State of Iowa v. Robert Lee Moriston

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: 23-1554
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1554 Filed September 4, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ROBERT LEE MORISTON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, John M. Sandy,

Judge.

A defendant appeals his convictions for forgery and identity theft.

AFFIRMED.

Jamie Hunter of Dickey, Campbell & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines,

for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and

Langholz, JJ. Sandy, J., takes no part. 2

AHLERS, Judge.

In April 2022, a Texas man was notified that a check written in his name

had been used at a Walmart in Spirit Lake, Iowa. The Texas man had never been

to Spirit Lake and promptly contacted the Spirit Lake police department to report

the activity. During the investigation, the Texas man learned that three additional

checks had been written in his name and used at Bomgaars, another business in

Spirit Lake. All four transactions occurred between January 20 and January 21,

2022, and involved checks drawn on a bank account the Texas man had closed

more than ten years earlier.

Following an investigation and a prosecution that involved multiple

amendments of the trial information and severance of some charges, Robert

Moriston was charged with and brought to trial in this case on two counts of forgery

as a habitual offender, identity theft, and possession of methamphetamine. The

jury found him guilty on all four counts, and he was sentenced accordingly.

On appeal, Moriston challenges only his convictions for forgery and identity

theft. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts and

the district court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts. We begin our

discussion with Moriston’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, as success on

that challenge would require us to remand for judgment of acquittal, in which case

it would be unnecessary to address his evidentiary challenge. See State v.

Dorsey, 16 N.W.3d 32, 40 n.1 (Iowa 2025).

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of

errors at law. State v. Cook, 996 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 2023). The jury’s verdict 3

will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Id. “Substantial evidence is

evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt.” State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022). “In

determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate

inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the

record evidence.’” Id. (citation omitted). Although Moriston challenges the

admissibility of certain evidence introduced at trial, we consider all evidence

admitted at trial—regardless of its admissibility—when assessing the sufficiency

of the evidence. See State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 597 (Iowa 2003).

In challenging his convictions for forgery and identity theft, Moriston does

not dispute that the person who passed the checks committed the crimes charged.

He simply contends the State failed to prove he was the person who passed the

checks. So, we need not get into the details of the elements of forgery and identify

theft. Instead, we focus only on whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s

verdict that Moriston was the person who passed the checks at the two stores.

Based on the evidence presented at trial, reasonable jurors could have

found the following facts. On January 20, 2022, a man entering the Walmart

caught an employee’s attention because the man was completely covered, with

only his eyes visible. The employee testified that it was immediately “apparent [the

man] was trying to conceal his identity, so that triggered [the employee] to watch

him.” The employee walked right past the man and observed him to be a large,

tall man, about six-feet three-inches in height and weighing 300 pounds or more.

The man wore a black flat-bill hat, gray neck gaiter, black-framed glasses, a black 4

hooded sweatshirt, jeans, Nike shoes with white trim around the bottom, a black

wristwatch, and black rubber gloves. After selecting items for purchase, he walked

to the checkout counter at the very back of the store and wrote a check. When

asked for identification, the man verbally provided the Texas man’s driver’s license

number. The cashier initially entered the number as an Iowa ID, and it was

rejected. Upon re-entry as a Texas ID, the transaction was approved. The man

left the store and loaded the items into a silver Chevy Suburban with distinctive

decals on both top corners of the rear windshield, and a third decal on the rear

passenger-side window.

That same day, and again on January 21, a man wearing nearly identical

clothing and driving a Suburban with the same distinctive decals was observed

shopping at Bomgaars, where additional forged checks were passed. While the

surveillance footage had been deleted by the time of the investigation, an

employee was able to recover still images of the man and vehicle.

Investigating law enforcement officers received a tip identifying the license

plate number of a vehicle with the same decals as those observed in the Walmart

and Bomgaars surveillance footage and traced the Suburban’s registration to

Teresa Moriston. Through social media, officers then identified her husband,

Robert Moriston, and believed him to be the same person from the surveillance

footage. Photos on social media revealed Robert Moriston to be a large, heavyset

man like the person in the store surveillance photos and videos.

Search warrants were executed at the Moriston residence and for the Chevy

Suburban. The search of the residence uncovered drug paraphernalia;

methamphetamine; and blank checks, a credit card, and a driver’s license bearing 5

the names of individuals not residing at the address. No evidence directly linked

to the Texas man was found in the residence or vehicle.

When police located Moriston, he attempted to conceal his identity by giving

a false name and acted aggressively toward officers. See State v. Bloom, 983

N.W.2d 44, 50 (Iowa 2022) (finding a false story told after a crime may be used as

evidence of guilt). After making a phone call to his wife from jail, Moriston

intentionally destroyed his cell phone. When officers collected his belongings,

Moriston possessed several items that matched the clothing from the suspect in

the surveillance footage, including dark-rimmed glasses, Nike shoes with white

trim around the bottom, and a gray neck gaiter. He also possessed three checks

and two credit cards issued in the names of individuals who did not reside with

him. Each of those individuals testified that they did not know Moriston and had

not authorized him to possess their financial information.

