State of Iowa v. Ryan Greggory Ethier

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-1184
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1184 Filed October 15, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RYAN GREGGORY ETHIER, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey A. Neary,

Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals his conviction for stalking. AFFIRMED.

Gary Dickey of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ. 2

BULLER, Judge.

Ryan Ethier appeals his conviction for stalking Michael W., the mother of

his child, in violation of a protective order. Ethier argues he did not purposefully

engage in a course of conduct covered by the stalking statute. We, like the district

court who served as fact-finder at Ethier’s bench trial, disagree. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Ethier dated Michael for about six months. At first, Michael thought Ethier

was nice, and she had no concerns about his drug use or mental health. But after

Michael unexpectedly became pregnant, Ethier’s behavior dramatically changed.

Ethier “got really upset,” insisted the child wasn’t his, and demanded that Michael

get a paternity test. When Michael did not immediately agree, Ethier—as Michael

described it—“flipped out and he was not happy. And he said you’re going to go,

and he made the appointment and made me go.” Ethier physically forced Michael

into the car and to a paternity-testing appointment in Omaha. She ultimately

complied with the test because she was concerned for her safety, and Ethier said

he would leave her stranded in Omaha if she didn’t. Testing established the child

was Ethier’s.

Michael broke up with Ethier before Christmas of 2021. In Michael’s words,

Ethier became “mentally unstable.” He began threatening her more explicitly and

frequently; Michael blocked Ethier’s number from her phone because he text-

messaged her thirty-to-sixty times in the middle of night. Michael described some

of the messages as “death threats.” In total, Michael had to block more than thirty

numbers and several email addresses because Ethier kept using different means

to contact, harass, and threaten her. 3

More than once, Ethier pointed a 9mm handgun at Michael’s head and

threatened to pull the trigger. On one occasion, he pulled the trigger while it was

pressed against her head. Ethier also threatened to shoot himself. He threatened

to crash while driving with Michael, which he “hoped” would also kill her and their

unborn child. And he threatened to kill Michael and take the child to Germany

once the child was born. Ethier also communicated threats about Michael to her

family members, which led those family members to also fear for Michael’s safety.

Many of the threats involved religious or pseudo-religious vocabulary. Both

Michael and Ethier hold pagan beliefs. However, according to Michael, Ethier’s

beliefs differed in that he adhered to a sect associated with white supremacy and

“more of what Hitler followed.”

On Christmas Eve at Ethier’s parents’ house, Ethier kept harassing Michael

and even lunged at her. Ethier’s family intervened, and a family member had to

use a TASER on Ethier and drag him out of the house to end the conflict.

In February 2022, Michael petitioned for civil relief from domestic abuse.

She included a detailed timeline and recitation of Ethier’s text messages and

conduct, consistent with what she later recounted at trial.1 She said, “I am scared

for my life” and “afraid if I piss him off enough or if he has a bad night he will kill

me.” In her view, Ethier was “extremely dangerous” and she was “deathly afraid

of him for [her]self and [her] children.” The district court entered a no-contact order

prohibiting Ethier from contacting Michael from February 17 onward.

1 There was some ambiguity around dates in Michael’s trial testimony, but that

inconsistency is immaterial. She cried while testifying at trial and explained: “He violated [the protective order] so many times, I can’t keep it straight.” 4

While the civil no-contact order was in place, Ethier continued to contact

Michael. He stipulated to reports of three no-contact violations that were

eventually charged by law enforcement:

• On July 11, Ethier showed up at Michael’s home and banged on the door until Michael’s family called the police. This was captured on video surveillance. When police spoke with Ethier, he admitted to knowing about the no-contact order and said he wanted to speak with Michael anyway.

• On July 28—the day after he was released from jail on the previous violation and a related drug charge—Ethier sent Michael a photo of runes carved into his body that Michael explained communicated a death threat in their shared religious tradition.

• On August 2—the day after his release on the July 28 charge—Ethier sent additional text messages to Michael that included various religious statements.

By the time Michael gave birth to her and Ethier’s child, she was so afraid

of Ethier she gave birth under an assumed name. Despite this, Ethier still showed

up at her house less than twenty-four hours after her discharge from the hospital,

“banging on [her] door” until she called police. At this point, the police also were

concerned about Ethier “hurting” Michael.

In April of 2023, one of Michael’s neighbors saw Ethier throwing rune tiles

onto Michael’s property from the sidewalk. Michael was home at the time but did

not know about the rune tiles until later. Michael testified that Ethier was using

some of the runes incorrectly or in a nonsensical way, but that the intended

message was “ill intent”—“I know he’s doing it out of harm. I know he is doing it

and misinterpreting all the positive things out of the religion. And he’s only doing

it thinking that they’re going to harm me and my children.” As a result of these

acts, a criminal no-contact order was entered on April 17. 5

In July, police twice found Ethier outside Michael’s house “screaming” so

loudly it upset the neighbors and their children. When Ethier spoke to police

regarding these events, he ranted and raved about Michael. He said she “needs

to be broken” and “needs to learn her fucking lesson.” A neighbor also saw Ethier

at Michael’s door on other dates that did not result in criminal charges.

