IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0819 Filed January 24, 2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SARAH RAE BERG, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
William Patrick Wegman, District Associate Judge.
Sarah Rae Berg appeals her conviction for unauthorized use of a credit
card. AFFIRMED.
Jessica Maffitt of Benzoni & Maffitt Law Office, P.L.C., Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Sarah Rae Berg appeals her conviction for unauthorized use of a credit
card, challenging the denial of her motion to dismiss and the sufficiency of the
evidence. Upon our review, we affirm Berg’s conviction because there was no
violation of the speedy-indictment right and there is sufficient supporting evidence.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
While employed at Casey’s General Store (Casey’s), Berg was caught
stealing three gift cards: a Casey’s card worth $75, a Visa card worth $200, and
an Amazon card worth $425. Berg’s manager reported her to the Evansdale Police
Department. When questioned, Berg admitted to taking the gift cards. She also
provided a written statement confessing that she used one or more of the cards to
purchase merchandise. As a result, the State filed a criminal complaint charging
Berg with fourth-degree theft. She made her initial appearance on August 9, 2022.
In early October, Berg moved to dismiss for lack of speedy indictment,
claiming the trial information should have been filed by September 23. The State
then filed trial information charging Berg with unauthorized use of a credit card.
After a hearing, the district court denied Berg’s motion, concluding that she did not
meet her burden. Berg waived her right to a jury trial and agreed to a trial on the
minutes of testimony. The court found Berg guilty of unauthorized use of a credit
card, and she appealed.
II. Review.
We review decisions regarding both sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims and
the speedy-indictment rule for errors at law. See State v. Williams, 895 N.W.2d
856, 860 (Iowa 2017); see also State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 3
2022). “We are bound by the findings of fact of the district court if they are
supported by substantial evidence.” Williams, 895 N.W.2d at 860 (citation
omitted). In determining whether the findings are supported by substantial
evidence, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including
all ‘legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be
deduced from the record evidence.’” Crawford, 972 N.W.2d at 202 (citation
omitted).
III. Discussion.
On appeal, Berg raises two challenges. She argues that her right to a
speedy indictment was violated and there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction. We review each argument independently.
A. Right to Speedy Indictment.
Berg first argues the district court should have dismissed the case because
the State violated her right to a speedy indictment. She claims the speedy-
indictment clock was triggered by her initial appearance on August 9. See
Williams, 895 N.W.2d at 867 (“The rule is triggered from the time a person is taken
into custody, but only when the arrest is completed by taking the person before a
magistrate for an initial appearance.”). Because no trial information was filed within
forty-five days of that date, she argues her motion to dismiss should have been
granted. See Iowa Code § 2.33(2)(a) (2022) (“When an adult is arrested for the
commission of a public offense . . . , and an indictment is not found against the
defendant within 45 days, the court must order the prosecution to be
dismissed . . . .”). In its counterargument, the State contends this rule does not
bar separate but related charges and the unauthorized use of a credit card was a 4
different charge than the fourth-degree-theft charge in the initial criminal complaint.
See State v. Leachman, No. 18-1826, 2020 WL 5651282, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Sep. 23, 2020) (“The speedy indictment rule does not extend to ‘any new charges
brought more than forty-five days after an arrest for a different offense, even
though the new charges arose from the same incident.’” (citations omitted)). But
Berg contests this, arguing that the facts to prove both charges are substantially
the same; therefore, she concludes the unauthorized use of a credit card and theft
charges are the “same offense” for purposes of a speedy indictment. See State v.
Abrahamson, 746 N.W.2d 270, 275 (Iowa 2008) (describing the “same offense”
test as “focus[ing] on whether the two offenses are in substance the same, or of
the same nature, or same species, so that the evidence which proves one would
prove the other” (cleaned up)). When one incident results in multiple charges, this
does not necessarily implicate the right to a speedy indictment. State v. Dennison,
571 N.W.2d 492, 497 (Iowa 1997) (“Clearly, his arrest on the other charges did not
preclude the State from filing separate charges arising out of the same incident or
episode after the forty-five-day period had expired.”), overruled in part on other
grounds by Williams, 895 N.W.2d 856.
The district court did not err by denying Berg’s motion to dismiss. “[T]he
forty-five-day period to bring an indictment applies only to the public offense for
which the defendant was arrested and any lesser included offenses.” State v.
