IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0104 Filed July 3, 2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NATHEN WAYNE CAMERON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Thomas P. Murphy,
Judge.
A defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for assault causing
serious injury and domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Heard by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ., but decided by Tabor, P.J.,
Greer, J., and Bower, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2024). 2
GREER, Judge.
“Ur done,” “m hurting you,” “m fucking you up,” “m getting even tonight,’
“You will regret everything,” “I promise,” “I will ruin u and I do not care”: Nathen
Cameron sent these messages and more to his girlfriend, Trisha, the same night
that Trisha fell from the balcony of their third-story apartment and sustained injuries
that ultimately led to her death. From this incident, a jury found Cameron guilty of
domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury and assault causing serious injury.
On appeal, Cameron challenges the sufficiency of the evidence concerning his
conviction and sentence for assault causing serious injury, asserting that his words
and actions did not cause a serious injury. Next, involving both convictions,
Cameron asserts the district court abused its discretion in admitting expert
testimony on domestic abuse dynamics. Finally, concerning his sentences,
Cameron maintains the district court abused its discretion in considering that
Cameron did not accept responsibility for his actions when he believed his
description of his role to the court conformed with the jury findings.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Cameron and Trisha were in a relationship for nearly four years and living
together in the same apartment for a year before the night of her fall. That night,
beginning in the early evening, they exchanged numerous text messages.
Cameron sent Trisha messages stating, “Be the victim ur gonna learn what it is. I
am done,” “U play victim,” and—multiple times—just the word “Victim.” Trisha
responded at various intervals: “I DIDN’T DO SHIT TO YOU,” “Not playing games,”
“Not sitting by myself on a Saturday night,” and “u were gone for 5 hours . . . AND
YOU STILL AREN’T HOME.” 3
Cameron had left the apartment building and arrived at a bar at 5:31 p.m.
Thirteen minutes later, he left the bar and went to a friend’s apartment. He sent
his friend a message stating that Trisha was “playing victim and shit,” and he
stopped in a second bar around 8:00 p.m. and had a shot of whiskey. Between
7:57 p.m. and 8:52 p.m., Trisha called Cameron twelve times. Cameron did not
answer any of the calls. Around 9:13 p.m., she left the apartment and met friends
at a different bar than where Cameron was. At 10:18 p.m., Cameron called Trisha,
she answered, and the two spoke for thirty-seven seconds. Around 10:38 p.m.,
Cameron arrived back at the apartment building and parked his car. Two minutes
later, Trisha got out of a rideshare in front of the apartment building and walked
inside. Two minutes after that, Cameron got out of his car and went inside. For
the next twelve minutes or so, Cameron and Trisha were the only people in their
apartment. The downstairs neighbor heard a male voice arguing, a loud crash,
and what he believed was a heavy item being dragged inside of Trisha and
Cameron’s apartment.
At 10:54 p.m., Cameron and his dog walked outside of the apartment
building. At 10:57 p.m., he called a friend on Snapchat and spoke with him for
twenty-four seconds. Seven minutes after exiting the apartment building, at
11:01 p.m., Cameron called 911 from Trisha’s phone. During the 911 call, he told
the dispatcher “my girlfriend just like, we were arguing and she just jumped off the
fucking balcony, bro. . . . She just jumped off the fucking balcony. And she’s
bleeding, bro. She’s bleeding.” He added that the balcony was on the third floor
of the apartment building, and “she’s like response—like, not responsive, but I
know she’s still awake.” Cameron cried and at times broke off from responding to 4
questions, including failing to answer whether Trisha was breathing; he hung up
on the dispatcher.
West Des Moines police officers arrived within five minutes. Officer Jacob
Sutton went to the area behind the apartment building beneath the balcony, where
Cameron was kneeling next to Trisha. She was lying flat on her back with her legs
straight out. Officer Sutton observed a softball-sized pool of blood where he
believed Trisha had landed and noticed she had dirt and leaves on her front;
because of the dirt and leaves and their location, he believed her body had been
moved or rolled after landing. He also saw blood on Trisha’s left knee and injuries
on the tops of her feet. After finding a faint pulse but no signs of breathing, Officer
Sutton and Officer Sydney Corbin began performing cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR) on Trisha. Emergency medical technicians arrived shortly
after law enforcement, took over CPR, and transported Trisha via ambulance to a
hospital.
