised on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim for 5
postconviction relief purposes, and the claim shall not be decided on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings.
Iowa Code § 814.7 (2023). Previously, a defendant in Iowa “could raise a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal,” and our appellate courts “had
the authority to either decide the claim or preserve it for further development in
postconviction-relief proceedings.” State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa
2021). But in 2019, the legislature amended the statute to require all ineffective
assistance claims to “be decided in the first instance in postconviction-relief
proceedings rather than on direct appeal.” Id.
Long before the amendment to section 814.7, the Iowa Supreme Court
recognized that most ineffective-assistance claims were better left for
postconviction relief proceedings, where they could be resolved on a complete
record following an evidentiary hearing. See id. at 152 (collecting cases). As a
result, our supreme court found in Treptow that the statute “worked no significant
change in appellate practice” but merely “codified more strongly our ‘judicial
practice stretching back for almost a half-century.’” 960 N.W.2d at 103 (citation
omitted). Young disagrees. He contends the 2019 amendment went a step too
far when it banished all ineffective assistance claims from consideration on direct
appeal. According to Young, the Supremacy Clause requires Iowa appellate
courts to resolve a federal question when the record is sufficient to do so.
There is no federal constitutional right to appellate review of criminal
convictions. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005). But once a state 6
chooses to create a right of appeal, constitutional protections attach.1 Id. The
Iowa Supreme Court has already determined that requiring defendants to save
their ineffective-assistance claims for postconviction review does not offend equal
protection or due process. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 107, 108. It also rejected a
challenge to section 814.7 on separation-of-powers grounds. See Tucker, 959
N.W.2d at 151. However, neither case confronted the particular issue that Young
raises here—whether a state court may refuse to consider a ripe federal
constitutional issue on direct appeal. To answer that question, this court must look
to some basic principles of federalism and follow the trail of breadcrumbs left by
the supreme court in Treptow and Tucker.
In our two-sovereign system, “[t]he laws of the United States are laws in the
several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the
State laws are.” Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990) (citation omitted). “The
Supremacy Clause makes those laws ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ and charges
state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to their
regular modes of procedure.” Id. (quoting U.S. Const. art. VI). But that doesn’t
mean states must provide a forum for every federal claim. “[F]ederal law takes the
state courts as it finds them.” Id. at 372 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court
has made clear that states have “great latitude to establish the structure and
jurisdiction of their own courts,” and so state courts are free to “apply their own
neutral procedural rules to federal claims.” Id.
1 For example, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from conditioning appellate access on a defendant’s ability to pay, see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956), and from denying counsel to indigent defendants in certain appeals, see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963). 7
One such rule was discussed in Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997).
In that case, Idaho officials filed a notice of appeal from a state court summary
judgment order rejecting their argument that a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims were barred
by qualified immunity. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 913–14. The Idaho Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal, citing the state’s final-judgment rule. Id. at 914. But the
officials argued Idaho’s appellate rule was preempted by federal law in their case—
partly because defendants in federal court may immediately appeal the denial of
qualified immunity. Id. at 918. The Supreme Court disagreed, deeming the state
final-judgment rule a neutral procedural requirement. Id. Even though the officials
did not enjoy the same procedural advantages available under federal law, the
Court found their substantive rights under § 1983 were “fully protected” in Idaho
court. Id. at 921.
There is, however, a limit to the constitution’s tolerance for state procedural
rules. In Haywood v. Drown, an inmate’s § 1983 claims were dismissed by a New
York trial court pursuant to a state statute limiting jurisdiction over damages claims
against state prison officials. 556 U.S. 729, 733 (2009). According to the statute,
the sole remedy for a prisoner seeking damages from a state correctional officer
was to bring a claim against the state itself in the New York Court of Claims, outside
the framework of § 1983. The plaintiff argued this rule violated the Supremacy
Clause. See id. at 732. But in the view of the New York Court of Appeals, the
statute was a neutral administrative requirement that treated state and federal
damages claims alike. See Haywood v. Drown, 881 N.E.2d 180, 184 (N.Y. 2007).
