IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-2085 Filed June 18, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD LEE SHOGREN, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, John Haney,
Judge.
A criminal defendant appeals his convictions for domestic abuse assault
and harassment. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.
Leah Patton (argued) of Patton Legal Services, LLC, Ames, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard at oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ. 2
BULLER, Judge.
“No face, no case.” With that street-slang rhyme, Richard Shogren bragged
to his mother in a recorded jail call about his plan to dissuade his girlfriend, S.J.O.,
from testifying against him in an upcoming domestic-abuse trial. S.J.O. ultimately
recanted, but Marshall County jurors disbelieved S.J.O.’s recantation and instead
credited her emotional description of Shogren threatening and assaulting her—as
captured by a 911 call and a responding police officer’s body camera. Shogren
challenges evidentiary rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence, the colloquy for his
stipulation to multiple previous domestic-abuse convictions, and the fine and
surcharge. We affirm Shogren’s convictions but, accepting the State’s
concessions on appeal, remand for additional proceedings on the sentence
enhancement and fine issues.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In December of 2022, S.J.O. called 911 and, with tears in her voice, told the
dispatcher: “I need officers . . . please, I’ve been abused . . . I was just kicked out
of a car and almost ran over . . . .” Over the next four minutes, S.J.O. described
how Shogren—who she described as her “ex-boyfriend”—hit her head against the
car window, “choked”1 her, and threatened to kill her and himself. With a wavering
voice, she said near the end of the call: “I’ve never been so scared in my whole
life.”
1 We use the word “choked” because that is the language S.J.O. used. However, we note the correct terminology would be “strangled” given S.J.O.’s description of the act. See Mary Pat Gunderson, Gender and the Language of Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 Geo. J. Gender & L. 1, 11 (2019) (on how language matters and noting that describing acts of strangulation as “choking” can minimize or mitigate the perpetrator’s actions). 3
A Marshalltown police officer responded to the gas station from which
S.J.O. had called 911. She had to use the gas station phone because Shogren
drove off with hers. The officer arrived “a couple minutes” after the 911 call and
observed S.J.O. “was very emotional” and “crying.” The officer also observed and
documented with photographs that S.J.O. had “some blood on the edge of her
mouth and some mild redness to her neck.”
In a conversation recorded on the officer’s body camera, S.J.O. again
identified Shogren as her “ex-boyfriend” and described how he “started yelling” at
her in the car, then “escalated” when he got mad about who she was talking to and
demanded to see all of their text messages. S.J.O. said she tried to roll down her
car window to yell for help, but Shogren rolled it back up and grabbed her seat belt.
Then he started “choking” her with his hand around her neck, “bashed [her] head
into the window,” “yanked” her hair, and threatened to kill her and himself. The
officer asked S.J.O. how she felt when she was being “choked,” and she said she
started getting lightheaded, had trouble breathing, and was scared. According to
S.J.O., she jumped out of the car after Shogren attacked her, and that’s when he
“almost ran [her] over.” She declined medical attention, explaining to police that
she “just want[ed] to be safe.” And the officer opined that the injuries he observed
were consistent with the assault reported by S.J.O.
S.J.O. told the officer that she and Shogren had been dating for around a
year but had broken up a couple weeks earlier after living together for a number of
months. And she said that day “ain’t the first time” Shogren had abused her,
specifically citing an instance of abuse two weeks before. 4
Police tried to follow up with S.J.O. after their initial contact to gather more
information and take updated photos of her injuries. Officers went to S.J.O.’s
residence, but she wouldn’t answer the door. And they called her cell phone, but
she wouldn’t return their calls.
In a recorded phone call between S.J.O. and Shogren before trial, he told
her: “I’m so sorry for everything I did wrong.” She told him she loved him, and he
responded with the same. He told her that he wanted her to “prove [him] wrong,”
and she responded that she was “not going anywhere.” And he raised his voice
at her when he learned she registered for the jail-call system with her real name,
exclaiming “they’re gonna know” he and S.J.O. were in contact, which violated a
no-contact order. Shogren told her: “You’ve gotta contact them. Call the police
station. Get it dropped.” He asked if she would “do that” for him, and she agreed.
