State of Iowa v. Robert Conrad Storm

CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedApril 26, 2023
Docket22-0163
StatusPublished

This text of State of Iowa v. Robert Conrad Storm (State of Iowa v. Robert Conrad Storm) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Iowa v. Robert Conrad Storm, (iowactapp 2023).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0163 Filed April 26, 2023

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ROBERT CONRAD STORM, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Ian K. Thornhill, Judge.

The defendant challenges the district court’s decision to revoke his deferred

judgment and impose his original term of incarceration following a number of

probation violations. AFFIRMED.

Webb L. Wassmer of Wassmer Law Office, PLC, Marion, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023). 2

POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.

Robert Storm pled guilty to attempted burglary; he received a deferred

judgment and was placed on probation for two years. One of the requirements of

Storm’s probation was residing in a residential correctional facility for up to 365

days. Just a few months later, in November 2021, the judicial district department

of correctional services alleged Storm violated the terms of his probation by,

among other things, leaving the correctional facility without approval.

At the probation revocation hearing that followed, Storm admitted violating

the terms of his probation on October 26, 2021, when he returned to the

correctional facility more than one hour late and, upon his return, gave a breath

sample with a blood alcohol content of .046. The State alleged seven other

probation violations, which Storm did not admit; the State elected to proceed with

an evidentiary hearing on the remaining violations. Storm’s probation officer

testified for the State. Storm did not put forth a defense. At the conclusion of the

presentation of evidence, the district court orally ruled that all of the violations were

“established by a preponderance of the evidence through the testimony of the

State’s witness.”

After establishing the probation violations, the State asked the court to

revoke Storm’s deferred judgment and impose the original two-year sentence. The

district court agreed with the recommendation; it entered judgment against Storm

for attempted burglary and sentenced him to a term of incarceration not to exceed

two years (with credit for time previously served).

Storm appeals, arguing the district court abused its discretion in revoking

his deferred judgment and sentencing him to a term of incarceration. He maintains 3

the district court “did not adequately consider [his] mental health issues” and that

“keeping [him] on probation and supervising him was a more appropriate and

effective way to address” his probation violations.

Storm has good cause for this appeal. See State v. Thompson, 951

N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2020) (finding good cause for an appeal because the defendant

“challenge[d] the order revoking her deferred judgment and entering a conviction

and sentence” and “the alleged error arose after the court accepted [the

defendant’s] guilty plea”). “Where, as here, a defendant does not assert that the

imposed sentence is outside the statutory limits, the sentence will be set aside only

for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996).

“An abuse of discretion is only found when the sentencing court exercises its

discretion on grounds or for reasons untenable or to an extent clearly

unreasonable.” Id.

In making its recommendation to the court, the State noted that Storm

refused to comply with either the terms of his probation or “his mental health needs

and recommendations from medical professionals.” It argued Storm “keeps

creating victims in our community” as a result of his “refusal to get help from his

mental health providers.” And the State referenced that Storm’s “chances on

pretrial release” and probation “just did not go well.” In deciding to revoke his

deferred judgment and impose the term of incarceration, the district court

recognized Storm’s “mental health issues” but noted “he’s not amenable to

supervision.” The court also recognized that “Storm [was] probably close to having 4

this time served or at least enough to where the Department of Correctional

Services will not hold him long, if at all.”1

The decision to revoke Storm’s deferred judgment and impose the original

sentence was an option properly before the court. See Iowa Code § 908.11(4).

And “[t]he district court has broad discretion in determining whether probation

should be continued or revoked.” State v. Covel, 925 N.W.2d 183, 188 (Iowa

2019). While Storm urges a different option would have been better and argues

the district court should have placed more weight on his mental-health issues,

neither of these arguments point to an abuse of the court’s broad discretion. See

State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020) (recognizing sentencing courts

are “afforded . . . a significant amount of latitude because of the ‘discretionary

nature of judging’” (citation omitted)); State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa

1983) (“Each judge must grapple with the facts and circumstances in the case

before him and arrive at the sentence he regards as right. The right of an individual

judge to balance the relevant factors in determining an appropriate sentence

inheres in the discretionary standard.” (internal citation omitted)).

1 While Storm asked the court to “expunge this”—which the court did not do—he also asked to be released, claiming he did not “deserve any more time in jail.” Imposing the original sentence, which everyone anticipated would be discharged almost immediately after Storm was taken into custody by the department of corrections, was more in line with Storm’s request than the court’s other options. See Iowa Code § 908.11(4) (2022); see also State v. Keutla, 798 N.W.2d 731, 733–34 (Iowa 2011) (holding that, after a probation violation, the district court may choose one of the four options in section 908.11(4): “(1) continue probation with or without altering the terms; (2) continue probation, but hold the defendant in contempt and impose a jail term; (3) continue probation and place the defendant in a violator facility; or (4) revoke probation and impose a sentence for the original conviction”). 5

Because the district court chose an option properly before it and Storm has

not shown the court abused its discretion in reaching its decision, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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Related

State v. Wright
340 N.W.2d 590 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1983)
State v. Thomas
547 N.W.2d 223 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1996)
State of Iowa v. Anouhak Anna Keutla
798 N.W.2d 731 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2011)
State of Iowa v. Christopher Ryan Covel
925 N.W.2d 183 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2019)

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State of Iowa v. Robert Conrad Storm, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-iowa-v-robert-conrad-storm-iowactapp-2023.