IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 21–1133
Submitted September 19, 2023—Filed December 8, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
STEPHEN ANDREW ARRIETA,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Worth County, Colleen D. Weiland,
Judge.
The defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained after a drug dog alerted to the smell of drugs during a commercial
vehicle inspection. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED. Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined. Colin Murphy (argued) of Gourley Rehkemper Lindholm, P.L.C., West Des
Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden (argued) and
Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 2
OXLEY, Justice. Officers are allowed to use a drug dog to conduct a “free air sniff” around
the outside of a vehicle during a valid traffic stop without any suspicion that the
vehicle contains drugs under the premise that the driver has no expectation of
privacy in the air outside the vehicle. Even so, that doctrine is a narrow one.
Stopping a vehicle for a traffic violation is itself a seizure, and any conduct that
goes beyond investigating the “mission” of the traffic violation is closely scruti-
nized.
In this case, Stephen Arrieta, a truck driver from Texas, failed a “PrePass”
check as he approached a weigh station on Interstate 35 outside Northwood. He
pulled into the weigh station, and an Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT)
officer undertook a “Level 3” commercial vehicle inspection of the driver’s docu-
mentation. Well into his inspection, the DOT officer called for a K-9 unit to con-
duct a free air sniff of the truck and trailer. The drug dog ultimately alerted to
the area around the sleeper compartment of the cab, and Arrieta admitted he
had a bowl of marijuana inside. Arrieta challenges the district court’s denial of
his motion to suppress the marijuana on three grounds. First, he argues that
the DOT officer engaged in an unlawful seizure when he extended his Level 3 document-only investigation to give the K-9 handler time to get to the weigh sta-
tion and search his truck, relying on Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348
(2015). Second, he argues that the K-9 handler engaged in an additional unlaw-
ful search when the dog jumped up on the fuel tank of the cab to enable it to
smell the area around the sleeper compartment where the marijuana was lo-
cated, relying on the property-based-search framework delineated in United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), and Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
Third, he challenges the reliability of Titan, the drug dog, relying on Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013). 3
As explained below, we conclude that Arrieta was detained beyond the time
needed to complete the Level 3 inspection in violation of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. That violation requires suppression of the sub-
sequently discovered drugs, so we need not address Arrieta’s other arguments.
The district court’s judgment is reversed and remanded.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On August 5, 2020, Stephen Arrieta was traveling through Iowa as he
hauled a load of insulation from Minnesota to Texas. His semitruck “failed” the
PrePass check just north of the Northwood DOT weigh station on I-35, so Arrieta
pulled into the weigh station. DOT Officer Taran Waalkens initiated a Level 3
commercial motor vehicle inspection, which involves a document review of the
logbook, truck and trailer registrations, fuel tax receipts, and bills of lading. Dur-
ing the ensuing inspection, Waalkens requested assistance from the Worth
County K-9 handler to conduct a free air drug dog sniff around the perimeter of
the semi as the inspection was being conducted. It was during this sniff that K-
9 Titan alerted to the smell of narcotics coming from inside the cab of Arrieta’s
truck. Arrieta admitted to the officers that he had a small amount of marijuana
in the sleeper compartment. A subsequent search of the cab revealed the mari- juana, and Arrieta was charged with possession of a controlled substance in
violation of Iowa Code § 124.401(5) (2020).
Before trial, Arrieta moved to suppress the evidence seized by the officers,
alleging the search violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. He advanced four argu-
ments in support of the motion to suppress, three of which he urges on appeal:
(1) officers lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to de-
tain him while waiting for a K-9 to arrive; (2) an impermissible search occurred when the K-9 made deliberate, physical contact with the vehicle by putting its 4
paws up on the fuel tank to reach the area near the sleeper compartment during
the free air sniff; and (3) K-9 Titan was not sufficiently trained and reliable to
provide probable cause to support the search of his truck. After a hearing, the
district court denied the suppression motion. Arrieta proceeded to a trial on the
minutes. He was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and was
sentenced to a fine of $250 and two days in jail, both of which were suspended.
