IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1368 Filed June 30, 2021
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MATTHEW WILLIAM CHINDLUND, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pocahontas County, Kurt J. Stoebe,
Judge.
Matthew Chindlund appeals his convictions following his guilty pleas to
assault while displaying a dangerous weapon and criminal mischief in the third
degree. AFFIRMED.
Kevin Hobbs, Johnston, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and May, JJ. 2
DOYLE, Presiding Judge.
Matthew Chindlund appeals his convictions following his guilty pleas to
assault while displaying a dangerous weapon and criminal mischief in the third
degree. Chindlund argues his pleas “were not voluntary and intelligently provided
given his mental incapacity.” Having failed to establish he was incompetent at the
time of his pleas or make a showing that a reasonable person would believe that
there is a substantial question of his competency, we affirm Chindlund’s
convictions and sentences.
I. Facts and Procedural History.
In July 2020, Chindlund attacked a CenturyLink employee who was working
on a phone line near Chindlund’s home. Chindlund accused the employee of wire-
tapping his home. He chased the employee with a metal pipe and threatened to
“beat his ass.” Chindlund picked up the employee’s work equipment and refused
to return it. Chindlund was arrested and taken to jail. He was charged with assault
while displaying or using a dangerous weapon. While in jail, Chindlund damaged
a telephone, television, television wall stand, a steel table, and his cell wall. He
was charged with criminal mischief in the second degree.
Chindlund made his initial appearance from his jail cell because he was still
acting in an aggressive manner. Jail notes show that Chindlund was talking to
himself in the mirror and accusing officers of breaking the law by tapping his phone
lines. A jail note from August 2 recounts that Chindlund had calmed down and
was behaving more respectfully that day. A jail note from August 9 stated that
Chindlund was experiencing anxiety and requested to see a doctor. After his bond
was reduced, Chindlund was released from jail on August 21. A month later, 3
Chindlund’s probation officer filed a report of violation alleging that Chindlund had
not contacted the department of correctional services and had not completed a
required substance-abuse evaluation. An arrest warrant was issued on September
16, and Chindlund was arrested and jailed a few days later.
On September 21, Chindlund signed written waivers of rights and guilty
pleas to assault while displaying a dangerous weapon, an aggravated
misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2)(c) and 708.2(3) (2020),
and to criminal mischief in the third degree, an aggravated misdemeanor in
violation of Iowa Code section 716.5. He asked the court to accept his pleas and
waived his rights to personally appear before the court and to have the court
address him personally. He also waived his right to move in arrest of judgment
and asked that he be sentenced immediately. The paper pleas were presented to
the court by counsel two days later. The court accepted the pleas, adjudged
Chindlund guilty of the charges, and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of
incarceration not to exceed two years on each count with the terms of incarceration
to be run concurrently.
Chindlund appeals contending he suffers from “a mental health problem”
and therefore his guilty pleas and waiver of rights were not voluntarily and
intelligently given.1
1 Other than taking the appeal, we cannot discern what relief Chindlund requests. 4
II. Standard of Review.
Our court reviews whether a trial court should have ordered a competency
hearing de novo. State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773 (Iowa 2018).
III. Analysis.
This is a direct appeal from Chindlund’s guilty pleas. Section 814.6(1)(a)(3)
(2020) prevents defendants from challenging their guilty pleas for anything but a
class “A” felony unless they establish “good cause.” So our threshold question is
whether Chindlund has good cause to appeal from his pleas. State v. Tucker, 959
N.W.2d 140, 153 (Iowa 2021).
Our supreme court has liberally interpreted good cause to mean the
defendant need only show a “legally sufficient reason.” Id. (quoting State v.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020)). What constitutes a legally sufficient
reason is context specific. Id. In Damme, the court held, “good cause exists to
appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges his
or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.” 944 N.W.2d at 105. More recently,
the court declined an invitation to expand the concept of good cause and hold that
a claim that a plea is not intelligently or voluntarily made constitutes good cause to
appeal as a matter of right. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 153.
Chindlund does not address the section 814.6 good cause issue. Chindlund
does not challenge his sentence, so Damme is of no help to him. See 944 N.W.2d
at 105. Chindlund asserts his pleas were not intelligently or voluntarily made, so,
at first blush, Tucker would seem to thwart him. But there is more. Chindlund
claims his plea was not knowingly and intelligently made because he was suffering
from a mental-health problem—thus alluding to a competency issue. Tucker did 5
not involve a competency issue, and our supreme court has not yet considered
whether a defendant’s claim of incompetence at the time of the guilty plea provides
section 814.6 good cause for a direct appeal. This court has addressed the issue
and concluded “that good cause exists to challenge competency at the time of the
plea irrespective of whether the issue was contested below.” State v. Cue, No. 19-
2150, 2020 WL 6157813, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2020), further review denied
(Dec. 22, 2020). Here, the State, citing Cue, “assumes without conceding” that a
challenge to the defendant’s competency to enter a guilty plea and waive a motion
in arrest of judgment establishes good cause to appeal from a guilty plea. After all
that, we find Chindlund has section 814.6 good cause to appeal from his pleas.
