State of Iowa v. Stephen Joshua Wilson
This text of State of Iowa v. Stephen Joshua Wilson (State of Iowa v. Stephen Joshua Wilson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0397 Filed June 18, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
STEPHEN JOSHUA WILSON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Adair County, Stacy Ritchie, Judge.
A defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for new trial
following remand. AFFIRMED.
John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., Sandy, J., and
Telleen, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2025). 2
TELLEEN, Senior Judge.
Stephen Wilson was charged with disarming a police officer and other
offenses following an altercation with emergency workers who were attempting to
assist him on the side of Interstate 80. Police responded after Wilson—who had
wandered about fifty miles from Des Moines—stood in the middle of the road,
jumped onto a slow-moving truck, and threatened the driver. Officers were
concerned about Wilson’s psychiatric status. When he began to scream
uncontrollably, they summoned an ambulance. Wilson threw punches at the
paramedics, and he tried to take control of a state trooper’s taser.
A jury found Wilson guilty. He moved for a new trial, arguing the
“overwhelming evidence” of his compromised mental state foreclosed a finding of
intent necessary to support the jury’s verdict. The district court denied Wilson’s
motion following a reported hearing. On direct appeal, he challenged his
conviction for disarming a police officer on sufficiency-of-the-evidence and weight-
of-the-evidence grounds. See generally State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706–07
(Iowa 2016) (distinguishing these claims and the standards by which they are
reviewed). We rejected Wilson’s sufficiency challenge but found the district court
failed to apply the correct legal standard in denying his motion for new trial. State
v. Wilson, No. 22-1090, 2023 WL 8449406, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023).
We therefore remanded the case for “the trial court to rule on his motion for new
trial” under the correct weight-of-the-evidence standard. Id. at *4. 3
Six days after procedendo issued, the district court entered an order stating
as follows:
On May 9, 2022, following jury conviction in this matter, the Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial. Having reviewed the evidence and considered the credibility of the witnesses at trial, the Court finds that the verdict is NOT contrary to the weight of the evidence or a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the Court denies the Motion for New Trial.
Wilson appeals. He contends the court erred by reconsidering his motion for new
trial without notice or a hearing, and that we should remand this case again so he
can have “an opportunity, after notice, to argue his motion.”
Our review is for correction of legal error.1 State v. Pearson, 876
N.W.2d 200, 204 (Iowa 2016). “It is a fundamental rule of law that a trial court is
required to honor and respect the rulings and mandates by appellate courts in a
case.” City of Okoboji v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 744 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Iowa 2008). In
doing so, the court must refrain from overstepping the scope of our instructions on
remand. See Pearson, 876 N.W.2d at 204 (explaining a mandate on remand
authorizes the district court “do the special thing authorized by this court in its
opinion, and nothing else” (citation omitted)). But the district court also “must not
read the mandate in a vacuum.” City of Okoboji, 744 N.W.2d at 332. Wilson
1 The State argues that the district court’s order was not a final judgment appealable as of right under Iowa code section 814.6(1)(a) (2024) and that Wilson should have brought this challenge by original certiorari action. Our supreme court has declined to resolve that question in the past, see Pearson, 876 N.W.2d at 204, and we do not decide it here. Even if the State is correct, we may treat Wilson’s notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.151(1). The scope of our review would be the same. City of Okoboji, 744 N.W.2d at 330. 4
contends the court did just that by reconsidering his motion without inviting
additional argument.2
The State argues Wilson failed to preserve his claim of error because he
never asked the district court for the hearing he says he was owed. As a general
rule, “[l]itigants may not raise issues—including constitutional issues—for the first
time in an appeal.” State v. Tucker, 982 N.W.2d 645, 653 (Iowa 2022). Perhaps
Wilson could have asked the court to hold a hearing and reconsider its ruling prior
to bringing this appeal. See, e.g., Buck v. Iowa Dist. Ct., No. 22-1890, 2024
WL 1295105, *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2024) (illustrating how such a motion can
better facilitate our review). But we decline to hold this failure against him. At the
time this case returned to the district court, Wilson’s trial counsel had long ago
withdrawn. It was Wilson’s previously-appointed appellate attorney who filed a
timely notice of appeal prior to requesting her own withdrawal. Under the
circumstances of this case, it would have been the better practice for the district
court to ensure Wilson had active trial counsel prior to entering its order on remand.
Because of these concerns, we choose to bypass the State’s preservation
argument.
2 Wilson does not challenge the substance of the district court’s ruling. If he had, we would face some difficulty. Although the court properly acknowledged the weight-of-the-evidence standards, it provided no explanation for why the greater amount of credible evidence overcomes Wilson’s argument that he lacked the requisite intent. We recognize that motions for new trial on weight-of-the-evidence grounds are to be granted “only in the extraordinary case,” Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706, and that they are commonly denied in a summary fashion. But a one-sentence statement that the verdict is not contrary to the weight of the evidence is not helpful to an appellate court’s analysis. We express no opinion on the merits. 5
Turning to the substance of Wilson’s appeal, we find no error in the district
court’s course of action. Litigants do not enjoy a categorical right to oral argument,
only “a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” In re Marriage of Seyler, 559
N.W.2d 7, 9 (Iowa 1997) (citation omitted); see also F.C.C. v. WJR, The Goodwill
Station, 337 U.S. 265, 275–76 (1949) (explaining that “in some situations . . .
argument submitted in writing is sufficient” for due process); Roach v. Bennett, 148
N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 1967) (finding no error in denial of oral argument where a
habeas petitioner had the opportunity to present evidence and file a written brief).
Wilson had that opportunity at sentencing, where the court invited argument and
his attorney deemed the motion “submitted in full at this time.” The reason we
remanded this case for a new “rul[ing] on [Wilson’s] motion” was not because
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