State of Iowa v. Paul John Joseph Kramer

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: July 24, 2024
• Docket: 23-1185
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1185 Filed July 24, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

PAUL JOHN JOSEPH KRAMER, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Mark T. Hostager

(self-representation) and Robert J. Richter (trial and sentencing), Judges.

The defendant challenges his conviction and sentence for driving while

barred. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Francis Hurley, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2

GREER, Judge.

Paul Kramer challenges his conviction and sentence for driving while

barred. Kramer maintains (1) the district court should have ordered a competency

hearing sua sponte; (2) the district court should not have allowed him to represent

himself in the criminal proceedings; and (3) he should be resentenced because the

district court relied on counterfactual reasons, like a guilty plea and the plea

agreement, when giving the basis for the sentence imposed.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The State charged Kramer with driving while barred by trial information. At

what was supposed to be his arraignment, Kramer waived his right to counsel,

asserting that he wanted to represent himself and telling the court: “They are an

officer of the court. There are certain things you and I both know they can’t do that

I can bring up. Subject matter, in personam jurisdiction, among other things.” At

that hearing, Kramer loosely espoused sovereign-citizen theories,1 such as

1 “Sovereign citizens are a diverse group of individuals having in common the

conviction that no government holds sway over their lives.” Martin Blinder, M.D., Psychiatry in the Everyday Practice of Law § 8:20 (5th ed. Oct. 2023 update); see also State v. Rhodes, No. 11-0812, 2012 WL 5536685, at *3–7 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012) (rejecting the argument that the defendant’s beliefs the court lacked jurisdiction over her concerning the prosecution and as a sovereign citizen she was “a conscientious objector” raised a competency-to-stand-trial issue). Here, although the district court did not characterize Kramer’s positions as a sovereign- citizen theory, Kramer stated he was “specially appearing” and that there was no constitutional or statutory basis for the proceeding, citing Iowa Code section 602.6101 (2022), which affords the district court exclusive, general, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, civil, criminal, probate, and juvenile, except in cases where exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction is conferred upon some other court, tribunal, or administrative body. The district court has all the power usually possessed and exercised by trial courts of general jurisdiction, and is a court of record. 3

“[t]here’s no constitutional basis” and “no statutory basis under Iowa Code

[section] 602.6101” for his prosecution. After additional discussion, including the

court’s explanation that representing himself would put him “at a disadvantage,”

the court concluded Kramer was knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right to

counsel. Kramer indicated he was not prepared to proceed with the arraignment

and needed three weeks, and the court delayed the arraignment for the requested

amount of time and appointed standby counsel to assist Kramer.

At his arraignment three weeks later, Kramer moved to dismiss the charge

against him, arguing the complaint and affidavit were “legally void.” He also argued

the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court quoted parts of Iowa Rule

of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2), noting that “if the defendant refuses to plead at

arraignment, the Court shall enter a not guilty plea.” Then the court concluded

“[s]o that’s what I’m going to technically enter for you today.” Following further

discussion with the court, Kramer waived his right to speedy trial, stating that he

wanted time to conduct discovery.

After several continuances, Kramer agreed to a bench trial on the charge in

May 2023. In waiving his right to a jury trial, Kramer told the court, “I would much

appreciate you find the findings of fact and conclusions of law, yes.” At trial, the

State called the police officer who witnessed Kramer driving and ultimately

arrested him for the offense. Kramer cross-examined the witness, asking the

officer about whether his signature on the complaint was notarized and pointing to

specific Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure he believed required notarization.

Kramer also raised arguments regarding procedural due process. He testified in

his own defense and introduced sixteen exhibits he prepared for trial. And along 4

with his presentation of evidence, he argued theories about defects in the

prosecution against him. In a written ruling filed after trial, the district court found

Kramer guilty of driving while barred.

At sentencing, the district court outlined the procedural history of the case,

noting Kramer “had a non-jury trial on May 8 and then there was a verdict returned

by this Court on June 25 setting the sentencing hearing for today[’s] date.” The

court imposed a ninety-day jail sentence, stressing that Kramer continued to be

convicted of driving while barred and the need to change that behavior. In the

written sentencing order filed the same day, the district court stated it “reviewed

the signed petition to plead guilty and considered the statements of the Defendant”

before accepting the plea. In the section describing the sentencing considerations,

the court included “The Plea Agreement” as one of the considerations.

Kramer appeals.

II. Discussion.

A. Competency Hearing. Kramer argues the district court should have sua

sponte ordered a competency hearing. See Iowa Code § 812.3. We review de

novo. State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Iowa 2018). The question is

“whether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial court judge whose failure to

conduct an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed, should have experienced doubt

with respect to competency to stand trial.” State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 531

(Iowa 1994) (citation omitted).

Kramer points us to State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Iowa 1982),

which provides: “Relevant factors in determining whether due process requires an

inquiry as to competency include (1) defendant’s irrational behavior, (2) demeanor 5

at trial, and (3) any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial.” He

concedes there is no medical opinion for us to consider but argues that his

“irrational behavior and demeanor at trial clearly showed that he was incapable of

appreciating the charge against him, understanding the proceedings,” or

effectively assisting in a defense.

