State of Iowa v. Rudy Singh

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: April 9, 2025
• Docket: 23-1778
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1778 Filed April 9, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RUDY SINGH, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Bethany Currie,

Judge.

A defendant appeals his convictions, arguing several improper statements

warrant a new trial and insufficient evidence supports his child-endangerment

convictions. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., Buller, J., and Vogel, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025). 2

VOGEL, Senior Judge.

Rudy Singh was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree sexual

abuse, four counts of child endangerment, and one count of domestic abuse

assault causing bodily injury. He now appeals those convictions, arguing (1) he is

entitled to a new trial based on several allegedly improper statements, and

(2) insufficient evidence supports the child-endangerment convictions. Because

the district court did not abuse its discretion when denying Singh’s mistrial motions

and substantial evidence supports his child-endangerment convictions, we affirm.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings.

Singh began sexually abusing his daughter—engaging in vaginal and oral

sexual abuse—when she was seven years old. According to the daughter, the

abuse continued “most every night,” except for the evenings when her mother did

not work a night shift. Singh’s abuse continued until she was twelve, when she

confided in her grandfather and mother, who confronted Singh. Yet the family did

not immediately report Singh to law enforcement, and the daughter recalled her

paternal grandmother telling her that if she told anyone, “you know what would

happen to him.”

Singh and the mother started fighting more often, with some fights turning

physical. The daughter recalled one evening when the two returned home and the

mother was drunk. She described Singh “dragging [the mother] in the house” and

the mother trying to shove him. Singh then “hit” the mother “in the face” and “kneed

her in the chest.” In response, the family’s dog, who was otherwise gentle, bit

Singh. The daughter was in the room while this occurred, as were her three

younger brothers. 3

The daughter later reported her father’s abuse to the Iowa Department of

Health and Human Services. She participated in a forensic interview and the

Department referred the case to local law enforcement. Based on the sexual

abuse and domestic-violence allegations, Singh was charged with two counts of

second-degree sexual abuse, Class “B” forcible felonies; four counts of child

endangerment, serious misdemeanors; and one count of domestic abuse assault,

a serious misdemeanor. After a four-day trial, the jury found Singh guilty on all

counts. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of imprisonment not to

exceed twenty-five years for the sexual-abuse convictions, four concurrent two-

year terms of imprisonment for the child-endangerment convictions, and a one-

year term of imprisonment for the domestic-abuse conviction, which also ran

concurrent to the child-endangerment sentences. Singh now appeals.

II. Motions for Mistrial.

Singh first argues that four statements made during the trial were sufficiently

prejudicial to have warranted a mistrial. District courts have “considerable

discretion in ruling upon motions for mistrial, since they are present throughout the

trial and are in a better position than the reviewing court to gauge the effect of the

matter in question on the jury.” State v. Brown, 5 N.W.3d 611, 615 (Iowa 2024)

(citation omitted). We therefore review denials of mistrial motions for abuse of

discretion and will not interfere with the court’s informed judgment unless “there is

no support in the record for the trial court’s determination.” Id. (citation omitted).

We consider each statement in turn. 4

A. “To hopefully send Rudy to prison.”

During the daughter’s testimony, the prosecutor asked her, “why are you

here today?” The daughter replied, “To hopefully send Rudy to prison.” Defense

counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, arguing “punishment is not something

for the jury to decide.” The statement breached an in-limine ruling, which excluded

all statements “relating to the criminal penalties upon conviction.” The district court

denied the mistrial motion, finding “one passing mention by a sixteen-year-old does

not necessarily indicate to the jurors what’s going to happen.” Instead, the court

gave a curative instruction, which was repeated in the final instructions, reminding

the jury that its job was “to determine if Mr. Singh is guilty or not guilty. In the event

of a guilty verdict, you will have nothing to do with punishment.”1

When testimony violates an in-limine ruling, “but the district court promptly

strikes the evidence and admonishes the jury to disregard it, a mistrial may be

granted only when the forbidden evidence is so prejudicial that its effect on the jury

could not be erased by the district court’s admonition.” State v. Kieffer, __ N.W.3d

__, 2025 WL 568668, at *5 (Iowa Feb. 21, 2025). Following quick action by the

district court to remedy an overstep, the defendant “bears the heavy burden of

demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion on the part of trial court.” State v. Brown,

397 N.W.2d 689, 699 (Iowa 1986). Singh has not cleared that high bar. The

1 Later in the trial, the daughter’s forensic interview was played for the jury. Intending to skip over one comment, the State unintentionally hit pause too late and the jury heard the daughter say she worried her brothers would “think that I was a bad person because I put my dad in prison.” Defense counsel noted the reference to “prison” and appeared to request a mistrial, stating “I’m not asking for any additional remedy beyond the one I’ve been denied.” Because counsel did not request curative instructions, none were given. 5

daughter’s reference to wanting to see her father punished—specifically, wanting

to see him in prison—did not indelibly taint the proceeding. The statement came

after the daughter emotionally recounted her father’s abuse and detailed violence

between her parents. The court’s instruction remedied any potential misuse of the

statement by clarifying the jury plays no role in fashioning Singh’s sentence, should

it find him guilty. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial.