Arrieta appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, and we transferred
the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s
ruling, concluding that the initial report of a stolen vehicle and the other dis-
crepancies found in Arrieta’s logbook justified the length of the stop, which was
still ongoing when Deputy Luther arrived with Titan. It concluded that Titan’s
training and experience satisfied the requirements that a drug dog be sufficiently
reliable to support Luther’s belief that a search would reveal drugs. Finally, it
concluded that the dog jumping up on the side of the truck was not an uncon-
stitutional search, relying on United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 511
(8th Cir. 2007).
We granted Arrieta’s application for further review to address whether Ar-
rieta’s constitutional rights were violated. II. Standard of Review.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress based on dep-
rivation of a constitutional right de novo. State v. Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284, 286
(Iowa 2017). “This review requires ‘an independent evaluation of the totality of
the circumstances as shown by the entire record.’ ” State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d
767, 771 (Iowa 2011) (quoting State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001)).
“Each case must be evaluated in light of its unique circumstances.” State v. Fogg,
936 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v. Coffman, 914 N.W.2d 240, 5
244 (Iowa 2018)). We give deference to the district court’s findings of fact, but we
are not bound by them. State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2017).
III. Was the Traffic Stop Unconstitutionally Extended?
Law enforcement officers often use drug dogs to locate illegal narcotics
during traffic stops. As a general matter, unless an officer has reasonable suspi-
cion that a vehicle contains drugs, an officer who otherwise lawfully stops a ve-
hicle cannot detain the vehicle beyond the purpose for the stop to conduct a drug
dog sniff. But they can conduct a free air drug dog sniff around the exterior of
the vehicle under Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
Arrieta raises several challenges to the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress, including his claim that the duration of the stop was impermissibly
extended without the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The de-
tention of an individual during a traffic stop, even if brief and for a limited pur-
pose, is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Kreps,
650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). Arrieta does not contest the validity of the
initial stop or the Level 3 inspection. Rather, he argues the seizure violated his
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 when
he was detained longer than what was reasonably necessary to complete the Level 3 inspection. He further argues the State failed to proffer a sufficient ex-
planation for the delay, demonstrating the officer’s improper intent to unduly
prolong the inspection to allow time for a K-9 unit to arrive on the scene. We
conclude the stop was impermissibly extended beyond a reasonable duration,
which renders it an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment. With
that violation, we need not, and do not, address whether the stop was also im-
permissibly extended under the Iowa Constitution. See In re Prop. Seized from
Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384, 391 n.6 (Iowa 2015). 6
The controlling precedent for Arrieta’s challenge is Rodriguez, 575 U.S.
348. That case also involved a free air sniff by a drug dog during a routine traffic
stop that revealed the presence of narcotics inside the vehicle. Id. at 352. Alt-
hough the initial stop was valid, the United States Supreme Court held that law
enforcement unconstitutionally prolonged the stop beyond what was necessary
to effectuate the legitimate purpose for the stop. Id. at 354–55. Support for the
holding came from underlying facts showing that the officer detained Rodriguez
for “seven to eight minutes” beyond the time reasonably needed to “complete
th[e] mission” of issuing a warning ticket while he waited for a K-9 unit to arrive.
Id. at 350–51, 353 (alteration in original) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407).
Absent individualized suspicion, law enforcement may not prolong a traffic stop
to conduct unrelated investigations—such as drug dog sniffs—that do not serve
the stop’s lawful objectives. Id. at 354–55.
Federal caselaw makes clear that even de minimis extensions of traffic
stops are unacceptable under the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (holding that an investigative detention must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop); United
States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 867–68 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that several minutes of additional questioning to ascertain defendant’s identity was imper-
missible in the absence of independent reasonable suspicion); United States v.
Gomez, 877 F.3d 76, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding evidence unlawfully obtained
during a five-to-six-minute traffic stop because the officer impermissibly ex-
tended the seizure to ask unrelated questions); United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d
651, 662–63 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that six minutes of questioning measurably
prolonged the traffic stop beyond its original purposes because the topics covered
more than just context-framing questions and the extraneous questions lasted a “not insubstantial” amount of time); United States v. Milton, 621 F. Supp. 3d 7
421, 430–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (finding that a delay of “two minutes or so” caused
by “investigative inquiries unrelated to motor vehicle violations” unconstitution-
ally prolonged the traffic stop); United States v. Cornejo, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1137,
1152 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (finding eight minutes was an unreasonably long duration
“to complete the simple, one-page, written warning citation”); United States v.