The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that “although States retain
substantial leeway to establish the contours of their judicial systems, they lack 8
authority to nullify a federal right or cause of action they believe is inconsistent with
their local policies.” Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736. A five-justice majority found that
the New York statute—although framed as a jurisdictional rule—effectively
immunized correctional defendants from § 1983 liability and thereby extinguished
a category of claims available under federal law. Id. at 736 & n.5. “A jurisdictional
rule cannot be used as a device to undermine federal law, no matter how
evenhanded it may appear.”2 Id. at 739. The Court held that New York’s law was
an “immunity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb,” interfering with federal policy
in violation of the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 742.
Young likens Iowa Code section 814.7 to the New York statute at issue in
Haywood. He argues that the Iowa legislature, “[h]aving created a right to direct
appeal of criminal convictions, . . . cannot ‘shut the courthouse door to federal
claims that it considers at odd with its local policy.’” Young acknowledges “most
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims will require factual development in a
collateral proceeding,” and he concedes that “[t]he Sixth Amendment does not
require the Court to consider” those claims. But he contends that the Supremacy
Clause prohibits Iowa courts from “ignor[ing] a claim which is squarely presented”
on direct appeal.
Section 814.7’s limitation on ineffective-assistance claims is not like the
jurisdictional rule at issue in Haywood. To start, section 814.7 is not jurisdictional;
it merely “limits the authority of Iowa’s appellate courts to resolve ineffective-
2 The Court reiterated this principle earlier this year in Williams v. Reed, a similar
§ 1983 case in which the majority deemed an Alabama administrative-exhaustion requirement unconstitutional because it “functionally immunize[d] defendants from a class of § 1983 claims in state court.” 145 S. Ct. 465, 472 (2025). 9
assistance claims on direct appeal.” State v. Rutherford, 997 N.W.2d 142, 145
(Iowa 2023) (citation omitted). But more importantly, the statute does not abridge
a criminal defendant’s federal substantive rights. Under Iowa’s framework,
criminal defendants who claim ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth
Amendment are not precluded from seeking relief in Iowa courts. Although they
must use postconviction-relief proceedings, the same remedies remain available
for an established constitutional violation. See Iowa Code § 822.7 (providing that,
upon a finding for a postconviction petitioner, the court “shall enter an appropriate
order with respect to the conviction or sentence in the former proceedings”); Ruiz
v. State, 912 N.W.2d 435, 443 (Iowa 2018) (discussing some of the remedies
available upon a successful postconviction claim of ineffective assistance).
Nothing about this requirement conflicts with federal law. Although the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has been incorporated against the states for more
than six decades, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963), the
Supreme Court has never held that an alleged violation of the right to effective
assistance must be considered—for the first time—on direct appeal. To the
contrary, the Court has recognized “there are sound reasons for deferring
consideration of ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims until the collateral-
review stage,” given that they “often depend on evidence outside the trial record.”
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 13 (2012); see also Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 152
(discussing the legitimate interests supporting the legislature’s determination that
ineffective-assistance claims should be resolved in the first instance in
postconviction-relief proceedings); Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 108 (same). Thus, a
state does not “act[] with any impropriety by reserving [a] claim of ineffective 10
assistance for a collateral proceeding.” Id.; see also Massaro v. United States,
538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (permitting ineffective-assistance claims to be raised for
the first time in a collateral proceeding, whether or not the petitioner could have
raised the claim on direct appeal). Indeed, as our supreme court recognized in
Treptow, “[r]equiring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to be presented in
the first instance in postconviction-relief proceedings is not uncommon.” 960
N.W.2d at 107; see also Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 152 (“Other courts have affirmed
the constitutionality of statutes requiring certain claims be pursued in the first
instance in postconviction-relief proceedings.”).
Because federal law permits state courts to defer ineffective assistance
claims for collateral review, section 814.7 does not “nullify a federal right” or
“undermine federal law.” Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736, 739. Iowa’s approach may
delay vindication of Young’s federal rights, but that is not an affront to the
Supremacy Clause. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 921. As with the defendants
claiming qualified immunity in Johnson, Young’s right to effective assistance of
counsel remains enforceable in Iowa courts.3 Iowa Code section 814.7 is a
“neutral procedural rule[]” properly regulating state adjudication of federal claims.
Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372. Young’s constitutional challenge accordingly fails,
meaning that we lack authority to decide his ineffective-assistance claim on direct
appeal.
