IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0807 Filed December 6, 2023
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
STEPHEN PRENTICE POTTER, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Henry County, Joshua P. Schier,
Judge.
Stephen Prentice Potter appeals the sentences imposed by the district court
after his guilty pleas. AFFIRMED.
Pamela Wingert of Wingert Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Stephen Prentice Potter appeals the sentences imposed by the district court
following his guilty pleas entered for eluding, possession of marijuana, and
operating while intoxicated. He contends the district court abused its discretion by
failing to properly weigh opportunities for rehabilitation and the State breached the
plea agreement. Because we find the district court did not abuse its discretion and
the State did not breach the plea agreement, we affirm the sentences.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This appeal results from a high-speed chase occurring in Henry County,
Iowa. Potter eluded officers on his motorcycle, leading to one of the officers
crashing and totaling his patrol vehicle. Following the crash, officers arrested
Potter and discovered marijuana in his possession. They also determined he was
under the influence while operating his motorcycle.
Potter was ultimately charged with Count I, eluding; Count II, possession of
a controlled substance, third offense; and Count III, operating while intoxicated,
second offense. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Potter pled guilty to the lesser
offenses of eluding; possession of marijuana, second offense; and operating while
intoxicated, first offense. The parties stipulated to concurrent, suspended
sentences on Counts I and II; a three-year suspended sentence on Count III to run
consecutive to Counts I and II; and probation. But the court’s approval of the
sentence was not a condition of the plea agreement, and the sentencing court
rejected the sentencing recommendations, instead sentencing Potter to
consecutive indeterminate prison terms on all three Counts: two years each for 3
Counts I and II and one year on Count III, for a total of five years. The court also
ordered Potter to pay $22,253.50 in restitution for the damaged patrol vehicle.
Potter timely appealed. On appeal, he argues the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing and that the State breached the plea agreement.
II. Scope of Review.
We review sentencing orders for correction of errors at law. State v.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). “We will not reverse a sentence unless
there is ‘an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.’” Id.
(citation omitted).
III. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing.
We begin by addressing Potter’s claim that the sentencing court abused its
discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when “the district court exercises its
discretion on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.”
State v. Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). In sentencing,
the court must consider “the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances,
the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform.”
State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002). It must also weigh
rehabilitation of the offender against the protection of the community. Id. at 725.
“The sentencing court has broad discretion to impose the sentence it determines
is best suited to [these goals].” State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355
(Iowa 2022) (citing Iowa Code § 901.5 (2021)). Exercising this discretion by
selecting one particular sentence over another is not an abuse of discretion.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. 4
First, Potter claims the district court abused its discretion when sentencing
him by failing to follow the plea agreement. Because the sentencing court is clearly
not bound by the plea agreement, we quickly reject this argument. See Iowa R.
Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(8).
Next, Potter contends the district court abused its discretion by improperly
weighing the circumstances of the case and the rehabilitative goals of sentencing.
He specifically claims the district court ignored key opportunities for rehabilitation,
including the available community resources and supports, his ability to pay the
restitution amount by working during probation, and substitute sentencing options
other than prison. Potter also argues serving the sentence prevents him from
providing necessary care for his ailing parents.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court explained its decision as follows:
The Court’s considered all the sentencing provisions provided for in Iowa Code Chapters 901, 902, and 907. The following sentence is based upon my judgment of what will provide maximum opportunity for your rehabilitation and at the same time protect the community from further offenses by you and others. The Court has specifically considered the following factors: Your age, your criminal history. . . . Your prior employment, your family circumstances. I do note that you do have the support of your parents. The nature of the offenses committed, the harm to the victims, your need for rehabilitation and your potential for rehabilitation, the plea agreement, and all the factors set out in the [pre-sentence investigation report]. The Court is concerned with the history of your criminal offenses. You’ve had several driving charges. You’ve had multiple driving under the influence. You’ve had several drug charges. You have similar offenses over and over and over. You’ve had the benefit of parole; you’ve had the benefit of probation; you’ve had probation revoked; you’ve had parole revoked twice for the same charge. You had opportunities, sir, and it doesn’t seem that you’re learning from them. . . . .... The reason the Court is ordering these sentences to run consecutively is due to the nature of your offenses, the potential 5
harm to the community, the need to protect the community. It’s due to your criminal history and your history of failing to succeed on probation and parole.