Officers Sutton and Jacob Belay spoke to Cameron, who told them that
Trisha jumped off the balcony and he “didn’t do shit to her.” He further explained
that he and Trisha were having a “disagreement” that evening because “shit wasn’t
ok,” but he had not been with her. He added that he “just watched [his] fucking
girlfriend jump off of a third story balcony.” He saw her walk on the balcony before
that but thought that she was going out for a smoke or to get some fresh air to calm
down. While Cameron was speaking with officers, he made several phone calls
to his friends from his cell phone. Law enforcement seized the phone as evidence
and detained him; Cameron joked that he had six cell phones on him but did not
hand over Trisha’s cell phone. Law enforcement described Cameron’s emotions 5
during these interactions as up and down and described him as combative.
Cameron was not taken into custody by law enforcement; he went from the
apartment to a third bar where he continued using Trisha’s phone. He asked the
bartender if he could use the bartender’s phone to log into Snapchat to delete
some things, but she told him no.
Cameron called Trisha’s parents from Trisha’s phone and told them that
Trisha had jumped off the balcony. He also said that the police were going to think
that he was responsible. Her parents went to the hospital, where Trisha was on a
ventilator and unconscious. Her mother noticed a rug burn on Trisha’s arm, that
one of her knees was swollen, her fingernails were broken, a toe was bleeding,
and she had spots around her face. Doctors determined that because of the
severe head and spinal cord injuries that Trisha suffered, she was brain dead and
would not recover; there was nothing that they could do to help her. The trauma
surgeon noted the same injuries as Trisha’s mother and found the combination of
laceration on Trisha’s feet and knees with the trauma to her head odd. Trisha died
after her family discontinued life-sustaining treatment.
When law enforcement executed a search warrant on the apartment, they
found the glass sliding door and the screen door to the balcony closed. The blind
that covered the doorway to the balcony was pulled down, to the point that
someone would have to duck underneath it to go out onto the balcony. Law
enforcement also found a ding in the hallway wall, an indent in a bedroom wall,
hair along the doorframe of the glass sliding door and the bottom of the fourth-floor
balcony, scratches in the bedroom door frame, and blood splatters on the bedroom
wall. The edge of the second-floor balcony—the balcony underneath Trisha and 6
Cameron’s—was damaged. Law enforcement seized a set of golf clubs; the head
of the driver had a dent on the back side, which did not match that of a golf ball.
All of the text messages exchanged between Cameron and Trisha had been
deleted from his phone, but detectives recovered them by extracting data from
Cameron’s phone. Detectives measured the apartment and found that the
distance from the railing on the third-floor balcony to the ground was twenty-three
and one-half feet.
Cameron gave the police Trisha’s cell phone two days after Trisha died. He
also consented to an interview with Detectives Jason Hatcher and Gabby Gitzen.
Cameron told them that the night that Trisha fell, he went to see his uncle around
6:00 p.m. He got home around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., but Trisha had left. After she
got home, they were arguing, and he went into the bathroom. He heard the sliding
door open, came out of the bathroom and heard Trisha scream, and then saw her
fall. He claimed that he sprinted down to her and called 911 immediately. He
surmised that maybe Trisha had tried to climb down from the balcony and slipped.
When Detective Hatcher asked Cameron how long he thought he and Trisha were
together before she jumped, he said “ten to thirty minutes. I don’t know, dude. I
don’t know.” In response to Detective Gitzen’s question whether anything got
physical, Cameron said, “No . . . . She threw something across the room, but that’s
about it.” He clarified that she threw her computers. He also added that “it was an
altercation in the apartment” and “we were yelling at each other, the neighbors
maybe could hear that.”
The State charged Cameron with and tried him for first-degree murder, a
class “A” felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.2 (2022); 7
domestic abuse assault by strangulation resulting in bodily injury, a class “D”
felony, in violation of sections 236.2(2), 708.1, and 708.2A(5); and willful injury
causing serious injury, a class “C” felony, in violation of section 708.4(1).
