In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 23–1218
Submitted February 17, 2025—Filed June 20, 2025
State of Iowa,
Appellee,
vs.
Patrick Wayman Scullark, Jr.,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda M.
Fangman, judge.
The State seeks further review of the court of appeals decision reversing
the district court order denying suppression of evidence found in the defendant’s
fanny pack during a search incident to arrest. Decision of Court of Appeals
Vacated; District Court Judgment Affirmed.
Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined
except McDermott, J., who filed a dissenting opinion.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin (argued),
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy Hau (argued) and Thomas J.
Ogden (until withdrawal), Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 2
Oxley, Justice.
Patrick Scullark, Jr. was charged with possessing a controlled substance
after police officers searched the fanny pack that he was wearing at the time of
his arrest on unrelated charges and that he attempted to pass to another person
before being handcuffed. Scullark contends that the district court should have
suppressed the evidence of the methamphetamine found in his fanny pack,
arguing that the search violated the United States and Iowa Constitutions
because he could no longer access the fanny pack at the time it was searched.
The court of appeals agreed and reversed the district court order denying
Scullark’s motion to suppress.
Incident to a lawful arrest, police officers are authorized to conduct a full
search of the arrestee’s person. Because Scullark was wearing the fanny pack
around his waist at the time of his arrest, we conclude that this was a valid
search of his person that did not violate either the United States Constitution or
the Iowa Constitution. As explained more fully below, we vacate the court of
appeals decision and affirm the district court order denying Scullark’s motion to
suppress.
I. Factual Background and Proceedings.
On April 12, 2022, Officer Jacob Bolstad investigated a domestic abuse
call involving Scullark. Officer Bolstad went to the residence Scullark was known
to be at, where he found Scullark sitting on the tailgate of a truck outside.
Scullark was talking on the phone and was in an emotional, distressed state
about going back to jail. When Officer Bolstad attempted to talk with Scullark,
Scullark bolted inside the residence despite Officer Bolstad’s order to stay
outside. Officer Bolstad followed. Inside the residence, Scullark remained
agitated and emotional. He was adamant that he could not go back to jail. 3
During their encounter, Scullark was wearing a fanny pack around his
waist. Officer Bolstad told Scullark that he was going back to jail and started to
handcuff him. Scullark pulled away to remove the fanny pack from his waist,
told Officer Bolstad “don’t touch me right now,” and attempted to hand the fanny
pack and other items to one of his companions standing nearby. At this point,
Scullark was not yet handcuffed, and Officer Bolstad was the only officer on the
scene. To prevent escalating the already emotional situation, Officer Bolstad did
not oppose the handoff. After Scullark handed the items to his companion,
Officer Bolstad handcuffed Scullark behind his back and advised the companion
to set the items down because he was going to search the items and bring them
to the jail.
Other officers arrived at the scene as Officer Bolstad led Scullark out of
the residence to the patrol car. As the two walked out, Officer Bolstad picked up
the fanny pack and other items. He testified at the suppression hearing that, at
this point, Scullark was unable to access the fanny pack and its contents.
Two of Scullark’s companions followed Officer Bolstad and Scullark
outside, protesting the search of the fanny pack and its transport to the jail. They
attempted to grab the contents of the fanny pack from the officers as Officer
Bolstad conducted a pat-down search of Scullark outside the patrol car and
another officer searched the fanny pack nearby. Officer Bolstad joined the search
of Scullark’s fanny pack after placing Scullark in the back of his patrol car. The
officers found a clear baggy containing methamphetamine inside the fanny pack.
The State charged Scullark with possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver and failure to affix a drug tax stamp. Scullark filed a motion to
suppress the contents of the fanny pack, arguing that the search violated his
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 4
article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. The district court found the search
of the fanny pack valid as a search incident to arrest (SITA) and denied Scullark’s
motion to suppress. In 2023, Scullark entered a conditional guilty plea to all
counts, preserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.
Scullark challenges the denial of his motion to suppress on two grounds:
(1) the SITA exception does not apply when an arrestee is unable to access the
item at the time it is searched, and (2) the State must establish that the officers
were looking for a weapon or for evidence of the offense of arrest. We transferred
the appeal to the court of appeals, which reversed the district court’s denial of
Scullark’s motion to suppress. The court of appeals agreed with Scullark that
the search did not satisfy the SITA exception because he could not access the
fanny pack at the time it was searched.
We granted the State’s application for further review to address whether a
search of a defendant’s fanny pack that he passed to another person before being
handcuffed violates either the United States Constitution or the Iowa
Constitution. We conclude that it does not. We therefore vacate the court of
appeals decision and affirm the district court order denying Scullark’s motion to
II. Analysis.
A. Jurisdiction to Consider the Appeal Under Iowa Code Section
814.6(3). The State challenges the court of appeals’ interpretation of Iowa Code
section 814.6(3) (2024). Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) prevents a defendant
from appealing a guilty plea to a nonclass “A” felony unless the defendant can
first establish good cause. Subsection (3) provides an exception to that rule:
A conditional guilty plea that reserves an issue for appeal shall only be entered by the court with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or the defendant’s counsel. An appellate court shall have jurisdiction over only conditional guilty pleas that comply 5
with this section and when the appellate adjudication of the reserved issue is in the interest of justice.
