In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 22–1188
Submitted September 12, 2024—Filed January 17, 2025
State of Iowa,
Appellee,
vs.
Lukouxs Alan Brown,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wright County, Gregg R.
Rosenbladt, judge.
The defendant appeals from a district court order finding him competent
to stand trial on the charge of murder in the first degree. Decision of Court of
Appeals Vacated; District Court Order Reversed and Case Remanded.
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
joined.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye (argued),
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman (argued), Louis S.
Sloven, and Kyle Hanson (until withdrawal), Assistant Attorneys General, for
appellee. 2
McDonald, Justice. Lukouxs Brown was charged with first-degree murder. The district court
found that Brown was not competent to stand trial and ordered Brown to
undergo mental health treatment designed to restore him to competency. After
eight months of treatment, the treatment provider reported to the court that
Brown remained not competent to stand trial and that there was no substantial
probability that Brown could be restored to competency within a reasonable
time. By statute, the district court was to hold a dispositional hearing on the
matter within fourteen days of receiving the report. See Iowa Code § 812.8(4)
(2021). Instead, the district court allowed the State more time to obtain a
separate psychiatric evaluation. The competing psychiatric evaluation concluded
that Brown was competent. The dispositional hearing was held more than ninety
days from the date the treatment provider’s report was filed. The district court
found Brown competent to stand trial and reinstated the criminal proceedings.
Brown filed this application for interlocutory appeal. The primary questions
presented in this appeal are (1) what standard of review do we apply to the
district court’s competency determination and (2) whether the district court
erred in allowing the State to obtain a separate psychiatric evaluation after
receiving a report from Brown’s treatment provider that there was no substantial
probability that Brown could be restored to competency within a reasonable
time.
I.
Brown was charged with first-degree murder after he allegedly cut the
throat of and killed Wayne Smith, one of his coworkers at a pork processing
plant, in February 2021. Prior to Brown’s arraignment, his counsel met with him
at the Wright County Jail. During that meeting, counsel observed that Brown 3
appeared to respond to outside stimuli not actually present. Brown stated that
he had been hearing voices and that he had previously been hospitalized for
schizophrenia. Counsel moved for a competency hearing on the basis that there
was probable cause to believe Brown was not competent to stand trial. In the
more formal language of the Code, there was probable cause to believe Brown
suffered from a mental condition that made it impossible for him to appreciate
the charges against him, understand the proceedings, or assist effectively in his
own defense. See id. § 812.3(1). The State conceded there was probable cause to
hold a competency hearing but did not concede Brown was not competent.
The district court found there was probable cause Brown was not
competent to stand trial. The district court suspended the criminal proceedings
and ordered Brown to undergo a psychiatric competency evaluation pursuant to
Iowa Code section 812.3(2). The district court ordered the evaluation to be
conducted at the Forensic Psychiatric Hospital at the Iowa Medical and
Classification Center (IMCC). Dr. Arnold Andersen, an IMCC psychiatrist,
conducted Brown’s competency evaluation. He diagnosed Brown with a
schizophrenia-like disorder and substance abuse disorders. Dr. Andersen
concluded that Brown was not competent to stand trial because he could not
appreciate the charges against him, effectively assist in his defense, or
understand the legal proceedings in a meaningful manner. Dr. Andersen
believed that Brown was a candidate for restoration treatment because there was
a “good possibility” he could become competent to stand trial within a reasonable
period of time.
After reviewing Dr. Andersen’s report and conducting a hearing pursuant
to Iowa Code section 812.4, the district court found Brown was not competent
to stand trial and continued to suspend the criminal proceedings against him. 4
The district court also found Brown posed a danger to public peace and safety
and committed him to IMCC for treatment designed to restore Brown to
competency. See id. §§ 812.5(2), .6(2)(a).
Brown was admitted to the Forensic Psychiatric Hospital at IMCC in May
under the care of psychiatrist Dr. Gary Keller. Dr. Andersen was also involved in
the treatment and evaluation of Brown. Drs. Keller and Andersen routinely
evaluated Brown and reported on his condition to the district court. See id.
§ 812.7. The mental status reports showed Dr. Keller formally diagnosed Brown
with schizophrenia. The mental status reports also showed Brown “struggled”
early in the treatment and had only “limited progress.” For example, Dr. Keller
noted Brown attempted to assault staff members at IMCC on two occasions. In
his October report, Dr. Keller noted Brown assaulted a peer. Dr. Andersen noted
Brown heard voices—specifically, the CIA.
The mental status reports also showed that after Brown’s initial struggles
and limited progress, Brown had “considerable improvement” in managing his
schizophrenia. In November, Dr. Andersen reported that Brown no longer
suffered from certain positive symptoms of schizophrenia, such as hallucinations
and delusions. He reported, for the first time, that Brown was progressing toward
eliminating the negative symptoms of schizophrenia. Dr. Andersen also reported,
for the first time, that Brown could “effectively assist his defense attorney in
preparing a case.” In December, Dr. Andersen reported that Brown “appreciates
in its essentials his charge and gives a reasonable estimate of a range of possible
consequences.” In the same report, Dr. Andersen concluded that Brown had a
general factual understanding of key court personnel “with a few lacunae” and
described Brown’s schizophrenia as “in substantial remission.” 5
In December, Drs. Andersen and Keller requested that Dr. John Bayless,
a neuropsychologist and professor emeritus at the University of Iowa Medical
School, assist them in evaluating Brown. Dr. Bayless assessed that Brown had
a verbal IQ score of seventy-four, impairments in nearly all aspects of his
intellectual abilities, and suffered from a major neurocognitive disorder. This led
Dr. Bayless to conclude that Brown was not competent to stand trial. Around
this time, Dr. Keller reported to the district court he believed “that within the
next court period we will be able to offer our final recommendations on this
patient.”
Dr. Andersen filed his final report with the district court on February 1,
2022. Prior reports regarding Brown stated there was a “modest possibility,”
“a small possibility,” “a moderately good possibility,” and a “possible but far from
certain” chance that Brown could be restored to competency within a reasonable
time. In the February report, however, Dr. Andersen reported that Brown
remained not competent to stand trial and was no longer a candidate for
restoration. Specifically, Dr. Andersen’s report noted Brown “ha[d] come a long
way” but, despite “prolonged and intensive” treatment, could not assist his
defense attorney “in even a modest or minimal manner,” could not follow court
proceedings, and did not have a rational understanding of key court personnel.
Dr. Andersen thus concluded that Brown “lacks the capability of ever being
restored to competency in any reasonable amount of time, with any currently
available or known treatment options.”
Upon receiving this notice, the court was required to “schedule a hearing
to be held within fourteen days.” Id. § 812.8(4). The district court started a
hearing on February 11, ten days after receiving the notice. The State requested
additional time to obtain an independent expert to evaluate Brown. Brown 6
resisted the motion for additional time. He raised due process concerns and
argued that the Code did not allow the State to obtain a separate psychiatric
evaluation at this stage of the proceedings. The district court granted the State
an indefinite continuance to obtain a separate psychiatric evaluation. The
district court stated it expected to “look at this again” in, “at maximum,” three
to four weeks.
More than one month later, on March 15, Brown filed a motion to dismiss
the case. He argued that the hearing required under section 812.8(4) had not
been held within the statutorily required fourteen days and that the State had
failed to produce any report from their expert’s evaluation of Brown. The State
resisted. It argued a hearing had been held within the required time even though
the hearing was not yet completed. The State also filed the report of their expert,
Dr. Rosanna Jones-Thurman. The district court denied Brown’s motion and
scheduled a hearing for May 6.
At the May 6 hearing, the State called Dr. Jones-Thurman to testify. After
reviewing the IMCC reports and conducting her own evaluation based on a short
interview with Brown, Dr. Jones-Thurman concluded that Brown was competent
to stand trial. She assessed that Brown had a verbal IQ score of seventy-eight.
This was four points higher than Dr. Bayless’s assessment. Dr. Jones-Thurman
opined that Brown knew he was accused of first-degree murder, understood
basic legal terms, and had a general understanding of the people involved in the
trial and their respective roles during trial. That latter assessment was
contradicted, in part, by her report, which stated Brown “can’t remember what
the jury does and doesn’t know exactly, but they might be like court jesters.”
Despite Brown’s reported statement that he believed the jurors in his case “might
be like court jesters,” Dr. Jones-Thurman concluded Brown’s competency had 7
been restored because he could appreciate the charges against him, adequately
assist in his defense, and understand the legal proceedings.
Brown presented competing evidence. Drs. Andersen and Bayless testified
at the May 6 hearing. They stood by their assessment that Brown was not
competent to stand trial and was not likely to be restored to competency within
a reasonable time. Additional testimony was provided by Brown’s sister, who
recounted an April 2022 phone call where Brown mentioned the CIA and hearing
voices. The phone call was recorded and admitted into evidence. During the call,
Brown discussed his plans to move to Oregon and go to culinary school upon
being released from jail. He told his sister that he was communicating with his
friend through the CIA. He said he communicated with the CIA in his head as “a
jail type of thing.” He mentioned something about the DEA, and he explained
that the cartel was involved, which, according to Brown, is how the cartel stays
connected with things.
The district court concluded the State met its burden in proving Brown’s
competence and ordered the criminal proceedings reinstated. The district court
found the “reported conclusions by Dr. Rosanna Jones-Thurman are clear,
concise, well-founded, and on point, and constitute very clear evidence that the
defendant is competent to stand trial.” The district court issued its order on
June 17, more than four months after the status report stating that Brown was
not capable of being restored was filed.
Brown filed an application for interlocutory appeal, which was granted. We
transferred the case to the court of appeals. On appeal, Brown argued the district
court erred in (1) finding he had been restored to competency, (2) allowing the
State to seek a separate psychiatric evaluation, and (3) failing to hold a
substantive hearing within fourteen days of Dr. Andersen’s final report. 8
Pursuant to controlling authority, the court of appeals reviewed the district
court’s competency determination de novo. See State v. Lyman, 776 N.W.2d 865,
873 (Iowa 2010) (“[W]e review a trial court’s decision as to a defendant’s
competency to stand trial de novo . . . .”), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v.
Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016). On de novo review, the court of
appeals found that Brown was not competent to stand trial but was progressing
toward regaining competency. It reversed the district court and remanded the
case with instructions to suspend the criminal proceedings and return Brown to
IMCC for further treatment. One member of the court of appeals panel concurred
specially, criticizing the de novo standard of review.
The State filed an application for further review arguing that this court
should overrule its precedents regarding the standard of review applied to
competency determinations. We granted the State’s application. “On further
review, we have the discretion to review any issue raised on appeal.” In re Est. of
Cawiezell v. Coronelli, 958 N.W.2d 842, 844 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Burton v.
Hilltop Care Ctr., 813 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2012)). We exercise that discretion
and limit our review to the questions of what should be the standard of review of
competency determinations and whether the district court erred in permitting
the State to obtain a separate psychiatric evaluation of Brown prior to the
hearing required under Iowa Code section 812.8(4).
II.
“Constitutionally, defendants may not be tried or convicted while they are
incompetent to stand trial or to assist in their defense. To deprive defendants of
this right is to deprive them of due process and a fair trial.” State v. Edwards,
507 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa 1993); see also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378
(1966) (“[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent 9
violates due process . . . .”); State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Iowa 2018)
(“[T]he conviction of an incompetent defendant violates due process.”). The
United States Supreme Court established that an individual is competent to
stand trial only if he has the “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and . . . a rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma,
517 U.S. 348, 368 (1996) (“The test for competence to stand trial . . . is whether
the defendant has the present ability to understand the charges against him and
communicate effectively with defense counsel.”). Under Iowa law, a defendant is
not competent to stand trial if “the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder
which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge, understanding the
proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense.” Iowa Code § 812.3(1).
Traditionally, this court has held that whether a defendant was competent
was a question of fact subject to review for the corrections of errors at law, i.e.,
substantial evidence review. See State v. Rieflin, 558 N.W.2d 149, 151–52 (Iowa
1996) (“Our scope of review is for the correction of errors at law. . . . We do not
review the evidence de novo where a determination of competency has been made
by the district court.”); State v. Drosos, 114 N.W.2d 526, 528 (Iowa 1962) (stating
that it “is well settled” that a question of a criminal defendant’s mental
competency is for the jury). In 2010, in State v. Lyman, this court changed
course, overruled its prior decisions, and held that Iowa’s appellate courts
should review competency determinations de novo. See 776 N.W.2d at 873
(“We believe . . . Rieflin [was] wrongly decided as to the standard of review
required when this court reviews a defendant’s pretrial hearing to determine his
or her competence to stand trial.”). 10
The State requests that we overrule Lyman and return to the errors at law
standard. We decline this request. “Stare decisis alone dictates continued
adherence to our precedent absent a compelling reason to change the law.”
Book v. Doublestar Dongfeng Tyre Co., 860 N.W.2d 576, 594 (Iowa 2015).
A compelling reason requires “the highest possible showing that a precedent
should be overruled” and “that the precedent is clearly erroneous.”
Brewer-Strong v. HNI Corp., 913 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Iowa 2018) (quoting McElroy v.
State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 394 (Iowa 2005)). This court is reluctant to overrule
precedent unless the precedent has “proved unworkable in practice, does
violence to legal doctrine, or has been so undermined by subsequent factual and
legal developments that continued adherence to the precedent is no longer
tenable.” Youngblut v. Youngblut, 945 N.W.2d 25, 44 (Iowa 2020) (McDonald, J.,
dissenting).
The State has not convinced us that Lyman was clearly erroneous when
decided. Prior to Lyman, our standard of review relating to competency
determinations was “somewhat inconsistent.” 776 N.W.2d at 871. In 1980, in
State v. Lyon, we applied a de novo standard of review when the defendant’s
competency became an issue during trial “[b]ecause constitutional safeguards
[were] implicated.” 293 N.W.2d 8, 9 (Iowa 1980) (quoting State v. Kempf,
282 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Iowa 1979)). One year later, in State v. Jackson, we
complicated matters as we stated, “[W]e do not review the evidence de novo where
a determination of competency has been made below. That is the case only where
no hearing is held below and we are examining the propriety of trial court’s
determination that no hearing was necessary.” 305 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Iowa 1981).
Later that year, in State v. Pedersen, we again used a de novo standard of review
in evaluating the defendant’s competency at trial “anew” because due process 11
was at stake. 309 N.W.2d 490, 495–96 (Iowa 1981). This hair-splitting led to
seemingly inconsistent jurisprudence for approximately thirty years. See, e.g.,
Rieflin, 558 N.W.2d at 151–52 (“We do not review the evidence de novo where a
determination of competency has been made by the district court. . . . We only
review the record de novo where no competency hearing is held below, and we
are examining the propriety of the district court’s determination that no hearing
was necessary.”); State v. Emerson, 375 N.W.2d 256, 260–61 (Iowa 1985)
(reviewing pretrial competency determination de novo after the case had
proceeded through trial because due process rights were implicated), abrogated
on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); State v. Aswegan,
331 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Iowa 1983) (stating that because the defendant did not raise
a due process challenge regarding pretrial competency hearing, the standard of
review is not de novo).
Lyman definitively adopted a de novo standard of review and ended the
immaterial distinctions in our caselaw. 776 N.W.2d at 873. Lyman provided a
bright-line rule that “[w]e review de novo a district court decision implicating a
defendant’s constitutional rights, even if the district court held a full hearing on
the matter below.” Id. Lyman was and is consistent with our court’s now-typical
practice of reviewing de novo decisions implicating constitutional rights. See,
e.g., State v. Miller, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 4469195, at *6 (Iowa Oct. 11,
2024) (“We review [defendant]’s constitutional challenges to his sentence de
novo.”); State v. Arrieta, 998 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Iowa 2023) (“We review the district
court’s denial of a motion to suppress based on deprivation of a constitutional
right de novo.”); State v. Liggins, 978 N.W.2d 406, 417 (Iowa 2022) (“Ordinarily,
when constitutional issues are involved, we have repeatedly stated over decades
of cases that our review is de novo.”); State v. Cahill, 972 N.W.2d 19, 27 (Iowa 12
2022) (“Due process claims asserting a Brady violation are reviewed de novo.”);
State v. Montgomery, 966 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Iowa 2021) (“We apply a de novo
standard of review to . . . the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.” (citation
omitted)); State v. Roby, 951 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Iowa 2020) (“We review
constitutional double jeopardy claims de novo.”); State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319,
327 (Iowa 2019) (reviewing “claims of systematic exclusion of a distinctive group
from the jury pool in violation of the Sixth Amendment” and Batson challenges
de novo); State v. Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Iowa 2017) (“Our review of claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel is de novo.”); Lyman, 776 N.W.2d at 873
(collecting cases).
The State correctly points out that our de novo review of a district court’s
competency determination makes Iowa an outlier jurisdiction. See State v.
O’Neill, 945 N.W.2d 71, 82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2020) (“Except for Iowa, . . . we have
found no jurisdiction applying a de novo, fact-reweighing approach on appellate
review.”). The point is immaterial. We do not shape our jurisprudence based
upon “a majoritarian numbers game.” State v. Hauge, 973 N.W.2d 453, 466 (Iowa
2022) (quoting State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 33 (Iowa 2015) (Appel, J.,
concurring specially)). While we can learn from observing what other
jurisdictions do in similar circumstances, we have no obligation to follow the law
of other jurisdictions and harmonize our law with theirs. Instead, it is our
obligation to ensure that the corpus of Iowa law is internally consistent and
coherent. Lyman is consistent with and coheres with the corpus of Iowa law
involving the review of constitutional questions, generally.
Nor has the State established that Lyman has proved unworkable or has
done such violence to the state of the law that it must be overruled. See
Youngblut, 945 N.W.2d at 44. While we are mindful of certain advantages the 13
district court has in making these difficult competency determinations, Iowa’s
appellate courts have great experience in conducting de novo review of factual
determinations without much difficulty. Indeed, since Lyman, Iowa’s appellate
courts have reviewed competency determinations de novo without much
difficulty. See, e.g., Veal, 930 N.W.2d at 337–38; State v. Wadsworth,
No. 16–1775, 2018 WL 2230666, at *4–10 (Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2018).
We decline the State’s request to overrule Lyman. The de novo standard of
review on what is, essentially, a legal question best protects the defendant’s
constitutional right to be tried only when competent to stand trial. See Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 704 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The prime
benefit of de novo appellate review in criminal cases is, of course, to prevent a
miscarriage of justice that might . . . rest upon the legal determinations of a
single judge.”). The de novo standard of review is consistent with our caselaw,
generally, regarding the review of constitutional questions. And the standard of
review has not proved unworkable in practice. We thus reaffirm our holding that
“we review a trial court’s decision as to a defendant’s competency to stand trial
de novo.” Lyman, 776 N.W.2d at 873.
III.
We now turn to the question of whether Iowa Code chapter 812 permits
the state to obtain a separate psychiatric evaluation after the district court
receives notice from the treatment provider regarding the defendant’s
competency pursuant to section 812.8. The district court concluded that the
State was entitled to obtain a separate psychiatric evaluation in this context. In
reaching that conclusion, the district court relied on language from
section 812.3(2), which provides that “[a]ny party is entitled to a separate
psychiatric evaluation by a psychiatrist or licensed, doctorate-level psychologist 14
of their own choosing.” We conclude the district court erred in its interpretation
of the statute.
Because the question presented is one of statutory interpretation and
construction, we begin with the text of the statutes at issue. Doe v. State,
943 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 2020). “[W]e read statutes as a whole rather than
looking at words and phrases in isolation.” Id. at 613 (alteration in original)
(quoting Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of Iowa Ass’n for Just., 867 N.W.2d 58, 72
(Iowa 2015)). “Perhaps no interpretive fault is more common than the failure to
follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider
the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of
its many parts.” Id. at 610 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012)).
When we look at the structure and text of Iowa Code chapter 812, it
becomes clear that the chapter sets forth section by section, a step-by-step
process for raising, regulating, and resolving issues regarding the defendant’s
competency to stand trial. Chapter 812 begins with section 812.3, which sets
forth who may raise an issue regarding the defendant’s competency and how.
As relevant here, section 812.3(1) provides that if the defendant or the
defendant’s attorney “alleges specific facts showing that the defendant is
suffering from a mental disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating
the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the
defense, the court shall suspend further proceedings and determine if probable
cause exists to sustain the allegations.” Section 812.3(2) then details what the
district court must do if it finds there is probable cause to believe that the
defendant is not competent. If the district court finds probable cause to believe
the defendant is not competent to stand trial, then it “shall suspend further 15
criminal proceedings and order the defendant to undergo a psychiatric
evaluation.” Id. § 812.3(2). At the probable cause stage of the proceedings, “[a]ny
party is entitled to a separate psychiatric evaluation by a psychiatrist or licensed,
doctorate-level psychologist of their own choosing.” Id.
The successive sections of chapter 812 dictate the next steps in the
process. Section 812.4 regulates the competency hearing after the district court
receives the psychiatric evaluation required by section 812.3. Section 812.5
governs the district court’s dispositional options after holding the competency
hearing required by section 812.4. If the district court finds the defendant
competent, then the criminal proceedings are reinstated. Id. § 812.5(1). If the
district court finds the defendant not competent to stand trial, then the criminal
proceedings are suspended indefinitely, and the district court shall “order the
defendant to be placed in a treatment program pursuant to section 812.6.” Id.
§ 812.5(2). Section 812.6 provides the district court with options for mental
health treatment for the defendant. Section 812.7 requires the treatment
providers or the director of the facility where the defendant is being treated to
provide periodic mental health status reports to the district court.
The conclusion of the restoration process is governed by sections 812.8
and 812.9. Where, as here, the treatment providers conclude “that there is no
substantial probability that the defendant will be restored to competency in a
reasonable amount of time, the psychiatrist or licensed doctorate-level
psychologist providing outpatient treatment to the defendant or the director of
the inpatient facility shall immediately notify the court.” Id. § 812.8(3). When the
district court receives such notice, the district court “shall schedule a hearing to
be held within fourteen days.” Id. § 812.8(4). Section 812.8, subsections (5)–(8),
provide the district court’s disposition options following the 812.8(4) hearing. If a 16
preponderance of the evidence shows the defendant’s competency has been
restored, the criminal proceedings are reinstated. Id. § 812.8(5). If a
preponderance of the evidence shows that “the defendant remains incompetent
to stand trial but is making progress in regaining competency,” the court is
required to continue the placement. Id. § 812.8(6). And if a preponderance of the
evidence shows that “there is no substantial probability the defendant’s
competency will be restored in a reasonable amount of time, the court shall
terminate the commitment . . . in accordance with the provisions of section
812.9.” Id. § 812.8(8).
Section 812.9 then establishes the time at which restoration treatment
must be terminated. Specifically, defendants “shall not remain under
placement . . . beyond the expiration of the maximum term of confinement for
the criminal offense” for which they are accused of committing. Id. § 812.9(1).
And a criminal defendant shall not remain under placement if “the court finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that there is no substantial probability that
the defendant will be restored to competency in a reasonable amount of time
under section 812.8, subsection 8.” Id. However, if neither of these occurs within
eighteen months of commitment, the court is required to schedule a hearing and
determine whether the defendant is competent at that point. Id. § 812.9(2). If the
defendant is not yet competent, the court must terminate the placement. Id.
The state may then commence civil commitment proceedings. Id. § 812.9(3). If it
appears the defendant later regains competency, “the state may make
application to reinstate the prosecution,” and the district court shall hold a
competency hearing as it would under section 812.8(4). Id. § 812.9(4).
After examining the structure and text of chapter 812, it becomes clear the
district court erred in granting the State’s request for a separate psychiatric 17
evaluation for the hearing required by section 812.8(4). The Code explicitly
allows the parties to obtain a separate evaluation at the probable cause stage of
the proceedings as set forth in section 812.3(2). However, there is no parallel
provision in relation to the dispositional hearing required by section 812.8(4).
We can infer from that omission that the statute does not allow for a separate
evaluation at the dispositional stage of the restoration process. See Vagts v. N.
Nat. Gas Co., 8 N.W.3d 501, 516 (Iowa 2024) (discussing “the well-established
rule[] of statutory construction that legislative intent is expressed by omission
as well as by inclusion, and the express mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of others not so mentioned” (quoting Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d
285, 289 (Iowa 1995))).
A separate psychiatric evaluation at the dispositional stage of the
proceedings is also inconsistent with the structure and purpose of chapter 812.
After the district court finds that a defendant is not competent to stand trial, the
district court must order the defendant to undergo treatment for the purpose of
restoring the defendant to competency. See Iowa Code §§ 812.5(2), .6. The
defendant’s treatment providers have superior knowledge regarding the
defendant’s mental health, and they are obligated to regularly report on the
defendant’s condition to the district court. See id. § 812.7. In other words, the
treatment is performed by a neutral treatment provider at the court’s direction
to assist the court in restoring the defendant to competency. There is no
indication in the Code that the experience and judgment of the professionals
directed by the court to restore the defendant to competency should then be
challenged in front of the very court that directed the treatment. In addition, it
is highly unlikely there will be any better medical evidence regarding the 18
defendant’s competency than the evaluations performed by the neutral
physicians who treated the defendant.
The timing of the dispositional hearing also cuts against the State’s
interpretation of the statute. Iowa Code section 812.8(4) envisions a short
process rather than a long one. The Code directs that the dispositional hearing
shall be held within fourteen days of the district court receiving notice that the
defendant is not likely to be restored to competency within a reasonable time.
See id. § 812.8(4). The length of time required to conduct a separate psychiatric
evaluation, draft and file a report with the court, and schedule a subsequent
hearing at this stage is entirely at odds with this fourteen-day requirement. See
State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Iowa 2018) (“In interpreting the statute, we
also consider the overall structure and context of the statute, not just specific
words or phrases in a vacuum.”); Rolfe State Bank v. Gunderson, 794 N.W.2d
561, 564 (Iowa 2011) (“The overall structure of a statute can have strong
influence on the meaning of particular words and phrases.”).
The facts of this case highlight how difficult it would be to comply with the
fourteen-day requirement if the parties were also entitled to a separate
psychiatric evaluation at this stage. On February 1, 2022, Dr. Andersen’s final
report was filed in the district court. This triggered a fourteen-day deadline to
hold a hearing regarding the restoration of Brown’s competence. See Iowa Code
§ 812.8(4). A hearing of some sort commenced on February 11. However, the
district court granted the State an indefinite amount of time to allow the State
to retain Dr. Jones-Thurman’s services. Dr. Jones-Thurman traveled to Wright
County to evaluate Brown a little over a week later. Dr. Jones-Thurman then
took several weeks to draft a report based on her short meeting with Brown. The
State then filed her report with the district court. The prior hearing was not 19
resumed until May 6, more than three months after the district court first
received notice regarding Brown’s mental health status. The district court did
not issue its order until the following month. The long delay in resolving the
competency issue in this case demonstrates why the structure and process set
forth in chapter 812 preclude the parties from obtaining a separate psychiatric
evaluation at this stage of the proceedings.
We thus hold that the Code does not authorize either party to hire an
independent expert to perform a separate psychiatric evaluation at the
dispositional phase of competency proceedings as set forth in Iowa Code
section 812.8. The language in Iowa Code section 812.3(2) allowing the parties
to obtain a “separate psychiatric evaluation” is limited to that section of the Code
in which it is contained—the probable cause proceedings governed by
section 812.3. Once the district court has ordered treatment for the purposes of
restoration, the district court can obtain sufficient information from neutral
medical experts to dispose of the matter. The district court erred in allowing the
State to obtain a separate evaluation and in considering the separate evaluation
at the dispositional phase of the proceedings.
IV.
On our de novo review of the appropriate record, we conclude a
preponderance of the evidence showed that there is no substantial probability
that Brown’s competency will be restored within a reasonable amount of time.
See Iowa Code § 812.8(8). We thus remand this matter for further proceedings
pursuant to Iowa Code section 812.9(3).
Decision of Court of Appeals Vacated; District Court Order Reversed
and Case Remanded.