State of Iowa v. Victoria Linda Nichole Gibbs

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 1, 2025
• Docket: 24-0845
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0845 Filed October 1, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

VICTORIA LINDA NICHOLE GIBBS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Ian K. Thornhill, Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals her convictions for child endangerment

without bodily injury. AFFIRMED.

Webb L. Wassmer (argued) of Wassmer Law Office, PLC, Marion, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ. 2

BULLER, Judge.

Victoria Gibbs was found guilty of three counts of child endangerment after

a jury found she left three children under the age of ten—one of which had special

medical needs—alone in her apartment for about five hours. Gibbs argues on

appeal that the supreme court’s decision State v. Cole, 3 N.W.3d 200 (Iowa 2024),

requires us to vacate her convictions. We disagree, finding Cole distinguishable

on multiple bases, including the ages of the children, one child’s medical issues,

and the length of time the children were left alone. We affirm Gibbs’s convictions.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Cedar Rapids police were dispatched to Gibbs’s apartment in October 2021

on a report that her three children—ages nine, seven, and four—had been left

alone for an extended period. The seven-year-old is nonverbal and has significant

medical needs.

When police arrived at the apartment around 8:00 p.m., they knocked on

the door and no one answered. Through the front window, officers saw Gibbs’s

seven-year-old child1 “wedged” among blankets and pillows on the couch. They

heard another child indoors, pleaded unsuccessfully for the child to open the door,

then heard the child lock the door and saw him run upstairs. The officers eventually

called the fire department with the plan of forcing entry. Before the fire department

could force the door open, a woman the officers had previously observed in the

neighboring apartment—Angel Wade—appeared inside, having apparently come

in through the back door, and she let police into Gibbs’s apartment.

1 Because two of the children share initials, and initials can be confusing in any

event, we refer to the children by their ages to protect their privacy. 3

Inside the apartment, officers observed the seven-year-old child had a

feeding tube and saw mucus-suctioning equipment for his mouth and throat

nearby. The child was “congested,” had a “wet cough,” and had “phlegm” in his

mouth and nose. His lungs sounded “wet and crackling.” He would have

“coughing fits”—described as “a couple of consecutive coughs in a row”—and stop

breathing for ten or more seconds. And his diaper “was saturated in urine.” The

other two children were in the upstairs bedrooms, watching TV or a tablet.

Gibbs returned home just after 10:00 p.m.—meaning officers were waiting

with her children more than two hours. While they were there, officers spoke to

Gibbs by phone, first around 8:45 p.m., when she initially claimed she would be

home in less than an hour. During the call, Gibbs was “very escalated and angry,”

“yelling and swearing,” and told police that a neighbor was watching the children.

When she arrived back at the apartment, police described Gibbs as “very

confrontational and angry with us that we were there. She tried to say that we

kicked her baby-sitter out to try to frame her into getting her in trouble.” Gibbs told

officers that Wade was supposed to be watching the kids and that Gibbs’s cousin

was also supposed to come by. Police issued Gibbs a summons based on her

promise to appear and the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

removed the children the next day.

What happened before officers arrived that night was disputed at trial.

Gibbs argued that Wade’s paramour, Parris Armstrong, was staying in the

apartment and watching the children. In support of this claim, Wade—for the first

time at trial—said Armstrong had been watching the kids that night. She did not

share that information with police, prosecutors, or HHS investigators in the two 4

years leading up to trial. And Wade denied that she was supposed to be watching

the kids, even though that’s what Gibbs told police. Armstrong partially agreed

with Wade’s testimony; he said he was at Gibbs’s apartment but didn’t answer the

door because he had outstanding warrants. But like Wade, Armstrong didn’t tell

anyone this before trial. The friend Gibbs was with that evening, Cassandra

Welch, also claimed to have seen Armstrong go over to watch the kids—but she,

like the others, did not share this information with police or HHS until trial.

