State of Iowa v. Tyler John Goode

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: March 5, 2025
• Docket: 24-0082
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0082 Filed March 5, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TYLER JOHN GOODE, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Becky Goettsch, Judge.

A defendant appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea.

AFFIRMED.

Daniel M. Northfield, Urbandale, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ. 2

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Tyler Goode appeals the sentence imposed following his Alford plea1 to

harassment in the first degree, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa

Code section 708.7(2) (2023).2 Goode claims (1) the district court erred when it

declined to follow the sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement and

(2) the State breached the plea agreement by not attending Goode’s sentencing

hearing, arguing the absence constituted a failure to advocate for the sentencing

recommendation provided in the agreement. But because Goode gave prior

consent to the State’s absence at the sentencing hearing, Goode waived any right

to allege such absence breached the agreement.3 See Jasper v. State, 477

N.W.2d 852, 856 (Iowa 1991) (“Applicant [for postconviction relief] cannot

deliberately act so as to invite error and then object because the court has

accepted the invitation.”); McCracken v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 445 N.W.2d 375,

378 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (“[A] litigant cannot complain of error which he has invited

or to which he has assented.”).

1 We have jurisdiction to hear Goode’s appeal because Goode has established

good cause by challenging the sentence imposed, which was not mandatory nor an agreed term of the plea deal. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020) (“We hold that the good-cause requirement is satisfied in this context when the defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea bargain.”). 2 Goode’s plea agreement covered multiple offenses and has resulted in two

proceedings on appeal. This appeal covers only his Alford plea to the charge of harassment in the first degree. His other appeal, case number 24-0080, is separate from our review. 3 Goode also waived reporting on the proceedings. The record on appeal contains

statements of proceedings, filed by Goode and substantially adopted by the district court. Goode’s consent to the State’s absence is admitted in one such filing. 3

We review the imposition of a sentence following conviction for legal error.

State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “We will not reverse the

decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in the

sentencing procedure.” Id. A district court is not bound by the sentencing

recommendation of a plea agreement. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(3). When the

sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, the district court’s sentencing

decision “is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d

at 724. Goode bears the burden of “overcom[ing] the presumption in favor of the

sentence.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106.

Goode does not dispute that his sentence is within the statutory limits. See

Iowa Code § 903.1(2) (imposing a statutory maximum two-year term of

imprisonment for an aggravated misdemeanor). Goode argues his sentence is

overly harsh and does not advance the societal aim of criminal sentencing, which

balances rehabilitation with community protection. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d

at 724. Determining what sentence will best achieve this balance is within the

discretion of the district court. See Iowa Code § 901.5.

The record here shows the district court “was very concerned with the

previous six months of [Goode’s] conduct,” which included a conviction for “simple

assault with the same victim.” The record also shows the court considered factors

relevant to criminal sentencing. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724–25 (recognizing

relevant factors to criminal sentencing “includ[e] the nature of the offense, the

attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender, and

the chances of reform”). 4

Goode challenges the district court’s decision not to give more weight to

Goode’s successful thirty-day inpatient alcohol treatment and its concern with

Goode’s other criminal acts. But he points us to no legal authority supporting his

specific challenges. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3) (“Failure to cite

authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”). And

Goode’s disagreement with the district court’s assessment of what sentence will

best serve the goals of criminal sentencing does not alone establish an abuse of

discretion. See State v. Neubauer, No. 17-1320, 2018 WL 1099229, at *1 (Iowa

Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2018) (“The defendant’s mere disagreement with the district

court’s exercise of discretion is not a ground for relief.”).

We conclude Goode has not met his burden of demonstrating the district

court abused its discretion when it declined to adopt the recommended sentence

in the plea agreement and imposed a sentence that was within the statutory limit.

Accordingly, we affirm.