At trial, the trauma surgeon who treated Trisha testified that most people
who die by suicidal falls “jump and they land on their feet or their—you know, their
hands and feet. They don’t usually land on the back of their head.” The surgeon
believed that Trisha’s broken kneecap was not caused by the fall, and she reported
those concerns to the medical examiner. The medical examiner testified, and the
State offered and the court admitted his autopsy report into evidence. The autopsy
report contained the medical examiner’s determination that “[s]ome of the blunt
force injuries sustained by [Trisha] are inconsistent with a simple fall, such as: the
patellar fracture, abrasions on the dorsal feet, and the abrasion on the anterior
right forearm.” The medical examiner believed that the broken kneecap was not
caused by the fall. While he listed the cause of death as injuries to the head and
neck, the medical examiner opined that “[g]iven the unclear circumstances
compounded by the unexplained injuries the manner of death is left as
undetermined.” Trisha had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.081 and cocaine in
her system when a blood sample was taken around 11:44 p.m. the night of the fall.
However, according to testimony at trial, the cocaine was metabolized to the point
that Trisha would have no longer been high at the time the sample was taken. The
medical examiner explained that “[u]sually in suicidal falls, decedents tend to either
jump and land on their feet or they dive and land on the top of their head.” He did
not see injuries associated with a suicidal fall here. 8
Also at trial, the State called Jodi Bowden-Fuentes, a domestic violence
program coordinator. Although Cameron objected to her testimony, the court ruled
it was admissible, explaining, “I do think there’s an aspect in this case that makes
this testimony relevant because the parties were in a domestic relationship. There
was also, regardless of whether willful injury is merged, a domestic abuse count.”
Bowden-Fuentes testified that she had never met Cameron or Trisha and did not
know anything about this case in particular, but she generally described that “[a]ny
resistance by [a domestic violence victim] is met with swift and harsh
consequences” with physical assault as “the most recognized” swift consequence.
On cross-examination, Bowden-Fuentes reiterated that she did not know Trisha or
Cameron, their families, or anything about their social life, their physical or mental
health, their financial situation, or their religion.
A friend of Cameron’s testified that the golf club with the dent was originally
his and that he had dented it while swinging and hitting a golf ball backwards. A
forensic nurse testified via prerecorded video. She stated that she reviewed
photos, the medical examiner’s autopsy report, and medical records of Trisha.
From those documents, she concluded that that bruising around Trisha’s eyes—
petechiae—was the result of CPR, loss of oxygen, and the trauma to the back of
her head, but not due to strangulation. However, she conceded that she had not
performed or attended any autopsies and had not attended Trisha’s. She also had
not spoken to Cameron or any of the medical personnel who treated Trisha before
she died. A forensic pathologist also testified that he reviewed the medical
examiner’s autopsy report, Trisha’s medical records, the 911 call, interviews of
Cameron, and photographs and reports from law enforcement. He concluded that 9
the injury to Trisha’s kneecap could have come from the fall and that all her injuries
were consistent with a fall from a third-story balcony. He also testified that the
injuries were consistent with a suicide, an accidental fall, or a homicidal act.
Cameron testified on his own behalf. He denied that he and Trisha were
fighting on the day of her fall. However, he interpreted her text messages as
accusing him of cheating on her, and he admitted he “clearly did not react well” to
that accusation. He threatened to leave the relationship but insisted that he did
not threaten to kill her. When he arrived back at the apartment around 10:44 p.m.,
he went into the bathroom and smoked marijuana. He came out of the bathroom,
saw Trisha drinking vodka straight from the bottle, poured the vodka down the sink,
and went back into the bathroom. He heard the sliding door to the balcony open
and saw her step onto the balcony. While he was still in the bathroom, he “kind of
heard—[he] just heard, ‘Aah.’ She just yelled, like, ‘Aah.’ . . . And [he] went on the
balcony, and [he] just looked over it, and [he] just saw her. . . . [J]ust saw her
laying on her back on the ground below [their] balcony.” He found her “on her
back. Her leg was folded up underneath her.” When asked why he deleted the
text message exchange with Trisha, he said that he “just didn’t want people to see
the way [they] were talking to each other. So [he] just deleted the messages.” He
insisted that he did not know for certain what happened, stating, “The only thing
that I know for certain is that I didn’t have anything to do with it. But I don’t know.”
