State of Iowa v. Quintin Demilo Clemons

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: December 18, 2024
• Docket: 23-1605
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1605 Filed December 18, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

QUINTIN DEMILO CLEMONS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Korie Talkington,

Judge.

The defendant challenges the sentence imposed following his guilty plea

for eluding, first offense. AFFIRMED.

Nathan A. Mundy (until withdrawal) of Mundy Law Office, P.C., Des Moines,

and Des C. Leehey of Cameron Leehey Law Firm, PLLC, Cedar Rapids, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024). 2

POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.

As part of a plea agreement he entered into with the State, Quintin Clemons

pled guilty to eluding, first offense. See Iowa Code § 321.279(1)(a) (2023). The

State agreed to recommend a sentence of 120 days in county jail with all but ten

days suspended while Clemons was free to make any request. Following an

unreported sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Clemons to 240 days

in county jail with all but thirty days suspended and placed him on probation.

Clemons appeals that sentence,1 arguing the district court failed to provide

adequate reasons on the record for imposing a more severe sentence than he

requested or the State recommended.

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(1)(f) requires the court to “ensure that

the basis for the sentence imposed appears in the record.” Where, as here, the

sentencing hearing is unreported, the court is required “to include in [its]

sentencing order the reason for the sentence.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d

915, 920–21 (Iowa 2014). “Errors in sentencing, including contentions the trial

court failed to articulate adequate reasons for a particular sentence, ‘may be

challenged on direct appeal even in the absence of an objection in the district

court.’” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted). “[I]f

the defendant waives reporting of the sentencing hearing and the court fails to

state its reasons for the sentence in the written sentencing order, the court has

1 As he is challenging his sentence, Clemons has good cause for this appeal. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020) (“[G]ood cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.”). 3

abused its discretion, and we will vacate the sentence and remand the case for

resentencing.” Thompson, 856 N.W.2d at 921.

Here, the court completed a sentencing form, including the following as its

reason for the sentence imposed:

Additionally, in the spot where the court could include a “statement of its reasons

for and the facts supporting its decision,” the court added: “The suspended

sentence and probation provided for below is based on Defendant’s maximum

opportunity for rehabilitation in the community.”

First, Clemons complains the court did not explain why it imposed a

sentence that was longer than even the State recommended. While Clemons’s

wish for more information is understandable, the district court was not required to

explain why it rejected his request and the State’s recommendation—“district

courts are not obligated ‘to give its reasons for rejecting particular sentencing

options.’” State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 67 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted).

The sentencing court is only required to “explain its reasons for selecting the

sentence imposed.” Id. (citation omitted). Clemons suggests the court was wrong

not to follow the plea agreement, but—as he recognizes in his appellate brief—the 4

plea agreement was not binding on the court. Cf. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10 (providing

the procedure when a plea is conditioned on the court’s acceptance of a

sentencing agreement). So the court was free to impose a sentence other than

those recommended by the parties; it was just required to provide reasons for why

it exercised its discretion in the way it did. See Thacker, 862 N.W.2d at 410 (“[If]

the district court departed from any agreement the parties may have had, then the

district court exercised discretion and, as a result, must make a statement on the

record as to why it exercised its discretion in the way it did.”).

Second, Clemons attacks the reasons the court did give, asserting that the

court relied on only boilerplate statements, which is not sufficient to satisfy the

requirements of rule 2.23(1)(f). We recognize the prohibition on boilerplate

language alone as stated in State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001).

But in more recent cases, our supreme court has approved of the use of sentencing

order forms, allowing the district court to “check boxes indicating the reasons why

a judge is imposing a certain sentence” to meet its obligation to state reasons for

the sentence on the record. See State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 457 (Iowa 2024)

(noting the boilerplate language of Lumadue that was found inadequate came from

a “pre-printed,” “one-size-fits-all form” where there was no personalization or

selection of criteria); Thompson, 856 N.W.2d at 921 (providing that, when properly

filled out, a check-the-box form is an acceptable way to express the court’s reasons

for a particular sentence imposed). The sentencing court’s action of marking the

factors it found relevant provides a personalized sentencing rationale. And while

the court’s reliance on four factors and one additional written statement may be

“terse and succinct,” it is enough to enable our review of the court’s discretion. See 5

State v. Wilson, 5 N.W.2d 628, 634 (Iowa 2024) (“A terse and succinct statement

is sufficient provided that the brevity of the court’s statement does not prevent

appellate review of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.”).

Finding no errors or abuse of discretion, we affirm Clemons’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.