Id. § 814.6(3). The court of appeals construed the requirement that the appeal
be “in the interest of justice” to mean when appellate review would be “fair and
right.” (Quoting Interests of Justice, Black’s Law Dictionary 971 (11th ed. 2019).)
Here, the State and Scullark agreed to a conditional guilty plea that
explicitly allowed Scullark to challenge the suppression ruling, and the district
court accepted the conditional guilty plea. The issue on appeal is the same issue
reserved by the conditional guilty plea, and success on appeal of that issue would
give Scullark some relief. Cf. State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 108–09
(Iowa 2021) (holding that “a legally sufficient reason is a reason that would allow
a court to provide some relief” for purposes of establishing good cause under
Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3)). Scullark satisfied section 814.6(3)’s “in the
interest of justice” requirement.
B. Unreasonable Search of the Fanny Pack. Scullark argues that
evidence from his fanny pack was obtained in violation of his right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. We review challenges to the denial of a
motion to suppress on constitutional grounds de novo. State v. Watts, 801
N.W.2d 845, 850 (Iowa 2011) (“Because this case concerns the constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, our review of the
district court’s suppression ruling is de novo.”). “We independently evaluate the
totality of the circumstances found in the record, including the evidence
introduced at . . . the suppression hearing . . . .” State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775,
780 (Iowa 2010). “We give deference to the district court’s findings of fact” but
are not bound by them. Id.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 6
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .” Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search is per se
unreasonable, and therefore, unconstitutional, “subject only to a few narrow and
well-delineated exceptions.” Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 660 n.1
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result). One such exception to the warrant
requirement is a search conducted incident to a lawful arrest. See, e.g., Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (limiting the scope of a search incident to
a lawful custodial arrest to the arrestee’s person and the area within his
immediate control—i.e., “the area from within which [one] might gain possession
of a weapon or destructible evidence”).
Similarly, article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution provides: “The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated . . . .” We have
recognized similar warrant exceptions under the Iowa Constitution. See State v.
Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Iowa 2004) (“Exceptions recognized by this court
are searches based on consent, plain view, probable cause coupled with exigent
circumstances, searches incident to arrest, and those based on the emergency
aid exception.” (emphasis added)). While our “interpretations of section 8 have
often ‘tracked with prevailing federal interpretations’ of the Fourth Amendment,”
State v. Burns, 988 N.W.2d 352, 360 (Iowa 2023) (quoting Kain v. State, 378
N.W.2d 900, 902 (Iowa 1985)), “we are not ‘compel[led]’ to follow that path,” id.
(alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Kuble v. Bisignano, 28 N.W.2d 504,
508 (Iowa 1947)). “It follows that if a federal interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment is not consistent with the text and history of section 8, we may
conclude that the federal interpretation should not govern our interpretation of
section 8.” Id. 7
Scullark argues that the search of his fanny pack violated his
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8
because (1) he was unable to access the fanny pack at the time the officers
searched it, and (2) the State failed to establish that the officers were looking for
a weapon or for evidence of the offense of the arrest.
In determining whether an exception to the warrant requirement applies,
we assess the officers’ conduct using an objective standard. State v. Simmons,
714 N.W.2d 264, 272 (Iowa 2006). Therefore, the officers’ subjective motivations
for conducting the search are irrelevant. Id. (“A search’s legality does not depend
on the actual motivations of the police officers involved in the search.”).
1. Determining the proper context of the search. The SITA exception has
developed in three contexts: (1) searches of the area within the arrestee’s
immediate control, (2) searches of the arrestee’s person, and (3) searches of
vehicles incident to arrest, see Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (limiting the scope of a
SITA to “the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ ”);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235–36 (1973) (authorizing full searches
of the person incident to arrest); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009)
(deciding the appropriate scope of a search of a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest). We must decide whether the search of the fanny pack at issue
here was a Robinson-type search of Scullark’s person or a Chimel/Gant-type
search of the area within his immediate control.
