State of Iowa v. Roger Paul Lustgraaf
This text of State of Iowa v. Roger Paul Lustgraaf (State of Iowa v. Roger Paul Lustgraaf) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-0167 Filed March 6, 2019
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROGER PAUL LUSTGRAAF, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Richard H.
Davidson, Judge.
Roger Lustgraaf appeals his conviction of two counts of sexual abuse in the
second degree. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ. 2
McDONALD, Judge.
Following a jury trial, Roger Lustgraaf was convicted of two counts of sexual
abuse in the second degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1(3) and
709.3(2) (1999). Although the offense conduct occurred long ago, Lustgraf was
only recently charged and convicted. Lustgraaf raises two claims in this direct
appeal.
Lustgraaf first contends the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight of the
evidence and the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new
trial on that ground. On review for the abuse of discretion, we find none. See
State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 2006) (stating review of a ruling on
motion for new trial is for abuse of discretion); State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659
(Iowa 1998) (setting forth the legal standard for ruling on motion for new trial). The
district court applied the correct legal standard, and its analysis was not clearly
unreasonable.
Lustgraaf next contends his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to a
jury instruction on the ground the instruction was an incorrect statement of law and
infringed his right against self-incrimination. Specifically, instruction fourteen
provided: “Evidence has been offered to show that the defendant made
statements at an earlier time and place. If you find any of the statements were
made, then you may consider them as part of the evidence, just as if they had been
made at this trial.” The argument is without merit. This court has repeatedly
rejected the same challenge to the same instruction. See State v. Garcia, No. 17-
0111, 2018 WL 3913668, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018); State v. Yenger, No.
17-0592, 2018 WL 3060251, at *4-5 (Iowa Ct. App. June 20, 2018), further review 3
denied (Sept. 13, 2018); State v. Hayes, No. 17-0563, 2018 WL 2722782, at *5
(Iowa Ct. App. June 6, 2018), further review denied (Aug. 3, 2018); State v. Payne,
No. 16-1672, 2018 WL 1182624, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2018), further review
denied (July 23, 2018); State v. Wynn, No. 16-2150, 2018 WL 769272, at *2-3
(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2018), further review denied (Apr. 4, 2018); State v.
Wineinger, No. 16-1471, 2017 WL 6027727, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2017);
State v. Tucker, No. 13-1790, 2015 WL 405970, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28,
2015). We see no reason to revisit the issue.
AFFIRMED.
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