IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1081 Filed October 1, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL ALLEN ZANONI JR., Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Bethany Currie,
Judge.
A defendant appeals his drug-related convictions. AFFIRMED.
Denise M. Gonyea (argued) of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard at oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ. 2
AHLERS, Presiding Judge.
A jury found Michael Zanoni guilty of three crimes: (1) possession with intent
to deliver over five grams of methamphetamine (enhanced as a second offense);
(2) failure to affix drug tax stamp (enhanced as a habitual offender); and
(3) possession of marijuana (enhanced as a third offense and habitual offender).
He was sentenced accordingly, and he appeals.
Zanoni raises six issues. He argues: (1) his right to a speedy trial was
violated because he was not brought to trial within one year of arraignment; (2) the
district court erred by not enforcing a plea agreement he claims to have reached
with the State; (3) the district court erred by denying his request to continue his
trial; (4) the district court erred in denying his motion seeking to suppress evidence
extracted from a cell phone; (5) the district court erred by denying his motion for
new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct for failing to call a witness; and (6) the
district court erred by denying his motion for new trial based on the claim that the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
I. Background
An Ames citizen became concerned that drugs were being sold in the
parking lot of an apartment complex next to his home. The concerned citizen
installed video cameras on his property to record the suspicious activity. He
eventually called 911 to report seeing a man (later identified as Zanoni) meeting
with others in the parking lot and “fiddling around” in the trunk of a car.
When police arrived in response to the 911 call, an officer drove past the
parking lot and saw Zanoni with a black backpack accented with neon green or
neon yellow. The officer made eye contact with Zanoni, but he didn’t see anything 3
suspicious, so he started to drive away. Immediately thereafter, the officer
received a call from dispatch saying the concerned citizen had called back and
reported that Zanoni had taken off running in the opposite direction after seeing
the officer. The officer circled back and spotted Zanoni twice, but the officer was
unable to apprehend him. Both times the officer saw Zanoni, Zanoni did not have
the backpack with him.
After searching unsuccessfully for Zanoni, the officer began looking for the
backpack by retracing Zanoni’s suspected escape route. The officer found a
backpack abandoned behind a row of trees where other items had also been
discarded. The backpack looked like it had not been sitting outside for long. The
officer took the bag to the police station and searched it. Inside, he found syringes,
a digital scale, marijuana, methamphetamine, two cell phones, and handwritten
notes of phone numbers and dollar amounts. The officer testified that drug dealers
frequently have two cell phones—one for personal use and the other for dealing.
The officer also testified that the notes were consistent with the types of notes he
sees in drug-dealing cases.
The backpack also contained items linking it to Zanoni. There was a
financial institution receipt with Zanoni’s name and account information on it and
other paper containing his name. One of the cell phones found in the backpack
was searched pursuant to a warrant. That search uncovered several “selfie” style
photos of Zanoni. The phone also had several text messages in which the person
sending the messages identifies himself as Zanoni. The user of the phone also
logged into user accounts with usernames that included Zanoni’s name, in whole 4
or in part. The phone also contained a photograph of Zanoni’s state-issued
identification card.
Based on this evidence, the State charged Zanoni with the aforementioned
crimes. As previously noted, the jury found him guilty of all three crimes.
II. Discussion of the Issues
We address the six issues Zanoni raises in turn.
A. Speedy Trial
Generally, a defendant is required to be brought to trial with one year of
arraignment. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(c). As Zanoni was not brought to trial within
that period, he moved to dismiss the charges on that basis. But the district court
correctly noted that there is an exception to the right to be brought to trial within
one year when the defendant either (1) personally waives the right on the record
or (2) personally waives the right in writing. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(d). Here,
Zanoni did both. As a result, the district court found that Zanoni took a “belt-and-
suspenders approach” by waiving in both ways, even though either would have
sufficed, and denied his motion.
On appeal, Zanoni challenges only his written waiver. The written waiver
contains a recitation of Zanoni’s rights, his affirmation of his understanding of them,
and a waiver of them. It also contains the correct case number and signatures of
Zanoni and his attorney. Nevertheless, Zanoni contends the written waiver was
invalid because the top line of the caption of the document refers to Wright County
rather than Story County. Because of this error, Zanoni contends that the Story
County Clerk of Court should have rejected the filing under Iowa Rule of Electronic
Procedure 16.308. 5
We need not address the merits of Zanoni’s challenge to his written waiver.