3 Indeed, Young’s preemption argument is even less compelling than the one in
Johnson. While the defendants in that case could point to a specific federal right allowing immediate appeals from qualified immunity decisions, Young cites no analogous federal rule that would entitle him to direct review of his ineffective- assistance claim. 11
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Young next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction for intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent. “This court
reviews sufficiency of evidence claims for the correction of errors at law.” Mong,
988 N.W.2d at 312 (citation omitted). The jury’s verdict must stand if it is supported
by substantial evidence. Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to
convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (citation omitted). The court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State,” granting all “legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly
and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” Id. (citation omitted)
Young contends the State failed to show an “assembly of people” was
placed in reasonable apprehension of serious injury by Young’s conduct. But the
jury was never asked to make that finding. The marshaling instruction provided
that, to convict Young on his intimidation charge, the State needed to prove:
1. On or about the 8th day of November, 2020, the defendant did shoot or discharge a firearm within an assembly of people.
2. The firearm was a dangerous weapon, as explained in [other instructions].
3. Joseph Ayala actually experienced fear of serious injury and his fear was reasonable under the existing circumstances.
4. The defendant shot or discharged the firearm with the specific intent to injure or cause fear or anger in Joseph Ayala.
5. The defendant acted without justification.
Citing State v. Ross, Young argues that the third element of the district
court’s instruction departs from the statutory requirements for intimidation with a
dangerous weapon. 845 N.W.2d 692, 701 (Iowa 2014) (holding that to prove an 12
offense under Iowa Code section 708.6 based on the discharge of a dangerous
weapon “within an ‘assembly of people,’” the State must show “at a minimum,” that
a defendant “placed two persons in the assembly in reasonable fear”). But Young
did not raise this issue at trial, and his challenge on appeal is to the sufficiency of
the evidence. “Where, as here, the defendant does not object to the relevant jury
instruction, the instruction is ‘the law of the case for purposes of reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence.’”4 State v. Schwartz, 7 N.W.3d 756, 764 (Iowa 2024)
(citation omitted). Consequently, the only question before the court is whether
there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the shooting
caused Ayala reasonable fear of serious injury. See State v. Clark, No. 23-1313,
2024 WL 5153099, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2024) (observing on review for
sufficiency of the evidence that “[u]nder the law of the case provided in the
instructions, only [one victim] needed to experience fear of injury”).
The reasonable apprehension element of a section 708.6 offense requires
the State to present evidence on “the actual effect of the shooting on th[e] particular
victim.” State v. White, 319 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Iowa 1982). It is not enough to
show that “a reasonable person in the position of the victim would have been
frightened.” Id. In White, a defendant discharged two shots without warning into
an occupied vehicle, then sped away—but the supreme court found those facts
insufficient to show the occupants experienced apprehension. Id. at 214, 216.
Similarly, in Mong, a victim who was struck by a bullet as he was walking away
4 Young argues that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply when a defendant
“raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in asserting the instructions were deficient.” But for the reasons discussed above, we cannot reach Young’s ineffective-assistance claim in this direct appeal. Iowa Code § 814.7. 13
from a fight testified he saw the defendant’s gun but “wasn’t too worried” because
he “had no beef with [the defendant].” See 988 N.W.2d at 308, 315. The court
found this testimony “showed [the victim] did not experience fear.” Id.
Actual fear does not require direct evidence. Ross, 845 N.W.2d at 701.
The State may rely on circumstantial facts to prove that a victim experienced fear.
White, 319 N.W.2d at 216 (acknowledging a victim’s “apprehension could be
‘inferred’ from the circumstances . . . in some cases, but not under this record”).
For instance, evidence of a victim’s flight from gunfire can support a reasonable
inference that the victim experienced fear. See State v. Foreman, 19-0878, 2021
WL 591417, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021) (finding sufficient evidence of
actual fear where camera footage showed bar patrons fleeing the scene after shots
were fired, and one woman became sick); State v. Lee, No. 08-1531, 2009 WL
3337666, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2009) (finding sufficient circumstantial
evidence of a victim’s fear where, after being shot in the back, the victim described
getting down to avoid further injury).
Ayala never saw Young’s gun. And he was in the middle of a fistfight with
Brown when Young fired his shots. Footage from a nearby security camera
captured the moment when Young discharged his weapon and Ayala fell to the
ground. The video shows Ayala lying in the street for a few moments before trying
to drag himself away. Within seconds, Ledesma breaks free from his own fight
and goes to Ayala’s aid. Both men then hurry to a bar across the street. At trial,
the prosecutor asked Ayala, “Did being shot scare you?” Ayala responded, “[o]h,
yeah,” and testified that he was worried he was going to die. 14
The jury was free to credit Ayala’s testimony about his own state of mind.