Then he said: “Ask them to drop all the charges. Say you lied or something, I don’t
care what.” When S.J.O. expressed concern about getting “in trouble” for lying,
Shogren yelled at her, said she wasn’t “gonna get in trouble because [she] was a
fucking white female,” and told her to just “tell them.”
In a different recorded jail call with his brother, Shogren remarked “hopefully
she still knows what’s up about depositions and all that” and “you know what I’m
gettin’ at.” He told his brother: “Just tell her to help me,” and his brother
responded: “I will.”
And in a third recorded jail call, this one with his mother, Shogren said: “I
don’t even expect to make it to trial, I’m hoping depositions will happen and
hopefully she just doesn’t show up.” His mother remarked, “If that happens, then
they don’t have anything,” and Shogren responded: “No face, no case.” 5
By the time of depositions and then trial, S.J.O. had recanted. When the
State called her as a witness at trial, it limited its questioning to the domestic
relationship between her and Shogren. But she was then called by the defense:
she testified she was under the influence of methamphetamine the day she called
911 and that she and Shogren had a verbal argument that never turned physical
or violent. And she denied that Shogren had influenced her testimony or tried to
do so, but she admitted that they had discussed the incident in the lead-up to trial.
When asked by the prosecutor about specific acts of abuse and specific
statements she made to police, S.J.O. repeatedly said she didn’t remember. By
the time of trial, she said Shogren was back to being her boyfriend and she loved
him “very much.” A police officer testified at trial that victims of domestic violence
were “not always” cooperative with law enforcement, it was “not uncommon” for
victims to decline further interviews or photographs, and they sometimes provided
different information or recanted after the emergent situation had ended.
The jury found Shogren guilty of domestic abuse causing bodily injury—
third or subsequent offense, a class “D” felony in violation of Iowa Code
sections 708.1 and 708.2A(1) and (4) (2022); domestic abuse causing bodily
injury, a serious misdemeanor in violation of sections 708.1 and 708.2A(1)
and (2)2; and harassment in the first degree, an aggravated misdemeanor in
violation of section 708.7(1) and (2). He was sentenced to concurrent prison
sentences. And he appeals.
2 The second domestic-abuse verdict was a lesser-included offense for domestic
abuse assault by strangulation. 6
II. Discussion
Shogren challenges evidentiary errors related to the jail calls, the sufficiency
of the evidence, the enhancement colloquy for the first domestic abuse count, and
the fine and surcharge for the second count. We address each contention
separately, as they concern different standards of review.
A. Jail Calls
Shogren first contests the admission of his statements on the recorded jail
calls, seemingly raising challenges under rules of evidence relating to hearsay,
relevance, and unfair prejudice.3 See Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.401, 5.402, 5.403, 5.801.
To the extent the hearsay rules are implicated, we review for correction of errors
at law. State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 621 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). Our review
of evidentiary rulings is otherwise for abuse of discretion. See id.
First, as to the hearsay question, we dispel some confusion that pervaded
discussions in the district court and is reprised in Shogren’s appellate brief and
oral argument: whether statements admitted under Iowa Rule of
Evidence 5.801(d)(2) must actually be admissions against the declarant’s interest.
This misunderstanding is so pervasive that Professor Emerita Laurie Doré
addresses it in her book on evidence, noting the “confusing” terminology and how
Iowa litigants sometimes “misleadingly” refer to this exception. See 7 Laurie Kratky
Doré, Iowa Practice Series: Evidence § 5.801:9 (2024). At least some of the
confusion likely stems from the rule’s historical title—“[a]dmission by party
3 The State raises an error-preservation concern, noting the district court made
express findings about some but arguably not all of the snippets of the calls played at trial. Given our resolution of this issue, we elect to reach the merits. 7
opponent”; but in the modern restyling of the rules, this exemption from hearsay is
more accurately titled “[a]n opposing party’s statement.” Compare Iowa R.