As noted, Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(d) allows a defendant to waive
the right to be brought to trial within one year of arraignment in either of two ways.
Zanoni waived both ways—in an on-the-record hearing as well as in writing. As
Zanoni does not challenge his on-the-record waiver, that waiver stands, so
Zanoni’s challenge based on a claimed violation of his right to be brought to trial
within one year of arraignment fails.
B. Failure to Enforce Plea Agreement
The day before his trial, Zanoni filed a motion seeking to enforce a plea
agreement he claimed to have reached with the State about ten months earlier in
June 2023.1 The claimed agreement called for the State to dismiss two charges
and reduce the third, with Zanoni pleading guilty to the reduced charge. The district
court denied Zanoni’s motion. Zanoni challenges the denial on appeal.
“Plea [agreements] are akin to contracts.” State v. Beres, 943 N.W.2d 575,
582 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). We review claims of breach of contract for
correction of errors at law. Dolly Invs., LLC v. MMG Sioux City, LLC, 984 N.W.2d
168, 173 (Iowa 2023).
Zanoni’s claim that a plea agreement was reached is supported by a letter
from an assistant county attorney to Zanoni’s then-defense counsel confirming that
an agreement was reached and the terms of the agreement. But even if that letter
1 At oral argument, counsel for Zanoni attempted to discuss a prior guilty plea that
Zanoni ultimately withdrew after the district court granted his motion in arrest of judgment in January 2023. Because Zanoni’s appellate briefing only addresses a purported agreement from June 2023, we limit our analysis to consideration of that purported agreement only. 6
establishes that an agreement had been reached, the State was permitted to
withdraw from the agreement “at any time prior to, but not after, actual entry of the
guilty plea by defendant or other action by defendant constituting detrimental
reliance upon the arrangement.” State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa 1979).
Zanoni never entered a guilty plea, nor does he point to any event that
shows that he detrimentally relied on an agreement. During the final pretrial
conference, the district court asked Zanoni’s attorney directly, “[W]hat evidence do
you have that your client relied on the agreement and has not withdrawn from it?”
His counsel acknowledged, “I have nothing to show the court.” This exchange plus
the surrounding circumstances caused the district court to deny the motion, stating,
“You’ve asked to redepose witnesses. You’ve refiled motions to dismiss. Clearly,
there was no intention whatsoever of taking this plea agreement until maybe 1:17
today when the motion was filed. The motion is denied.”
The court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, and the court’s
conclusion contains no legal error. Zanoni’s actions were consistent with those of
a defendant with no plea agreement. He never advised the court of an agreement.
He never asked to set a plea hearing. About a month and one-half after the date
of the letter, he participated in a hearing at which he waived his right to be brought
to trial within one year of arraignment—a waiver that would be unnecessary if
Zanoni intended to plead guilty pursuant to the claimed plea agreement. Nine
different trial dates were scheduled after the date of the letter, yet Zanoni never
informed the court that a trial date was unnecessary because he intended to plead
guilty. Additionally, Zanoni moved to dismiss the charges—another action
inconsistent with having a plea agreement. He also asked to redepose witnesses. 7
Under these circumstances, it is clear that both the State and Zanoni operated with
the understanding that there was no plea agreement. Zanoni’s challenge on this
ground fails.
C. Denial of Continuance Request
The day before his trial, Zanoni filed a motion seeking to continue it. The
district court denied the motion. Zanoni challenges the denial on appeal. We
review for an abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb the ruling unless an
injustice has resulted. State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Iowa 2000).