Given this evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude that Moriston was

the individual who passed the forged checks and used the Texas man’s

identification information. To challenge these findings, Moriston emphasizes that

the State’s case relied almost entirely on circumstantial evidence. He points to the

fact that the man’s identity was concealed in the surveillance footage and argues

that no physical evidence links him to the Texas man. He further contrasts his

admission of guilt to possession of methamphetamine with his continued denial of

involvement in forgery and identity theft. Based on these arguments, Moriston

contends that the evidence was insufficient to identify him as the person

responsible for the crimes. 6

Yet it is well-established that direct and circumstantial evidence are equally

probative. State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022). The jury was free

to weigh the evidence and assign credibility to the testimony as it saw fit. State v.

Trane, 934 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Iowa 2019) (“The jury is entitled to reject a party’s

evidence and credit the evidence against it.”).

Here, the jury was presented with Moriston’s alternative explanations and

found them unpersuasive. On appeal, Moriston essentially asks this court to

reweigh the evidence and substitute his interpretation of the facts for that of the

jury—something we are not permitted to do in assessing a sufficiency-of-the-

evidence challenge. See Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d at 256 (“It is not our place ‘to

resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to

determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters

are for the jury.’” (quoting State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa 2006))).

The jury considered the evidence and reasonably found that Moriston was the

individual who committed the acts of forgery and identity theft. Because identity is

the only element Moriston challenges and substantial evidence supports the jury’s

findings on that issue, his sufficiency challenge fails.

II. Evidence of Prior Bad Acts

Before trial, Moriston filed a motion to sever the counts related to his

possession of identification information and documents belonging to individuals

other than the Texas man. The district court granted the motion to sever.

However, at the final pretrial conference, the State requested a ruling on whether

it could introduce this evidence at the trial on the charges related to the Texas

man’s information. The district court granted the State’s request, reasoning that 7

the evidence was not being offered for propensity purposes, but rather to prove

identity—specifically, that Moriston was the individual who committed the charged

acts as part of a common scheme of using other people’s identities.

On appeal, Moriston argues the district court erred in admitting evidence

that he possessed checks and an expired temporary driver’s license of individuals

other than the Texas man. He contends the evidence constitutes improper

character evidence in violation of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b).

We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dessinger,

958 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Iowa 2021). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the

[district] court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable

or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 690

(Iowa 2019) (cleaned up).

Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b)(1), “[e]vidence of any other crime,

wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that

on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”

However, such evidence may be admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”

Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b)(2). Here, Moriston does not challenge that someone

committed forgery and identity theft. He only challenges that he is that someone.

Thus, the central issue at trial was identity.

When a perpetrator’s identity is contested, bad-acts evidence may be

relevant to prove identity. State v. Putman, 848 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Iowa 2014). To

determine whether evidence is admissible to establish identity, the court first

determines whether the evidence is relevant to a disputed factual issue. Id. at 9. 8

Second, there “must be clear proof the individual against whom the evidence is

offered committed the bad act or crime.” Id. (citation omitted). If both these criteria

are met, the court must then assess whether the probative value of the evidence

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id.

Here, Moriston’s possession of financial documents belonging to unrelated

individuals is relevant to the disputed issue of identity. The fact that he was found

in possession of checks and identification documents belonging to others tends to

support the State’s theory that he was the individual who committed forgery and

identity theft as to the Texas man. There is also clear proof that Moriston

committed the bad act, as the items were found in his residence when it was

searched and on his person when he was apprehended.

Moriston asserts that the test is still not satisfied because the standard for

admitting prior bad acts to prove identity is more demanding, requiring that the acts

be “strikingly similar” or of a “unique nature.” Id. at 11 (quoting In re J.A.L., 694

N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 2005)). He emphasizes that the individuals whose financial

documents he possessed all lived in his local area, unlike the Texas man. Moriston

argues that this distinction undermines any inference that he came into possession

of the Texas man’s information in the same way. He also points out that, while he

had possession of the others’ financial information, there is no evidence he ever

physically possessed the Texas man’s ID or any debit card in his name. He

contends that the introduction of this evidence improperly took away focus from

the key issue at trial—whether he committed forgery and identity theft with the

Texas man’s identification information—and turned it to the highly prejudicial

possession of unrelated identification and financial documents. We disagree. 9

The Iowa Supreme Court does not interpret the admissibility of prior bad

acts as narrowly as Moriston suggests. Id. at 11 (“[W]hen assessing the relevancy

of prior-bad-acts evidence, we look not only for similarities between two acts

committed by the defendant, but also for similarities between contents of materials

possessed by the defendant and acts committed by the defendant.”). The fact that

Moriston was found in possession of checks and identification documents

belonging to other third parties simply adds to the body of circumstantial evidence

linking him to the charged offenses. It did not distract from the trial’s central issue

of whether he had possessed and used the Texas man’s information. Rather, it

supported the State’s theory that the person in the surveillance footage and photos

was Moriston.

It was reasonable for the district court to find that this evidence fell within an

exception to the rule prohibiting propensity evidence. See Iowa R.

Evid. 5.404(b)(2). While Moriston may have suffered minimal prejudice, we find

no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination that the probative evidence was

not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Moriston, so we

find no error in the admission of this evidence.

III. Conclusion

Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict finding that Moriston

committed the crimes. We reject his evidentiary challenge, as the district court did

not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm

Moriston’s convictions for two counts of forgery and one count of identity theft.