Dolson, 673 F. Supp. 2d 842, 867 (D. Minn. 2009) (finding delay of one minute
and twenty-four seconds to call drug task force to be an unlawful extension).
The critical question for courts applying Rodriguez is not whether the un-
related investigation occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, but whether
conducting the unrelated investigation adds time to the stop. Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at 357. “Just as an officer may not earn ‘bonus time’ to conduct inquiries
for an unrelated criminal investigation by efficiently processing the matters re-
lated to the traffic stop, an officer may not consume much of the time justified
by the stop with inquiries about offenses unrelated to the reasons for the stop.”
Gomez, 877 F.3d at 91–92 (citation omitted).
We have likewise applied Rodriguez’s holding in a variety of factual con-
texts. In In re Property Seized from Pardee, we concluded that a twenty-five-mi-
nute traffic stop was unconstitutionally prolonged beyond what was necessary to address the traffic infraction. 872 N.W.2d at 396–97. We rejected the state’s
reliance on individualized suspicion of additional criminal activity because the
officers “developed reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity—if at all—only
by prolonging the initial stop beyond the time reasonably necessary to execute
the traffic violation warnings.” Id. at 391. Pardee reiterated the rule delineated
by Rodriguez: “Authority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic
infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. at 392 (omis-
sion in original) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354). Rodriguez made clear that the Fourth Amendment will permit certain extraneous investigations that do not 8
perpetuate the roadside stop, but the stop is lawful only “so long as [unrelated]
inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at 355 (alteration in original) (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323,
333 (2009)).
We applied Rodriguez’s rule again in State v. Salcedo to hold that an officer
cannot utilize delay tactics to prolong a lawful traffic stop until a drug dog arrives
on the scene. 935 N.W.2d 572, 579 (Iowa 2019). In that case, the defendant
consented to a vehicle search within fourteen minutes of being pulled over, which
ultimately revealed marijuana in the trunk before the dog ever arrived. Id. at
574–75. Although the stop was objectively short in light of the officer’s
suppression hearing testimony that it would take anywhere from ten to twenty-
five minutes to complete an average traffic stop, we found this stop violated the
Fourth Amendment because it was delayed by the officer’s actions unrelated to
investigating or processing the traffic violation. Id. at 576, 580–81. In reaching
the decision, we noted that the officer’s “complete lack of effort to address
Salcedo’s specific traffic infraction” was obvious from the evidence, such as body
camera footage that showed the officer repeatedly flipping through the pages of
a car rental agreement and his admitted failure to ask any questions related to the traffic infraction during the stop. Id. at 580. Additionally, we found that the
officer was “no closer to completing the mission of the traffic stop than he was
prior to inviting Salcedo into his patrol car” to ask him a few questions. Id. at
580–81. We agreed with Salcedo’s argument that the officer was merely
“stringing along the stop until a drug dog arrived” and the delay was
“measurable, unreasonable, and in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.”
Id.
To be clear, there is no time limit on traffic stops. “Whether a particular detention is reasonable in length is a fact-intensive question, and there is no per 9
se time limit on all traffic stops.” Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d at 510. For instance,
when complications arise while carrying out the original purposes of the stop,
law enforcement may reasonably detain a driver for a longer duration than when
a stop is strictly routine. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685–
87 (1985). The specific circumstances of the stop determine the outcome of each
case, so courts should conduct a thorough factual inquiry into the record. There-
fore, the timeline of relevant facts is particularly pertinent to our decision in this
case, and we discuss them in some detail.
At approximately 12:35 p.m., Arrieta’s truck “failed” the PrePass, so he
pulled into the DOT weigh station. Waalkens met Areitta at his truck at approx-
imately 12:39 p.m. to begin the Level 3 inspection. Due to COVID-19 protocols
in place at the time, Waalkens put his email into the “Keep Trucking” app Arrieta
used for his logbook so Waalkens could access and review the log without being
in close contact. Waalkens then reviewed Arrieta’s information from his com-
puter inside the weigh station facility while Arrieta waited in his truck.