To assess Zanoni’s claim, we start with some procedural history. The trial
date Zanoni sought to continue was the fourteenth trial date set in his case. Zanoni
had previously filed a motion to continue the thirteenth trial date, which was
scheduled to take place just one week earlier. At the hearing on that motion,
Zanoni testified that he and his attorney would be better prepared if he could be
given a week’s continuance. The court granted Zanoni’s request and continued
the case one week to the fourteenth trial date, which Zanoni unsuccessfully tried
to continue.2 In denying the request to continue the last trial date, the court gave
the following rationale to defense counsel:
Well, last week, when you called Mr. Zanoni to testify at the hearing on the motion to continue, he said that a week—to start tomorrow would be fine. So I’m taking his word on that. He has had sufficient time. He’s had twenty months or so. And [a previous defense attorney] had previously done depositions a year ago, so clearly
2 Part of the reason the trial was continued only one week was that Zanoni had
another felony case pending in Story County. In both that case and this case, Zanoni had redemanded his right to a speedy trial, and that ninety-day speedy-trial deadline was approaching. Due to defense counsel’s schedule and the need to have different jury panels for Zanoni’s two cases, there was difficulty scheduling both cases for trial within the speedy-trial deadline if this case did not proceed to trial when it did. 8
previous attorneys did do work on the case. It’s not as though it was sitting completely stale with no motion whatsoever. The motion to continue is denied.
As the district court observed during the hearing, Zanoni appeared to be
undertaking a strategy to delay the trial. The record supports this observation. At
some point, the case needed to be tried, and we find no abuse of the district court’s
discretion in making that happen when it did by denying Zanoni’s latest request for
a continuance.
D. Motion to Suppress
Next, Zanoni argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress evidence extracted from the cell phone found in the abandoned
backpack. The motion was made orally on the third day of trial. The basis for the
motion was that the original search warrant application and warrant were not
retained—they only existed in electronic form in the court filing system. Zanoni
claims Iowa Rule of Electronic Procedure 16.411(1) required the filer of the search
warrant application and warrant to retain the original for inspection and, because
that was not done, the warrant was invalid. The district court denied the motion as
untimely and because rule 16.411(1) does not apply to search warrant applications
or warrants. We agree with both bases for denying the motion.
As to determinations of timeliness of a motion to suppress, we review for
abuse of discretion. State v. Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Iowa 2009). Motions to
suppress illegally obtained evidence must be filed no later than forty days after
arraignment. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(4)(c), (6).3 Failure to meet that deadline
3 The Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure underwent several revisions while this
case was pending in the district court. All references made to those rules are to 9
“waives the objection that the evidence was unlawfully obtained unless good cause
is shown for a later filing.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.12(3). There is no question the
motion was untimely, as it was made 549 days after arraignment. We find no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to deny Zanoni’s motion as
untimely.
Although the untimely nature of Zanoni’s motion is a sufficient basis for
rejecting Zanoni’s challenge, we also address the merits. We review a district court
ruling interpreting the rules of electronic procedure for correction of errors at law.
State v. Mendoza, 999 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa Ct. App. 2023).
As noted, Zanoni’s challenge is based on his contention that rule 16.411(1)
required the retention of the original search warrant application and warrant. This
calls on us to interpret rule 16.411(1). In interpreting court rules, we apply the
same principles that we use for interpreting statutes. In re N.F., 17 N.W.3d
667, 674 (Iowa 2025). One of those principles is that when the text is plain and its
meaning is clear, we do not search for meaning beyond the express terms of the
rule. See Vaudt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 4 N.W.3d 45, 50 (Iowa 2024). If the
text is “clear and unambiguous, we apply a plain and rational meaning consistent
with the subject matter of the statute.” State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 202
(Iowa 2004).
the newest revisions because both parties cite to the newest version, neither argues the revision changed the relevant substantive law, and our supreme court has ordered retroactive application of the newest rules to cases pending at the time of their adoption. Iowa Supreme Ct. Order, In the Matter of Adopting Amendments to the Revised Chapter 2 Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure ¶ 2 (May 31, 2023). 10
Here, the rule provides: “When the law requires the filing of an original
document, such as a will, codicil, mortgage document, note payable, birth
certificate, foreign judgment, or other certified or verified document, the filer must
scan the original document and electronically file the scanned document.” Iowa
R. Elec. P. 16.411(1)(a) (emphasis added). In that instance, the filer must retain
the original for at least two years or until the conclusion of the case, appeal, estate,
or as otherwise required by law. Iowa R. Elec. P. 16.411(1)(b).
The clear and unambiguous text of the rule reveals that it applies only when
the law requires the filing of an original document. Iowa R. Elec. P. 16.411(1)(a).