So where does that leave us?
Throughout the district court proceedings, neither Chindlund nor his counsel
mentioned Chindlund’s competency. No one requested a competency hearing,
and Chindlund does not ask for one on appeal. Being a paper plea, Chindlund did
not appear before the court taking the plea. If one follows Chindlund’s argument,
apparently the district court was supposed to have divined from the minutes of
testimony that Chindlund was incompetent to plead.
There is a presumption that a defendant is competent to stand trial, and the
defendant has the burden to prove incompetence. Cue, 2020 WL 6157813, at *3
(citing State v. Gaston, No. 18-1293, 2020 WL 1307690, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar.
18, 2020)). But when questions arise about a criminal defendant’s competency,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1368 Filed June 30, 2021
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MATTHEW WILLIAM CHINDLUND, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pocahontas County, Kurt J. Stoebe,
Judge.
Matthew Chindlund appeals his convictions following his guilty pleas to
assault while displaying a dangerous weapon and criminal mischief in the third
degree. AFFIRMED.
Kevin Hobbs, Johnston, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and May, JJ. 2
DOYLE, Presiding Judge.
Matthew Chindlund appeals his convictions following his guilty pleas to
assault while displaying a dangerous weapon and criminal mischief in the third
degree. Chindlund argues his pleas “were not voluntary and intelligently provided
given his mental incapacity.” Having failed to establish he was incompetent at the
time of his pleas or make a showing that a reasonable person would believe that
there is a substantial question of his competency, we affirm Chindlund’s
convictions and sentences.
I. Facts and Procedural History.
In July 2020, Chindlund attacked a CenturyLink employee who was working
on a phone line near Chindlund’s home. Chindlund accused the employee of wire-
tapping his home. He chased the employee with a metal pipe and threatened to
“beat his ass.” Chindlund picked up the employee’s work equipment and refused
to return it. Chindlund was arrested and taken to jail. He was charged with assault
while displaying or using a dangerous weapon. While in jail, Chindlund damaged
a telephone, television, television wall stand, a steel table, and his cell wall. He
was charged with criminal mischief in the second degree.
Chindlund made his initial appearance from his jail cell because he was still
acting in an aggressive manner. Jail notes show that Chindlund was talking to
himself in the mirror and accusing officers of breaking the law by tapping his phone
lines. A jail note from August 2 recounts that Chindlund had calmed down and
was behaving more respectfully that day. A jail note from August 9 stated that
Chindlund was experiencing anxiety and requested to see a doctor. After his bond
was reduced, Chindlund was released from jail on August 21. A month later, 3
Chindlund’s probation officer filed a report of violation alleging that Chindlund had
not contacted the department of correctional services and had not completed a
required substance-abuse evaluation. An arrest warrant was issued on September
16, and Chindlund was arrested and jailed a few days later.
On September 21, Chindlund signed written waivers of rights and guilty
pleas to assault while displaying a dangerous weapon, an aggravated
misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2)(c) and 708.2(3) (2020),
and to criminal mischief in the third degree, an aggravated misdemeanor in
violation of Iowa Code section 716.5. He asked the court to accept his pleas and
waived his rights to personally appear before the court and to have the court
address him personally. He also waived his right to move in arrest of judgment
and asked that he be sentenced immediately. The paper pleas were presented to
the court by counsel two days later. The court accepted the pleas, adjudged
Chindlund guilty of the charges, and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of
incarceration not to exceed two years on each count with the terms of incarceration
to be run concurrently.
Chindlund appeals contending he suffers from “a mental health problem”
and therefore his guilty pleas and waiver of rights were not voluntarily and
intelligently given.1
1 Other than taking the appeal, we cannot discern what relief Chindlund requests. 4
II. Standard of Review.
Our court reviews whether a trial court should have ordered a competency
hearing de novo. State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773 (Iowa 2018).
III. Analysis.
This is a direct appeal from Chindlund’s guilty pleas. Section 814.6(1)(a)(3)
(2020) prevents defendants from challenging their guilty pleas for anything but a
class “A” felony unless they establish “good cause.” So our threshold question is
whether Chindlund has good cause to appeal from his pleas. State v. Tucker, 959
N.W.2d 140, 153 (Iowa 2021).
Our supreme court has liberally interpreted good cause to mean the
defendant need only show a “legally sufficient reason.” Id. (quoting State v.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020)). What constitutes a legally sufficient
reason is context specific. Id. In Damme, the court held, “good cause exists to
appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges his
or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.” 944 N.W.2d at 105. More recently,
the court declined an invitation to expand the concept of good cause and hold that
a claim that a plea is not intelligently or voluntarily made constitutes good cause to
appeal as a matter of right. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 153.
Chindlund does not address the section 814.6 good cause issue. Chindlund
does not challenge his sentence, so Damme is of no help to him. See 944 N.W.2d
at 105. Chindlund asserts his pleas were not intelligently or voluntarily made, so,
at first blush, Tucker would seem to thwart him. But there is more. Chindlund
claims his plea was not knowingly and intelligently made because he was suffering
from a mental-health problem—thus alluding to a competency issue. Tucker did 5
not involve a competency issue, and our supreme court has not yet considered
whether a defendant’s claim of incompetence at the time of the guilty plea provides
section 814.6 good cause for a direct appeal. This court has addressed the issue
and concluded “that good cause exists to challenge competency at the time of the
plea irrespective of whether the issue was contested below.” State v. Cue, No. 19-
2150, 2020 WL 6157813, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2020), further review denied
(Dec. 22, 2020). Here, the State, citing Cue, “assumes without conceding” that a
challenge to the defendant’s competency to enter a guilty plea and waive a motion
in arrest of judgment establishes good cause to appeal from a guilty plea. After all
that, we find Chindlund has section 814.6 good cause to appeal from his pleas.
So where does that leave us?
Throughout the district court proceedings, neither Chindlund nor his counsel
mentioned Chindlund’s competency. No one requested a competency hearing,
and Chindlund does not ask for one on appeal. Being a paper plea, Chindlund did
not appear before the court taking the plea. If one follows Chindlund’s argument,
apparently the district court was supposed to have divined from the minutes of
testimony that Chindlund was incompetent to plead.
There is a presumption that a defendant is competent to stand trial, and the
defendant has the burden to prove incompetence. Cue, 2020 WL 6157813, at *3
(citing State v. Gaston, No. 18-1293, 2020 WL 1307690, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar.
18, 2020)). But when questions arise about a criminal defendant’s competency,
section 812.3 lays out a procedural mechanism designed to ensure due process
is satisfied. Section 812.3(1) provides that “at any stage of a criminal proceeding”
a competency hearing is required when the district court finds probable cause that 6
there are “specific facts showing that the defendant is suffering from a mental
disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge,
understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense.” The court
may make a finding of probable cause either after application by the defendant or
defendant’s attorney, or after holding a probable cause hearing on its own motion.
Id. “Probable cause exists for a competency hearing when a reasonable person
would believe that there is a substantial question of [Chindlund]’s competency.”
State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773, 779 (Iowa 2018). Whether to hold a competency
evaluation to determine a defendant’s competency to stand trial presents a legal
question; as a result, the trial court’s discretion does not play a role. Id. Moreover,
once a court finds a defendant competent to stand trial, the presumption of
competency continues unless the defendant produces new evidence to the
contrary. State v. Mann, 940 N.W.2d 450 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019).
As noted, neither Chindlund nor his attorney requested a competency
evaluation. Should the district court have ordered a competency hearing on its
own motion—or should we? To evaluate whether a hearing was required, we only
consider those competency factors known to the court at the time of the guilty plea
hearing. See State v. Walton, 228 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Iowa 1975). Factors in
determining whether due process requires an inquiry into competency include
(1) the defendant’s irrational behavior, (2) demeanor at trial, and (3) any prior
medical opinion on competence to stand trial. State v. Lucas, 232 N.W.2d 228,
232 (Iowa 1982). Since Chinlund did not appear before the district court, the record
lacks any courtroom demeanor evidence. Our record also lacks any medical
opinions on Chindlund’s competency. So we are left to consider only evidence of 7
Chindlund’s irrational behavior. While the minutes of testimony and attached jail
notes show Chindlund was agitated, loud, disruptive, and destructive, nothing in
the record before the court would alert it, or a reasonable person, to believe there
was a substantial question of Chindlund’s competency. So on our de novo review,
and after applying applicable factors, we find no specific facts about Chindlund’s
competence that required the court to order a hearing on its own motion under
section 812.3. Furthermore, on the record presented, Chindlund has failed to meet
his burden to prove he was incompetent when his guilty plea was accepted. His
claim is better suited for postconviction relief where an adequate record may be
developed.
Chindlund also claims his plea was not voluntary and intelligently given
because he was not given an adequate explanation of concurrent versus
consecutive sentencing in his written pleas. This direct appeal claim is barred
under section 814.6. See Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 153.
Chindlund is entitled to no relief in this appeal. Thus, we affirm his
AFFIRMED.