State of Iowa v. Tracy Vern Buchholz

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: February 19, 2025
• Docket: 24-0039
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0039 Filed February 19, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TRACY VERN BUCHHOLZ, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Chris Foy, Judge.

A defendant appeals the sentences imposed following his entry of guilty

pleas to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse in two cases. AFFIRMED.

Charles D. Paul of Nidey Erdahl Meier & Araguás, PLC, Cedar Rapids, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ. 2

SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

Tracy Buchholz appeals the sentences imposed following his guilty plea to

two counts of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. Buchholz claims the

district court relied on unlawful sentencing factors and disregarded mitigating

circumstances, resulting in an abuse of discretion.1 Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

This appeal concerns two criminal cases consolidated on appeal. In each

case, the State charged Buchholz via trial information with sexual abuse in the

third degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.4(1)(a) (2022).

Buchholz pled not guilty to both charges.

The first case to proceed to jury trial concerned Buchholz’s acts against J.B.

During trial, J.B. testified that on February 8, 2022, Buchholz encountered J.B.

alone in her work office. The two were previously acquainted, although they did

not know each other well. After talking with J.B. about matters unrelated to her

work, Buchholz asked J.B. for a hug. J.B. testified she was becoming very

uncomfortable, and although she did not want to hug Buchholz, she agreed,

thinking he would leave sooner if she went along with it. Against J.B.’s will,

Buchholz then began kissing, groping, and restraining J.B. Before he quit, he

touched her genitals on top of her clothing.

1 Despite entering a guilty plea, we have jurisdiction to hear Buchholz’s appeal

because Buchholz has established good cause by challenging his sentence, which was not an agreed term of the plea deal. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020) (“We hold that the good-cause requirement is satisfied in this context when the defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea bargain.”). 3

Buchholz testified in his own defense, but before the State could cross-

examine him, Buchholz accepted a mid-trial plea offer that covered both pending

prosecutions. Rather than proceeding with the fourth day of the jury trial, the

district court conducted a plea hearing. Buchholz entered a plea of guilty in both

cases to amended charges of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, in

violation of Iowa Code section 709.11.2

Buchholz agreed the district court could rely on the evidence presented

during trial as the factual basis for his plea to the offense against J.B. He agreed

the submitted minutes of testimony in his separate case would be the basis for his

plea to the offense against J.M. Additionally, during the plea colloquy, Buchholz

described what he believed was his culpable conduct against J.M. He explained,

on or about April 25, 2022, “[J.M.] was at Sweets Marsh and I approach [sic] her,

and I got out of the car and gave her a hug. And then at that time, I probably

grabbed—I believe I grabbed her by the buttocks.” He also said he grabbed J.M.’s

breasts and forced a kiss on her. He admitted he intended to commit a sex act

against her, despite being aware of the offensive nature of his contact.

The plea agreement did not limit what either party could ask for at

sentencing. And the State conveyed during the plea hearing the prison sentences

it intended to seek—the statutory maximum of two years of imprisonment for each

offense, to be served consecutively. The district court discussed with Buchholz

the possibility of spending up to four years in prison.

2 The State had the burden to prove Bucholz committed an assault on the victim

and did so with the specific intent to commit a sex act, both elements which Bucholtz admitted at the plea hearing. 4

At sentencing, J.B. and J.M. each read their victim impact statements to the

court. The district court also received a presentence investigation report (PSI),

which recommended a suspended sentence with probation. Attached to the PSI

were two supporting documents: a psychosexual assessment report and

Buchholz’s written account of the crimes. The written account denied that

Buchholz assaulted either victim with the intent to commit sexual abuse, accusing

both victims of initiating the contact. The report described that Buchholz denied

doing anything more than hugging J.B. and denied having any physical contact

with J.M.

The district court sentenced Buchholz to two consecutive indeterminate

prison terms, each not to exceed two years. Buchholz appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a sentence that

does not exceed the statutory limits. State v. Headley, 926 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Iowa

2019). A sentence that falls “within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong

presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or

the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720,

724 (Iowa 2002). Buchholz bears the burden of “overcom[ing] the presumption in

favor of the sentence by affirmatively demonstrating the court relied on an improper

factor.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020). 5

III. Sentencing

A. Sentencing Factors

Buchholz claims the district court abused its discretion by relying on

unproven allegations in J.M.’s victim impact statement and by failing to give greater

consideration to the PSI’s sentencing recommendation.

A sentencing court is required to “state on the record the basis for the

sentence imposed.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). Courts must consider the

sentencing recommendation of both parties, the victim impact statements if any

were provided, “[t]he content and recommendation of the [PSI],” and “[a]ll other

factors required by law to be considered.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(f). Other

pertinent matters a court may consider include “the nature of the offense, the

attending circumstances, [the] defendant’s age, character and propensities, and

[the] chances of his reform.” Headley, 926 N.W.2d at 550 (alteration omitted). In

contrast, “[a] court may not consider an unproven or unprosecuted offense when

sentencing a defendant unless (1) the facts before the court show the accused

committed the offense, or (2) the defendant admits it.” State v. Witham, 583

N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998).