He denied assaulting Trisha, strangling her, hitting her with a golf club, throwing
her off the balcony, laying a finger on her, moving her body, or killing her. On
cross-examination, however, he claimed that he unfolded her leg from underneath
her before law enforcement arrived. 10
The jury acquitted Cameron of first-degree murder, finding him guilty of the
lesser-included charge of assault causing serious injury, a class “D” felony, and
domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, a lesser-included charge of domestic
abuse assault by strangulation resulting in bodily injury.1
At sentencing, the State recommended consecutive terms of incarceration;
Cameron requested a deferred judgment and probation. In the presentence
investigation report (PSI), the PSI preparer reported that, when giving his version
of the events, Cameron “still den[ied] any physical assault ever took place.”
Cameron admitted to only “a nasty text argument that led to a verbal one.” The
State offered and the court admitted a Facebook post from Cameron from the day
after the verdict was rendered. Cameron wrote: “Now accepting all the Laughing
emojis.. Thank you to everyone who has continued to support me thru this circus.
I thank god! They slandered me for 7 months, now it’s time for TRUTH. I’m home.”
(Punctuation as in original.)
The court sentenced Cameron to five years of imprisonment on the assault-
causing-serious-injury conviction and one year of imprisonment on the domestic
abuse assault causing bodily injury conviction, to be served concurrently. It also
required that Cameron complete the domestic abuse intervention program and
Iowa domestic assault intervention program. In imposing the sentences, the court
explained:
I’ve also considered that you’ve not accepted responsibility for your actions. The jury found that you committed an assault, which is a specific intent crime. You do not admit to that. The nature of the offense is serious. It required specific intent. And a serious injury is
1 The willful injury causing serious injury charge merged into the assault causing
serious injury conviction. 11
one which creates a substantial risk of death or causes permanent disfigurement or extended loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ. I’ve considered those factors . . . .
Cameron appeals.
II. Discussion.
Cameron only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction for assault causing serious injury,2 the admission of expert testimony on
domestic abuse dynamics at trial, and his sentences. We address Cameron’s
evidentiary challenge first.
A. Expert Testimony.
Next, Cameron asserts that the testimony by Bowden-Fuentes was
irrelevant and, even if relevant, should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial.
He also argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence
as it did not engage in any balancing of this prejudice against its probative value
when making its ruling admitting the evidence. “We review evidentiary rulings for
an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court
exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent
clearly unreasonable.” State v. Wilson, 878 N.W.2d 203, 210–11 (Iowa 2016)
(internal citation omitted).
2 Although Cameron does not challenge the domestic abuse assault causing bodily
injury conviction, to find Cameron guilty of that charge, the jury had to conclude 1. . . . Cameron did an act which was meant to cause pain or injury to [Trisha]. 2. . . . Cameron had the apparent ability to do the act. 3. . . . Cameron’s act caused a bodily injury to [Trisha]. 4. The act occurred between family or household members who resided together at the time of the incident. 12
“Generally, we have been committed to a liberal view on the admissibility of
expert testimony.” Ranes v. Adams Lab’ys, Inc., 778 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Iowa
2010). To determine if the expert testimony is admissible, we consider, first,
whether the testimony “‘will assist the [jury]’ in understanding ‘the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue’” and, second, whether the witness is qualified to testify
as an expert based on “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Id.
(quoting Iowa R. Evid. 5.702). Cameron does not dispute that Bowden-Fuentes
was an expert based on sufficient knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education. Instead, he focuses his argument on her testimony being unnecessary
to assist the jury.
