IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0448 Filed April 23, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SHERICA TANYA SMILEY, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County,
Karen Kaufman Salic, Judge.
A defendant appeals her convictions and sentence for possession of
methamphetamine and possession of cannabis. CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED;
SENTENCE VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and
Chicchelly, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
A jury convicted Sherica Smiley of two counts of drug possession after
officers found two tablets that tested positive for methamphetamine and one
cannabis vape cartridge inside her vehicle. Smiley appeals her convictions,
challenging the use of her prior misdemeanor conviction during trial, the sufficiency
of the evidence, the district court’s denial of her motion for new trial, and the district
court’s imposition of a $430 fine on her possession-of-cannabis conviction.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On the evening of February 14, 2022, Smiley and her partner got into a
dispute that ended with Smiley leaving the home where Smiley had been residing
with her partner. Smiley got in her vehicle and began driving north with the intent
of staying with a friend for a while.
On the same stretch of highway, Officer Gerdes drove south. Smiley’s
vehicle approached Officer Gerdes’s vehicle. Smiley was traveling at thirty-five
miles per hour, twenty miles per hour below the speed limit. And about a third of
Smiley’s vehicle was over the center line. Maneuvering to avoid a collision, Officer
Gerdes drove onto the highway’s shoulder. He then turned around and initiated a
traffic stop.
Smiley generally cooperated with Officer Gerdes during the stop. She
provided identification, although she did not have a driver’s license. She did not
try to conceal her lack of current registration or insurance. She performed three
field sobriety tests, which did not lead Officer Gerdes to conclude she was driving
impaired. And when a K-9 unit arrived, she did not object to a drug-dog sniff of the
vehicle’s exterior. The officer of the K-9 unit, Officer Klein, testified at trial, “She 3
was very pleasant throughout the whole investigation and was very easy to deal
with and very nice.” After the drug dog signaled the presence of contraband and
Officer Klein began a search of the vehicle’s interior, Smiley gave consent to
Officer Gerdes to search a lockbox found within the vehicle.
Officer Gerdes stayed with Smiley, and Officer Klein continued to search
the vehicle. On the center console, Officer Klein noticed seeds and stems from
what appeared to be marijuana use. In the center console area, Officer Klein
discovered a small plastic baggie with a panda-bear pattern printed on it. The
baggie contained two different-colored tablets. Later lab testing confirmed the
tablets contained methamphetamine. Tucked between the center console and the
front passenger seat, Officer Klein found a package labeled “cannabis
concentrate” that contained what appeared to be a commercially produced
cannabis vape cartridge.
Although Smiley was the vehicle’s sole occupant and the registered owner,
she denied either item belonged to her. She also denied knowing either was in
her vehicle. And she asked that the objects be tested for fingerprints, which was
never done.
The State charged Smiley with one count of possession of
methamphetamine and one count of possession of cannabis, both in violation of
Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2023), each a serious misdemeanor. The charges
were tried by jury.
At trial, an issue arose about the admissibility of Smiley’s prior misdemeanor
conviction. The following exchange occurred on Smiley’s cross-examination: 4
Q: Did you also tell the officers that you don’t do drugs? A: I told them that they weren’t my drugs and that they can test me if they needed to, I’m willing to take a test. Q: But did you also tell the officers that you don’t have any history of drug use? A: No. They didn’t ask me that at that time, but, I mean, I could have. Q: And isn’t it true that you actually do have some—
At this point, defense counsel objected, asserting “this is irrelevant and would be
a prior bad act.” The district court and the parties then discussed the objection
outside the jury’s presence. The district court also allowed Smiley to consult
privately with defense counsel.