Evid. 5.801(d)(2) (2009), with Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(d)(2) (2025). The plain text of
the rule makes clear these statements need not actually be admissions or
statements against interest; they just have to be statements (1) “offered against an
opposing party” and (2) “made by the party in an individual or representative
capacity.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(d)(2)(A). So, in a criminal case, the State can
always offer statements made by a defendant under this rule. With that backdrop,
the portions of the jail calls admitted at trial were not hearsay as a matter of law:
Shogren’s statements are exempted from the rules against hearsay under
Rule 5.801(d)(2)(A).4 The district court correctly applied the law on hearsay.
Second, as to relevance, both the district court and the parties rely on our
unpublished decision in State v. Campbell, No. 10-0117, 2013 WL 4011071 (Iowa
Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2013). There, we affirmed that statements by a defendant
attempting to “dissuade the victim from appearing in court” were relevant as
evidence reflecting consciousness of guilt comparable to fabrication. Campbell,
2013 WL 4011071, at *6–7. So too here. Shogren’s encouragement of S.J.O. to
recant, conspiring with his brother to get S.J.O. to “help” him, and bragging to his
mother about “no face, no case” all reflect consciousness of guilt and were
4 It’s not clear whether Shogren is also challenging admission of statements made
by the listeners on the calls (S.J.O., his brother, his mother). To the extent he does, they were offered for their responsive context and not for the truth of any matter asserted. See State v. Canady, 4 N.W.3d 661, 668 (Iowa 2024) (“[The non- party caller’s] statements also fell outside the hearsay rule. Most were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.”); cf. State v. Enderle, 745 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Iowa 2007) (recognizing courts hold police statements during interrogations of defendants admissible “to provide context for [the defendant’s] responses”). 8
admissible as substantive relevant evidence. See State v. Nance, 533 N.W.2d
557, 562 (Iowa 1995) (“Admissions may be implied by the conduct of the defendant
subsequent to a crime when such conduct indicates a consciousness of guilt.”).
And beyond this purpose, we independently conclude the calls were relevant to
show the relationship dynamics between Shogren and S.J.O. Cf. State v. Taylor,
689 N.W.2d 116, 125 (Iowa 2004) (“[T]he defendant’s prior conduct directed to the
victim of a crime, whether loving or violent, reveals the emotional relationship
between the defendant and the victim and is highly probative of the defendant's
probable motivation and intent in subsequent situations.”). The district court did
not abuse its discretion in finding Shogren’s statements relevant.
Third, as to Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403, the parties point to another
unpublished case to guide this analysis: State v. Buchanan, No. 17-0695, 2018
WL 3913671 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018). There, we conducted a Rule 5.403
analysis of similar jail calls in which the defendant attempted to concoct an alibi
defense and dissuade the victim from appearing at trial. See Buchanan, 2018
WL 3913671, at *10–11. We agreed that the statements on the calls were
“prejudicial” in the sense that they were inculpatory, but they were not “unfairly
prejudicial” and therefore the district court was not required to exclude them. Id.
The same analysis applies here. Undoubtedly Shogren’s statements were
prejudicial in the sense they were inculpatory—that’s why the State offered them.
But we find they were not unfairly prejudicial. As part of this analysis, we note
something the jury would not have known in listening to the calls at trial: only
snippets were played. The State originally offered seven nearly-full-length
recorded calls, which were winnowed through a combination of prosecutorial 9
discretion and the district court’s ruling to clips of just three calls, each of limited
duration—one about four minutes, and two around thirty seconds each. We need
not repeat the particulars of the district court’s lengthy analysis here, but we note
the court excised what it perceived as the unfairly prejudicial portions of the calls,
in which Shogren or a caller referred to extraneous information or other-bad-acts
evidence. In our review, we find the district court conducted the appropriate
balancing test in a thoughtful way, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the
court admitting the most probative portions of Shogren’s statements at trial. See
State v. Buman, 955 N.W.2d 215, 221 (Iowa 2021) (“[W]e ordinarily defer to the
district court in doing the balancing under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403.”).