As our supreme court has acknowledged, “[d]omestic violence is never a
single isolated incident. Rather, domestic violence is a pattern of behavior, with
each episode connected to the others.” State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 128 n.6
(Iowa 2004) (quoting Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in
Domestic Violence Civil Cases, 34 Fam. L.Q. 43, 56 (2000)). So, the information
was also helpful for the jury in understanding the elements involved with the
domestic-abuse-assault charge. Likewise, in a prosecution for first-degree
murder—like the prosecution here—expert testimony on domestic abuse generally
can assist the fact finder in determining the state of the mind of the defendant and
thus is helpful to the jury. See State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 28 (Iowa 2006)
(holding that an understanding of the domestically abusive relationship between
the defendant and the victim “was essential to the jury’s ability to determine [the
defendant’s] state of mind on the night of [the decedent’s] death and what might
have motivated him to beat and strangle her”); State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 13
234, 246 (Iowa 2001) (finding no abuse of the district court’s discretion in allowing
expert testimony on domestic abuse and battered women’s syndrome because it
“allowed the jury to view both the defendant’s and the victim’s behavior in the
context of the nature of their relationship”). Thus, Bowden-Fuentes’s testimony
here was relevant to help the jury understand a material issue of the first-degree-
murder charge and the necessary state of mind the State had to prove. That the
jury ultimately acquitted him of that charge does not make the evidence unhelpful;
in contrast, it may have been the basis for his acquittal.
Additionally, the district court limited the testimony to only general concepts
of domestic abuse, and thus, it was not unfairly prejudicial to Cameron because
Bowden-Fuentes did not testify about him, Trisha, or their relationship. Rather,
Bowden-Fuentes testified that she had no knowledge about Trisha, Cameron, or
their families, social life, physical health, mental health, financial situation, or
religion. Instead, she testified about domestic abuse in general, and it was for the
jury to determine whether that general information even applied to Cameron and
his relationship with Trisha.
Although we do not have the benefit of the district court’s balancing analysis
regarding the probative value and the risk of unfair prejudice of the evidence, we
do not find Bowden-Fuentes’s testimony to be unfairly prejudicial to Cameron given
the general nature of the subject matter coupled with the supporting firsthand
testimony related to the incidences of domestic abuse from eyewitnesses. See
Iowa R. Evid. 5.403 (permitting the court to “exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of” unfair prejudice, among
other things); Newell, 710 N.W.2d at 28–29 (explaining that because the expert 14
did not ever testify that the decedent was in fact a victim of domestic violence,
“[t]hat determination was left to the jury” and any prejudice to the defendant would
be based on the jury’s determination the expert’s testimony about domestically
violent relationships applied). The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
Bowden-Fuentes’s testimony. Regarding the court’s failure to conduct the
necessary, applicable balancing test, to the extent the court did abuse its discretion
by failing to conduct the test, we conclude any error was harmless—the probative
value of Bowden-Fuentes’s testimony was not substantially outweighed by a
danger of unfair prejudice. See State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 30 (Iowa 2004)
(discussing that evidentiary errors only require a new trial when a substantial right
of the defendant was affected by the error). This does not entitle Cameron to a
new trial. See id.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence—Assault Causing Serious Injury.
First, Cameron argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove he
committed an act that caused a serious injury to Trisha. To limit the analysis,
Cameron contends that the only serious injury was the spinal and skull fractures
and that the State did not prove the broken kneecap fit the definition of a serious
injury. Then, he asserts that because the jury acquitted him of first-degree murder
and did not find him guilty of any offense that required a finding he forced Trisha
to fall causing the serious injury, the jury must have rejected that he forced Trisha
to fall from the balcony. And because the elements of assault causing serious
injury “did not necessarily involve physical contact between Cameron and [Trisha],”
the State failed to show Cameron “caused” the serious injuries Trisha sustained
through his verbal or physical actions. In his view, the only path to his conviction 15
for assault causing serious injury was if the State could show that his actions or
words inside the apartment caused Trisha to go accidentally fall off the balcony or
commit suicide by jumping. And as he describes it, the jury found that “Cameron
only intended to ‘cause pain or injury’ or put [Trisha] ‘in fear of an immediate
physical contact which would have been painful, injurious, insulting or offensive’ to
[her].” He maintains the evidence could not show the causal connection of his
actions to the serious injury.
With his focus on proof of causation, on appeal, Cameron asks us to apply
the causation analysis found in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm § 26 (Am. L. Inst. June 2024 update), which provides
that when examining factual causation, the fact finder considers whether “the harm
would not have occurred absent the conduct” of the actor. Cameron did not ask
for a causation instruction that would have instructed the jury on the Restatement
language he now offers, so we do not consider Cameron’s causation argument
because of the lack of record made below and because the unchallenged
instructions that were given are the law of the case.3 See State v. Schiebout, 944
N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 2020) (providing that when there are no objections to the
jury instructions, they become the law of the case for purposes of our review of the
record for sufficiency of the evidence).
