State of Iowa v. Leonardo Monroe Campbell Sr.

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

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No. 25-1401

Filed August 19, 2026

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State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

Leonardo Monroe Campbell Sr., Defendant–Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, The Honorable Mark Hostager, Judge.

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AFFIRMED

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Stuart Hoover, East Dubuque, Illinois, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.

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Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.

Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

Leonardo Campbell Sr. appeals from convictions in two separate cases for driving while barred as an habitual offender, arguing the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial in the 2025 case and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction in the 2024 case because the State did not prove he had notice of his barred status. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion and sufficient evidence supports Campbell’s conviction, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In two separate cases, the State charged Campbell with driving while barred as an habitual offender, in violation of Iowa Code section 321.561 (2024)1—an aggravated misdemeanor. One case arose from a traffic stop on February 18, 2025; the other arose from a stop on May 3, 2024. The cases were tried to separate juries on consecutive days. Campbell was convicted in each, and his appeals have been consolidated.

In the 2025 case, Dubuque police officer Ryan Cole testified that he saw Campbell driving a Dodge Durango on the evening of February 18, 2025, initiated a traffic stop, and identified Campbell as the vehicle’s sole occupant. When the prosecutor asked how he had identified the driver, Cole answered: “I previously had arrested him for the same offense, the driving while barred, the previous summer.” Campbell immediately moved, outside the presence of the jury, for a mistrial. He argued that Cole’s reference to a prior arrest for the same offense put inadmissible prior-bad-acts evidence before the jury that

1 While the State charged Campbell of committing the offense of diving while barred in two different years, 2024 and 2025, the applicable Code section remained the same both years. So we refer to the 2024 Code for ease of reference.

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no instruction could cure; in the alternative, he moved to strike the answer and requested a cautionary instruction. The State responded that it had not attempted to elicit prior bad acts and did not resist striking the testimony.

The district court found the testimony prejudicial but determined that the prosecutor’s question had not directly called for the answer, which it attributed to a lack of witness preparation. Describing whether the prejudice could be cured as “a close call,” the court denied the motion for a mistrial. It granted the motion to strike and instructed the jury:

Ladies and gentlemen, you heard testimony that the defendant was previously arrested. An arrest is not an adjudication of guilt. Furthermore, the defendant is not on trial for any act other than the charge in this case. Consequently, such testimony is hereby stricken. You shall ignore it, and it shall not be considered in reaching your verdict in this case.

The court also granted Campbell’s oral motion in limine barring any further reference to prior bad acts. The State then introduced Campbell’s certified driving record, which showed that he was barred from driving as an habitual offender on the date of the stop and rested. Campbell moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the due process clauses of the United States and state constitutions required the State to prove he had been notified that his license was barred. The court denied the motion, concluding that neither notice nor knowledge of the barment is an element of the offense. The jury found Campbell guilty.

In the 2024 case, Dubuque police officer Austin Weitz testified that he stopped the vehicle Campbell was driving on May 3, 2024, and that Campbell’s driving record showed his status in Iowa was barred. The State introduced Campbell’s certified driving record, which reflected a barment effective from November 2023 through November 2027. On crossexamination , Weitz agreed that Campbell had told him his license was

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“suspended,” that Weitz corrected him—“barred”—and that a suspension and barment are distinct. At the close of the State’s evidence, Campbell again moved for judgment of acquittal, contending that due process required proof he had been notified of his barred status. The court denied the motion, concluding that the offense has two elements—operation of a motor vehicle and a barred license or privilege at the time of operation—and that neither notice nor knowledge of the barred status is required. Campbell also objected to the marshaling instruction on the same ground, urging that it should include a third element requiring proof that the State notified him his license was barred; the court overruled the objection. Campbell offered no evidence, and the jury found him guilty.

At a combined sentencing hearing, the district court overruled Campbell’s motion in arrest of judgment and sentenced him to forty days in jail in the 2025 case and 180 days in jail in the 2024 case, to be served consecutively. Campbell appeals. He contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial in the 2025 case and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction in the 2024 case because the State did not prove he had notice of his barred status.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Mistrial (the 2025 case)

We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion, mindful that the district court—present throughout the trial—is better positioned than we are to gauge the effect of challenged testimony on the jury. State v. Brown, 996 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Iowa 2023); State v. Jirak, 491 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). A court abuses its discretion when it rules on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Iowa 2017). When the court acts promptly to

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address objectionable evidence, the defendant carries a heavy burden to show a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Choudry, 569 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).

Ordinarily, striking improper testimony cures any error, and a cautionary instruction is deemed insufficient only in extreme cases. State v. Peterson, 189 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 1971), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908, 909, 912–14 (Iowa 1973). A trial court’s prompt action in striking an improper response and directing the jury to disregard it will generally prevent prejudice. Brown, 397 N.W.2d at 699. And a defendant contending otherwise “bears a heavy burden of demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion.” Choudry, 569 N.W.2d at 620. To secure a reversal based on stricken testimony, the defendant must show the material was of a type more likely than not to implant prejudice of an indelible nature in the jurors’ minds. State v. Mayberry, 411 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Iowa 1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006).