Waalkens first scanned the bar codes on Arrieta’s driver’s license and the
registration form for the semi-tractor. The electronic system, which automati-
cally runs a warrant check and checks for current registration, reported that the semi-tractor was stolen. Waalkens followed up with “Cedar Falls state radio” to
check the license plate and vehicle identification number (VIN). Although the
license plate number was not reported stolen, the VIN again registered as stolen.
Waalkens then asked state radio to check with the originating agency to see if
the stolen report was still valid while he continued his inspection. Waalkens
learned about this issue “right away,” which he estimated to be within the first
ten minutes. He continued his inspection while he waited for information about
whether the stolen report was valid. 10
As the inspection continued, Waalkens noticed discrepancies in Arrieta’s
paperwork that he found to be suspicious. The bill of lading showed that Arrieta
“was only hauling insulation from Minneapolis all the way back down to Texas,”
which Waalkens believed was not “fairly common” because “from [his] work ex-
perience” only hauling insulation on “that far of a trip . . . wouldn’t be a produc-
tive trip for the company at that point.” Waalkens also identified what he de-
scribed as inconsistencies from his review of Arrieta’s logbook. Arrieta was pri-
marily a local hauler in Texas, and he was not required to maintain a licensed
electronic logbook. The Keep Trucking app Arrieta used on his cell phone allowed
him to retroactively edit the location, miles, and times. Waalkens noted a few
instances in the log where Arrieta had changed duty status locations in Texas
with no recorded driving time. The logbook also showed that Arrieta drove the
770 miles “from Edmond, OK to Minneapolis, MN . . . in exactly 11 hours of
driving time” the prior day. Waalkens calculated (wrongly)1 that Arrieta “would
have averaged 77 mph during th[e] entire trip.” Finally, Waalkens found it sus-
picious that the logbook “did not specify what [Arrieta] brought up to Minneap-
olis, but he just had a trip to go all the way up to Minneapolis and then straight
back down to Texas.” These factors, combined with Waalkens’s “know[ledge] that I-35 is a very popular corridor for drug trafficking,” led him to request a K-9 unit
to further inspect Arrieta’s truck.
Waalkens testified he learned about the VIN discrepancy within the first
ten minutes of his investigation—after returning to the building and scanning
the bar code on the registration. After asking state radio to follow up on the
stolen report with the initiating authorities in Arlington, Texas, Waalkens turned
to the logbook. He testified he identified discrepancies in the logbook “within 20
1Driving 770 miles over 11 hours would be an average of 70 mph, not 77 mph (770 ÷ 11
= 70). 11
minutes of starting the inspection.” He estimated it took another “few minutes”
each to review the fuel tax receipts, bills of lading, and trailer registration.
Waalkens called state radio to request a K-9 unit shortly before 1:34
p.m.—an hour after he began his inspection but before he received confirmation
about whether the stolen truck report was valid. Waalkens testified he “needed
to further investigate the log[]book and talk with Mr. Arrieta” when he called for
the K-9 unit. When asked to clarify whether, “in addition to discussing with [Ar-
rieta] log[]book issues,” there was “any other thing that was not yet completed
by the time you contacted state radio for a K-9,” Waalkens responded, “Just
reviewing the information with the driver.”
At 1:34 p.m., while the K-9 unit was en route, state radio told Waalkens
not to hold Arrieta based on the stolen VIN report; the Arlington police depart-
ment had been contacted and reasoned that because the truck’s current regis-
tration was valid, the report was likely outdated. Waalkens testified that he nev-
ertheless continued holding Arrieta “because he was traveling from Texas to Min-
nesota[,] . . . the discrepancies in [his] log[]book changes in southern Texas, [and]
incorrect mileage on his log[]book.” Critically, based on our de novo review of the
record, by about 1:34 p.m. Waalkens was done with all of his tasks except going over the inspection with the driver.
Just before 2:00 p.m., the K-9 unit—Worth County Sheriff’s Office Chief
Deputy Jesse Luther and his dog Titan—arrived at the weigh station. Luther had
been in a meeting at the sheriff’s office in Northwood, the county seat, about ten
miles from the weigh station. When Waalkens’s request for a K-9 unit came in,
Luther asked his boss for permission to leave for the weigh station. He was
granted permission and “left the meeting within minutes.”