See Ross, 845 N.W.2d at 701 (finding substantial evidence to support an
intimidation conviction where the jury heard “testimony from two people that they
subjectively experienced fear”). And Ayala’s efforts to remove himself from the
area of the fight after Young’s shots lend circumstantial support to his recollection
of being afraid. See Foreman, 2021 WL 591417, at *4.
Young counters that the State’s evidence only shows Ayala “felt fear from
having been shot,” not fear “because of the shooting.” But the fact that Ayala was
shot does not rule out a reasonable inference that he feared further harm. See
Lee, 2009 WL 3337666, at *2. A victim must be placed in fear “at a time at which
he could reasonably have expected to be at risk of serious injury.” State v. Rivas,
No. 03–0511, 2004 WL 57660, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2004) (finding
insufficient evidence to support an intimidation count for a victim who was unaware
of the defendant’s firefight with police until the morning after). Young remained on
the sidewalk for roughly twenty seconds after the shooting, while Ayala retreated
to the bar across the street. A rational jury could find Ayala remained in reasonable
apprehension of serious injury during this time. We conclude that, as marshaled
at trial, Young’s conviction for intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent is
supported by sufficient evidence.
C. Sentencing Discretion
Finally, Young contends the district court failed to appreciate its discretion
to sentence him to less than a five-year minimum term of imprisonment on both
counts. Iowa Code section 902.7 (2020) requires a sentencing court to impose a
five-year minimum when the jury finds the defendant committed a forcible felony 15
while armed with a dangerous weapon—as was the case here. But an exception
exists for a first-time offender. See Iowa Code § 901.10(1). When a defendant
has no prior convictions under the dangerous-weapons enhancement in section
902.7, the court “may, at its discretion, sentence the person to a term less than
provided by the statute if mitigating circumstances exist and those circumstances
are stated specifically in the record.” Id.
Although there is no dispute that Young had no prior convictions under
section 902.7, the State urged the court to impose “mandatory five-year minimums”
at sentencing. Young’s counsel requested “seven years on each charge,” without
addressing the dangerous-weapon minimum. The district court imposed
consecutive prison terms of up to ten years, finding “a five-year minimum is
applicable to both Counts I and II.” Young argues that—when viewed against the
backdrop of the parties’ sentencing recommendations—the court’s sentence
reflects a mistaken belief that the statutory minimums were mandatory. We
disagree.
Sentencing decisions within statutory limits “are cloaked with a strong
presumption in their favor.” State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 302 (Iowa 2025)
(citation omitted). “While the district court is required to demonstrate its exercise
of discretion by stating on the record the reasons for imposing a particular
sentence, it ‘is generally not required to give its reasons for rejecting particular
sentencing options.’” State v. Smith, 17 N.W.3d 355, 359 (Iowa 2025) (citation
omitted). However, when “a court fails to exercise the discretion granted it by law
because it erroneously believes it has no discretion, a remand for resentencing is
required.” State v. Lee, 561 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Iowa 1997). The burden is on the 16
defendant to show such a misunderstanding occurred. State v. Wilbourn, 974
N.W.2d 58, 67 (Iowa 2022).
In sentencing Young, the district court did not reference its discretion under
section 901.10, nor did the court mention any mitigating factors favoring an
exception. But neither of those facts is enough to overcome the presumption of
regularity. See State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1996) (“The fact the
district court did not specifically mention the absence of mitigating circumstances
is inconsequential since this court has recognized that the district court is not
required to note them.”); State v. Russian, 441 N.W.2d 374, 374 (Iowa 1989)
(finding no abuse of discretion when the court “did not invoke, nor even mention,
section 901.10”).
Young points out that “[d]uring the prosecutor’s sentencing
recommendation, he described the firearm enhancement as ‘mandatory’ on three
occasions.” As a result, Young argues this case is similar to State v. Ayers, where
the supreme court found a district court did not exercise its discretion in sentencing
a first-time offender to a minimum sentence under section 902.7 based on both
parties’ errant suggestion that such a penalty was mandatory. 590 N.W.2d 25, 29
(Iowa 1999). But in Ayers, the district court made an express misstatement about
its authority to waive the minimum sentence, informing the defendant that the court
“has no discretion whatsoever” and that given “the use of a dangerous weapon the
Court has to impose a mandatory minimum term of no more than five years.” Id.
at 27.