We single out one complaint in Shogren’s brief for a little more discussion—
his assertion that some of the inculpatory statements (particularly those made to
his brother) “lacked proper context.” We think this argument is a bit disingenuous.
There was nothing preventing Shogren from exercising his right under Iowa Rule
of Evidence 5.106 to have a broader context from the call played for the jury or
from calling his mother or brother as witnesses to supply context at trial. We
happen to have the full recordings available in the record before us, and we can
see why Shogren’s counsel chose not to make such a request: the surrounding
context for the statement encouraging his brother to have S.J.O. “help” him with
regard to depositions cast him in a decidedly negative light—to put it mildly. On
that call, Shogren discussed his prior domestic-abuse convictions, how the current
charge was a felony, how S.J.O. was “pretty smart” for blocking his calls from the
jail and he wanted his brother to pass on a message that he “loved” her, and how
he had been using drugs. The court’s shortening of the calls and excision of certain 10
portions was overwhelmingly to Shogren’s benefit, and he should not complain
now about a ruling that benefited him below. And in much the same vein, we
summarily reject the complaint in Shogren’s brief that no cautionary instruction was
given, since he never asked for one below and may well have believed it would
draw unwanted attention to his (ultimately successful) witness tampering.
Last, we observe there is a lot of chatter in Shogren’s brief and in the district
court below about forfeiture by wrongdoing. See generally Giles v. California, 554
U.S. 353 (2008) (examining federal constitutional law when a defendant wrongfully
causes the declarant’s unavailability as a witness). We aren’t entirely sure why.
There is no Confrontation Clause issue when a party’s own statements are offered
against that party. E.g., Campbell, 2013 WL 4011071, at *6. And to the extent this
objection was intended to relate to S.J.O.’s statements, there is no Confrontation
issue with regard to her statements because she testified at trial (for both sides, in
fact) and was subject to cross-examination. See Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“[W]e reiterate that, when the declarant appears for
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on
the use of his prior testimonial statements.”). And even beyond these problems
ruling out a Confrontation issue, we don’t think recorded jail calls are generally
testimonial. Cf. id. at 51–52 (identifying considerations for “testimonial”
statements). From our perspective, the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing and
Confrontation analysis was a red herring in this case below and remains so on
appeal.
In sum, we see no error at law nor discern any abuse of discretion in how
the district court handled the recorded jail calls. 11
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence and State v. Smith
Shogren next challenges sufficiency of the evidence for his domestic-abuse
and harassment convictions. We review for correction of errors at law. State v.
Cahill, 972 N.W.2d 19, 27 (Iowa 2022). “[W]e are highly deferential to the jury’s
verdict. The jury’s verdict binds this court if the verdict is supported by substantial
evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021)). “In
determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate
inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the
record evidence.’” Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 339 (citation omitted).
For the domestic-abuse charges, Shogren concedes the
domestic-relationship element, contesting only whether he assaulted S.J.O. His
argument on appeal is about credibility, and he points to S.J.O. recanting and her
trial testimony that she was under the influence when she made statements to the
911 dispatcher and police. But the jury reasonably could have credited S.J.O.’s
earlier tearful statements about the assault rather than her subsequent recantation.
And although corroboration is not necessary, S.J.O.’s statements the day of the
assault were supported by the blood on her lip and red marks on her neck, which
the officer opined were consistent with her report. We do not relitigate credibility
on appeal, and Shogren’s claim supplies no basis for relief. Cf. State v.
Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502, 507–08 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (“A criminal defendant
is not entitled to acquittal merely because he wishes the jury had believed him
instead of the victim.”). 12
Shogren’s challenge to the harassment conviction meets a similar fate.