When Luther arrived with Titan, Arrieta was still in his truck. Luther spoke briefly with Waalkens and Arrieta, and then he and Titan began a free air sniff 12
of the truck at 2:00 p.m. while Waalkens took Arrieta inside the weigh station to
review the paperwork. Luther and Titan first made a clockwise pass around the
truck, beginning from the front passenger side of the vehicle. During this first
pass, Luther allowed Titan to lead rather than directing him where to sniff. Lu-
ther noticed Titan “immediately showed signs of a breathing change” and was
“in odor” during the first trip around the truck and trailer. Titan did not ever
“alert” during this pass, though.
The team then turned around for a counterclockwise pass. During this
pass, Luther cued Titan to sniff particular areas of the truck he wanted Titan to
focus on—a process he called “detailing.” As they came around the front driver’s
side corner of the truck, Titan jumped up and placed his paws on the truck twice
to reach the areas Luther directed him to sniff. First, Titan placed his front paws
on the truck’s tire to smell near the engine compartment, and then he placed
them on the fuel tank to smell near a seam in the truck’s body behind the driver’s
side door near the sleeper compartment. After smelling the seam, Titan gave an
alert that he had found the source of the odor of narcotics by sitting down.
Luther informed Waalkens about the alert, and they questioned Arrieta,
who admitted having a “bowl” of marijuana in the sleeper compartment of his truck, which he had smoked the night before to help him fall asleep. Arrieta
agreed that Waalkens could retrieve the marijuana, and Waalkens pulled his
cruiser behind the truck, advising dispatch that he would be searching the ve-
hicle based on Titan’s alert. This was at 2:06 p.m.—an hour and a half after
Arrieta first pulled into the weigh station. Waalkens found 0.29 grams of mari-
juana in Arrieta’s sleeper compartment; a search of the rest of the truck and
trailer revealed no additional marijuana or other narcotics. Arrieta was arrested
and charged with possession of marijuana. 13
In assessing whether Waalkens unduly prolonged the duration of the stop,
we acknowledge that this stop was not “normal” based on the report that Ar-
rieta’s truck might be stolen. Under our totality approach, we give proper weight
to the additional time required to complete this particular inspection given the
officer’s collateral investigation to determine if the truck was stolen. Even so, a
close review of the record reveals that the inspection should have reasonably
been completed before the K-9 unit arrived, and Waalkens no longer had author-
ity to detain Arrieta to conduct the free air sniff.
The district court gave undue weight to Waalkens’s asserted need to in-
vestigate whether the truck was stolen to excuse the delay. Waalkens learned of
the report at the outset, called dispatch, and asked them to follow up. Mean-
while, he continued his investigation, discovering some discrepancies in Arietta’s
logbook within twenty minutes of starting the inspection. This would have been
around 1:00 p.m. He continued reviewing the logbook and other paperwork over
the next half hour and—other than talking to Arrieta—was finished with his re-
view when he received word that the stolen report was cleared up at 1:34 p.m.
This was approximately twenty-five minutes before Luther and Titan arrived.
Thus, even if we assume the officer’s calls with state radio added some measur- able amount of time, the inspection should have wrapped up shortly after state
radio responded.
The evidence in the record reveals that Waalkens was simply waiting inside
the weigh station between the time he talked to state radio at 1:34 p.m. and
Luther’s arrival just before 2:00 p.m. Waalkens testified he was done inspecting
the paperwork other than going over it with Arrieta when he called for the K-9
unit, which was before he talked to state radio. So, when he received confirma-
tion that the truck was not stolen at 1:34 p.m., there was no basis for Waalkens to continue holding Arrieta except to go over the paperwork and discuss any 14
logbook issues with him. Once he received the green light to not hold Arrieta
related to the stolen VIN report at 1:34 p.m., Waalkens should have been pre-
pared to talk to Arrieta then. Instead, he waited twenty-five minutes for Luther
to arrive before going to get Arrieta from his truck. Although we do not have a
bodycam video to reveal what Waalkens was doing in the meantime as we did in
Salcedo, 935 N.W.2d at 576, Waalkens admitted he only needed to review the
paperwork with Arrieta and offered no explanation for not doing that after talking
to state radio at 1:34 p.m. He certainly was not acting diligently to complete the
purpose of the traffic stop. Waalkens’s estimation of the time it took him to review
Arrieta’s documents and his admission that he only needed to review the paper-
work with Arrieta when he called for the K-9 unit reveal that he was “stringing
along the stop until a drug dog arrived.” Id. at 580; see also State v. Flanagan,
No. 20–0652, 2021 WL 4593222, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2021) (holding an
unconstitutional delay occurred because the officer was less than expeditious in
completing his traffic-related mission by asking off-topic questions); State v.