The district court and the parties continued their discussion outside the
presence of the jury:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, my client at this time would not be acknowledging that she has a prior drug conviction that she’s aware of, and I believe that to continue down this would be a collateral matter as to whether or not she does or does not. .... [STATE]: Your Honor, I do have the client’s criminal history and it clearly indicates she does have a prior conviction from Polk County from 2021. COURT: Our problem is going to be . . . if [Smiley] denies it, I’m going to have to at least allow some inquiry in it, . . . . If we get to a point where she will say that she was not honest with the officers about her history, we can let it go at that, but if she’s going to say she didn’t say that, she wasn’t convicted of it, . . . I’m going to have to let the State probably try to impeach her on that.
After again consulting privately with Smiley, defense counsel reported that
“[Smiley] would acknowledge that she did not tell law enforcement that she had a
prior drug conviction, . . . and we would be willing to stipulate that on the record.”
The district court then suggested a limiting instruction, and a brief conversation
occurred off the record. When the record continued, the district court stated it had
reviewed “with counsel” the proposed stipulation and limiting instruction. 5
The jury returned, and the district court read the following stipulation to the
jury:
[T]he parties are stipulating that defendant told law enforcement that she did not have a drug history. However, she does have a conviction for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in 2021. You may consider the prior conviction only for the purpose of determining whether you believe her testimony at trial today. You may not conclude that she is guilty of the charges in this case because of the prior drug paraphernalia conviction.
Defense counsel did not object to the stipulation as read by the court.
The jury convicted Smiley on both counts, and Smiley moved for new trial.
She argued the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The district
court denied Smiley’s motion. For each count, the district court imposed a
sentence of thirty days of incarceration, with a portion suspended, and a $430 fine
with a fifteen percent surcharge.
Smiley appeals. She challenges the use of her prior conviction at trial, the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict, the denial of her motion for new trial, and the
fines imposed.
II. Error Preservation
The State disputes error was preserved on Smiley’s challenge to the use of
her prior misdemeanor conviction to impeach, arguing Smiley’s agreement to the
stipulation waived her initial objection and absolved the district court of the need
to make a final ruling on admissibility. Smiley responds that the district court issued
a final admissibility ruling before she agreed to the stipulation. She contends the
stipulation was therefore not a waiver because it was only offered as a tactical
decision—a means of mitigating the prejudice that would result from the court’s
“erroneous” admissibility ruling. 6
“The preservation of error doctrine is grounded in the idea that a specific
objection to the admission of evidence be made known, and the trial court be given
an opportunity to pass upon the objection and correct any error.” State v. Brown,
656 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Iowa 2003). “[A]n objection, once made and overruled,
need not be asserted repeatedly to the same type of evidence” to preserve error.
State v. Schmidt, 312 N.W.2d 517, 518 (Iowa 1981).
But “[a]fter a party objects, a ‘subsequent affirmative act amounting to an
express or implied assent to the reception of the evidence’ waives that objection.”
State v. Spiker, No. 19-1957, 2021 WL 377120, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2021)
(quoting Schmidt, 312 N.W.2d at 518). Although “[g]enerally, a stipulation to the
admission of testimony at trial constitutes a waiver of any objection to the testimony
raised prior to trial,” the ultimate issue is whether “the spirit of [our error
preservation] rule was met.” Brown, 656 N.W.2d at 360–61.
Smiley offered the stipulation after a short exchange with the district court.
Defense counsel reported Smiley “would not be acknowledging that she has a prior
drug conviction that she’s aware of.” The district court responded, “if she denies
it, I’m going to have to at least allow some inquiry in it,” and “if she’s going to say
she didn’t say that, . . . I’m going to have to let the State probably try to impeach
her on that.” Defense counsel then conferred with Smiley and—without further
discussion—affirmatively acted by offering the stipulation.
