State of Iowa v. Walter Deon Latrell Baylor

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1466 Filed October 16, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

WALTER DEON LATRELL BAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Jeffrey D. Bert,

Judge.

The defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.

Travis M. Visser-Armbrust (until withdrawal) of TVA Law PLLC, Sheldon,

and Michael H. Johnson of Johnson Law Firm, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. 2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

After a warrantless search of Walter Baylor’s vehicle, which resulted in

officers finding a digital scale with drug residue in an open glove box and drugs

and drug paraphernalia in the vehicle’s trunk, the district court first suppressed the

admission of everything found, except for the scale. The State moved to

reconsider the ruling, and the district court then reversed course and denied the

motion to suppress. Baylor appeals the district court’s reversal of the partial grant

of his motion to suppress following his convictions.1 He asserts this was an

improperly conducted inventory search and that the district court was correct when

it applied State v Ingram, 914 N.W.2d 794 (Iowa 2018) to exclude all evidence

collected after the discovery of the scale. But after the district court reversed

course, Baylor urges the new reasoning is flawed as the search was

unconstitutional when the deputies continued to search his vehicle against their

internal policies and because the State did not meet its burden to show any

exception to the warrant requirement existed. The State argues it met its burden

to show that the warrantless search fell within a recognized exception, so the

district court was correct by changing course. Upon our de novo review, we affirm

the ruling of the district court.

1 Following a trial on the minutes, Baylor was convicted of one count of possession

of a controlled substance, pursuant to Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(d) (2021), and one count of eluding, pursuant to section 321.279(3)(a). He also pled guilty to one count of stalking and violation of protective order, pursuant to section 708.11(3)(b)(1), and two counts of first-degree harassment, pursuant to section 708.7(2). 3

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

On July 12, 2021, law enforcement was informed by Baylor’s ex-girlfriend

and her father about Baylor’s concerning behavior toward her, including sending

threatening messages, attempting to run her off the road, and a specific threat that

he would shoot the ex-girlfriend the next time he saw her. Law enforcement was

told to look for Baylor in a silver vehicle with missing hubcaps. In the early morning

hours of July 24, Muscatine County Sheriff’s Deputy Dave Hallet spotted a vehicle

matching that description; he also noticed the vehicle was missing license plates

and had a headlight out. Deputy Hallet initiated a traffic stop with flashing lights,

but the driver of the vehicle disregarded his lights and, instead, increased its

speed. At that point, Deputy Hallet turned on his sirens and the vehicle

continued—at times traveling more than 100 miles per hour through two counties

and into Davenport city limits. Other members of law enforcement joined the chase

until finally, using stop sticks that deflated the vehicle’s tires and a PIT maneuver,2

Baylor’s vehicle was stopped. When the vehicle came to a stop, Baylor fled on

foot. After a short pursuit he was caught.

As the vehicle was now stopped, the deputies called to have it towed and

impounded. Prior to impoundment, the deputies started an inventory search,

which as Deputy Hallet explained, is done to document anything of “evidentiary

value” or “for the protection of the person whose car it is who has anything valuable

in there.” Likewise, the deputies conducted an “article search,” because law

enforcement also knew from an earlier incident with Baylor and his ex-girlfriend

2 A pursuit intervention technique is known as a PIT maneuver. 4

involving threats with a weapon that Baylor might have a firearm. Although Baylor

identified that he was “Walter Baylor,” he had no identification on him, so the

deputies searched the car for his identification plus any insurance documentation

or car registration to ascertain ownership of the vehicle. Moreover, Deputy Hallet

was also aware that Baylor was wanted on multiple outstanding warrants. As

Deputy Hallet looked for the registration, he saw a digital scale with drug residue

on it in the already open glove box compartment. As he later testified at the

suppression hearing, it was at this point the investigation “shifted” to a full search

of the vehicle for narcotics. From there, the officers found eleven empty marijuana

containers; three scales; a box of baggies; and four sealed bags labeled THC

gummies, containing 200 grams of THC infused gummies. All the evidence except

the digital scale from the glove box was found in a bag in the trunk.

Baylor moved to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle, claiming that

the search violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; article

I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution; or both. Baylor contended an inventory search

was not warranted because he was apprehended outside the vehicle, had not

returned to the vehicle after running, and the vehicle was disabled and being

impounded. Additionally, he asserted that once the scale was discovered in the

glove box compartment, the deputy was required to call for a search warrant under

the Muscatine County Sheriff’s towing and impound internal rules. The internal

rules referenced conforming to Ingram and provided that “[i]f law enforcement

discovers contraband during an inventory search, the search should immediately

stop, and law enforcement should obtain a warrant to search the entire vehicle,

including any closed containers.” 5

After a suppression hearing involving testimony from only Deputy Hallet, the

district court held that that the inventory exception did not excuse the warrantless

search of the vehicle. Pointing to Ingram, the district court found that the deputy

failed to follow department policy involving the impoundment procedure, which

required him to stop the search and obtain a warrant once he discovered the digital

scale. And because the State failed to prove factors supporting the “plain view or

automobile exception to the warrant requirement,” the court ordered that all

evidence except for the digital scale in the open glove box compartment was

inadmissible.

The State moved to reconsider, arguing that the inventory exception did not

preclude a search under the automobile exception or the plain view doctrine. After

reconsidering, the district court denied Baylor’s motion to suppress in full,

concluding the deputy was justified in conducting a warrantless search under the

automobile exception as outlined in State v. Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d 789, 792─96

(Iowa 2008). Baylor appeals from this second suppression ruling.

II. Standard of Review.

Baylor raises a challenge under both the federal and Iowa Constitutions.