The seminal decision establishing the scope of a search of the area within
the arrestee’s immediate control is Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. In Chimel, police
officers arrested a defendant in his home pursuant to an arrest warrant. Id. at
753. The officers then searched the entirety of the defendant’s three-story home
premised only “on the basis of the lawful arrest.” Id. at 753–54. The United States 8
Supreme Court held that, incident to a lawful arrest, officers can search “the
arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence.” Id. at 763. Chimel also set out the justifications
underlying the SITA exception. A search of the person and the area within his
immediate control “serve[s] the dual purposes of protecting arresting officers and
safeguarding any evidence the arrestee may seek to conceal or destroy.” Vance,
790 N.W.2d at 786 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63).
Searches of the arrestee’s person are treated differently from a search of
the area within the arrestee’s reach. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224 (“Examination of
this Court’s decisions shows that these two propositions have been treated quite
differently.”). The Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he validity of the search of
a person incident to a lawful arrest has been regarded as settled from its first
enunciation, and has remained virtually unchallenged until the [Robinson] case.”
Id. But “[t]he validity of the second proposition, while likewise conceded in
principle, has been subject to differing interpretations as to the extent of the area
which may be searched.” Id. In Robinson, a police officer searched the arrestee’s
coat pocket and a cigarette pack he found in it incident to a lawful custodial
arrest. Id. at 221–23. The Court set out a categorical rule that officers may
conduct a full search of the arrestee’s person and the items immediately
associated with the person without regard to the justifications supporting the
SITA exception. Id. at 235–36.
[The] intrusion [of a custodial arrest] being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment. 9
Id. at 235. The validity of the search does not depend on a later determination
about the likelihood that officers would have found weapons or evidence in the
specific situation. Id. Rather, by virtue of a lawful arrest, an officer is authorized
to search the arrestee’s person, his pockets, and physical items immediately
associated with him. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014).
The Court expounded on the Robinson rule in Riley v. California. Id. at 386.
Riley involved the search of a cellphone incident to arrest. Id. at 378. In declining
to extend Robinson to digital data, the Court did not “overlook Robinson’s
admonition that searches of a person incident to arrest, ‘while based upon the
need to disarm and to discover evidence,’ are reasonable regardless of ‘the
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in
fact be found.’ ” Id. at 386 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235). The Court also
noted that “Robinson’s categorical rule strikes the appropriate balance in the
context of physical objects.” Id. Maintaining that categorical rule for physical
items, the Court distinguished searches of digital data found on the person: “A
conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s pockets works no
substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may make
sense as applied to physical items, but any extension of that reasoning to digital
data has to rest on its own bottom.” Id. at 393.
Likewise, under the Iowa Constitution, we have historically recognized an
officer’s broad authority to search the arrestee’s person incident to a lawful
custodial arrest.
It is usual and proper for police officers, upon the arrest of felons to subject them to search and take from them articles found upon their persons. . . . Surely there can be no rule of law forbidding a police officer upon the arrest of one charged with a felony, from making a close and careful search of the person of the individual for stolen property, instruments used in the commission of crimes, or any article which may give a clue to the commission of crime or the 10
identification of the criminal. This too may be done promptly on arrest, and not delayed for authority from a court or a superior. The offender would speedily dispose of all such articles which would be found upon his person that might lead to the discovery of crime.
Reifsnyder v. Lee, 44 Iowa 101, 103 (1876). It is a well-settled rule that police
officers have inherent authority to search the arrestee’s person incident to arrest
without a warrant. State v. Kilby, 961 N.W.2d 374, 385 (Iowa 2021) (McDonald,
J., concurring specially). “[T]he greater power to arrest necessarily includes the
lesser power to search.” Id. at 386.
Indeed, we have previously adopted and applied the categorical rule from
Robinson to article I, section 8 challenges. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 974 N.W.2d
493, 496–97, 499 (Iowa 2022) (“And if an officer may lawfully arrest a person,
then the officer may perform a warrantless search incident to that arrest. The
search incident to arrest would, in turn, justify the warrantless seizure of the
contraband [found in the defendant’s pocket].” (citations omitted)); State v. Cook,
530 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1995) (“The full search of the arrestee’s person ‘is
not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but
is also a “reasonable” search under that Amendment.’ ” (quoting Robinson, 414
U.S. at 235)), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. Doran, 563 N.W.2d
620 (Iowa 1997) (en banc), overruled in part by, Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113
(1998); State v. Farrell, 242 N.W.2d 327, 329 (Iowa 1976) (“A search of the person
is permissible as an incident to lawful arrest, even when the offense is only a
minor moving traffic violation.”).
The federal SITA exception “trilogy” ends with Arizona v. Gant, which
determined the appropriate scope of the search of a vehicle incident to arrest.
556 U.S. at 351; see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 374 (“The trilogy concludes with
Arizona v. Gant . . . .” (citations omitted)). In Gant, police officers searched the 11
defendant’s vehicle after they arrested him for driving with a suspended license.
556 U.S. at 335. At the time of the search, the arrestee was handcuffed and in
the back of the patrol car. Id. The Court determined that officers may, without a
warrant, “search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest.” Id. at 351. This latter holding authorizing searches if “it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest” is
based on “circumstances unique to the automobile context.” Id. at 335, 351.