Other evidence, including screenshots of messages from Gibbs, supported

the State’s theory that the children were left alone. Camara Prime testified that

Gibbs had video-called her unexpectedly that day at 4:19 p.m. and asked her to

go check on the kids two or three times that evening. But Prime never actually

went over to the apartment and did not agree to do so before Gibbs left the children

alone.2 Facebook messages corroborated Prime’s testimony and the State’s

theory the children were left alone:

• Gibbs told Prime to call her when Prime got to the apartment, so that Gibbs could call the oldest child and have him let Prime inside.

• Sometime between 4:54 p.m. and 6:28 p.m., Gibbs messaged Prime: “Don’t forget.my kids bitch I’m already driving.”

• At 8:14 p.m., Gibbs tried to call Prime; when Prime didn’t pick up, Gibbs messaged: “Dude where TF are u the police surrounding my shit u bogus as fuck dude call me before u get to my house dude like fr.”

• Then Gibbs messaged: “Camara so u gun look and not fucking respond I need to talk to u before u get to my fucking house dude tph.”

2 Although ancillary to how we view the issues on appeal, the record indicates

Prime was not capable of caring for the children on her own. 5

• The next day, Gibbs messaged: “Dude dhs tryna take my kids if they contact u please say u came to watch my kids [s]o my neighbor could go to bed and the police came and so I sent u home.”

• Later that next day, Gibbs messaged again: “My kids are gone u don’t have to answer but if they contact please say what I said fr.”

An HHS child protection worker rebutted Gibbs’s trial theory and Armstrong,

Wade, and Welch’s testimony. The HHS worker explained that no one she spoke

to contemporaneous with the events—not Gibbs, Wade, or Welch—had

mentioned Armstrong, or she would have interviewed him as part of her child-

abuse investigation.

The jury resolved the conflicts in the evidence by finding Gibbs guilty as

charged on one count of neglect of a dependent person, a class “C” felony in

violation of Iowa Code section 726.3 (2021), and three counts of child

endangerment without causing bodily injury, aggravated misdemeanors in

violation of Iowa Code section 726.6.3 The court deferred judgment on the felony

and imposed suspended consecutive sentences on the misdemeanors. Gibbs

appeals, challenging only sufficiency of the evidence for the misdemeanor

convictions.

II. Standard of Review

We review sufficiency claims for correction of errors at law. State v. Jones,

967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). A verdict supported by substantial evidence

3 From the trial information through sentencing, the parties and the court cited

subsections (1)(a), (3), and (7) of section 726.6. We suspect the trial information erroneously charged Gibbs under the version of the statute in effect for the first half of 2021, rather than the version that took effect as of July 2021. As best we can tell, the appropriate subsections at the time of the offenses and the trial were (1)(a), (4), and (8). Neither party asks us to take any corrective action on this issue, and we discern no prejudice to Gibbs. 6

binds us. Id. “In determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial

evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including

all ‘legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be

deduced from the record evidence.’” Id. (citation omitted).

“It is not our place to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the

credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh

the evidence; such matters are for the jury. It is also for the jury to decide which

evidence to accept or reject.” State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022)

(cleaned up).

III. Discussion

At Gibbs’s trial, each count of child endangerment was marshaled

identically other than the child’s name. The State had to prove:

1. On or about the 24th day of October, 2021, the defendant was the parent of [child].

2. [Child] was under the age of fourteen.

3. The defendant acted with knowledge that she was creating a substantial risk to [child]’s physical, mental, or emotional health or safety.

These elements track the Code. See Iowa Code § 726.6(1)(a).

On appeal, Gibbs only challenges the third element—acting with knowledge

to create a substantial risk to the child. Last year, the supreme court analyzed that

element and explained,

[A] parent creates a risk when that risk is clearly outside the range of risks that accompany ordinary life. This requirement is satisfied when the risk results from (1) a parent’s independently unlawful behavior, (2) a parent’s overtly abusive behavior, or (3) other parent behavior that creates an identifiable risk that falls clearly outside the risks of ordinary life. 7

Cole, 3 N.W.3d at 207. Applying those principles, the court held that a mother did

not commit child endangerment when she went grocery shopping some twenty

minutes away, leaving children ages five though twelve asleep at home. See id.

at 207–08. The court emphasized that at least some of the children were old

enough to supervise the others, and there were no extraordinary or unusual risks

present in the home. See id. at 208. And the court made clear it “d[id] not suggest

that it is always appropriate or lawful for parents or other caregivers to leave

children without adult supervision.” Id. at 209.