The supreme court’s recent decision in State v. Brown, 5 N.W.3d 611 (Iowa 2024) is analogous. There, an officer testified that the defendant had “convictions on his record that he should not,” the defendant objected and moved for a mistrial, and the supreme court affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion. Brown, 5 N.W.3d at 614–15. Central to that holding was that the defendant’s status—barred from driving as an habitual offender—“necessarily implies repeated convictions,” so the officer’s reference added little the jury could not otherwise infer, and the district court had acted quickly. Id. at 615.

The same reasoning controls here. Campbell was tried for driving while barred as an habitual offender, and his certified driving record— admitted apart from the stricken testimony—showed that his privileges were

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barred on that basis. A jury informed that Campbell was barred as an habitual offender could already infer, as Brown recognized, that he had repeatedly run afoul of Iowa’s driving laws. Officer Cole’s passing reference to a prior arrest for the same offense thus disclosed little the properly admitted evidence did not, and it was if anything, less prejudicial than the testimony in Brown: Cole mentioned only an arrest, not a conviction, and the court told the jury that “an arrest is not an adjudication of guilt.” The court struck the answer, barred any further reference to prior bad acts, and directed the jury to disregard what it had heard. That prompt and pointed response sufficed. See State v. Brown, 397 N.W.2d 691, 699 (Iowa 2023).

We are unpersuaded by Campbell’s contrary authorities. Bruton v.

United States concerned the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant, a circumstance the Court held an instruction could not cure. 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). And the biased-juror cases he invokes address a structural defect in the tribunal itself, not a curable evidentiary slip. See State v. Christensen, 929 N.W.2d 646, 676 (Iowa 2019). A single, promptly stricken reference to a prior arrest is not of that order. Nor does the district court’s candid description of its ruling as “a close call” establish an abuse of discretion; that the court weighed the question carefully, and acknowledged it might have erred, reflects the conscientious exercise of discretion rather than its absence. The question is not whether we would have ruled the same way, but whether the court’s choice fell within the range of reasonable options—and it did. See United States v. Dominguez, 226 F.3d 1235, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000) (“While we conceivably might have followed a different course and even arrived at a different result than the district court did if we had been presiding over the trial of this case, we were not. The whole point of discretion is that there is range of options open, which means more than one choice is permissible.”).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. And even if the ruling were error, reversal would not follow, because on this record the stricken testimony did not prejudice Campbell. See State v. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 1994). We affirm the conviction in the 2025 case.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence (the 2024 case)

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Brown, 996 N.W.2d at 695–96. In doing so, we make all “legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017)). Substantial evidence supports the verdict when it “would convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 2018)). To the extent Campbell frames his claim as one of constitutional due process, our review would be de novo. Giles v. State, 511 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Iowa 1994).

Campbell’s argument on appeal is not the one he made below. In the district court, he contended that the due process clauses of the United States and state constitutions require the State to prove notice of barred status while conceding that the statute and existing caselaw were against him. On appeal he advances a different theory—that chapter 321 itself imposes a notice requirement—and urges us to adopt the position of the dissent in State v. Williams, 910 N.W.2d 586, 598 (Iowa 2018) (Wiggins, J., dissenting). Because he did not present that statutory-interpretation argument to the district court, it is not preserved. State v. Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa 1999) (“[A] party cannot sing a song to us that was not first sung in trial court.”).

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And to the extent he means to renew the constitutional claim he raised below, he has not supported it with reasoned argument or authority, which waives it. State v. Gibbs, 941 N.W.2d 888, 902 (Iowa 2020) (McDonald, J., concurring specially).

The argument fails on its merits in any event. Driving while barred under section 321.561 has two elements: that the defendant operated a motor vehicle, and that the defendant’s license or privilege to drive was barred at the time of operation. The supreme court has squarely held that notice is not among them—“proof of mailing is not an essential element” of the offense. Williams, 910 N.W.2d at 594. This court has since applied Williams to reject the very sufficiency argument Campbell makes. State v. Bartenhagen, No. 22- 1489, 2024 WL 1295960, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2024). We are bound by Williams and are not free to adopt the view of its dissent. See State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence established both elements. Officer Weitz testified that he stopped the vehicle Campbell was driving on May 3, 2024, and Campbell’s certified driving record, admitted as an exhibit, showed that his driving privileges were barred from November 2023 through November 2027—establishing that he was barred as an habitual offender on the date of the stop. That is substantial evidence of each element. Campbell’s apparent belief that his license was “suspended” rather than “barred” bears only on his knowledge, which the State was not required to prove; it does not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence on the elements the State did have to establish.

Campbell also objected below to the marshaling instruction, seeking a third element that would have required proof of notice, but he does not renew

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that challenge on appeal. The evidence was sufficient, and we affirm the conviction in the 2024 case.

AFFIRMED.