The rule provides some examples of documents for which the law requires an
original to be filed. In contrast to the examples listed in the rule, Zanoni points to
no law requiring the filing of an original search warrant application or warrant, and
we have found none in our own search. Compare Iowa Code
§§ 633.301, .302 (2022) (requiring the clerk to file and maintain an original will),
and Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.961 (requiring filing of a promissory note for cancellation
before judgment can be entered), with Iowa Code §§ 808.3, .4, .5, .8, .11 (imposing
no requirement that an original search warrant application or warrant be filed or
maintained). In fact, some rules and statutes suggest that it is permissible, if not
preferable, for search warrant applications to be submitted and search warrants to
be issued electronically. For example, Iowa Rule of Electronic Procedure 16.702
permits a search warrant application to be presented to a judicial officer “in paper
form if the applicant or the court does not have immediate access to technology
necessary to electronically present the application to the court”—suggesting
electronic presentation is the norm and presentation of a paper application the 11
exception. Similarly, Iowa Code section 808.3(1)(b) permits submission of a
search warrant application to a judicial officer “in person or by electronic
submission,” and section 808.4 permits the warrant to be issued electronically.
Given these authorities permitting electronic handling of search warrant
applications and warrants—coupled with Zanoni’s failure to cite any authority to
the contrary—we conclude that search warrant applications and warrants are not
documents for which the law requires the filing of an original. As such, like the
district court, we conclude that rule 16.411(1) does not apply to search warrant
applications or search warrants. The district court correctly denied Zanoni’s motion
to suppress the evidence extracted from the cell phone.
E. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Zanoni’s next contention is that the court erred in denying his post-trial
motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. His argument stems
from the fact that the State initially listed Ames police officer John Barney as a
witness in the minutes of testimony. Later, the State informed defense counsel
that it did not intend to call Officer Barney as a witness and removed the officer
from the witnesses listed in the minutes. Zanoni claims the prosecutor’s failure to
call Officer Barney as a witness was misconduct, amounting to a violation of his
due process rights and warranting a new trial, because he claims Officer Barney
had information favorable to Zanoni’s defense. He also claims the State’s removal
of Officer Barney from the minutes of testimony was misconduct because it was 12
intended to deny him the right to depose that witness under Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.13(1). We disagree on both claims.4
We review a court’s ruling related to prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of
discretion and only reverse if such discretion was based on “grounds clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d
124, 134 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). A new trial based on prosecutorial
misconduct resulting in a due process violation will only be granted if the defendant
proves prosecutorial misconduct occurred and that the “misconduct resulted in
prejudice that denied the defendant a fair trial.” Id. at 138.
Prosecutors have a duty to comply with the requirements of due process to
ensure the defendant receives a fair trial. See id. at 139. But Zanoni cites no
persuasive authority for his claim that the prosecutor had the obligation to call a
witness listed in the minutes. In fact, our case law establishes that prosecutors
have no duty to call a witness listed in the minutes of testimony if they later
determine the witness’s testimony is unnecessary. State v. Shipley, 757 N.W.2d
228, 232 (Iowa 2008) (finding no such duty in Iowa Rule of Criminal
4 Zanoni’s brief makes passing reference to an additional argument—that the court
erred when it did not allow him to depose Officer Barney regardless of whether the officer had been removed from the list of witnesses in the minutes of testimony. If Zanoni is attempting to make this a separate issue, we find the issue forfeited. The section heading in Zanoni’s brief asserts that the court erred by denying his motion for new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct for failing to call Officer Barney as a witness. Neither the section heading nor the argument that followed developed any independent argument about a standalone right to depose Officer Barney. So, if Zanoni is attempting to raise a standalone issue to that effect, we find the issue forfeited due to Zanoni’s failure to adequately identify it, develop it, or cite relevant authority in support of it. See State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 311 (Iowa 2024) (stating a party forfeits an issue when a party fails to clearly identify an issue, make more than a perfunctory argument in support of an issue, or cite any authority in support of the issue). 13
Procedure 2.5(3)); State v. Castillo, 315 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa 1982) (holding that
now rule 2.5(3) “does not require the State to call every witness whose name is
endorsed” on the trial information and minutes). And we see no misconduct in
removing a witness from the witness list when the State no longer intends to call
the witness, even if that may have had the practical effect of preventing Zanoni
from deposing the witness under rule 2.13(1).