Gibbs argues Cole controls here and requires us to vacate her convictions.

The State disagrees and distinguishes the facts of this case. We consider each

count—one for each child—separately.

The special-needs seven-year-old. We consider the child with the feeding

tube and unique medical needs first, as he presents a somewhat different factual

question. For this child, we have little trouble concluding the risk Gibbs knowingly

or recklessly created was extraordinary and sufficient to warrant criminal

conviction. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, Gibbs

was nearly two hours away from home and left the seven-year-old with no adult to

attend to his complex medical needs. The police testimony at minimum suggests

the child was having difficulty breathing and was unable to fend for himself for a

significant portion of the roughly five hours Gibbs left him without adult supervision.

There is no evidence the other children in the house were capable of caring for 8

him—and the child’s difficulty breathing when the police arrived suggests they

were not. The jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence.4

The nine-year-old. The nine-year-old raises perhaps a closer question. We

recognize that, in Cole, our supreme court cited outside-the-record evidence for

the proposition that nine-year-olds have historically been trusted to walk to school

without supervision. 3 N.W.3d at 208. Even taking such an observation at face

value, we think walking to school is a far cry from being left to provide

comprehensive care for a seven-year-old sibling with special medical needs and

another four-year-old sibling. Both the plain language of the statute and our cases

recognize that convictions for child endangerment can be grounded in the risk of

mental and emotional—in additional to physical—injuries. See Iowa Code

§ 726.6(1)(a); State v. Tewes, No. 20-0990, 2021 WL 4304240, at *3 (Iowa Ct.

App. Sept. 22, 2021). And the risk Gibbs created by abandoning the children for

some five hours, functionally leaving the nine-year-old responsible for all of them,

far exceeded the ordinary risk to these children.

For example, the record establishes that even the adult neighbors and the

police officers had some hesitation about using the specialized medical equipment

to suction the seven-year-old’s mucus. And there is no indication the nine-year-

old had any training with that apparatus or his brother’s feeding tube. And perhaps

most telling, Gibbs herself recognized that she could not safely leave the children

4 The State on appeal additionally argues that, because abandonment of the special-needs seven-year-old independently violated section 726.3, it is a per se act of child endangerment. We understand why the State argues this, based on the supreme court’s language in Cole. See 3 N.W.3d at 205–06. But, because we find the facts support a child-endangerment conviction without reference to any independently unlawful act, we decline to rest our holding solely on this ground. 9

home alone, as evidenced by her attempts to arrange care for the children, her

frantic follow-ups with Prime when she did not go to the apartment, and her attempt

to convince Prime to lie and tell HHS and police she watched the kids when she

didn’t. See State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1993) (“A false story told by a

defendant to explain or deny a material fact against [her] is by itself an indication

of guilt and the false story is relevant to show that the defendant fabricated

evidence to aid [her] defense.”). We cannot say as a matter of law the record lacks

substantial evidence for the count related to the nine-year-old, so we must affirm.

The four-year-old. As for the youngest child, we conclude the jury

reasonably found that leaving a four-year-old without adult supervision for five

hours created an extraordinary risk sufficient to warrant conviction, for many of the

reasons we have already discussed. The law did not require the State to prove

the four-year-old or her siblings actually suffered injury, but rather the crime

requires substantial evidence of the “defendant’s knowledge that the children were

in a position of substantial risk.” State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 431

(Iowa 2005). While perhaps we can conceive of different facts that could warrant

acquittal—like a preschooler being left alone for a few minutes rather than five

hours, or being left with a teenage sibling instead of a nine-year-old—we think the

evidence here was sufficient to generate a fact question for the jury on Gibbs’s

knowledge. And in our criminal justice system, jurors representative of the

community’s common sense are best suited to resolve these questions—not

appellate judges reviewing a cold record.

AFFIRMED.