But as the State argues, the facts of this case are similar to those in State

v. Rhodes, where the defendant espoused sovereign-citizen beliefs to the district

court and then, on appeal, argued the court should have held a hearing to

determine whether she was competent to stand trial. 2012 WL 5536685, at *3–7.

When questioned by the court, Rhodes responded coherently, and her testimony does not support the presence of a mental disorder. Rather, Rhodes’s testimony, actions, and behaviors demonstrate her unwillingness to accept the fact she was being prosecuted and the fact the court had jurisdiction over her. Her numerous pro se filings show her tenacity in dealing with the situation as she thought appropriate.

Id. at *7.

Similarly, at all times throughout the pendency of the case for which we

have a record, Kramer responded appropriately to the court’s directions and gave

coherent responses to questions. At his criminal trial, he presented an orderly—

albeit ill-advised—defense, marshalled exhibits, raised a foundational issue, and

cross-examined one of the State’s two witnesses. “[Kramer’s] unconventional

beliefs applying or misapplying populist legal theories do not raise a competency

issue.” Id.; accord State v. Borchers, No. 22-1454, 2024 WL 467375, at *9 (Iowa

Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2024) (concluding there was not a substantial question about the

defendant’s competency at trial where the defendant “showed a rational—if

somewhat misinformed—understanding of the proceedings and the charges 6

against him. Without the help of counsel, he wrote cogent arguments in his pretrial

motion. He had a firm grasp of the facts of his arrest”).

The record shows that Kramer had a present ability to understand the

charge and the proceedings that followed and was able to present his defense.

And so, the district court had no duty to order a competency evaluation sua sponte

or otherwise inquire. See State v. Newman, 970 N.W.2d 866, 871 (Iowa 2022)

(noting there is a presumption that a defendant is competent to stand trial). On

our de novo review, we find no legal error in allowing the trial to proceed without

having a competency hearing or requiring a competency evaluation.

B. Self-Representation. The Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to counsel. See U.S. Const.

amend. VI; State v. Rater, 568 N.W.2d 655, 657–58 (Iowa 1997). The right to

counsel includes the right to self-representation. Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 658; see

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). Unlike the right to counsel, the

right to self-representation is not effective until a defendant asserts it. Rater, 568

N.W.2d at 658. And before the right to self-representation attaches, a defendant

must knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel after the court informs

the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Id.;

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. Kramer argues the district court should not have allowed

him to represent himself, suggesting his waiver was not knowing and voluntary

because of his misinformed beliefs about the law. We review de novo. Rater, 568

N.W.2d at 657.

Here, Kramer understood the charge being brought against him and the

facts the State intended to establish. He wished to defend against the charge by 7

raising arguments about the jurisdiction of the court and the authority of the State

to sanction him—arguments he recognized a licensed attorney would not be able

to make on his behalf. With these facts in mind, as we understand it, Kramer’s

argument on appeal boils down to an assertion that because of his mistaken

personal beliefs about how the law works, he should not have been allowed to

represent himself.

But we are unprepared to conclude that a defendant’s decision to pursue a

defense based on sovereign-citizen theories precludes them from exercising their

constitutional right to represent themself. See, e.g., State v. Franklin,

No. 15-2091, 2017 WL 6516357, at *1 n.2, *3–4 (reversing and remanding for new

trial where defendant whose “behavior and assertions . . . align[ed] with the

‘sovereign citizen’ movement” was not allowed to represent himself). As the

Seventh Circuit recently concluded, while

sovereign-citizen theories . . . reflect misunderstandings about criminal jurisdiction[,] . . . there is no bright line rule barring sovereign citizens from representing themselves. To the contrary, a defendant like [Kramer] can make a clear-eyed, tactical decision to mount a sovereign-citizen defense. Although the defense is almost certain to fail, the Sixth Amendment protects the right of defendants to “go down in flames if they wish[].”

United States v. Jones, 65 F.4th 926, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2023) (fourth alteration in

original) (internal citations omitted).

Following a colloquy with Kramer, where the court explained his right to

counsel and that Kramer would be disadvantaged by representing himself, the

district court concluded Kramer’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. Nothing

Kramer points to on appeal convinces us it was otherwise. 8

C. Sentencing. As a final point, Kramer argues he should be resentenced

because, in its written sentencing order, the district court accepted a plea Kramer

did not make and stated it was relying on a nonexistent plea agreement as one of

the reasons for the sentence imposed. The State concedes the errors in the

sentencing order. But it argues that because the court clearly understood the

procedure of the case when orally pronouncing sentencing, the mistakes in the

sentencing order are clerical in nature and require only a nunc pro tunc order to

correct them.

When there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence

and the written order, the oral pronouncement controls. State v. Hess, 533

N.W.2d 525, 528 (Iowa 1995). And here, it is undisputed that the district court

correctly recited the procedural history of the case before orally imposing

sentence. The errors on the sentencing order were “clerical in nature”—“not the

product of a judicial reasoning and determination.” Id. at 527. “[W]hen the record

unambiguously reflects that a clerical error has occurred, we will direct the district

court to enter a nunc pro tunc to correct the judgment entry.” Id.

Because Kramer has not pointed to any issues with the sentencing hearing

and the oral pronouncement of sentence, and because the mistakes in the

sentencing order are clerical in nature, we agree with the State. We affirm

Kramer’s sentence but remand to the district court so that it may issue a nunc pro

tunc order to correct the clerical error in the written judgment entry.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.