Likewise, in State v. Moore—another case invoked by Young—the supreme
court found the district court was unaware of its discretion under section 901.10(1) 17
when the court did not “say or write anything noting its discretion to reduce the
minimum five-year term.” 936 N.W.2d 436, 439 (Iowa 2019). In that case,
however, the district court specifically agreed with defense counsel’s statement
that there “[wasn’t] too much wiggle room” for sentencing. Id. at 439.
Distinguishing Russian, the supreme court found this exchange provided a clear
record that the district court failed to exercise its discretion. Id. at 440.
We don’t have that clear record here, making this case more like Russian
than Ayers and Moore. Unlike the latter two cases, the district court did not adopt
the prosecutor’s mandatory language. In fact, after Young’s allocution, the court
asked the prosecutor to clarify his recommendation: “[W]hat is the minimum that
the State’s requesting?” This indicates to us that the court understood its
discretion. With that requested clarification, and no affirmative evidence otherwise,
Young cannot overcome the presumption of regularity. See Smith, 17 N.W.3d at
359 (noting a defendant must “provide a record showing that the court abused its
discretion” (citation omitted)); Ayers, 590 N.W.2d at 29 (Iowa 1999) (explaining that
“in Russian, we could not tell from the record whether the sentencing court was
aware it had discretion,” and so “the defendant had an affirmative duty to provide
a record showing the district court was unaware of its discretion to apply a lesser
sentence”). We accordingly reject Young’s sentencing challenge and affirm his
convictions and sentences.
AFFIRMED.
Schumacher and Buller, JJ., concurs; Tabor, C.J., specially concurs;
Sandy, J., joins special concurrence. 18
TABOR, Chief Judge (specially concurring).
Justice delayed is justice denied. Not a novel concept, but applicable here.
See State v. Smith, 957 N.W.2d 669, 684 (Iowa 2021) (Christensen, C.J., specially
concurring) (“[R]egardless of the antiquity of the problem and the difficulties it
presents, the courts and the bar must do everything possible to solve it.” (quoting
Dep’t of Gen. Servs. v. R.M. Boggs Co., 336 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Iowa 1983)));
Bookwalter v. Steele, No. 4:17-CV-2333 SPM, 2018 WL 3208550, at *3 (E.D. Mo.
June 29, 2018) (“Petitioner has been waiting on the state court’s decision for over
seven years, and he should not be required to wait endlessly for a determination
of his claims. That the adage ‘justice delayed is justice denied’ may by now be
trite makes it no less true.”); In re Marriage of Seely, No. 17-0777, 2018 WL
2725324, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 6, 2018) (“It’s cliché to say that justice delayed
is justice denied. But it’s a cliché for a reason, it’s true.”). Young’s attorney failed
to object to a faulty jury instruction on justification. The State admits the instruction
was wrong. But we can’t address it here because the legislature amended Iowa
Code section 814.7 (2019) to prohibit our appellate courts from deciding any
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal from the criminal
proceedings. Even those claims where the record is fully developed. As our
supreme court stated: “This statutory change . . . results in significant
disadvantages to some defendants and can mean the difference between freedom
and incarceration while the case proceeds.” State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226, 233
(Iowa 2019) (noting direct appeal is “typically a much faster vehicle for relief”).
Still, this statutory change has withstood challenges. Our supreme court
has upheld section 814.7 against separation of powers, due process, and equal 19
protection claims. State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 103–08 (Iowa 2021). And
now our court rejects Young’s attack on that statute under the Supremacy Clause.
In my view, Young makes a powerful case that “the Iowa legislature’s
determination that most ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are better
resolved in collateral proceedings cannot countermand the Sixth Amendment’s
requirement that states provide indigent defendants with effective representation.”
But as the majority properly finds, Young’s interest in vindicating his Sixth
Amendment right can be diverted to postconviction proceedings without violating
the Supremacy Clause. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 923 n.13 (1997) (“We
have made it quite clear that it is a matter for each State to decide how to structure
its judicial system.”).