State v. Spiker provides guidance in how this court has previously
considered the error preservation issue where the State offered and the defendant
agreed to a stipulation after the defendant objected to evidence at trial. See 2021
WL 377120, at *5 (finding error unpreserved). Smiley tries to distinguish her case 7
from Spiker by arguing that, unlike here, the stipulation in Spiker was helpful to the
defendant. Id. (“Not only did Spiker’s trial counsel consent to admission of the
rape-kit evidence, he also relied on the evidence in closing argument.”). But under
the present circumstances, this is a distinction without a difference. The stipulation
was offered by Smiley, not the State. The district court asked whether the parties
found the stipulation as read to the jury acceptable, and defense counsel
responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” In her appellate briefing, Smiley concedes the
stipulation was a tactical trial maneuver. Although Smiley argues she offered the
stipulation only because the court indicated it would permit questioning, the fact
remains: the strategic stipulation resolved the evidentiary issue Smiley now raises
on appeal. See id. (affirming the district court’s denial of Spiker’s motion to
continue because the stipulation, which the parties agreed to before the court ruled
on Spiker’s motion, “resolved the issues Spiker now raises on appeal”).
Because the stipulation resolved the issue, the district court had no further
opportunity to expand on its reasoning or clarify the specifics of its initial
determination. Cf. id.
We note that in State v. Brown, the parties entered a stipulation after the
defendant’s objection at trial, and yet the Iowa Supreme Court held error was
preserved. See 656 N.W.2d at 360–61. That said, unlike in Brown, this record
contains no pretrial objections to the evidence and does not reveal an
understanding by the parties or the court that the in-court objection and minimal
exchange “would be sufficient to preserve the issue.” Id. at 361. And nowhere in
the record does the district court, after accepting Smiley’s stipulation, express a
further “understanding that [Smiley] was not waiving [her] ‘right to argue’ on appeal 8
that the objectionable [prior conviction] should have been excluded.” Id.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we determine Brown is
distinguishable.1
In short, we cannot conclude the spirit of our error preservation rule has
been met. So we affirm the district court’s reading of the parties’ agreed-to
stipulation without reaching the merits of Smiley’s challenge on the issue.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Standard of Review
We review challenges to sufficiency of the evidence for correction of legal
error. See State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022). A jury verdict is
binding on appeal “if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “We consider
all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, including all legitimate
inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the
evidence in the record.” State v. Folkers, 941 N.W.2d 337, 338 (Iowa 2020).
B. Analysis
To convict Smiley for possession of methamphetamine, the jury was
instructed the State had to prove (1) Smiley “knowingly or intentionally possessed
methamphetamine,” and (2) Smiley “knew that the substance she possessed was
methamphetamine.” Similarly, a conviction for possession of cannabis required
1 Smiley did not cite Brown, 656 N.W.2d at 355, in her briefing. Indeed, she cited no case affirmatively supporting her position that the stipulation did not waive her objection and therefore any error preservation effect it may have had. 9
the State prove both elements as they relate to cannabis. Smiley’s challenge
focuses on the possession element without presenting argument to challenge the
second element of knowledge. We limit our review accordingly. See Iowa R. App.
P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3).
The parties agree this is a constructive possession case. The jury was
instructed that a conviction on a theory of constructive possession required proof
Smiley had “both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion
or control over [the substance], either directly or through another person,” and “[a]
person’s mere presence at a place where a thing is found or proximity to the thing
is not enough to support a conclusion that the person possessed the thing.”
Several factors are used to determine whether a defendant had constructive
possession of contraband discovered within a vehicle,2 including:
(1) incriminating statements made by the person; (2) incriminating actions of the person upon the police’s discovery of a controlled substance among or near the person’s personal belongings; (3) the person’s fingerprints on the packages containing the controlled substance; . . . (4) any other circumstances linking the person to the controlled substance. . . .([5]) was the contraband in plain view; ([6]) was it with the person’s personal effects; ([7]) was it found on the same side of the car or immediately next to the person; ([8]) was the person the owner of the vehicle; and ([9]) was there suspicious activity by the person.
Dewitt, 811 N.W.2d at 475 (quoting State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 194
(Iowa 2008)).
