State of Iowa v. Terrence Deshaun Williams

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: June 18, 2025
• Docket: 24-0797
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0797 Filed June 18, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TERRENCE DESHAUN WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David F. Staudt,

Judge.

Following a guilty plea, a defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his

request for substitute counsel. APPEAL DISMISSED.

Alexander Smith of Parrish Kruidenier, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and

Sandy, JJ. 2

SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

The State charged Terrence Williams by trial information with second-

degree criminal mischief, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code

section 716.4(1) (2023), and second-degree attempted burglary, a class “D”

felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 713.6. Williams pled not guilty and waived

his right to speedy trial.

Roughly two weeks before his jury trial was scheduled to begin, Williams’s

counsel moved to withdraw, citing “a complete breakdown of the relationship and

ability to communicate.” The district court held a hearing on the motion, at which

Williams conveyed he was seeking substitute counsel. Williams expressed

frustration with defense counsel’s responsiveness to communications and failure

to arrange time for Williams to review discovery before a plea-bargain offer lapsed.

Even so, Williams conceded, “[Defense counsel] is a good lawyer, she is a great

lawyer. Maybe not the right time.”

The district court determined that substitution of defense counsel would not

remedy the situation and denied the motion to withdraw. The district court

continued the trial date to provide time for Williams and defense counsel to meet

to review discovery and discuss Williams’s options. Prior to Williams’s scheduled

trial date, he again requested a hearing to obtain substitute counsel.1 At the

hearing, Williams withdrew his request and asked the court to set a plea hearing

as soon as possible.

1 A written motion does not appear in our record. 3

In January 2024 and with representation by counsel, Williams entered a

non-conditional written guilty plea to criminal mischief and attempted burglary, as

charged. Williams also waived his right to move in arrest of judgment. Williams’s

written plea also indicated satisfaction with his attorney and indicated he withdrew

any complaint about his attorney that he may have filed previously. In exchange

for his guilty pleas, the State agreed to recommend suspended sentences. The

district court sentenced Williams in accordance with the plea agreement. Williams

appeals, challenging the district court’s denial of his request for substitute counsel.

Normally, when a defendant has pled guilty to a felony that is not a class “A”

felony, the defendant must establish good cause to challenge the resulting

conviction on appeal. Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). The defendant must establish

a “legally sufficient reason to appeal as a matter of right”—meaning, “a reason that

would allow a court to provide some relief.” State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109

(Iowa 2021). If such a defendant fails to establish good cause, “this court is without

jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” Id. at 110. The State claims Williams failed to

establish good cause.

Ordinarily, “[a] guilty plea waives all defenses and challenges not intrinsic

to the voluntariness of the plea.” State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 146

(Iowa 2021). Still, a defendant can reserve the right to challenge an earlier

adverse ruling by entering a conditional guilty plea. See Iowa R. Crim.

P. 2.8(2)(b)(9). But Williams’s guilty plea was not conditional on his right to appeal

the district court’s denial of his request for substitute counsel. So by pleading

guilty, Williams has waived his right to challenge the pretrial ruling. See, e.g., State

v. Hill, No. 23-1886, 2024 WL 1757330, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2024) 4

(reasoning the defendant’s guilty plea waived his right to challenge the pretrial

ruling on a motion to extend the speedy-trial deadline and precluded the appellate

court from providing relief). We therefore cannot provide the relief he seeks.

To get around this barrier, Williams asserts we should find good cause

based on his claim that the district court’s denial of his request was effectively a

complete denial of his right to counsel, creating a structural error. See Lado v.

State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Iowa 2011) (recognizing three ways in which

structural error can arise based on a defendant’s right to counsel). But Williams

was not completely denied counsel; his argument is fundamentally that his

representation was so deficient that it equated to no counsel at all.

As Williams concedes, we cannot hear ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claims on direct appeal. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109 (“[Iowa’s appellate courts

are] without authority to decide ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct

appeal.”); see Iowa Code § 814.7. And we have already rejected a defendant’s

attempt at opening a back door to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on

direct appeal by allowing defendants to present their claim through the lens of

structural error that arises from alleged ineffective assistance. See, e.g., State v.

Vanderflught, No. 22-0569, 2023 WL 5602659, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 30,

2023); State v. Huffman, No. 22-0568, 2023 WL 6619396, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

Oct. 11, 2023).

And Williams’s suggestion that Lado, which involved postconviction-relief

proceedings and was decided years before the legislature added the good cause

requirement of section 814.6, permits us to expand our authority as he now

requests is unpersuasive. See 804 N.W.2d at 252; see also Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 5

at 103 (discussing the 2019 omnibus crime bill that added section 814.6’s good

cause requirement).

Williams’s effort at establishing good cause is also not bolstered by an

attempt to claim the alleged error caused him to enter the plea unintelligently or

involuntarily. See Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 153 (declining to “hold that a claim that

a plea is not intelligently or voluntarily made constitutes good cause to appeal as

a matter of right”); see also State v. Hanes, 981 N.W.2d 454, 461 (Iowa 2022) (“If

[the defendant] relied on constitutionally deficient advice of counsel to plead

guilty . . . , he can pursue relief in postconviction proceedings.”).

Williams has failed to establish good cause. Accordingly, we dismiss his

appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.