Gant effectively overruled New York v. Belton, which had allowed police officers
to contemporaneously search the passenger compartment of an automobile and
any containers found therein incident to a lawful arrest of an occupant of the
vehicle. 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981).
After Gant, we decided State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2015). In
Gaskins, police officers searched a locked safe in the arrestee’s vehicle incident
to arrest after the arrestee was handcuffed and placed in the back of the patrol
car. Id. at 3. In holding the search of the safe invalid, “[w]e approve[d] Gant’s
‘reaching distance’ rationale as an appropriate limitation on the scope of
searches incident to arrest under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution
because that limitation is faithful to the underlying justifications for warrantless
searches incident to arrest.” Id. at 13.
Scullark argues that the reaching-distance rule of Gant and Gaskins
applies to the search at issue here instead of the categorical Robinson rule.
Scullark asserts that under Gant and Gaskins, the search of his fanny pack
violated both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 because he was
unable to access the fanny pack at the time it was searched. We disagree. We 12
conclude that because the fanny pack was attached to his person at the time of
the arrest, this is a search of the person, governed by Robinson—rather than a
search of the area within his immediate control, governed by Chimel, Gant, or
Gaskins.
Starting with his argument under the Fourth Amendment, Gant did not
modify the rule pertaining to searches of the arrestee’s person and the items
immediately associated with him. Robinson still governs these searches. See
People v. Cregan, 10 N.E.3d 1196, 1203 (Ill. 2014) (“Gant does not apply to a
search incident to arrest of the defendant’s person or items immediately
associated with the defendant’s person. The search in those circumstances is
still controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson.”).
The language of the majority opinion in Gant, Justice Alito’s dissent, and
the subsequent Riley opinion inform our conclusion. As Justice Alito stated in
his Gant dissent: “The first part of the Court’s new two-part rule—which permits
an arresting officer to search the area within an arrestee’s reach at the time of
the search—applies, at least for now, only to vehicle occupants and recent
occupants . . . .” 556 U.S. at 363–64 (Alito, J., dissenting). Then in Riley, the
Court took a limited view of the majority opinion in Gant by referencing it as a
case “which analyzed searches of an arrestee’s vehicle” and “authorize[d] police
to search a vehicle ‘only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.’ ” Riley, 573
U.S. at 384–85 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343). The Riley Court also noted that
“[l]ower courts applying Robinson and Chimel . . . have approved searches of a
variety of personal items carried by an arrestee.” Id. at 392.
Although other courts have extended Gant outside of the vehicle context,
see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 997 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2021) (applying Gant 13
to the search of a backpack the arrestee dropped prior to arrest); United States
v. Knapp, 917 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2019) (extending Gant’s principles to
a purse near the arrestee at the time of search and limiting Robinson to searches
of clothing and containers concealed under or within the clothing); United States
v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying Gant to the search of a bag
the arrestee was holding at the time of arrest), we find more persuasive those
federal cases that have not, see, e.g., United States v. Perez, 89 F.4th 247, 256,
259 (1st Cir. 2023) (stating that “Gant did not address carried personal property
at all,” and the Robinson rule would continue to govern searches “of personal
items carried by an arrestee” (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 392)); United States v.
Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 752 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Gant elaborates upon the
circumstances in which an arrestee no longer has the possibility to reach into
the ‘passenger compartment’ of his vehicle, and the Court’s discussion of
whether the arrestee is no longer ‘unsecured and within reaching distance’ of
that area must be understood in that limited context. The Court focuses
exclusively on how the rule will affect vehicle searches . . . .” (citations omitted)
(quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343)). We therefore find that the reaching-distance
rule of Gant does not apply to searches of the arrestee’s person incident to arrest.
Robinson still governs these searches.
We reach the same conclusion under the Iowa Constitution. Like Gant,
Gaskins did not change the standard for searches of the arrestee’s person
incident to arrest. To determine the validity of a search of the arrestee’s person,
we likewise look to Robinson. See Hunt, 974 N.W.2d at 496–97, 499 (applying
Robinson to a challenge to contraband found in an arrestee’s pocket under both
the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8). 14
2. Was Scullark’s fanny pack part of his person? We still need to determine
whether the search of an arrestee’s person incident to an arrest allows a police
officer to also search a fanny pack on the arrestee’s person at the time the officer
initiates an arrest. In other words, what is included in the “person” that can be
searched incident to his arrest? As the Kentucky Supreme Court recently
explained:
[I]f the [bag] is properly considered part of [the defendant’s] “person,” then the search was lawful as no additional justification for the search other than it being incident to his arrest was needed. However, if the [bag] was instead “the area within his immediate control,” we would then need to address whether the search of the [bag] was justified based on officer safety or the preservation of evidence.
Commonwealth v. Bembury, 677 S.W.3d 385, 396–97 (Ky. 2023).
To determine the proper scope of a search of an arrestee’s person, we look
to the time of arrest. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 226 (“When an arrest is made, it
is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to
remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape.” (emphasis added) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. 762–63)).