Zanoni’s arguments ignore two important tools in his toolbox. First, if Zanoni
believed Officer Barney had information favorable to the defense, Zanoni could
have compelled him to testify via subpoena. See State v. Russell, 897 N.W.2d
717, 731 (Iowa 2017) (recognizing state and federal constitutional rights to compel
testimony). Second, even though Zanoni no longer had the right to depose Officer
Barney under rule 2.13(1) once he was removed from the State’s witness list in the
minutes, he still had the option of requesting the court to order Officer Barney to
be deposed under rule 2.13(6)(a). Regardless of whether that request was
granted, it does not change the fact that Zanoni could have subpoenaed the officer
to testify about the information Zanoni contends was favorable to him. The State
did not have the obligation to call the witness for Zanoni. The district court reached
the same conclusion, and we find no abuse of discretion in its decision to deny
Zanoni’s motion for new trial accordingly.
F. Weight of Evidence
Zanoni’s final contention is that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for a new trial based on his claim that the verdict is contrary to 14
the weight of the evidence.5 A court may grant a new trial “[w]hen the verdict is
contrary to law or contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.24(2)(b)(7). Zanoni claims the weight of the evidence preponderates against
a finding that he possessed the backpack containing the drugs.
A district court may grant a motion for a new trial only in exceptional
circumstances where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.
State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 2003). The district court has broad
discretion when ruling on motions for new trial based on the weight of the evidence.
Id. We will only overturn its decision when it abuses its discretion by basing its
decision on “grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly
unreasonable.” Id. Our task is not to review the underlying question by making
our own credibility determinations or reweighing evidence. Id. at 203. Instead, we
analyze the evidence to determine whether the district court abused its discretion
when it found that the evidence did or did not preponderate against the verdict. Id.
In doing so, we rely on the credibility and evidentiary inferences made by the
district court. Id. at 209.
All three of the crimes of which Zanoni was found guilty required proof that
he possessed the backpack containing the contraband. To prove possession the
5 The issue heading raising this issue in Zanoni’s brief refers to claimed error in
denying his motion in arrest of judgment based on the weight of the evidence. However, the body of the argument in this section focuses on the denial of his motion for new trial, as it should. See McGhee v. State, No. 22-0075, 2023 WL 3862172, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7, 2023) (finding a motion in arrest of judgment to be an improper vehicle for claiming a verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence). As the substance of the argument focuses on the denial of his new- trial motion—and not his motion in arrest of judgment—we limit our analysis accordingly. 15
State must show the defendant “exercised dominion and control over the
contraband, had knowledge of the contraband’s presence, and had knowledge the
material was a narcotic.” State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Iowa 2008).
Actual possession can be shown by evidence that contraband was on an
individual’s person at some point. State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Iowa
2021).
Zanoni contends the verdict was against the greater weight of the evidence
due to lack of proof that he possessed the backpack, and the court abused its
discretion in finding otherwise. So we turn to the evidence. Two individuals
witnessed Zanoni with a black backpack accented with neon green or yellow.
When an officer drove by in response to a 911 call reporting suspicious activity,
Zanoni fled in the opposite direction with the backpack. The officer pursued Zanoni
and saw him two times without a backpack. Unable to apprehend Zanoni and
suspecting he had discarded the backpack, the officer traced Zanoni’s suspected
escape route. The officer found a backpack matching the description of the one in
Zanoni’s possession. A search of the backpack revealed evidence of Zanoni’s
possession of it, including a bank receipt with Zanoni’s name and account
information; a phone containing several selfies of Zanoni; a picture of his state-
issued ID; several text messages where the sender identified himself as Zanoni;
and several apps with account names containing Zanoni’s name either in whole or
in part.
This evidence supports the jury’s finding that Zanoni possessed the
backpack, his knowledge of the contraband within, and his knowledge that the
contents were narcotics. See Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 343 (finding actual possession 16
when a defendant looked back at a bag of drugs on the ground where he had been
standing and attempted to shepherd police away from the area); State v. Keys,
No. 11-2089, 2013 WL 1457044, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2013) (finding actual
possession when an officer witnessed a defendant stop midflight and later found
drugs in the same spot the defendant stopped). Given the plethora of evidence
linking Zanoni to the backpack containing drugs and evidence of his intent to
distribute them, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined
the weight of the evidence did not preponderate against the verdict and thus
denied the motion for a new trial.
III. Conclusion
Finding no merit in any of Zanoni’s six challenges, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.