B. “[The daughter] was very forthcoming talking with the forensic interviewer.”

During trial, a law enforcement officer testified about his investigation into

Singh, including his review of the daughter’s forensic interview. The prosecutor

asked, “If you can recall, can you tell us about [the daughter’s]—observations you

made of [the daughter’s] demeanor during this interview?” The officer responded,

“When I was watching the interview, [the daughter] was very forthcoming talking

with the forensic interviewer.” Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial,

arguing the statement improperly vouched for the daughter’s credibility. The court

sustained counsel’s objection, denied the mistrial motion, and instructed the jury

“Only you, the jury, get to decide any witness’s credibility.”

We again find no abuse of discretion in denying the mistrial motion. To

begin, credibility determinations are reserved for the jury, and we police testimony

that “directly or indirectly comments on the child’s credibility.” State v. Jaquez, 856

N.W.2d 663, 665 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted). However, not all testimony

describing a child’s report is vouching. See State v. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668, 673,

678 (Iowa 2014) (finding statement that a child victim was “consistent throughout 6

the entire interview process” was not vouching, as it was a factual statement that

informed, rather than displaced, the jury’s credibility determination).

Out of the presence of the jury, the court discussed both dictionary and case

law definitions of the term “forthcoming,” which is open to multiple understandings.

See Beek v. State, No. 20-0704, 2021 WL 5106445, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 3,

2021) (noting “forthcoming” could mean either “characterized by candidness” or

“responsive”). Placing the officer’s testimony in context, the daughter was indeed

responsive in her forensic interview—discussing her father’s abuse, her fear of

reporting, and other difficult topics. Yet even if the jury initially understood

“forthcoming” to confirm the daughter’s candor, the court sustained counsel’s

objection and promptly reminded the jury that “only you” decide a witness’s

credibility. The jury also watched the daughter’s interview and thus could itself

measure her interview against her testimony and decide how responsive,

consistent, and, ultimately, credible, she was. Under these facts, the court

dispelled any potential prejudice with its instruction and did not abuse its discretion

when denying the mistrial motion.

C. “Did Mr. Singh ever provide you or volunteer any records to show, ‘Hey, I was working’”?

During cross-examination of the investigating officer, defense counsel

probed the scope of the investigation, including whether the officer explored if

Singh could have been working during some of the alleged events. Counsel asked

the officer, “But you didn’t check work records, so we don’t know when Rudy might

have been working during that time period?” The officer responded, “Correct.”

Counsel continued, “And if he had work records showing that he was working at 7

that time period, would that be something that would be relevant to your

investigation?” The officer replied, “If I had specific dates that these allegations

occurred. But you forget that I only had a time period.”

During re-direct, the prosecutor asked the officer, “Now, [defense counsel]

asked you a lot about work records of Mr. Singh. Did Mr. Singh ever provide you

or volunteer any records to show, ‘Hey, I was working.’” Before the officer

answered, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing the

question violated Singh’s right to remain silent and improperly shifted the burden

of proof away from the State. The court sustained the objection, denied the mistrial

motion, and provided a curative instruction: “The State must prove Mr. Singh’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Singh does not have to prove or disprove

anything. Mr. Singh has the right to remain silent.”

Assuming without deciding that this issue could be characterized as

potentially burden-shifting, the prosecutor’s question was not so prejudicial as to

require a new trial. Understood in context, the prosecutor was responding to

defense counsel’s line of questioning about whether law enforcement reviewed

Singh’s work records. If the jury was left wondering whether those work records

existed, that door was opened by Singh, not the State. In any event, the jury was

quickly admonished that Singh need not say or produce anything. Viewing the

question “in the context of the entire trial,” State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 33

(Iowa 2006), the court did not abuse its discretion when denying the motion for

mistrial. 8

D. “He asked for a lawyer.”

Later in the trial, another officer who had interviewed Singh after his arrest

testified. The prosecutor asked, “What happened after the defendant agreed to

speak with you?” The officer answered, “I asked him some routine questions.

When I got to the actual assault incident, he asked for a lawyer, and we stopped.”

Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, again arguing the statement

violated Singh’s right to remain silent. After deliberation, the court sustained the

objection and informed the jury, “You are directed that the answer that he gave is

stricken, and you shall disregard that answer. You’re reminded again the State

must prove Singh’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Singh does not have to

prove or disprove anything. And Mr. Singh has the right to remain silent.”

Again, we find the court’s sustaining of the objection and curative instruction

prevented any prejudice to Singh. See State v. Veal, 564 N.W.2d 797, 809–10

(Iowa 1997) (concluding district court’s instruction to disregard officer’s testimony

stating the defendant “asked to contact her attorney” was “sufficient to prevent

prejudice” to the defendant). We presume juries follow instructions, State v.

Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2010), and Singh has not met his “heavy

burden” to show the court’s action to sustain the objection and admonish the jury

to disregard the statement were insufficient, Brown, 397 N.W.2d at 699. Thus, the

court did not abuse its discretion when denying Singh’s mistrial motion.

E. Cumulative Error.

Finally, Singh argues that even if none of these statements in isolation

required a mistrial, the cumulative effect of the statements deprived him of a fair 9

trial.2 However, none of Singh’s identified statements rise to the level of prejudice

requiring a new trial. See State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 917 (Iowa 2003) (“We

find no error in the judge’s rulings with respect to the various matters raised by the

defendant on appeal. It follows, then, that we also find no merit in [his] contention

he was denied a fair trial by the cumulative effect of the court’s rulings.”), overruled

on other grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2010). Instead, across

four full days of testimony from the daughter, the mother, several other family

members, the forensic interviewer, law enforcement officers, and Singh himself,

there were a handful of isolated statements that were quickly remedied by the

district court by appropriate instructions to the jury. Viewing the statements in the

context of the entire proceeding, Singh was not deprived of a fair trial.

III. Substantial Evidence of Child Endangerment.

Singh also contests whether there was sufficient evidence to convict him of

child endangerment. See Iowa Code § 726.6(1)(a), 726.6(3), 726.6(7) (2019).

Reviewing for legal error, we will uphold the jury’s verdict if substantial evidence

supports it. State v. Cole, 3 N.W.3d 200, 203 (Iowa 2024). “Substantial evidence

is evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence raising only suspicion, speculation, or

conjecture is not substantial.” Id. (cleaned up). Across the record, we will view the

facts “in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. at 208.

2 The State contests error preservation, arguing cumulative error was never raised

to the district court. However, during trial, defense counsel emphasized the number of mistrial motions, including multiple admonitions about the right to remain silent. After trial, counsel’s new-trial motion raised cumulative error based on some of the statements identified on appeal. Assuming without deciding that error was preserved, we elect to reach the merits. 10

As to each of the four children who witnessed the domestic-abuse event,

the jury was instructed that the State must prove Singh was the child’s parent, the

child was under fourteen years old, and Singh “acted with the knowledge that he

was creating a substantial risk to [the child’s] physical, mental, or emotional health

or safety.” A “substantial risk” meant “the very real possibility of danger.” See

Kieffer, 2025 WL 568668, at *2 (noting unopposed instructions become law of the

case). As for “creating” a risk, “parent-created risks are those that arise from

parents’ illegal or overtly abusive behavior.” Cole, 3 N.W.3d at 205–06 (collecting

cases).

Against that backdrop, substantial evidence supports Singh’s convictions.

Three of the four children testified at trial, and all agreed they were in the same

room, close to the parents, when the parents returned home and began fighting.

They also agreed their normally gentle dog was roused to bite Singh during the

event. Two of the children had different recollections of who the aggressor was,

but we leave it to juries to resolve these discrepancies and decide whose version

of events is most credible. State v. Fetters, 562 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Iowa Ct.

App. 1997). Crediting the mother and daughter’s testimonies, the jury could find

that Singh hit the mother in the face and kneed her, causing injury and bleeding,

while the children were close by in the same room.

Singh insists that, even if evidence shows domestic violence between

himself and the mother, “there was no evidence” the children “were in any kind of

danger.” We disagree. First, the jury need only find a risk to the children’s

physical, mental, or emotional health or safety—proof of actual harm is not

required. See State v. Anspach, 627 N.W.2d 227, 222–23 (Iowa 2001). Second, 11

a jury could reasonably believe that watching Singh beat their mother in their

presence risks the children’s mental and emotional health. See United States v.

Trice, 88 F.4th 738, 739–41 (8th Cir. 2023) (finding “witnessing the domestic

assault of a parent is an adequate basis for child endangerment” under Iowa law).

Thus, substantial evidence supports Singh’s child-endangerment convictions.

AFFIRMED.