Consistent with the “jealously guarded” SITA exception, the proper scope of the
time of arrest rule is narrow; “[i]t does not extend to all articles in an arrestee’s
constructive possession, but only those personal articles in the arrestee’s actual
and exclusive possession at or immediately preceding the time of arrest.” State
v. Byrd, 310 P.3d 793, 799 (Wash. 2013) (quoting State v. Ortega, 297 P.3d 57,
60 (Wash. 2013) (en banc)).
Officers are authorized to search not only the person but also those objects
which are closely related to and immediately associated with the person. Preston
v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (“This right to search and seize without
a search warrant extends to things under the accused’s immediate control . . . .” 15
(citations omitted)). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
The human anatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency[,] . . . many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one’s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one’s person to a point at which it would have little meaning.
United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1981).
Because police officers necessarily must make quick ad hoc decisions
when determining how, where, and what to search, they need to know what items
they are authorized to search without triggering the need for additional
justifications. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“A police officer’s determination as
to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is
necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not
require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the
search.”). The time-of-arrest rule sets a bright-line rule that allows officers to
search the arrestee’s person and any items in the arrestee’s actual and exclusive
possession at the time of the arrest or immediately preceding it. This limited
search “constitute[s] only minor additional intrusions compared to the
substantial government authority exercised in taking [the arrestee] into
custody.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 392.
Full Robinson searches of the person ensure officer safety during “the
extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station.” 414 U.S. at 234–35. “When police take
an arrestee into custody, they also take possession of his clothing and personal
effects, any of which could contain weapons and evidence.” Byrd, 310 P.3d at 16
798. Thus, “it is reasonable to allow for an officer to protect himself by searching
items he places in his patrol car and transports to the police station.” State v.
Allen, No. 06–1770, 2007 WL 2964316, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2007); cf.
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646–48 (1983) (explaining that another
governmental interest in searching any container or article found on the arrestee,
incident to incarcerating an arrestee, is to inventory personal property and
protect officers against possible false claims of theft).
Scullark relies on Gaskins, but like Gant, Gaskins involved the search of
a vehicle incident to the driver’s arrest. The locked safe that the officers searched
in Gaskins was never on or attached to the arrestee’s person. See Gaskins, 866
N.W.2d at 3–4. Here, however, the fanny pack was physically attached around
Scullark’s waist at the time Officer Bolstad initiated Scullark’s arrest by
attempting to place him in handcuffs. It was only at this point that Scullark
removed and handed the fanny pack to his companion. We believe this is
sufficient to conclude that the fanny pack was immediately associated with
Scullark. The fanny pack was an extension of his person, much like his pockets,
the search of which requires no additional justification beyond lawful arrest. See
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable
cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.”);
see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 393 (explaining “that inspecting the contents of an
arrestee’s pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond
the arrest itself may make sense as applied to physical items” but not to digital
data); 68 Am. Jur. 2d Searches and Seizures § 276, at 512–13 (2020) (noting that
a purse is considered an extension of the person much like the person’s clothing
or pockets). 17
Because the police officers needed no additional justification to search the
fanny pack, we conclude that the State was not required to show the officers’
reasons for conducting the search. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235–36. “Since it
is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of
no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the respondent
or that he did not himself suspect that [he] was armed.” Id. at 236 (footnote
omitted). We do not inquire into the officers’ reasons for conducting the search
of the arrestee’s person because “[t]he interests justifying search are present
whenever an officer makes an arrest.” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177
(2008); see also Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35 (explaining that the close contact
with suspects when making an arrest and transporting them to the jail, as
opposed to the “fleeting contact” involved with “Terry-type stop[s,] . . . is an
adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search
justification”); Byrd, 310 P.3d at 796 (“[S]earches of the arrestee’s person and
personal effects do not require ‘a case-by-case adjudication’ because they always
implicate Chimel concerns for officer safety and evidence preservation.” (quoting
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235)).
Therefore, a lawful custodial arrest justifies a warrantless search of the
person, as long as the search is contemporaneous with the arrest. See Vance,
790 N.W.2d at 786 (“[T]he lawful custodial arrest of a person justifies the
contemporaneous search of the person arrested and of the immediately
surrounding area . . . .”). Here, the officers searched the fanny pack while still at
the scene and within minutes of Scullark’s arrest. Officers need not expose
themselves to unnecessary danger by searching the arrestee and the items on
his person before he is properly secured. “[T]he police may see to the safe custody
and security of suspects first and then make the limited search which the 18
circumstances of the particular case permit.” State v. Shane, 255 N.W.2d 324,
328 (Iowa 1977). “The search incident to arrest rule respects that an officer who
takes a suspect into custody faces an unpredictable and inherently dangerous
situation and that officers can and should put their safety first.” Byrd, 310 P.3d
at 797.