Lopez-Cardenas, No. 15–2040, 2017 WL 3283279, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 2,
2017) (identifying officer’s “striking shift to slow motion” immediately upon dis-
covering the drug dog would be delayed as compelling evidence to support the conclusion that unrelated checks unduly prolonged the traffic stop). Even cred-
iting the unusual circumstances present in this case, we conclude that here, as
in Salcedo, the delay was “measurable, unreasonable, and in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights.” 935 N.W.2d at 581.
On a motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search, “[t]he
defendant has the burden of proof as to whether a seizure occurred,” Fogg, 936
N.W.2d at 668, whereupon the burden shifts to the state to prove that its war-
rantless actions were justified, State v. Torres, 989 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Iowa 2023) (“In seeking to sustain an exception to the warrant requirement, the state bears 15
the burden of proof.” (quoting State v. Wilson, 968 N.W.2d 903, 909 (Iowa 2022))).
In this case, the State did not meet its burden because it failed to explain the
twenty-five-minute delay between the time Waalkens heard back from state radio
and the arrival of the drug dog, during which Waalkens should have been going
over the paperwork discrepancies with Arrieta. It is not enough to prove that the
inspection was still ongoing when the dog conducted the free air sniff. Rather,
the State’s burden of proving the stop was not extended beyond its lawful pur-
pose required evidence showing that Waalkens could not reasonably have com-
pleted the inspection before Luther arrived. Thus, the State failed to justify the
considerable delay to await the arrival of a drug dog, and, in the absence of rea-
sonable suspicion, violated Arrieta’s Fourth Amendment rights.
The State makes a passing argument that Waalkens’s suspicions from Ar-
rieta’s logbook, the stolen vehicle report, and his travel along I-35 as a known
drug route provided reasonable suspicion to support delaying Arrieta beyond the
purpose for the initial stop. “When a person challenges a stop on the basis that
reasonable suspicion did not exist, the State must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the stopping officer had specific and articulable facts, which
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, to reasonably believe criminal activity may have occurred.” State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa
2004). We determine the existence of reasonable suspicion by considering the
totality of the circumstances facing the officer. State v. McIver, 858 N.W.2d 699,
702 (Iowa 2015). But an officer’s “[m]ere suspicion, curiosity, or hunch of crimi-
nal activity is not enough.” Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204.
In considering the circumstances of the stop, the factors identified by the
State do not rise to the level needed to create reasonable suspicion that Arrieta
was engaged in criminal activity. We considered whether reasonable suspicion justified prolonging a traffic stop to conduct a free air sniff in Pardee and came 16
to a similar conclusion on more facts. In Pardee, the officer identified several
factors supporting reasonable suspicion, including “California plates, the
slowing down to sixty-five miles per hour, the failure to make eye contact with
the trooper, the oversight of leaving the right signal light on after pulling over,
the initial nervousness [of the vehicle occupants], the lived-in look of the vehicle,
[and] the air freshener [in the vehicle].” 872 N.W.2d at 394. We concluded that
the trooper “developed reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity—if at all—
only by prolonging the initial stop beyond the time reasonably necessary to
execute the traffic violation warnings.” Id. at 391.
Moreover, the stolen vehicle report cannot be considered among the
circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion to continue holding Arrieta
because Waalkens learned the truck was not stolen twenty-five minutes before
Titan began his sniff around the truck. Once the issue had been resolved by the
call from state radio, it could no longer be used to extend the stop. By Waalkens’s
own admission, the only task left before completing the inspection was reviewing
the paperwork with Arrieta. There is no justification for why Waalkens delayed
talking to Arrieta during the twenty-five minutes between resolving the
discrepancy in the stolen vehicle report and Titan conducting the free air sniff. Therefore, Arrieta was improperly detained in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights when the free air sniff occurred, and any evidence obtained as a result of
the search should have been suppressed.
IV. Conclusion.
The district court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.