State of Iowa v. Marshall Louis Field
This text of State of Iowa v. Marshall Louis Field (State of Iowa v. Marshall Louis Field) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1186 Filed November 2, 2022
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARSHALL LOUIS FIELD, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Paul D. Scott, Judge.
Marshall Louis Field appeals his guilty pleas on an alleged defect in the plea
proceedings. APPEAL DISMISSED.
Debra S. De Jong, Orange City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., Tabor, J., and Scott, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2022). 2
SCOTT, Senior Judge.
Marshall Louis Field appeals his guilty pleas based on an alleged defect in
his plea proceedings. He asserts the district court failed to engage in a sufficient
plea colloquy, which violated his constitutional rights. Being without jurisdiction,
we dismiss the appeal.
In June 2019, Field was charged with one count of eluding, a class “D”
felony, and one count of operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, and
one count of driving while barred, both aggravated misdemeanors. He was also
alleged to be a habitual offender. Field was on probation at the time of these
charges and was facing additional charges in other cases. A global plea
agreement was reached in October with Field agreeing to participate in ordered
drug court. If Field successfully completed the drug court program, the State
agreed Field would plead only to eluding. But if Field were unsuccessfully
discharged, he would plead to all the counts and the parties would seek
consecutive prison sentences.
Unfortunately, in June 2021, Field violated his drug court agreement and
absconded from the residential facility. He stipulated to violating the drug court
agreement and requested he be terminated from the program. Pursuant to court
order, Field was unsuccessfully discharged.
On July 29, 2021, Field entered written guilty pleas to the charges of
eluding, OWI, second offense, and driving while barred, as well as to escape. Field
waived his personal appearance at the plea hearing, as permitted by Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) and the Iowa Supreme Court’s COVID-19 protocol
then in effect. He asked for immediate sentencing. 3
On July 30, a sentencing hearing was held. To supplement the written
pleas, Field admitted he had a prior conviction for OWI and admitted he was driving
in excess of twenty-five miles an hour above the speed limit when eluding. The
State and the defense asked that the court adopt the agreed-upon sentences,
which the court did. Field filed a timely notice of appeal, alleging his pleas should
be set aside for failure to substantially comply with Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.8(2)(b).
The State contends Field’s appeal should fail because he failed to file a
motion in arrest of judgment. Field’s failure to challenge the adequacy of the plea
proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment precludes his ability to make that claim
on appeal. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a) (“A defendant’s failure to challenge
the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall
preclude the defendant’s right to assert such challenge on appeal.”). Field
contends his failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment, which was a right he
explicitly acknowledged in his written pleas, should be excused because he was
not personally advised of his right during an in-person colloquy. However, at the
time Field pled guilty, the Iowa Supreme Court had suspended the requirement for
in-person guilty pleas for class “D” felonies. The suspension was upheld in State
v. Basquin, 970 N.W.2d 643, 654–56 (Iowa 2022). Therefore, Field was not
entitled to an in-person colloquy, and he waived his right to challenge any defect
in the plea proceeding.
In any event, Field has not established good cause to appeal. See Iowa
Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2021) (permitting appeal from a conviction where the
defendant pled guilty if good cause is established). Good cause means a “legally 4
sufficient reason,” which “is a ground that potentially would afford the defendant
relief.” State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 149 (Iowa 2021). Although Field
contends that his plea could not have been made knowingly and intelligently
without an in-person colloquy, our supreme court expressly declined to “expand
the concept of good cause and hold that a claim that a plea is not intelligently or
voluntarily made constitutes good cause to appeal as a matter of right.” Id. at 153.
Moreover, Iowa Code section 814.29 stipulates: “If a defendant challenges
a guilty plea based on an alleged defect in the plea proceedings, the plea shall not
be vacated unless the defendant demonstrates that the defendant more likely than
not would not have pled guilty if the defect had not occurred.” Field makes no
assertion that he would not have pled guilty nor does he establish a defect
occurred. Because Field has not established good cause to pursue an appeal from
his guilty pleas, we are without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and it must be
dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
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