Scullark’s position requires extending the reasoning of Gant and Gaskins
to searches of the person. However, a reasonable search of the person should
not depend on games of “hot potato.” An arrestee cannot establish and reduce
the scope of a permissible SITA by handing the item to a companion before the
officer can search him. See State v. Rincon, 970 N.W.2d 275, 284–85 (Iowa 2022)
(holding that a woman could not prevent police officers from searching her purse
by removing it from an automobile when officers had authority to search the
automobile and its containers under the automobile exception); see also
Reifsnyder, 44 Iowa at 103 (“The offender would speedily dispose of all such
articles which would be found upon his person that might lead to the discovery
of crime.”).
We therefore conclude that because Scullark was wearing the fanny pack
around his waist at the time of arrest, the fanny pack was immediately
associated with his person for purposes of the SITA exception, and the
categorical rule from Robinson and the related Iowa precedent applies. The
search of the fanny pack was reasonable as a search of Scullark’s person, and
no additional justification for the search was required beyond Scullark’s lawful
custodial arrest. We hold that the search of Scullark’s fanny pack was a valid
SITA under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8. The district
court did not err in denying Scullark’s motion to suppress. 19
III. Conclusion.
For the reasons stated above, we vacate the court of appeals decision and
affirm the district court order denying Scullark’s motion to suppress.
Decision of Court of Appeals Vacated; District Court Judgment
Affirmed.
All justices concur except McDermott, J., who files a dissenting opinion. 20
#23–1218, State v. Scullark
McDermott, Justice (dissenting).
Under the Iowa Constitution, before an officer may search or seize
“persons, houses, papers [or] effects,” the officer must first obtain a warrant.
Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. One recognized exception to this warrant requirement,
justified by necessity, allows an officer to search a person placed under arrest
and the area within the person’s immediate control for two purposes: (1) to
ensure the officer’s safety and (2) to prevent the person from destroying evidence
of a crime for which there is probable cause. The majority concludes that the
officers’ search of Patrick Scullark, Jr.’s fanny pack was lawful under this
“search incident to arrest” exception. But because the officer’s search of the
fanny pack in this case meets neither of the two purposes for the exception, I
must respectfully dissent.
Scullark was in his backyard when Officer Jacob Bolstad arrived to
investigate an allegation of domestic violence. Bolstad’s bodycam footage shows
that as he began to talk to Scullark about the matter, Scullark got upset and
walked inside with Bolstad walking after him. Inside the house, the discussion
continued, with a couple of women also present in the room who were helping
Scullark move in. Scullark was distraught and complained to Bolstad that he
didn’t do anything, he was on parole, and the charge might mean going back to
prison. After a few minutes, Scullark calmed down, and at that point, Bolstad
told Scullark that he needed to take him to jail.
Before Bolstad put Scullark in handcuffs, Scullark handed his fanny pack
and cellphone to one of the women in the room. As Bolstad began to handcuff
Scullark, Bolstad said, “All the stuff you’re handing to her, I’m searching.” As
Bolstad continued applying the handcuffs, the woman carrying the fanny pack 21
and phone began to walk ahead of them into an adjoining room. Bolstad told the
woman, “Stay over here with that.” The woman promptly set the fanny pack and
phone down on some boxes. As Bolstad led a handcuffed Scullark toward the
door, Bolstad stopped where the woman had set down the items and picked up
the fanny pack and cellphone. Bolstad admits that, at this point, Scullark could
not have accessed the fanny pack.
Another officer who had arrived was waiting in the backyard when they
exited the house. Bolstad handed the fanny pack to the other officer to carry.
Bolstad led Scullark from the back door, around the house, and to Bolstad’s
police cruiser in front of the house. The two women from inside walked with
them. When they got to Bolstad’s cruiser, Bolstad patted Scullark down,
revealing no weapons or contraband. At this point, a third officer had arrived to
assist. Before putting Scullark in the cruiser, Bolstad gave Scullark, still
handcuffed, a moment to talk to the two women. The women had Scullark’s
mother on speakerphone, and Scullark told his mother that he was being taken
to jail. Bolstad then placed Scullark in the back of the police cruiser and closed
the door. At this point, outside the cruiser, the other officer holding the fanny
pack opened it, and he and Bolstad searched it. The fanny pack contained a
baggy of methamphetamine, for which Scullark was ultimately prosecuted for
possession.
One of the evils that the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution was designed to protect against was the abuse of suspicionless
general warrants. See William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and
Original Meaning 602–1791, at 603–13 (2009) [hereinafter Cuddihy, The Fourth
Amendment]. General warrants allowed government officers to search a person
or property for evidence of wrongdoing without specifying what they were looking 22
for or why they had suspicion to search. See Sanders v. State, 2 Clarke 230, 239
(Iowa 1855). Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless the state
proves that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v.
Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Iowa 2004). The warrantless search of Scullark’s
fanny pack—his “effect,” meaning movable personal property—was thus
unlawful unless a recognized exception applies.
The State relies on the search-incident-to-arrest exception, which permits
an arresting officer to search the arrestee’s person and “the area into which an
arrestee might reach.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Under the
Federal Constitution, the exception allows the search where it ensures officer
safety, prevents evidence from being destroyed, and in the context of
automobiles, enables evidence collection. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235–36 (1973); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–44 (2009). Under the
Iowa Constitution, the exception allows the search only where it ensures officer
safety and prevents evidence from being destroyed. See State v. Gaskins, 866
N.W.2d 1, 14 (Iowa 2015). Because an automobile is not involved, the question
presented here is the same under both the Federal and Iowa Constitutions:
whether once Scullark removed his fanny pack and was handcuffed, the officer-
safety or evidence-destruction rationales existed to justify the search of the fanny
pack.
Once Scullark removed the fanny pack, it was no longer part of his
“person.” And when the woman walked into the adjoining room with the fanny
pack, it was no longer within an area that Scullark could readily access. From
that moment forward, neither of the rationales supporting the search-incident-
to-arrest exception—officer safety and evidence preservation—could justify the
search of the fanny pack. When the officers eventually searched the fanny pack 23
while standing outside the police cruiser, Scullark sat handcuffed in the back
seat of the cruiser with the door shut. We do not assume that once handcuffed
and locked in a police car, an arrestee will exhibit “the skill of Houdini [or] the
strength of Hercules” to break free and gain access to a container. Thornton v.
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 626 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Scullark could not have grabbed a
weapon hidden inside, nor could he have removed any items of evidence had
there conceivably been any.
It bears mentioning that Scullark never ceded his privacy interest in the
fanny pack. The fanny pack was not in any sense abandoned, as Scullark
personally handed it to the woman inside his home. See State v. Bumpus, 459
N.W.2d 619, 625 (Iowa 1990) (holding that a defendant lacks standing to
challenge a search or seizure of abandoned property). And in her hands (or as it
lay on a box in his home), the fanny pack was not otherwise going to be taken to
the jail where it inevitably would have been searched as part of the booking
process. See State v. Entsminger, 160 N.W.2d 480, 483–84 (Iowa 1968) (holding
that police can search an arrestee’s effects during booking without a warrant).
“The search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement,” we
have declared, “must be narrowly construed and limited to accommodating only
those interests it was created to serve.” State v. McGrane, 733 N.W.2d 671, 677
(Iowa 2007). The warrantless search of the fanny pack in this case did nothing
to advance those interests. Because the fanny pack didn’t fall within the search-
incident-to-arrest exception, or any other exception, the police needed to get a
warrant supported by probable cause to search it. They didn’t, and the search
was thus unconstitutional. See State v. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d 293, 297 (Iowa 24
2005). The district court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence
uncovered through the search of the fanny pack.
This conclusion is not groundbreaking. In State v. Canas, for instance, the
police had a warrant for the defendant’s arrest. 597 N.W.2d 488, 491
(Iowa 1999), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601
(Iowa 2001). The police arrived at the defendant’s motel, but when the defendant
saw them, he went back into his room and slammed the door. Id. When the police
knocked and the defendant answered, they pulled him out of the room to arrest
him. Id. When the officers grabbed him, the defendant had been standing about
four feet from an unzipped bag on a nightstand, arguably within his area of
immediate control. Id. After his arrest, the police went back into the motel room,
searched the bag, and found drug paraphernalia. Id. We held that the search-
incident-to-arrest exception did not apply because, at the time of the search, the
defendant was outside the motel room and thus the search did not advance
officer safety or prevent the destruction of evidence. Id. at 493.
In United States v. Davis, the defendant was being chased by police
through a swamp. 997 F.3d 191, 198 (4th Cir. 2021). As he came out of the
swamp to surrender, he took off the backpack he was wearing and laid it on the
ground. Id. The police handcuffed him and then searched his bag. Id. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the government
could not justify the search of the bag under the search-incident-to-arrest
exception because once the defendant was secured in handcuffs and the
backpack was not under his immediate control, there was no longer any safety
or destruction-of-evidence concerns. Id.
Similarly, in United States v. Fernández Santos, the police went to the
defendant’s house to arrest him. 716 F. Supp. 3d 8, 12 (D.P.R. 2024). When they 25
arrived, they saw the defendant throw a fanny pack (yes, another fanny pack)
out a window and into the backyard. Id. The police arrested the defendant inside
the house. Id. After about forty minutes, the police searched the fanny pack.
United States v. Fernández Santos, No. 23–063, 2023 WL 8915838, at *2 (D.P.R.
Dec. 27, 2023). The district court rejected the government’s search-incident-to-
arrest argument and suppressed the items discovered in the fanny pack,
concluding that once the defendant threw the fanny pack into the yard, the
search would not advance the officer-safety or evidence-preservation rationales.
