State of Iowa v. Tony Wayne Hyde

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 30, 2024
• Docket: 23-1086
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1086 Filed October 30, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TONY WAYNE HYDE, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Heather Lauber, Judge.

Tony Hyde appeals his conviction for second-degree murder. AFFIRMED.

Richard Hollis, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden (until withdrawal) and

Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., Buller, J., and Doyle, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024). 2

DOYLE, Senior Judge.

Tony Hyde appeals after a jury found him guilty of second-degree murder

for killing Tim Thacker. Hyde contends the district court abused its discretion by

denying his motion for new trial because the weight of the evidence shows he was

justified or too intoxicated to form a specific intent to kill. We review the district

court’s denial of Hyde’s motion for abuse of discretion. See State v. Ary, 877

N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016). Finding none, we affirm.

The district court may grant a motion for new trial if it finds the verdict is

contrary to the weight of the evidence. See id. “Contrary to the weight of the

evidence” means that “a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of

an issue or cause than the other.” Id. (citation omitted). In other words, the

question for the court is whether a greater amount of credible evidence suggests

the verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice. See id. Because an argument that

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence essentially concedes there is

adequate evidence to support the verdict, such motions should be granted “only in

the extraordinary case in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the

verdict rendered.” Id.

Hyde first claims the weight of the evidence shows that he was justified in

killing Thacker because they were engaged in a mutual physical confrontation.

Hyde testified that Thacker punched him in the mouth “several times” and that he

believed Thacker would stab him. But Hyde admits that he did not see Thacker

with a knife. A witness to the fight testified that Hyde was beating Thacker, who

did not fight back. And unlike the severe injuries suffered by Thacker, the only 3

injuries Hyde sustained were a small cut to his lip and cuts to his hand that Hyde

inflicted on himself while beating Thacker.

In denying Hyde’s motion for new trial, the district court focused on “the fact

that the beating in this case was so severe.” The evidence shows that Hyde not

only beat Thacker until he lost consciousness but continued beating him afterward.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the verdict was not

contrary to the weight of the evidence based on a justification defense.

Hyde also claims that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence

because his intoxication rendered him unable to form the intent to kill. Hyde

testified that he consumed alcoholic beverages just before the altercation, and a

preliminary breath test after showed his blood alcohol concentration was three

times above the legal limit for driving. But voluntary intoxication is not a defense

to second-degree murder:

It has long been the general rule in Iowa that, although voluntary intoxication cannot constitute a defense to a crime, it may negate criminal intent if such intent is an element of the crime charged. Voluntary intoxication may not, however, reduce a charge when the crime does not require a specific intent. Thus, where the defendant has been charged with second-degree murder, a general intent crime, the defendant’s voluntary intoxication cannot negate malice aforethought and reduce the crime to manslaughter.

State v. Caldwell, 385 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1986) (internal citations omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hyde’s motion on this

basis.

AFFIRMED.