These factors are guideposts, and the list does not exclude consideration
of other relevant factors on a case-specific basis. Id. “However, any relevant facts
2 Factors one through four generally apply to all constructive possession cases,
while factors five through nine apply when contraband was found within a vehicle. State v. Dewitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 475 (Iowa 2012). 10
and circumstances that are considered in addition to the specific factors, whether
it is circumstantial or direct evidence of the crime, must be sufficient to raise a fair
inference of guilt.” Id. Conviction requires “more than suspicion, speculation, or
conjecture.” Id.; State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Iowa 1981).
Factors one through five are either neutral or weigh in favor of Smiley.
Specifically, as to factors one and two, Smiley made no incriminating statements
and took no incriminating actions at any point after Officer Gerdes initiated the
stop, including after Officer Klein discovered the tablets and vape cartridge.
Rather, Smiley agreed to the field sobriety test, consented to the lock-box search,
denied the tablets and vaper cartridge were hers, and asked that the items be
fingerprinted. Because the items were never fingerprinted, there is no evidence of
Smiley’s fingerprints being on the items—factor three. No party specifically
addresses factor four. On the fifth factor, neither object was found in plain view.
The tablets were inside the center console, which had a lid on it and was packed
full of assorted objects. The vape cartridge package was “wedged down” in the
area between the center console and the front passenger seat, which “almost
touches the center console,” such that Officer Klein testified he had to take the
vape cartridge package out to confirm that it contained cannabis.
The remaining factors are less favorable to Smiley’s appeal. On factor six,
the items were found among many of Smiley’s personal belongings, as Smiley kept
her and her kids’ effects in the vehicle in case she got kicked out of the place she
was staying. On factor seven, the tablets in the center console were in the spot
immediately next to the driver’s seat. And though the package was shoved
between the console and seat on passenger’s side, not Smiley’s driver’s side, 11
Officer Klein testified the package was “very easily” within a driver’s reach. Turning
to the eighth factor, Officer Gerdes testified Smiley was the vehicle’s registered
owner.3 And lastly, on factor nine about whether a defendant acted suspiciously,
Officer Klein testified he found it “odd” Smiley stood in front of Officer Gerdes’s
patrol car while he performed the drug-dog sniff of her vehicle. He explained, “it
was damp and cold out that night” and Smiley had the option to sit with Officer
Gerdes inside his vehicle instead.
In her defense, Smiley presented evidence of an alternative explanation for
the presence of the drugs in her vehicle: they could have belonged to her partner’s
teenage nephew and his girlfriend. Smiley testified she shared the vehicle with
her partner and the nephew. She stated the nephew had driven the vehicle just
the night before. And the fact that the contraband was not coated in the grime that
covered most of the vehicle’s remaining contents supports the inference that the
contraband had only been recently stashed away—but this fact could implicate
Smiley as easily as it could implicate any other recent occupant. Smiley also said
that when she and her partner got into the argument that night, Smiley left without
having planned on it and without telling the nephew she was leaving. But despite
Smiley’s “alternative explanation for the evidence, ‘the jury was not required to
accept the defendant’s version of the events.’” State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336,
3 Smiley testified she owned the vehicle with her son and the registration should
have been in both names. But no other evidence was admitted supporting this claim. It is “the very function of the jury is to sort out the evidence” and make credibility determinations when testimony conflicts. State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1993). 12
343 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting State v. Helm, 504 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1993)).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the record
contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts on both convictions. “It
is not for us to interfere with the finding made when supported by substantial
evidence, even though the evidence may have also supported a finding favorable
to the defendant.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting State v. Keeton, 710 N.W.2d 531, 535
(Iowa 2006)). Smiley was the owner, driver, and only occupant of the vehicle when
she was pulled over. The drugs were found in an area “very easily” within her
reach. And the cleanliness of the packages in comparison to the rest of the vehicle
suggest recent placement, which would be consistent with Smiley attempting to
hide the packages when she got pulled over.
The totality of the circumstances presents sufficient evidence to “raise[] a
‘fair inference of guilt’ and generate[] ‘more than suspicion, speculation, or
conjecture.’” Id. at 343–44 (quoting Dewitt, 811 N.W.2d at 475). We are therefore
bound by the jury’s verdict.
