State of Iowa v. Shawn Alvin Krug

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 30, 2024
• Docket: 23-1669
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1669 Filed October 30, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

SHAWN ALVIN KRUG, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Kossuth County, Ann M. Gales,

Judge.

A defendant appeals his convictions on speedy trial grounds. AFFIRMED.

Michael J. Jacobsma of Jacobsma Law Firm, P.C., Orange City, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. 2

BADDING, Judge.

Shawn Krug was arrested after a dispute with his neighbors led to a standoff

with the police. The State filed a trial information on March 15, 2023, charging him

with multiple crimes. In a written arraignment, Krug pled not guilty to the charges

against him and demanded speedy trial under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure

2.33(2)(b).

Trial was set for May 23—well before the ninety-day speedy trial deadline

of June 13. At a final pretrial conference the morning of trial, the district court

“developed serious concerns about the defendant’s competency to stand trial as a

result of his irrational and nonsensical statements, his agitated and confused

demeanor, and his pressured speech.” The court also knew that Krug had a history

of mental illness, having ordered competency evaluations for him “twice within the

past year in different criminal cases.” Based on those concerns, the court found

“probable cause to believe the defendant is presently suffering from a mental

disorder which prevents him from appreciating the charges, understanding the

proceedings, and assisting effectively in the defense.” See Iowa Code § 812.3(1)

(2023). The court suspended the proceedings and ordered Krug to undergo a

psychiatric evaluation. See id. § 812.3(2).

A letter from Krug was filed with the court on July 3, asking that his case be

dismissed because his evaluation wasn’t performed before the speedy trial

deadline. The court instructed Krug to “direct his questions to his attorney,” who

would then “determine whether any motions or other filings are appropriate.” See

id. § 814.6A (prohibiting a defendant who is currently represented by counsel from

filing any pro se document with the court). And the court reiterated that the 3

proceedings were stayed until the evaluation was performed. Krug sent another

letter about his speedy trial rights a couple weeks later, with the same response

from the court.

Krug’s psychiatric evaluation, which found him competent to stand trial, was

filed on July 20. Following a telephone conference with the parties, the court lifted

the stay and reset the trial. The court’s order noted that defense counsel

“calculated that the 90-day speedy trial deadline will run 21 days after the

evaluation report was filed—i.e., on August 10, 2023.” So, with the consent of the

prosecutor and defense counsel, the court scheduled Krug’s trial for August 8,

2023. A few days before trial, the court entered an order denying defense

counsel’s oral motion to dismiss the proceedings on speedy trial grounds. Krug’s

case proceeded to trial, where the jury found him guilty as charged.

Krug appeals, claiming his ninety-day speedy trial right “was violated when

the [S]tate delayed [his] court ordered competency evaluation 52 days beyond the

court’s order.” He argues that “no good cause existed to delay [his] trial as long

as it did.” At the outset, we disagree with the State that error was not preserved

on Krug’s claim—defense counsel made an oral motion to dismiss at the final

pretrial conference, which the district court denied. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641

N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). But we agree with the State that Krug’s claim fails

on its merits.

In applying Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b), our supreme court

has “recognized that, if trial does not commence within ninety days of the filing of

the charging instrument, the charge must be dismissed unless the State proves (1)

defendant’s waiver of speedy trial, (2) delay attributable to the defendant, or (3) 4

good cause for the delay.” State v. Campbell, 714 N.W.2d 622, 627–28 (Iowa

2006) (cleaned up). We need not address the first two issues because the last is

dispositive.

As this court found in State v. McCullough, No. 10-0165, 2010 WL 8607565,

at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2010), good cause exists for a delay like this one

under Iowa Code section 812.4(1), which provides that “speedy trial shall be tolled

until the court finds the defendant competent to stand trial.” See also Iowa Code

§ 812.3(2) (“Upon a finding of probable cause sustaining the allegations, the court

shall suspend further criminal proceedings and order the defendant to undergo a

psychiatric evaluation . . . .”); State v. Cox, No. 10-0829, 2011 WL 486543, at *4

(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011) (“[W]here a defendant may be incompetent, the

legislature has specifically provided that proceedings are to be suspended and the

speedy trial deadlines tolled.”).

Because “the speedy trial clock stops ticking” under section 812.3(2) “when

proceedings are suspended to determine a defendant’s competency to stand trial

and does not resume ‘until the court finds the defendant competent to stand trial,’”

we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Krug’s motion

to dismiss. Cox, 2011 WL 486543, at *7 (quoting Iowa Code § 812.4(1)); accord

State v. Jordan, No. 12-0212, 2014 WL 3749335, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 30,

2014); State v. Goemaat, No. 10-0405, 2011 WL 444029, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

Feb. 9, 2011).

AFFIRMED.