Potter fails to show the sentencing court abused its discretion. The court
properly considered the goals of sentencing and the circumstances of Potter’s
situation. After assessing the applicable factors, it declined to follow the plea
agreement. While there are circumstances that weigh in favor of probation, such
as Potter’s positive social support and his caregiving responsibilities, these are not
dispositive. Conversely, Potter had similar criminal offenses with a history of failed
attempts at supervision. The offenses themselves were also the result of
dangerous circumstances involving a high-speed chase that put others at risk. The
court was authorized to consider all these factors and exercise its discretion in
determining a sentence. See West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d at 355. While the court
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0807 Filed December 6, 2023
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
STEPHEN PRENTICE POTTER, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Henry County, Joshua P. Schier,
Judge.
Stephen Prentice Potter appeals the sentences imposed by the district court
after his guilty pleas. AFFIRMED.
Pamela Wingert of Wingert Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Stephen Prentice Potter appeals the sentences imposed by the district court
following his guilty pleas entered for eluding, possession of marijuana, and
operating while intoxicated. He contends the district court abused its discretion by
failing to properly weigh opportunities for rehabilitation and the State breached the
plea agreement. Because we find the district court did not abuse its discretion and
the State did not breach the plea agreement, we affirm the sentences.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This appeal results from a high-speed chase occurring in Henry County,
Iowa. Potter eluded officers on his motorcycle, leading to one of the officers
crashing and totaling his patrol vehicle. Following the crash, officers arrested
Potter and discovered marijuana in his possession. They also determined he was
under the influence while operating his motorcycle.
Potter was ultimately charged with Count I, eluding; Count II, possession of
a controlled substance, third offense; and Count III, operating while intoxicated,
second offense. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Potter pled guilty to the lesser
offenses of eluding; possession of marijuana, second offense; and operating while
intoxicated, first offense. The parties stipulated to concurrent, suspended
sentences on Counts I and II; a three-year suspended sentence on Count III to run
consecutive to Counts I and II; and probation. But the court’s approval of the
sentence was not a condition of the plea agreement, and the sentencing court
rejected the sentencing recommendations, instead sentencing Potter to
consecutive indeterminate prison terms on all three Counts: two years each for 3
Counts I and II and one year on Count III, for a total of five years. The court also
ordered Potter to pay $22,253.50 in restitution for the damaged patrol vehicle.
Potter timely appealed. On appeal, he argues the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing and that the State breached the plea agreement.
II. Scope of Review.
We review sentencing orders for correction of errors at law. State v.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). “We will not reverse a sentence unless
there is ‘an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.’” Id.
(citation omitted).
III. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing.
We begin by addressing Potter’s claim that the sentencing court abused its
discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when “the district court exercises its
discretion on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.”
State v. Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). In sentencing,
the court must consider “the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances,
the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform.”
State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002). It must also weigh
rehabilitation of the offender against the protection of the community. Id. at 725.
“The sentencing court has broad discretion to impose the sentence it determines
is best suited to [these goals].” State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355
(Iowa 2022) (citing Iowa Code § 901.5 (2021)). Exercising this discretion by
selecting one particular sentence over another is not an abuse of discretion.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. 4
First, Potter claims the district court abused its discretion when sentencing
him by failing to follow the plea agreement. Because the sentencing court is clearly
not bound by the plea agreement, we quickly reject this argument. See Iowa R.
Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(8).
Next, Potter contends the district court abused its discretion by improperly
weighing the circumstances of the case and the rehabilitative goals of sentencing.