IV. Motion for New Trial
Appellate courts generally apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review
to challenged rulings on a motion for new trial when the basis for the motion
asserted the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. State v. Ary, 877
N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016). When an appellant claims the district court applied
an improper standard in ruling on the motion, we review for legal error. Id.
Smiley claims the district court applied the wrong standard in ruling on her
motion for new trial. She asserts the district court improperly applied the 13
sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard instead of the weight-of-the-evidence
standard. Immediately after the district court ruled on Smiley’s motion, the court
asked defense counsel, “Any other record that you would like to make on that?”
Defense counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” At no point before this appeal did
Smiley alert the district court of any alleged error in the standard applied. The
State does not contest error preservation on Smiley’s challenge to the standard
applied.4
On our review of the record, it is clear the court considered Smiley’s motion
for a new trial separate from her motion in arrest of judgment. At the hearing on
post-trial motions the district court addressed the pending motion in arrest of
judgment and motion for new trial:
As far as the Motion In Arrest of Judgment, by ruling on case law, that cannot be used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court having presided at trial does find that the jury’s verdict was based on sufficient evidence of possession. They certainly could reach the inferences that they did regarding the location of the items, the recency of their placement and either accept or reject the explanations provided both in argument and testimony. The jury is the appropriate finder of fact for those issues and believed the evidence advanced by the state and that was sufficient evidence for—to support the conviction. As far as the new trial, there do not appear to be grounds to grant that, and the request for a new trial is denied as well.
4 The conflict in our cases regarding error preservation remains unresolved, as we
have split four to four on this issue. While we will have to wait for a future case or further review to resolve the conflict in our cases, our hope is that practitioners take note of the possibility that this conflict will be resolved in the future by finding error is not preserved under these circumstances and will alert this type of error to the district court’s attention. See State v. Rethwisch, No. 22-0530, 2023 WL 5607147, at *4–6 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2023). 14
We conclude the district court did not apply an incorrect standard to the
motion for a new trial. Although the district court’s ruling on the weight-of-the-
evidence challenge was brief, as noted, it is clear from the record that the court
considered Smiley’s motion for a new trial separate from her motion in arrest of
judgment. But we take this opportunity to remind district courts that when ruling
on a motion for a new trial, the court should state the reasons for its ruling.
Although the court failed to do so here, under this record we believe we can review
the district court’s ruling on Smiley’s motion for a new trial. See State v. Maxwell,
743 N.W.2d 185, 192 (Iowa 2008).
A trial court rules on a motion for a new trial by applying a weight-of-the-
evidence standard. Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706. This standard gives a trial court wide
latitude because the court may make its own witness credibility determinations and
balance the evidence supporting alternative verdicts. State v. Reeves, 670
N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 2003). Thus, the deciding court must weigh the evidence
and determine “whether ‘a greater amount of credible evidence’ suggests the
verdict rendered was a miscarriage of justice.” Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706 (quoting
State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658–59 (Iowa 1998)).
But to avoid the danger of “lessen[ing] the role of the jury as the principal
trier of the facts and . . . enabl[ing] the trial court to disregard at will the jury’s
verdict,” trial courts are cautioned “to exercise this discretion carefully and
sparingly.” Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 659. Accordingly, reviewing courts will “only
consider ‘whether the district court’s determination that the evidence does not
preponderate heavily against the verdict was a clear and manifest abuse of 15
discretion.’” State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180, 216 (Iowa 2013) (cleaned up)
(quoting Reeves, 670 N.W.2d at 203).
Smiley argues the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion.
The evidence presented at trial consisted of two photographs of the vape cartridge
package, two photographs of the baggie containing the tablets, the crime lab report
confirming the tablets contained methamphetamine, and trial testimony from
Officer Gerdes, Officer Klein, and Smiley. So, any determination of guilt or
innocence relied heavily on testimony evidence, which the court was free to accept
or reject based on its own credibility determinations.