At sentencing, the district court stated:

What I am going to consider and what I feel compels the sentence I’m going to impose is in both cases, you acted in an aggressive manner. With [J.B.], you did have inappropriate sexual contact with her. Inappropriate contact that I think was sexually motivated. [J.M.], in her victim impact statement, has indicated that you treated her in a manner that sounds very similar to how [J.B.] was treated. And the fact that you felt your behavior in either case was . . . acceptable or . . . would not result in some kind of consequences, that’s concerning. . . . And . . . something else that has . . . had an impact on my decision here, probably not as big of an impact as the fact that we 6

have two victims two different times, but both in . . . the statement that you gave to the preparer of the . . . presentence investigation report, and in your dealings with the psychosexual evaluator, you denied having any contact of a sexual nature. Mr. Buchholz, I don’t believe that. I heard [J.B.]. I saw her on the stand. I cannot . . . credit your statement that you made to two different people then, after pleading guilty, that nothing happened. And the fact that you felt it was, again, that it was acceptable to completely deny any inappropriate contact, causes me to question . . . the weight I should give the presentence investigation, PSI recommendation, because if they’re accepting your statement, they’re . . . basing their judgment, their opinions on incorrect, false information. . . . So to me, the fact that within a six-week period you, you assaulted two women, your assault in both cases was sexually motivated, and while you did not—in your plea—did not necessarily admit to a sex act in either case, I believe I can rely on the record from the trial in the case involving [J.B.] to conclude that there was contact of a sexual nature. And [J.M.] in her victim impact statement has indicated the same level of contact, and offensive and sexually motivated contact.

(Emphasis added.)

Buchholz alleges the above italicized sentence shows the district court

determined Buchholz committed a sex act against J.M. and factored that

determination into the decision to impose the maximum sentence. But we do not

agree the court’s statement, which recognized “the same level of conduct,” means

the court decided Buchholz committed a sex act against J.M. Nowhere in the

record did the court say Buchholz committed a sex act against or had sexual

contact with J.M.

When discussing both cases, the court said, “[Buchholz] acted in an

aggressive manner” and “assaulted” both women based on his sexual motivation.

These statements do not accuse Buchholz of any conduct beyond that necessary 7

to establish guilt for the crimes Buchholz admitted to in his guilty plea. See Iowa

Code § 709.11. The court added:

I am basing my decision on what I . . . know about your actions involving [J.B.], and I’m also then basing them on what you’ve admitted to and what you pled guilty to with respect to [J.M.] And because I think protection of the community and deterrence of others is going to require incarceration, I will be sentencing you to prison.

Because it is not apparent from the record, we will not infer that the district

court considered an unproven allegation. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725.

Lacking clear evidence from Buchholz, we assume the district court “filter[ed] out

improper or irrelevant evidence” and exercised proper discretion. State v. Sailer,

587 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Iowa 1998).

We also reject Buchholz’s argument that the district court failed to

adequately consider the recommendation in the PSI. The record reveals the

district court considered the PSI and exercised judicial discretion in deciding the

weight to give it. See Headley, 926 N.W.2d at 552 (“[S]entencing

recommendations contained in the PSI are not binding on the court.”). “We believe

this was a proper exercise, rather than an abuse, of discretion.” State v. Nelson,

279 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 1979).

B. Mitigating Factors

Lastly, Buchholz contends the district court abused its discretion by failing

to consider all mitigating factors and imposing consecutive sentences. Buchholz

argues his sentences do not advance the societal goals of criminal sentencing and

that issuing consecutive sentences is “beyond what was necessary.”

Together with the information identified in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure

2.23(2), before pronouncing a sentence, a district court must consider what 8

sentencing options will best advance the societal goals of criminal sentencing. See

Iowa Code § 901.5; Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724. The societal goals “focus on

rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the community from further

offenses.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724. When determining how to achieve those

goals, relevant factors include: “the nature of the offense, the attending

circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances

of reform.” Id. at 724–25. It is within the discretion of the district court to determine

what sentence will best achieve these goals. See Iowa Code § 901.5.

The record shows the district court balanced the relevant and lawful factors,

including mitigating factors, when deciding what sentence best advanced the

social goals of criminal sentencing. The court acknowledged Buchholz has “very

little in the way of criminal history,” which would typically weigh “in favor of a more

lenient sentence.”

But the court determined the nature of Buchholz’s conduct and the need to

protect the community outweighed this mitigating factor. The court expressed

concern that both of Buchholz’s offenses were against victims that he knew,

involved similar aggressive and sexually-motivated offensive contact, and

occurred in secluded environments that limited the victims’ opportunities to protect

themselves. Buchholz does not argue the court failed to provide reasons for the

imposition of the consecutive sentences but rather that the sentence was too

severe. The court stated its decision to impose consecutive sentences was based

on the same reasons it imposed prison time. See State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269,

275 (Iowa 2016) (recognizing the imposition of consecutive sentences may be 9

based on the same reasons as those supporting incarceration). The imposition of

consecutive sentences was within the statutorily mandated discretion of the court.

IV. Conclusion

Buchholz has failed to affirmatively demonstrate the district court relied on

impermissible sentencing factors or abused its discretion when it imposed

sentences within statutory limitations.

AFFIRMED.