Id. at *7–8; Fernández Santos, 716 F. Supp. 3d at 14 (adopting the magistrate’s
suppression ruling).
United States v. Knapp presents a factual scenario even more analogous to
this case. 917 F.3d 1161, 1163 (10th Cir. 2019). In Knapp, the defendant was
arrested after giving a witness statement to police about a grocery store theft
when officers learned that she had an outstanding arrest warrant. Id. After
making the defendant wait inside the grocery store while several officers
completed the earlier theft investigation, one of the officers eventually took
possession of the purse she had been carrying. Id. at 1163–64. The officer asked
for her consent to search the purse, but she refused. Id. at 1164. When the
defendant asked if she could simply leave the purse in her truck or give it to her
boyfriend, the officer refused. Id. at 1163. The officers placed her in handcuffs
behind her back and led her outside. Id. at 1164. As the defendant stood outside
a police cruiser, an officer threatened that she would be guilty of a felony if she
brought drugs to a detention center. Id. The defendant then told the officer that
the purse contained a pistol. Id. Three officers were present as they searched the
purse while the defendant, still handcuffed, stood with her back to them. Id. She
was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. 26
The government in Knapp argued that the search was justified under the
search-incident-to-arrest exception. Id. at 1167. Analyzing the rationales for the
exception described in Chimel v. California, the Tenth Circuit first concluded that
the purse was not part of the defendant’s “person” at the time of the search. Id.
at 1167–68. Turning next to whether it was within the area of the arrestee’s
immediate control, the court recited several facts: (1) the defendant’s hands were
cuffed behind her back, (2) the arresting officer was standing next to her with
two other officers standing nearby, (3) the purse was closed and placed three to
four feet behind her, and (4) the officers had maintained exclusive possession of
the purse since placing her in handcuffs inside the grocery store. Id. at 1169. In
light of these facts, the court held that it was unreasonable to believe she could
have gained possession of a weapon or destroyed evidence inside her purse at
the time of the search. Id. at 1168. The panel thus reversed the district court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. Id. at 1170.
In this case, the majority concludes that once an officer begins an arrest
attempt, the search-incident-to-arrest exception makes anything on or near the
person at that moment fair game to search, regardless of what happens after. But
in real life, time does not freeze, as we all know, and our analysis of risks
similarly does not remain static as events change. Grounding the search-
incident-to-arrest exception on such an artificial notion—reducing interactions
between suspects and police to what can be thought of as a series of Polaroid
pictures and justifying a later search by holding up an outdated snapshot—
untethers the exception from its rationale. Had the cases discussed above relied
on the “freeze-frame” notion of the search-incident-to-arrest exception, none
would have come out the way that they did. 27
The search-incident-to-arrest exception is based on an existing exigency—
a present threat to officer safety or a present threat of losing evidence—not a
historical one. Taken to its logical end, the majority’s theory would have
permitted the officers in this case not simply to have searched the fanny pack
five minutes after Scullark was handcuffed (as happened here), but for the
officers to hold onto the fanny pack and conduct a warrantless search a month
or even a year later, in a location miles away from Scullark.
The majority worries that a different application would make search-
incident-to-arrest decisions more complicated because it would force officers to
decide between (1) making the arrest immediately, before personal items can be
discarded, to take advantage of the warrant exception or (2) delaying the arrest
and having to go through the hassle of a search warrant. But as Justice Scalia
warned, “The weakness of this argument is that it assumes that, one way or
another, the search must take place. But conducting a Chimel search is not the
Government’s right; it is an exception—justified by necessity—to a rule that
would otherwise render the search unlawful.” Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The search-incident-to-arrest exception
is based on the justification that officers need to search items that presently are
on or near the arrestee, not that officers get to search items that previously were
on or near the arrestee.
I recognize the attractiveness of a bright-line rule in these situations. Clear
rules, when they can be drawn consistent with a person’s constitutional rights,
are unquestionably worthy judicial pursuits. But this case demonstrates what
happens when we expand what is supposed to be a limited exception in favor of
easier-to-administer rules. The framers crafted our constitutional search and
seizure protections despite the potential hindrance or haziness they might pose 28
for law enforcement. “The Fourth Amendment’s framers were well aware of the
constitutional alternatives regarding search and seizure.” Cuddihy, The Fourth
Amendment at 613.
When in conflict, upholding our constitutional protections must always
prevail over the urge for simplicity in implementation. “Solving unsolved crimes
is a noble objective,” as Justice Scalia observed, “but it occupies a lower place in
the American pantheon of noble objectives than the protection of our people from
suspicionless law-enforcement searches. The Fourth Amendment must prevail.”
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 481 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
I would reverse the trial court’s ruling denying the motion to suppress and
remand the case for further proceedings.