Penn-Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d 384, 390 (Iowa 2015), overruled on other grounds by
Williams, 895 N.W.2d 856. Theft and unauthorized use of a credit card are
different offenses. See State v. Pittman, No. 13-1762, 2015 WL 567228, at *7
(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015) (finding unauthorized use of a credit card and theft- 5
by-deception “two distinct crimes”). They reside in separate chapters of the Iowa
Code. See Abrahamson, 746 N.W.2d at 276 (considering the location of the code
sections of the charged crimes in analyzing whether the offenses are the same).
While the charges are based on the same series of events, the speedy-indictment
rule does “not apply ‘to all offenses arising from the same incident or episode’”.
Penn-Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d at 390 (quoting State v. Sunclades, 305 N.W.2d 491,
494 (Iowa 1981) (finding that the speedy-indictment rule applied only to the initial
charge of attempted murder for which the defendant was arrested and not the later-
filed separate charges of going armed with intent and assault while participating in
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0819 Filed January 24, 2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SARAH RAE BERG, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
William Patrick Wegman, District Associate Judge.
Sarah Rae Berg appeals her conviction for unauthorized use of a credit
card. AFFIRMED.
Jessica Maffitt of Benzoni & Maffitt Law Office, P.L.C., Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Sarah Rae Berg appeals her conviction for unauthorized use of a credit
card, challenging the denial of her motion to dismiss and the sufficiency of the
evidence. Upon our review, we affirm Berg’s conviction because there was no
violation of the speedy-indictment right and there is sufficient supporting evidence.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
While employed at Casey’s General Store (Casey’s), Berg was caught
stealing three gift cards: a Casey’s card worth $75, a Visa card worth $200, and
an Amazon card worth $425. Berg’s manager reported her to the Evansdale Police
Department. When questioned, Berg admitted to taking the gift cards. She also
provided a written statement confessing that she used one or more of the cards to
purchase merchandise. As a result, the State filed a criminal complaint charging
Berg with fourth-degree theft. She made her initial appearance on August 9, 2022.
In early October, Berg moved to dismiss for lack of speedy indictment,
claiming the trial information should have been filed by September 23. The State
then filed trial information charging Berg with unauthorized use of a credit card.
After a hearing, the district court denied Berg’s motion, concluding that she did not
meet her burden. Berg waived her right to a jury trial and agreed to a trial on the
minutes of testimony. The court found Berg guilty of unauthorized use of a credit
card, and she appealed.
II. Review.
We review decisions regarding both sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims and
the speedy-indictment rule for errors at law. See State v. Williams, 895 N.W.2d
856, 860 (Iowa 2017); see also State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 3
2022). “We are bound by the findings of fact of the district court if they are
supported by substantial evidence.” Williams, 895 N.W.2d at 860 (citation
omitted). In determining whether the findings are supported by substantial
evidence, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including
all ‘legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be
deduced from the record evidence.’” Crawford, 972 N.W.2d at 202 (citation
omitted).
III. Discussion.
On appeal, Berg raises two challenges. She argues that her right to a
speedy indictment was violated and there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction. We review each argument independently.
A. Right to Speedy Indictment.
Berg first argues the district court should have dismissed the case because
the State violated her right to a speedy indictment. She claims the speedy-
indictment clock was triggered by her initial appearance on August 9. See
Williams, 895 N.W.2d at 867 (“The rule is triggered from the time a person is taken
into custody, but only when the arrest is completed by taking the person before a
magistrate for an initial appearance.”). Because no trial information was filed within
forty-five days of that date, she argues her motion to dismiss should have been
granted. See Iowa Code § 2.33(2)(a) (2022) (“When an adult is arrested for the
commission of a public offense . . . , and an indictment is not found against the
defendant within 45 days, the court must order the prosecution to be
dismissed . . . .”). In its counterargument, the State contends this rule does not
bar separate but related charges and the unauthorized use of a credit card was a 4
different charge than the fourth-degree-theft charge in the initial criminal complaint.