I write separately to underscore that serious doubt remains whether
vindication in postconviction-relief proceedings—on a practical level—will come
quickly enough to deliver justice. At oral argument, counsel for the State asserted
that if trial counsel’s error was blatant, the postconviction-relief petitioner could
move for judgment on the pleadings and there would be “no reason” that obtaining
relief would take a long time. But the State’s attorney acknowledged that such
expedited relief doesn’t often happen in postconviction proceedings.
What does happen too often in postconviction proceedings is inordinate
delay. See, e.g., Hrbek v. State, 958 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Iowa 2021) (“For the past
thirty-four years, John Hrbek has been litigating a still-pending application for
postconviction relief in an attempt to vacate his convictions for two counts of
murder in the first degree.”); State v. Liggins, 978 N.W.2d 406, 436 (Iowa 2022)
(“The delay [of nearly thirty years] in this case was a result of the course of appeals 20
and actions for postconviction relief.”); Millbrook v. State, No. 23-1910, 2025 WL
705917, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2025) (noting lapse of twelve years before the
district court held a hearing on postconviction-relief application); Newman v. State,
No. 20-0555, 2022 WL 2348785, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2022) (noting lapse
of almost four years before the district court rejected postconviction claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel); Dockery v. State, No. 13-2067, 2016 WL
351251, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2016) (“[A]lthough three attorneys were
appointed to represent Dockery in the PCR action, none made any substantive
filings appropriate to a PCR action during the three-and-one-half years the action
was pending.”).
Pushing consideration of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims to
postconviction relief adds cases to the district court’s civil docket. And, for indigent
defendants, the risk of delay is fueled by the dwindling number of attorneys
accepting court appointments, especially in rural counties. See State Public
Defender Contract Attorneys, Fiscal Research Brief, Legislative Services Agency
(Jan. 4, 2024) https://perma.cc/9BF3-4ADP. To be fair, policymakers have acted
to address this problem. That fiscal research brief explains that the General
Assembly shifted some appropriations from the Indigent Defense Fund to the State
Public Defender, which has created a Wrongful Conviction Unit to take on more
postconviction-relief cases. See id. But as an illustration of the problem, over the
three years of Young’s criminal case, he had six court-appointed attorneys
withdraw because of case overload, conflict, impending retirement, or withdrawal
from the court-appointed list, with all the continuances and delays owed to that
kind of turnover. And Iowa Court Information System District Court statistical 21
reports show more than one-quarter of all postconviction cases decided in 2024
took more than two years to resolve. So the hope that a blatant trial error may be
quickly remedied in a postconviction-relief action may prove illusory in many cases.
Which brings me to plain error. The idea is this: “while ordinarily error
should be preserved, there should be some safety valve to allow substantial justice
to be done even where error was not preserved.” Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 117
(Appel, J., dissenting). But our supreme court has refused to adopt plain error—
without explaining why. See id. at 109 (“We have repeatedly rejected plain error
review and will not adopt it now.”). Meanwhile, “the vast majority of states and
federal courts all embrace plain error.” Id. at 120 (Appel, J., dissenting). So now,
by Young’s calculation, Iowa stands alone in offering no safety valve to allow
substantial justice on direct appeal—neither plain error nor ineffective assistance
of counsel. And although concentrating on his Supremacy Clause claim, Young is
right that this situation leaves him—and others like him having meritorious, yet
unpreserved claims from our trial courts—with no prompt remedy, no matter how
obvious the mistake or how clearly it has affected their substantial rights.
A few years ago, our supreme court stopped requiring unpreserved
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to be raised as ineffective assistance
of counsel. State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022) (“[T]he great
purpose of our jurisprudence [is] that law and justice should be synonymous.”
(citation omitted)). At oral argument, the State’s attorney asserted that Crawford
takes care of most ineffective-assistance claims that could have been decided on
direct appeal. Perhaps. But if fairness dictates reaching those unpreserved 22
sufficiency claims on direct appeal, it is hard to justify postponing consideration of
a plain error in the jury instructions on justification.
In the abstract, the majority is correct that section 814.7 appears to be a
neutral procedure regulating how ineffective-assistance claims are heard in Iowa.
See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (recognizing states have “great
latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts”). But
realistically defendants with viable, yet unpreserved, claims will face long stretches
of incarceration waiting for a court to decide whether their Sixth Amendment rights
were violated. Maybe the solution is the adoption of plain error. Maybe it’s more
effective postconviction relief. Maybe it’s increasing the supply of attorneys. In
any event, those possibilities do not help Young today.