We review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting convictions for
correction of errors at law. State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 2022).
3 In the record made involving the instructions, we do note that Cameron did object
to the submission of the felony murder charge on the basis of sufficiency of the evidence. 16
We affirm when the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, meaning “the
quantum and quality of evidence is sufficient to ‘convince a rational fact finder that
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Banes, 910
N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018) (citation omitted). In conducting our review,
we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, including all
reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence. Id.
We turn to the unchallenged jury instructions. To find Cameron guilty of
assault causing serious injury, the jury had to conclude:
1. . . . Cameron did an act which was specifically intended to cause pain or injury or specifically intended to place [Trisha] in fear of immediate physical contact which would have been painful, injurious, insulting or offensive to [her]. 2. [Cameron] had the apparent ability to do the act. 3. [Cameron’s] act caused a serious injury to [Trisha].
Accord Iowa Code § 708.2(4). As it was instructed, the jury also had to find that—
regarding a serious injury—Cameron’s act caused “a disabling mental illness,
condition which cripples, incapacitates, weakens or destroys a person’s normal
mental functions or bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which
causes serious permanent disfigurement or extended loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily part or organ.” Two alternatives for potential serious injury
were included in the marshalling instruction for first-degree murder: (1) forcing
Trisha to fall from a third-floor balcony or (2) striking her kneecap. Cameron did
not object to the instruction that described these two alternatives.
As a preliminary matter, Cameron argues that the only serious injury that
the jury could have based its verdict on was the fall from the balcony, and now on
appeal, contends that the injury to Trisha’s kneecap was not a serious injury, thus 17
should not have been considered. That argument was never made below and was
not mentioned in the record made on the motions for judgment on acquittal or part
of any objection to the jury instructions. Likewise, Cameron did not argue the knee
injury was not a serious injury under the law during his closing arguments. Instead,
Cameron’s focus at trial related to lack of proof that he caused the knee injury,
even so, we review the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal not
withstanding any failure to preserve error in the district court. See State v.
Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022).
From our view, there is substantial evidence to support the jury concluding
that Cameron either pushed Trisha off the balcony or struck her kneecap,
shattering it. The State relied upon these alternative theories to reach a conviction
and “we are required to affirm if at least one of the alternatives presented to the
jury is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Triplett, No. 19-1902, 2021 WL
3074475, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 21, 2021) (relying on Iowa Code § 814.28).
Pivoting to the injuries that resulted in Trisha’s death, Cameron acknowledges that
trauma to the head and spine were serious but emphasizes the evidence does not
prove he caused those injuries. But the jury heard from multiple medical experts
that Trisha’s injuries were inconsistent with an intentional jump. Instead, the
injuries demonstrated that she hit the ground with her back first—not her feet or
the top of her head, as the experts noted was usually the case when a person
jumps rather than being pushed. Likewise, she had other injuries that were
inconsistent with only the fall: wounds on her hands and feet, broken fingernails,
and a rug burn on her arm. The jury could have relied on this evidence to find that 18
Cameron caused either the injuries from the fall and Trisha did not intentionally
jump or attempt suicide.
In addition, the jury also could have factored in multiple inconsistencies in
Cameron’s story in determining his guilt: while Cameron testified that Trisha landed
with her leg folded underneath her, when officers arrived her legs were straight
out; Cameron denied moving her body yet she had grass and dirt on her front side
while the impact injuries were to her back side, and he was the only person with
Trisha before law enforcement arrived. Cameron vacillated between saying he
saw Trisha jump, he saw her walk onto the balcony, and he only heard her scream
while he remained in the bathroom. He maintained that she had thrown her
computer at him; law enforcement found no damage to the computers in the
apartment. Similarly, Cameron testified that Trisha was drinking vodka straight
from the bottle, but law enforcement did not find a vodka bottle. He originally told
law enforcement that he arrived home around 8:00 p.m., but security camera
footage showed him parking Trisha’s car at 10:38 p.m.
The jury also could have considered that, when officers searched the
apartment—which had been secured since they first responded to the 911 call—
the screen and glass sliding doors to the balcony were closed and the shade was
lowered to the point that it would have blocked someone from walking through.
