State of Iowa v. Seth Anthony Hankins

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 25, 2023
• Docket: 23-0484
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0484 Filed October 25, 2023

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

SETH ANTHONY HANKINS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Gregory D. Brandt,

District Associate Judge.

A defendant appeals his sentence following his plea of guilty to driving while

barred as a habitual offender. AFFIRMED.

Jessica Donels of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Gentry, Brown, Bergmann &

Messamer, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ. 2

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Seth Hankins appeals his sentence following his plea of guilty to driving

while barred as a habitual offender and driving while license was denied or

revoked. His sole argument on appeal is that the district court abused its discretion

in rejecting the recommended sentence and instead imposing a jail term. For the

reasons discussed herein, and finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the district

court’s judgment and sentence.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Hankins was charged by trial information dated November 14, 2022, with

driving while barred as a habitual offender, an aggravated misdemeanor, and

driving while license was denied or revoked, a serious misdemeanor. On

January 4, 2023, Hankins filed a document indicating his intent to plead guilty as

charged. A plea agreement jointly recommended a fine of $1000 on each count.

The fine for the driving while barred as a habitual offender was to be paid on the

date of the sentencing. The plea agreement reflected that the court was not bound

by the plea agreement and could provide the maximum punishment allowed by

law.

A sentencing hearing was held on March 22. Hankins filed three exhibits,

which indicated payments toward outstanding fines and penalty by Hankins, those

payments made March 7, March 8, and also on the day of the sentencing hearing.1

The court entered a separate sentencing order for each count. As to Count I, the

court’s written sentencing order imposed a seven-day jail term and suspended the

1 The record does not reflect what amount of fines and costs remained outstanding

before the sentencing, if any. 3

fine. The order provided, in part, “Due to the Defendant’s excessive fines the Court

will not follow the plea agreement in this case.” The sentencing order on Count II,

which is not challenged on appeal, imposed a fine and surcharge. Hankins timely

appealed the sentencing order as to Count I.

II. Standard of Review

We review sentences imposed in a criminal case for correction of errors at

law. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). “We afford sentencing

judges a significant amount of latitude because of the ‘discretionary nature of

judging and the source of the respect afforded by the appellate process.’” State v.

Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). Sentencing decisions

that fall within the statutory limits are “cloaked with a strong presumption in [their]

favor.” Id. at 134 (citation omitted). Absent “an abuse of discretion or some defect

in the sentencing procedure,” we will not reverse a sentence. Damme, 944 N.W.2d

at 103 (quoting State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002)). “An abuse

of discretion occurs when the court exercises its discretion on grounds or for

reasons that are clearly untenable or unreasonable. We may find grounds

untenable when based on an erroneous application of the law.” State v.

Thompson, 951 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2020) (quoting State v. Covel, 925 N.W.2d 183,

187 (Iowa 2019)).

III. Analysis

Although Hankins has no right of direct appeal because he pled guilty, we

have jurisdiction to hear his appeal as he challenges only his sentence. See

Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 104. 4

Hankins alleges the district court abused its discretion “in rejecting the joint

recommended sentence and imposing a sentence of 7 days of jail ‘due to the

defendant’s excessive fines.’” Because Hankins pled guilty to an aggravated

misdemeanor, the district court had the discretion to sentence him to a maximum

term of imprisonment of two years and a fine between $855 and $8540 or to

impose a suspended sentence. See Iowa Code §§ 903.1(2), 907.3 (2022). The

district court’s imposition of the seven-day jail sentence with the fine suspended

was within the statutory range of permissible sentences and is “cloaked with a

strong presumption in its favor.” Fetner, 959 N.W.2d at 134. “Our task on appeal

is not to second-guess the sentencing court’s decision.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at

106. Yet resentencing is required if the district court relied on an improper

consideration at sentencing, even if the consideration was merely secondary. Id.

In our analysis of the arguments presented in this appeal, we are guided by

recent supreme court case law in State v. McCalley, 972 N.W. 2d 672, 678 (Iowa

2022), wherein our supreme court affirmed a six-day jail sentence. But unlike the

appellant in McCalley who argued the court improperly considered poverty a factor

supporting incarceration, 972 N.W.2d at 677-78, Hankins argues that his recent

payments toward his fines and penalty distinguishes his case. Hankins does not

argue that he could not pay the previous fines.

We highlight, as we have many times, that in reaching a sentencing

decision, the district court must determine which legally authorized sentence for

the offense “will provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the

defendant, and for the protection of the community from further offenses by the

defendant and others.” See Iowa Code § 901.5. This requires the district court to 5

weigh multiple factors, “including the nature of the offense, the attending

circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances

of reform.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106 (quoting Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725).

The district court also must “consider the defendant’s prior record of convictions or

deferred judgments, employment status, family circumstances, and any other

relevant factors.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725.

We turn to whether Hankins has affirmatively demonstrated that the district

court relied on an improper factor. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106. Hankins

points to the district court’s consideration of “excessive fines.” We do not have a

transcript of the sentencing hearing. The written sentencing order indicates

Hankins appeared personally, but also indicates Hankins waived his right to be

personally present and waived reporting and any record or transcription of the

hearing. So we are left with the written sentencing order for purposes of our

review.

In formulating Hankins’s sentence, the written sentencing order indicates

the court considered the nature and circumstance of the crime, protection of the

public from further offense, Hankins’s criminal history, Hankins’s propensity for

further criminal acts, and the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation, along with

Hankins’s excessive fines, which we interpret as the court’s consideration of

Hankins’s prior convictions and criminal history, as is permitted. Based on this

record, and reading the sentencing order along with McCalley, we determine that

Hankins has not shown the court considered an inappropriate sentencing factor.

See McCalley, 972 N.W.2d at 678. 6

IV. Conclusion.

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a

seven-day jail sentence and affirm Hankins’s sentence for the aforementioned

reasons.

AFFIRMED.