Even after he was arrested and detained in jail pending trial, Ethier used

other inmates’ calling cards to repeatedly call Michael’s cell phone. When she

received these calls, Michael began “shaking and hung up [her] phone and started

freaking out.” Ethier also attempted to mail Michael a letter written on a Christmas

card, but jail staff intercepted it before it was sent out for delivery. In the portion of

the letter addressed to Michael, Ethier wrote: “I’m violating the protection order

again I don’t give a fuck I just want to see my daughter.” And in a recorded jail call

made to his mother, Ethier remarked it was unfair he was charged with felony

stalking when he “didn’t even fucking hit the bitch.” He said he “could watch her

burn alive and not give a fuck.”

A forensic psychologist who had previously evaluated Ethier’s competence

testified on his behalf at trial. She said she could not offer any opinion as to his

mental state when he committed criminal acts, but she opined that he suffered

from methamphetamine-induced psychosis and possible schizoaffective disorder.

A jailer opined that, during the nine months he was in jail, Ethier had not displayed

any evidence of delusions or psychosis; to the contrary, he had been a jail trustee

with special privileges until he got caught gambling.

Ethier also testified. He admitted to being “irritated” with Michael and said

she “robbed [him] of fatherhood.” He said he disagreed with some of what others 6

had reported about his behavior, but he was not specific with his denial. And he

agreed that, when he engaged in some of the charged behaviors, he felt rejected

and angry. He said he kept contacting and messaging Michael because he

“wanted her to respond.” At a few points, he described himself going “off the

rocker” or “going off the rails on a crazy train.” He agreed this could or would have

scared Michael. In the end, he said he didn’t “blame” Michael for the no-contact

order against him, and he acknowledged his acts “probably more than likely”

violated the order.

Ethier waived a jury trial, and after a bench trial the district court found him

guilty of stalking in violation of a protective order, a class “D” felony in violation of

Iowa Code section 708.11(3)(b)(1) (2023). At a contested sentencing hearing, the

victim gave an impact statement2 explaining that Ethier continued to contact her

even after the guilty verdict. The court sentenced Ethier to prison, and he appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors at law.

See State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). “In determining whether

the [factfinder]’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate inferences and

presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record

evidence.’” Id. (citation omitted). We do not require corroboration of victim

testimony, nor do we substitute our view of the evidence for that of the factfinder.

2 We observe that the district court placed the victim under oath before she gave

her victim impact statement. But Iowa Code section 915.21(3) provides: “A victim shall not be placed under oath . . . at the sentencing hearing.” 7

State v. Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502, 507–08 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc);

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.21(3).

III. Discussion

To evaluate Ethier’s challenge, we look first to the statute. The act of

stalking requires proof of two elements:

[1] The person purposefully engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened or to fear that the person intends to cause bodily injury to, or the death of, that specific person or a member of the specific person’s immediate family. [2] The person has knowledge or should have knowledge that a reasonable person would feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened or fear that the person intends to cause bodily injury to, or the death of, that specific person or a member of the specific person’s immediate family by the course of conduct.

Iowa Code § 708.11(2). Ethier challenges only the first element, whether he

“purposefully engage[d] in a course a conduct” governed by the statute.

As to mens rea, stalking is a general-intent crime. State v. Neuzil, 589

N.W.2d 708, 711–12 (Iowa 1999). The “focus is not on the defendant’s mental

state but on the result defendant’s purposeful acts cause in a reasonable person.”

Id. at 711. The crime does not require “the stalker actually intended to cause fear

in the victim,” only that “the stalker consciously engaged in conduct that he knew

or should have known would cause his victim to be afraid.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

This interpretation—requiring only general intent—ensures stalkers cannot “avoid

conviction by asserting an emotional inability to form the requisite specific intent.”

Id. at 712.

As to actus reus, “course of conduct” is a term of art and means “repeatedly

maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person without legitimate 8

purpose, . . . repeatedly conveying oral or written threats, threats implied by

conduct, or a combination thereof, directed at or toward a person.” Iowa Code

§ 708.11(1)(b). And “repeatedly” means “on two or more occasions.” Id.

§ 708.11(1)(d).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, we have little trouble

concluding that Ethier knew or should have known that his acts—the threats, the

incessant messaging and calling, the photographs, and the runes—were a course

of conduct he knew or should have known would cause Michael to fear bodily injury

or death. Ethier largely admitted this at trial. And we conclude these acts amount

to a course of conduct as defined by statute. This is almost a textbook example of

stalking: an extended series of repeat acts intended to terrorize the victim.

We single out one facet of Ethier’s appellate argument for more discussion.

He asserts that “multiple fear-inducing acts do not give rise to liability unless the

offender intended the incidents to be a part of a course of conduct.” We reject this

assertion for two reasons. First, it is a thinly veiled attempt at revising the statutory

elements to create a specific-intent, rather than general-intent, offense—which has

already been rejected by the supreme court. Neuzil, 589 N.W.2d at 711–12. And

second, it places the focus on the defendant’s mental status, rather than the

defendant’s purposeful acts—which runs contrary to legislative intent and

controlling precedent. Id. at 711. We do not believe the General Assembly

intended that a stalker could immunize acts of stalking by claiming the individual

threatening acts were not part of a broader course of conduct.

We decline to disturb Ethier’s conviction and affirm.

AFFIRMED.