S.J.O. told police and the 911 dispatcher that Shogren threatened to kill her, and
the jury was free to credit that statement rather than her recantation at trial. That
Shogren wishes the jury had believed different evidence is not a valid rationale for
appellate relief. See id.
In his reply brief, Shogren argues we should order judgment of acquittal
based on our long-criticized and divided panel decision in State v. Smith, 508
N.W.2d 101 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). We are not persuaded. Assuming without
deciding there is anything left of Smith after it has been repeatedly disapproved of
by our supreme court and this court,5 we find it inapplicable here—just as we have
in every other case since Smith was decided. We have carefully reviewed the 911
call and body-cam footage, and we have little trouble concluding a reasonable jury
could have found those statements established the elements of the offenses and
were more credible than the recantation that followed a rekindling of the
5 As the supreme court has explained,
Smith is an outlier case. It has been criticized in the commentary, and it has not been followed in any sexual abuse case in Iowa since. The primary flaw in Smith is that it is inconsistent with the standard of appellate review of jury verdicts, which requires that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict and which requires deference to the jury’s resolution of disputed factual issues. State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2022); see also State v. Trane, 984 N.W.2d 429, 437 (Iowa 2023) (declining to follow Smith and calling it “inconsistent with our appellate standard”); State v. Showers, No. 23-0390, 2024 WL 2317709, at *5 & n.4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 22, 2024) (collecting a wide array of voices from our court criticizing Smith). For its part, the State’s brief colorfully posits that Smith “seemingly hangs on only by the thread of tradition.” And in oral argument, the State stressed that Smith cannot be good law in this context because the opinion weighed the credibility of the evidence like a motion for new trial rather than deciding sufficiency like a motion for judgment of acquittal. See State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998) (on the difference between the two). 13
relationship between S.J.O. and Shogren. Shogren’s statements on the recorded
calls supply a believable explanation for S.J.O.’s changing story. And there was
nothing about S.J.O.’s statements to 911 or the police that we found so absurd or
unbelievable it precluded conviction (again assuming without deciding we have the
power to set aside a verdict on that basis). We decline to disturb the jury’s verdict
here, under Smith or any other case law.
C. Sentencing-Enhancement Colloquy
Shogren next argues the district court’s colloquy with him about his prior
convictions was insufficient under State v. Harrington, 893 N.W.2d 36, 45–47
(Iowa 2017), and related cases. See also Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(8)(a). The State
concedes the colloquy was inadequate because Shogren was not informed that
there would be no trial on this issue. We accept this concession given the record
made below. And we note we can reach this issue because Shogren was not
advised of the need to file a motion in arrest of judgment. State v. Smith, 924
N.W.2d 846, 851 (Iowa 2019). We therefore vacate the enhanced sentence
imposed on count one and remand for either a proper stipulation colloquy or trial
on the enhancement, followed by re-sentencing on count one if the enhancement
is proven. See State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 148 (Iowa 2018). We do not
disturb the prison sentences on counts two and three.
D. Fine and Surcharge
Last, Shogren contends that the district court erroneously suspended the
fine and surcharge on count two. The State concedes error and suggests we
remand with directions for the district court to impose the fine. See Iowa Code
§ 903.1(1) (prohibiting the court from suspending the fine for a simple or serious 14
misdemeanor); State v. Abbott, No. 17-1337, 2018 WL 1433807, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 21, 2018). We agree and so order, noting the surcharge must
necessarily be imposed as well. See Iowa Code § 903.1(4).
III. Disposition
We affirm Shogren’s convictions. We vacate the enhancement on count
one and remand for either a new stipulation colloquy or trial on the prior
convictions. We also vacate the imposition of the suspended fine imposed on
count two and remand with directions to impose the fine and appropriate
surcharge. At re-sentencing, the court should impose sentence on count one if the
enhancement is proven and issue a corrected sentencing order addressing the
fine and surcharge on count two. We do not disturb the prison sentences on counts
two and three.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.