Given the descriptions of the state of disarray in Smiley’s vehicle, it would
be reasonable to believe that Smiley was unaware that a small baggie was mixed
within the contents of her center console and a pocket-sized package was stashed
between the center console and the front passenger seat. And yet, both items
were “easily” within reach, and Smiley was the vehicle’s only occupant when
Officer Klein discovered the items. So it is also reasonable to believe Smiley knew
about the items and tried to hide them when Officer Gerdes initiated the traffic stop.
On Smiley’s motion for new trial, the district court determined, “there do not
appear to be grounds to grant that, and the request for a new trial is denied.” Upon
our review, we find no “clear and manifest abuse of discretion,” and affirm
accordingly. See Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d at 216.
V. Fine and Surcharge
The district court imposed a fine of $430 plus surcharge for Smiley’s
possession of cannabis conviction, which Smiley appeals. The State concedes 16
this issue and agrees that the district court failed to exercise discretion regarding
the minimum fine that could be imposed for this conviction.
We review criminal sentences for correction of legal error. State v.
Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Iowa 2022). “When a sentencing court has
discretion, it must exercise that discretion.” State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 27
(Iowa 1999). Failure to do so is a reversible error and requires a reviewing court
to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. Id.
At sentencing, the State recommended imposition of “the minimum fine of
$430 plus fifteen percent surcharge” for both counts. This recommendation
misstated the minimum fine for the possession of cannabis conviction, which does
not carry any minimum fine for a first offense such as Smiley’s. See Iowa Code
§ 124.401(5)(b) (providing the specific penalty for a first-offense possession-of-
marijuana5 conviction, which does not contain a mandatory minimum fine). In
contrast, the recommendation properly stated the minimum fine for Smiley’s
possession of methamphetamine conviction. See id. § 903.1(1)(b) (setting the
minimum fine of $430 for convictions of serious misdemeanors for which no
specific penalty is provided elsewhere). The district court adopted the State’s
recommended sentences without discussion.
5 As used in Iowa Code § 124.401, “marijuana” means “all parts of the plants of
the genus cannabis, whether growing or not; . . . the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin, including tetrahydrocannabinols.” Id. § 124.101(20). So, although Smiley’s conviction is for possession of “cannabis,” the State properly points out that the distinction is immaterial under the circumstances here. 17
Nothing in the record indicates the district court was aware it had discretion
to impose a fine less than $430 or elect to impose no fine at all. The district court
said it was adopting the State’s recommendation, which misstated the amount of
discretion the court had in how much of a fine, if any, to impose on the cannabis
conviction. Under these facts, “we can hardly say [the court] exercised discretion.”
Ayers, 590 N.W.2d at 32. As such, we must vacate the fine on the possession of
cannabis conviction and remand for the limited purpose of resentencing on that
count.6 See id.
VI. Conclusion
Because Smiley did not preserve error on her evidentiary challenge, we
affirm the district court’s reading of the parties’ stipulation without reaching the
merits of Smiley’s challenge. We conclude sufficient evidence exists to support
Smiley’s convictions and affirm the district court’s ruling on the motion for new trial.
But as the record does not demonstrate the district court was aware it had
discretion to impose a lower fine, we vacate the fine for the possession-of-cannabis
conviction and remand for the limited purpose of resentencing on that count.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED IN PART AND
REMANDED.
6 Because we are not addressing a carceral sentence, our remand for the limited
purposes of resentencing on the possession of cannabis conviction does not conflict with our supreme court’s recent opinion in State v. Duffield. See 16 N.W.3d 298, 303–04 (Iowa 2025) (“Vacating the defendant’s sentence and remanding the case for plenary resentencing should be the presumed remedy in cases involving the district court’s failure to exercise its discretion in imposing a carceral sentence or the district court’s failure to articulate its reasons for imposing a carceral sentence.” (emphasis added)).