He specifically claims the district court ignored key opportunities for rehabilitation,
including the available community resources and supports, his ability to pay the
restitution amount by working during probation, and substitute sentencing options
other than prison. Potter also argues serving the sentence prevents him from
providing necessary care for his ailing parents.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court explained its decision as follows:
The Court’s considered all the sentencing provisions provided for in Iowa Code Chapters 901, 902, and 907. The following sentence is based upon my judgment of what will provide maximum opportunity for your rehabilitation and at the same time protect the community from further offenses by you and others. The Court has specifically considered the following factors: Your age, your criminal history. . . . Your prior employment, your family circumstances. I do note that you do have the support of your parents. The nature of the offenses committed, the harm to the victims, your need for rehabilitation and your potential for rehabilitation, the plea agreement, and all the factors set out in the [pre-sentence investigation report]. The Court is concerned with the history of your criminal offenses. You’ve had several driving charges. You’ve had multiple driving under the influence. You’ve had several drug charges. You have similar offenses over and over and over. You’ve had the benefit of parole; you’ve had the benefit of probation; you’ve had probation revoked; you’ve had parole revoked twice for the same charge. You had opportunities, sir, and it doesn’t seem that you’re learning from them. . . . .... The reason the Court is ordering these sentences to run consecutively is due to the nature of your offenses, the potential 5
harm to the community, the need to protect the community. It’s due to your criminal history and your history of failing to succeed on probation and parole.
Potter fails to show the sentencing court abused its discretion. The court
properly considered the goals of sentencing and the circumstances of Potter’s
situation. After assessing the applicable factors, it declined to follow the plea
agreement. While there are circumstances that weigh in favor of probation, such
as Potter’s positive social support and his caregiving responsibilities, these are not
dispositive. Conversely, Potter had similar criminal offenses with a history of failed
attempts at supervision. The offenses themselves were also the result of
dangerous circumstances involving a high-speed chase that put others at risk. The
court was authorized to consider all these factors and exercise its discretion in
determining a sentence. See West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d at 355. While the court
could have imposed the sentence recommended in the plea agreement, it is not
error for it to have imposed a different sentence. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725.
IV. Breach of Plea Agreement.
Potter also challenges his sentence by alleging the State breached the plea
agreement by failing to properly recommend the agreed upon sentence to the
district court. A breach of the plea agreement is a defect in the sentencing
procedure that warrants reversal. State v. Patten, 981 N.W.2d 126, 130
(Iowa 2022). Our inquiry is “whether the prosecutor acted contrary to the common
purpose of the plea agreement and the justified expectations of the defendant and
thereby effectively deprived the defendant of the benefit of the bargain.” Id. at 131
(citation omitted). By agreeing to a plea, the prosecutor is obligated to
“recommend” the plea agreement, which “requires the prosecutor to present the 6
recommended sentences with his or her approval, to commend these sentences
to the court, and to otherwise indicate to the court that the recommended
sentences are supported by the State and worthy of the court’s acceptance.” State
v. Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Iowa 1999). But we do not require “florid
advocacy” by the State. State v. Davis, 971 N.W.2d 546, 557 (Iowa 2022). The
mere proposal of a plea agreement “carries with it the State’s implicit
representation it is ‘worthy of the court’s acceptance.’” State v. Schlachter, 884
N.W.2d 782, 786 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Horness, 600 N.W.2d at 299–300).
Regarding the plea agreement, the State stated:
Since this case did involve possession of drugs, I did staff this case with the county drug investigator and the attorney in my office that handles driving offenses, and based upon the facts presented to us, we agreed that a proper recommendation in this case would be for [Potter] to plead to the lesser-included offenses and recommendation of two years on each aggravated, those run concurrent with one another; one year on the serious offenses, consecutive, for a total of three years, suspended with supervised probation.
Potter argues this is not an adequate recommendation of the sentence, thereby
breaching the plea agreement. We disagree. There are no facts here to suggest
that the State interfered with the agreement in any way. See id. at 787 (“[W]here
the prosecutor has been held to have breached the plea agreement, there was
something the prosecutor said that implicitly or explicitly undermined the plea
agreement.”). While certainly not a glowing reference, we only require the
minimum recommendation. See Davis, 971 N.W.2d at 557. Upon review of the
record, we find the State adequately commended the plea agreement to the
sentencing court. Based on the nature of the offenses and the experience of the
actors consulted during negotiations, the State explained its reasoning for the 7
agreement. It also highlights the agreement itself, providing its implicit support of
the proposed sentence. See Schlachter, 884 N.W.2d at 786. There is no evidence
here suggesting the State sabotaged the process or somehow convinced the
sentencing court to decline the agreement. Absent additional circumstances, we
find no breach.
Because we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Potter, and the State did not breach the plea agreement, we affirm Potter’s
sentences.
AFFIRMED.