“When a defendant challenges a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress

based upon the deprivation of a state or federal constitutional right, our standard

of review is de novo.” State v. Hauge, 973 N.W.2d 453, 458 (Iowa 2022) (citation

omitted). This means “[w]e review the entire record to independently evaluate the

totality of the circumstances and examine each case ‘in light of its unique

circumstances.’” Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Iowa 2019)). 6

III. Analysis.

We start where the district court ultimately landed—it applied the automobile

exception to the warrantless search but rejected the plain view doctrine and

reconsidered Baylor’s theory involving the violation of the impoundment policy.

The State asks us to affirm, contending the deputy had probable cause to search

the vehicle, including the trunk, thus implicating the automobile exception. Baylor

argues that neither an inventory search nor the automobile exception allow a

warrantless search of the trunk of the vehicle where the contraband was found

according to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,

section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.3 Central to Baylor’s argument is that the deputy

violated the county’s impoundment policy, Ingram applies, and the deputy was

required to stop the search and then obtain a warrant. See Ingram, 914 N.W.2d

at 820 (addressing a search of a closed container during a warrantless inventory

search of an impounded vehicle and requiring that the police advise the owner or

operator of the options to impoundment; allow the person to retrieve personal items

from the vehicle; and if the vehicle is impounded, store closed containers found

within the vehicle for safekeeping as a unit unless the owner or operator directs

otherwise). And Baylor argues that the district court’s reliance on Allensworth was

improper because Ingram is more recent authority and controls the circumstances

found here. Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d at 789; Ingram, 914 N.W.2d at 820─21.

3 Although Baylor cited both the federal and state constitutions, he has not argued

that the state constitution affords him more protection than its federal counterpart. As our supreme stated in State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 148 (Iowa 2017), “[w]e have continued to follow the federal automobile exception for decades.” Because Baylor does not argue that we should do otherwise, we will continue that approach here. See State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 624 (Iowa 2009). 7

Searches without a warrant are presumed to be unreasonable, and the State has

the burden to prove an exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v.

Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997) (“When a warrantless search is

challenged, the State must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the search came within an exception to the warrant requirement.”). In this case,

three exceptions were raised at various points: the inventory exception, the plain

view doctrine, and the automobile exception. But, with the court relying on the

automobile exception to deny the motion, we note it is applicable when “probable

cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time the car is stopped by police.”

Storm, 898 N.W.2d at 145 (citation omitted). “The inherent mobility of motor

vehicles satisfies the exigent-circumstances requirement” such that, as to our state

constitution, the Iowa Supreme Court declined to require a “case-by-case exigency

determination.” Id. at 145.

Because we are to conduct an “independent evaluation of the totality of the

circumstances” established in the record, we discuss the facts developed at the

suppression hearing. See id. at 144 (citation omitted). First, Baylor did not

challenge the legality of the initial stop of the vehicle, and the deputy testified that

although the vehicle was damaged, he did not believe it was immobile.4 Second,

the deputy entered the car to conduct an inventory search, but he also intended to

obtain paperwork about ownership to verify if it was stolen, as the car had no

4 While at the same time suggesting in his appellate brief that the record be reopened to determine the mobility of the vehicle, Baylor asserts that the vehicle was not a “fleeting target, nor capable of movement” so the automobile exception should not come into play. But the testimony of Deputy Hallet was unrebutted and, thus, we do not address that argument further. 8

license plates and was just involved in a high-speed chase. Upon entry, the deputy

saw an open glove box, and as he looked to see if paperwork might be there, he

spotted the digital scale, typically used to weigh narcotics, with residue on it.

Considering these circumstances, when Baylor urges the application of

Ingram and the consideration of the department’s policy, he ignores that the

Muscatine County Sheriff’s department policies directing impoundment focused on

identifying the owner of the vehicle to then follow the steps articulated. Here, once

Deputy Hallet started the search for the registration, his observation of the digital

scale provided probable cause to search for illegal substances, and the rules

directing impoundment were no longer front and center. Also, in contrast, Ingram

addressed the limits of warrantless inventory searches as opposed to an inquiry

over a finding of probable cause that might justify an officer’s action in opening a

closed bag in a vehicle impounded after a traffic stop. See 914 N.W.2d at 798,

820. So, we find the facts and legal theories here distinguishable from those in

Ingram.

Like in Allensworth, which was not overruled by Ingram, the deputy here did

not follow his department’s impound policy to request a warrant upon discovery of

illegal substances. See Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d at 790 n.1. Allensworth mirrors

the facts in the instant case. In both Allensworth and here, the deputies were

alerted to the possible presence of illegal substances—by an anonymous call in

Allensworth and by sight here. Id. at 791. Although in the instant case, the

Muscatine County Sheriff’s department had a policy involving impoundment, and

we may fault the deputy for not adhering to it, there is no constitutional prohibition

to an automobile search once probable cause is established. See id. at 796 9

(“[W]hether or not the search subsequent to the discovery of the [illegal substance]

was completed in compliance with the sheriff’s inventory search rules, the search

of the vehicle . . . was reasonable under the automobile exception. Probable

cause for an automobile exception search ‘may evolve from a proper investigatory

stop of a vehicle.’” (citation omitted)). Given the totality of the circumstances

presented, we find that the reasoning behind our automobile exception cases

offers a more reasonable “bright-line rule” to guide the applicability of a warrantless

search here. See Storm, 898 N.W.2d at 156. The district court properly denied

the motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle.

IV. Conclusion.

In sum, we find there was probable cause to search the vehicle once the

digital scale with residue was observed in an open glove box, so the automobile

exception applied to search the vehicle. For the reasons stated above, we affirm

the district court’s ruling denying Baylor’s motion to suppress and affirm his

conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED.