State of Iowa v. Logan Mitchell Isaac

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

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No. 24-1664

Filed August 19, 2026

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State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

Logan Mitchell Isaac, Defendant–Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, The Honorable Kevin McKeever, Judge.

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AFFIRMED

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William (Bill) Monroe, Burlington, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.

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Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., Buller, J., and Vogel, S.J.

Opinion by Ahlers, P.J.

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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

The district court found Logan Isaac guilty of third-degree sexual abuse and willful injury causing bodily injury following a trial on the minutes. Isaac appeals. He claims the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress and committed an error during the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm.

I. Motion to Suppress

The record establishes the following facts. Law enforcement received a report that a woman had been attacked with a knife at a senior living facility the prior night. The woman’s phone was missing after the attack, and it was pinging at the facility. The woman called the facility and learned there was security camera footage of the attack and blood in the parking lot. Police then went to the facility to meet with its manager and review the security footage.

Officers went door-to-door at the facility looking for someone who matched the attacker shown on the footage and found Isaac in his grandmother’s apartment. Isaac was sitting in a recliner. When asked for his identification, he retrieved his backpack from behind the recliner, removed his ID from a wallet in the backpack, handed the ID to an officer, and set the backpack on the floor next to him. Officers read Isaac Miranda warnings and questioned him about the night before. At one point Isaac got up, walked to the kitchen, and appeared to try to access the contents of a cell phone.1 An officer directed Isaac to return to the recliner. The officers then had Isaac put on his shoes, told him he was under arrest, had him stand up, and handcuffed him. An officer began searching the backpack. Before the officer was able to

1 The apartment had an open floor plan with no wall separating the kitchen from the living room.

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complete the search, Isaac attacked the officer, attempting to butt him in the head. The officer stopped searching the backpack to restrain Isaac. Officers confirmed that the backpack belonged to Isaac and collected it along with his wallet to take with them as they took Isaac to jail.

Upon arrival at the jail, the jail would not hold Isaac’s backpack or wallet, so officers took those items to the police station, where they completed searching them. One item found was a list of names of women, including the victim in the instant case. An officer contacted the victim and learned that Isaac had sexually assaulted her. The State then initiated these proceedings against Isaac for the sexual assault.

Isaac filed a motion to suppress, arguing the seizure and search of his backpack and wallet violated his state and federal constitutional rights so evidence obtained via that seizure and search should not be admissible. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion, reasoning that the warrantless search of the backpack and wallet was permissible as a search incident to arrest and as an inventory search. Isaac waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to be tried on the minutes, resulting in his convictions.

Because Isaac’s motion to suppress claimed law enforcement violated his right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment and article 1, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, our review is de novo. State v. Scullark, 23 N.W.3d 49, 53 (Iowa 2025). This includes independently evaluating the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 53–54. And while we defer to the district court’s factual findings, we are not bound by them. Id. at 54.

“[A] warrantless search is per se unreasonable, and therefore, unconstitutional, subject only to a few narrow and well-delineated

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exceptions.” Id. (cleaned up). One of those exceptions is a search incident to arrest (SITA). Id. Under this exception, law enforcement may search a person and the area within the person’s immediate control in an effort to both protect officers and prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence. Id. at 55. Accordingly, “an officer is authorized to search the arrestee’s person, his pockets, and physical items immediately associated with him.” Id. To determine the proper scope of a SITA, “we look to the time of arrest.” Id. at 58. Officers are permitted to search “personal articles in the arrestee’s actual and exclusive possession at or immediately preceding the time of arrest.” Id. at 58–59 (citation omitted).

Body camera footage shows that, at the time of his arrest, Isaac’s backpack and wallet were in his possession—or were at least immediately associated with him—as the backpack and wallet were right next to his feet. As such, the officers were permitted to search both upon Isaac’s arrest. Isaac accuses the officers of gamesmanship by directing him to sit in the recliner after he walked to the kitchen. He claims that by doing so the officers intended to place him in immediate proximity to the backpack and wallet so that they could search them without a warrant. But review of the body camera footage makes it clear that the officers were simply trying to maintain control over the situation and prevent Isaac from tampering with a cellphone—potential evidence. Plus, since they were investigating allegations of a knife attack, getting him out of the kitchen was a reasonable safety measure. Because Isaac was previously sitting in the recliner, it was natural for the officers to ask him to return to his seat as they continued their investigation. We agree with the district court that police could lawfully search the backpack and wallet without a warrant as a SITA.

In reaching our conclusion we reject Isaac’s contention that the search

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occurred too late to be a valid SITA because the search was not completed until the seized items were taken to the police station. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807–09 (1974) (finding a search of an arrestee’s shirt ten hours after arrest a lawful SITA). As previously noted, an officer started searching the backpack immediately after Isaac’s arrest. That search was interrupted by Isaac’s attempt to butt the officer. The officer had to stop to subdue Isaac and eventually transport him to jail—a task made more difficult by Isaac’s refusal to walk, requiring multiple officers to carry him to the police vehicle for transport. We decline Isaac’s invitation to find that a delay in the search negated application of the SITA exception when Isaac caused the delay by his disruptive and violent actions.

Finally, we affirm the denial of Isaac’s motion for another reason. Even if police should not have looked into the backpack at the time of Isaac’s arrest and should have left the backpack and wallet at Isaac’s grandmother’s apartment, they would have been inevitably searched, so no suppression would be necessary. See State v. Seager, 571 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Iowa 1997) (recognizing the exclusionary rule does not apply when evidence would have inevitably discovered by lawful means). That is because officers obtained and executed a search warrant for Isaac’s grandmother’s apartment following his arrest. The backpack and wallet would have been searched at that time pursuant to the search warrant. Cf. State v. Porter, 33 N.W.3d 281, 287–89 (Iowa 2026) (recognizing a premises warrant permits law enforcement to search items on the premises owned by visitors).

For the reasons stated, we conclude the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress based on a valid SITA. As such, it is unnecessary to address whether the search was a valid inventory search.

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II. Sentencing

Isaac also argues that the district court committed reversible error at the sentencing hearing. See State Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002) (recognizing we review sentencing challenges for corrections of errors at law and will reverse for a defect in the sentencing procedure). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(2) establishes the procedure for sentencing a defendant. Rule 2.23(2)(b) requires the court to “inform the defendant of the defendant’s plea or the verdict and ask whether the defendant has any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced.” (Emphasis added). However, the district court “need not use the exact language in the rules of criminal procedure at sentencing.” State v. Jackson-Douglass, 970 N.W2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2022). Instead, “[s]ubstantial compliance is sufficient.” Id.

Isaac claims the district court failed to substantially comply with rule 2.23(2)(b) because when it provided Isaac an opportunity for allocution it asked him, “[D]id you want to address the court any further at this time?” and then after Isaac spoke about his lack of income asked him, “Anything else?” But Isaac ignores the fact that just moments later the court inquired with defense counsel, “All right. Okay. Well, the—before I pronounce sentence, is there any legal reason that I can’t do so on behalf of your client?” And counsel responded in the negative. Isaac said nothing at that time. This was substantial compliance with rule 2.23(2)(b), which is all that we require. So we conclude there was no defect in the sentencing procedure.

AFFIRMED.