Yet Cameron did not mention seeing Trisha duck underneath the shade, lower it
after she was on the balcony, or close either sliding door, and he did not say that
he did so himself. As another consideration, Cameron had Trisha’s phone, which
he used to call 911 and Trisha’s parents; yet he kept the phone for two days and
deleted his text conversation with her before surrendering it. And although 19
Cameron claimed that he called 911 immediately after finding Trisha on the
ground, evidence demonstrated that he waited seven minutes and called and
spoke with his friend on Snapchat before doing so.
“[A] defendant’s false story to explain or deny a material fact against him is
by itself an indication of guilt and is relevant to show that the defendant fabricated
evidence to aid his defense.” State v. Bloom, 983 N.W.2d 44, 50 (Iowa 2022)
(cleaned up); accord State v. Little, No. 19-1062, 2021 WL 1400068, at *9 (Iowa
Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2021) (noting a jury could properly infer guilt based upon actions,
such as making inconsistent statements). While Cameron insisted that he did
nothing to Trisha and they were only involved in a verbal argument, the jury “was
free to discount that testimony based on its inconsistency with other evidence and
[Cameron’s] interest in the trial.” State v. Jenkins, No. 21-1718, 2023 WL 4759448,
at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. July 26, 2023). For these reasons, we find that the guilty
verdict for assault causing serious injury is supported by substantial evidence.
C. Sentence.
Lastly, Cameron challenges his sentences imposed, arguing the court
abused its discretion because it considered the fact that Cameron did not accept
responsibility for his actions. He points out that he only admitted that he and Trisha
had a verbal altercation with no intent to seriously injure her and he asserts his
version at trial comported with what the jury found—an “assault causing serious
injury but without the intent to cause a serious injury.” But the State pointed out at
sentencing that Cameron never admitted he assaulted Trisha at any time or
caused her to suffer a serious injury, so his version did not align with the jury
verdict. And as the State argued to the district court at sentencing, once released 20
from jail, Cameron posted on his Facebook page that “he’s now accepting all
laughing emojis and that he believes he was subjected to seven months of
slander.”
While Cameron argues that the jury’s verdicts did not require that it find he
physically touched Trisha, that is not so. The jury here found Cameron guilty of
both assault causing serious injury and domestic abuse assault causing bodily
injury. Both of those convictions required a showing that Cameron caused physical
injury to her—both a serious injury and a bodily injury. And the serious injury must
have comprised “a disabling mental illness, condition which cripples, incapacitates,
weakens or destroys a person’s normal mental functions or bodily injury which
creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement or extended loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or
organ.” Neither charge involved merely a verbal altercation or nasty text argument.
Thus, Cameron did fail to accept responsibility for his actions here, given that he
insisted that he never committed any physical assault of Trisha. Instead, he
reduced his actions to a nasty text and a verbal battle.
“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within
the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only
be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate
matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). To establish an
abuse of discretion, the defendant bears the burden to affirmatively show that the
district court relied on improper factors or clearly untenable grounds. State v.
Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 759, 762 (Iowa 1998). Here, the district court considered
Cameron’s age and employment, criminal history, mental-health and substance- 21
abuse needs, and that he had “loving and supportive family.” But it also examined
the nature of the offense, the community’s need for protection, the maximum
opportunity for rehabilitation, and Cameron’s version of the incident contained in
the PSI report, where he denied any assault occurred. Along with Cameron’s lack
of acceptance of responsibility, these factors are all reasonable and proper for the
court to consider. See State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022)
(noting a lack of remorse or responsibility is highly pertinent to evaluating the need
for rehabilitation). For these reasons, the court correctly concluded that Cameron
did not accept responsibility for his actions, and it did not abuse its discretion in
factoring this consideration into determining his sentence.
III. Conclusion.
Because the verdict for assault causing serious injury is supported by
substantial evidence that Cameron either caused Trisha to fall from the balcony—
fracturing her skull and spine—or hit her, breaking her kneecap, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony on domestic abuse dynamics to
assist the jury in understanding the first-degree murder charge of which Cameron
was eventually acquitted, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
considering that Cameron failed to accept responsibility for physically assaulting
Trisha when imposing his sentences. Because the district court did not abuse its
sentencing discretion, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.