See State v. Leachman, No. 18-1826, 2020 WL 5651282, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Sep. 23, 2020) (“The speedy indictment rule does not extend to ‘any new charges
brought more than forty-five days after an arrest for a different offense, even
though the new charges arose from the same incident.’” (citations omitted)). But
Berg contests this, arguing that the facts to prove both charges are substantially
the same; therefore, she concludes the unauthorized use of a credit card and theft
charges are the “same offense” for purposes of a speedy indictment. See State v.
Abrahamson, 746 N.W.2d 270, 275 (Iowa 2008) (describing the “same offense”
test as “focus[ing] on whether the two offenses are in substance the same, or of
the same nature, or same species, so that the evidence which proves one would
prove the other” (cleaned up)). When one incident results in multiple charges, this
does not necessarily implicate the right to a speedy indictment. State v. Dennison,
571 N.W.2d 492, 497 (Iowa 1997) (“Clearly, his arrest on the other charges did not
preclude the State from filing separate charges arising out of the same incident or
episode after the forty-five-day period had expired.”), overruled in part on other
grounds by Williams, 895 N.W.2d 856.
The district court did not err by denying Berg’s motion to dismiss. “[T]he
forty-five-day period to bring an indictment applies only to the public offense for
which the defendant was arrested and any lesser included offenses.” State v.
Penn-Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d 384, 390 (Iowa 2015), overruled on other grounds by
Williams, 895 N.W.2d 856. Theft and unauthorized use of a credit card are
different offenses. See State v. Pittman, No. 13-1762, 2015 WL 567228, at *7
(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015) (finding unauthorized use of a credit card and theft- 5
by-deception “two distinct crimes”). They reside in separate chapters of the Iowa
Code. See Abrahamson, 746 N.W.2d at 276 (considering the location of the code
sections of the charged crimes in analyzing whether the offenses are the same).
While the charges are based on the same series of events, the speedy-indictment
rule does “not apply ‘to all offenses arising from the same incident or episode’”.
Penn-Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d at 390 (quoting State v. Sunclades, 305 N.W.2d 491,
494 (Iowa 1981) (finding that the speedy-indictment rule applied only to the initial
charge of attempted murder for which the defendant was arrested and not the later-
filed separate charges of going armed with intent and assault while participating in
a felony that arose out of the same incident)). The fourth-degree-theft charge for
which Berg was originally arrested requires proof of the taking of the property of
another. See Iowa Code §§ 714.1, 714.2(4). The complaint largely focused on
the unlawful activation of the gift cards at Casey’s and employee theft. The
unauthorized-use-of-a-credit-card charge focuses on the use of the gift cards to
obtain merchandise. See id. § 715A.6(1)(a)(1) (“A person commits a public
offense by using a credit card for the purpose of obtaining property . . . with
knowledge . . . [t]he credit card has been revoked or canceled.”). The same
evidence of unlawful activation that supported the theft charge is probative of
Berg’s awareness that she was not authorized to use the card. The evidence is
being used to prove different acts even though they stem from the same incident.
See generally Abrahamson, 746 N.W.2d at 275. But this does not support the
assertion that the two charges are synonymous. 6
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Second, Berg contends that the conviction is unsupported by sufficient
evidence because the only evidence offered is an uncorroborated confession. See
Curtis v. State, No. 06-1045, 2008 WL 3916446, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 27,
2008) (holding that out-of-court confessions require corroboration to warrant a
conviction). “Corroboration need not be strong . . . so long as it confirms some
material fact connecting the defendant with the crime.” Id. (citation omitted). Our
review of a trial-on-the-minutes verdict is the same as a jury verdict. State v.
Geddes, 998 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Iowa 2023).
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, substantial evidence
supports Berg’s conviction. See Crawford, 972 N.W.2d at 202. Two July 12, 2022
receipts from Casey’s confirmed a cashier named “Sarah” approved the activation
of the three cards. A third Casey’s receipt dated July 13 showed a purchase of
groceries and gas. The last four digits of the Casey’s gift card activated on July 12
match the last four digits of the card used to purchase merchandise on July 13.
The police complaints and investigation verify these transactions. Combined,
these documents corroborate Berg’s confession to both activating and using the
cards to purchase other items. See Curtis, 2008 WL 3916446, at *5.
IV. Disposition.
Because Berg’s right to a speedy indictment was not violated and sufficient
evidence supports the verdict, we affirm her conviction of unauthorized use of a
credit card.
AFFIRMED.